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i n t r O d u C t i O n
This sTudy of criME in VErsE connects innovations in 
Victorian poetry to developments in the Victorian discourse of 
crime—a network of interrelated and often contradictory con-
cepts informed by legal fictions, punitive mechanisms, medical 
theories, class conflicts, and gender codes.1 Tracing dialectical 
links between criminal discourse and poetic representation, the 
study assembles multiple genres—the street ballad, the dramatic 
monologue, the verse novel, the verse drama—and examines the 
ways in which poets adopted and adapted particular verse forms in order to 
accommodate the evolving epistemologies of crime and to elaborate the poetics 
of murder. Because significant institutional and ideological changes throughout 
the Victorian period complicated and obscured the meanings of murder, Crime 
in Verse frames its textual analyses with investigations of the specific historical 
contexts in which these meanings were renegotiated. Generating moral ambi-
guities and cultural anxieties, shifting understandings of murder—as a material 
act, an abstract idea, and an aesthetic representation—created opportunities for 
poets to coordinate interests in formal innovation, generic experimentation, 
and political expression. Poetically productive and topically resonant, the theme 
of murder assisted poets, and can assist us, in reconceptualizing the literary 
achievements and cultural engagements of Victorian verse.
 Historicizing murder, while carefully highlighting poetic form and genre, this 

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There is no essential incongruity between crime and culture.
—oscar Wilde, “Pen, Pencil and Poison”
Int rod uc t I o n
project benefits from and responds to two ongoing critical projects in Victorian 
literary studies: the exploration of interdisciplinary and historicist approaches to 
literary representations of crime and, within the subfield of poetry studies, the 
development of interpretive methodologies that recognize poetry’s political sen-
sibilities. Predominantly, the novel, whether addressed in popular crime genres, 
such as Newgate, detective, and sensation fiction, or more broadly conceived in 
discussions of realist fiction, shapes our contemporary perspective of Victorian 
crime literature. Revealing the extent to which our studies of crime are bound up 
in understandings of genre, a scholarly concentration on the novel has generated 
a corresponding emphasis on the middle-class ideologies, interests, and fears of 
its authors and readers.
 Following D. A. Miller’s groundbreaking The Novel and the Police (1988), 
which proposed a “radical entanglement between the nature of the novel and the 
practice of the police” and connected the novel’s “representational techniques” 
to cultural modes of “disciplinary power” (2), two decades of rigorous scholar-
ship have refined our sense of the novel’s literary accomplishments and political 
participation while acquainting us with the social arenas and professional fields 
of criminal discourse. Even a partial listing of the most recent work attests to the 
continuing productivity and increasing specialization of this approach: Ronald 
R. Thomas’s Detective Fiction and the Rise of Forensic Science (1999) connects 
specific portrayals of criminal bodies, forensic technologies, and literary detec-
tives to the emergence of an investigative science, the invention of a literary 
genre, and the renegotiation of cultural authority; Marlene Tromp’s The Private 
Rod: Marital Violence, Sensation and the Law in Victorian Britain (2000) presents 
portraits of marital violence in middle-class sensation fiction as evidence of the 
genre’s resistance to the high cultural conventions of literary realism and the 
conservatism of legal authority; Jonathan Grossman’s The Art of Alibi: English 
Law Courts and the Novel (2002) emphasizes the “trial-oriented” (1) nature of 
Victorian culture and, isolating novels and trials as the “era’s most prominent 
narrative paradigms” (2), reads juridical procedures and fictional texts as formal 
and logical analogues; Lisa Rodensky’s The Crime in Mind: Criminal Responsibil-
ity and the Victorian Novel (2003) argues that the novel’s third-person narrators 
and its “intensive exploration of the inner life” (7) granted readers access to the 
otherwise elusive interior of the criminal mind in ways that interrogated and 
affirmed legal definitions of criminal responsibility; and Lisa Surridge’s Bleak 
Houses: Marital Violence in Victorian Fiction (2005) explores how the narrative 
and metanarrative operations of the domestic novel are “charged” (9) with the 
energies and anxieties of continuing wife-assault debates, which were staged in 
the courts, the legislature, and the newspaper.2 Attentive to the narrative strate-
gies of fiction, the political identities of the bourgeoisie, and the intricate corre-
lations between textual details, genre codes, and legal developments, such studies 
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have mapped important vantage points from which to survey the imbrications 
of literary genre and cultural discourse in representations of crime.
 While novel scholars have been amassing and arranging texts in order to 
create assemblages of crime fictions that reveal patterns of political interest and 
literary inspiration, poetry scholars, also privileging middle-class literature, have 
tended to organize their work on crime poems around individual authors and 
texts. This tendency most likely reflects significant formal differences across 
genres of poetry, which render arguments for thematic cohesion and structural 
continuity less apparent. Foregoing the construction of comparative frame-
works, analyses of verse representations of crime are largely focused in content 
and small in scope—and dispersed across decades of journal articles and book 
chapters. Even so, a loose constellation of poems could be said to define our 
view of poetry’s criminal interests. In particular, dramatic monologues, which 
comprise a subfield of transgression studies in their own right, and verse nov-
els, which reproduce the narrative scope of more popular crime fictions, have 
garnered the most attention. While key texts, especially Robert Browning’s “Por-
phyria’s Lover” (1836), “My Last Duchess” (1842), and The Ring and the Book 
(1868–69), seem to dominate discussions about the subject of murder and the 
evolution of genre, other poetic representations of crime have attracted atten-
tion as contemporary scholarly priorities renew interest in their authors and 
themes. A second-wave feminist revival of Elizabeth Barrett Browning’s work, 
together with a corresponding focus on the gender, class, and racial politics of 
sexual violence, for example, has led to new work on the rape of Marian Erle in 
Aurora Leigh (1856) and the infanticide of the fugitive speaker in “The Runaway 
Slave at Pilgrim’s Point” (1848). Similarly, Oscar Wilde’s “The Ballad of Reading 
Gaol” (1898), long perceived as a less intellectually and aesthetically rigorous 
poem, has been revisited by scholars interested in biographical and sociological 
approaches to Wilde’s experience as a prisoner, the poem’s considerations of pri-
vate and public forms of violence, and its relationship to late-Victorian prison 
reform.3
 To a significant extent, Crime in Verse is marked by these same patterns. In 
collecting a range of murder poems, however, this study begins to locate the-
matic and generic continuities across seemingly disparate texts, and by incorpo-
rating minor poems, noncanonical poets, and street verses, which are typically 
overlooked in studies of Victorian poetry and crime writing, it also begins to 
reorganize the terms of our conversation. Inspired by the insights, strategies, and 
omissions of previous scholarship, this project maintains a double vision. Asking 
questions about Victorian representations of crime and scholarly presentations 
of Victorian poetry, it upholds a now well-established tradition of delineating 
the contours of genre and discourse in order to understand the textual strategies 
and political significance of crime writing in Victorian England. In extending 
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that tradition beyond the realm of the novel, it also broadens our perspective 
on literary mediations of crime in terms of genre—and class. Insofar as they 
resonate across the generic divide of Victorian studies, the chapters that follow 
may nudge us toward a more trans-generic vision of Victorian literary crimes. 
In the meantime, however, each chapter remains invested in generic difference, 
privileging a poetry studies model attentive to the formal ingenuity and liter-
ary history of verse. Such an emphasis helps to foreground the dialectical and 
reciprocal processes of generic innovation and discourse formation, allowing 
us to consider how shifting epistemologies of murder influenced developments 
in poetic form and language—and how the tools of poetic form and language 
enabled poets to fashion topical critiques of Victorian England’s evolving crimi-
nal discourses.
 In performing this task, Crime and Verse does not catalogue the many poems 
about murder published in the Victorian period or attempt to locate a unitary 
poetics of murder crisscrossing disparate texts. Rather, with a restricted topic 
and a selective scope it offers detailed analyses of a relatively small subset of 
poems, carefully observing the political dimensions of genre and following the 
intricate arguments of specific poems. Positioning these poems with respect to 
a complex network of criminal discourses, it also references various nonliterary 
texts. Trial transcripts, parliamentary debates, legislative acts, newspaper reports, 
journal articles, medicolegal treatises, political pamphlets, critical reviews, and 
private correspondence are pressed into service to reveal the interlocking fea-
tures of legal discourse, genre codes, and individual poems.
 While the theme of murder supplies apt demonstrations of how relatively 
brief or highly condensed poems can embed multiple layers of cultural mean-
ings and make pointed political arguments, it also accesses multiple questions 
of power—between killers and victims, between juries and defendants, between 
the state and its subjects. For this reason, the theme of murder also offers the 
practical advantage of class mobility. Of interest to Victorians of all classes for a 
variety of reasons, murder inspired verse representations for a variety of occa-
sions and audiences. In bringing together the murder poems of anonymous 
street balladeers, recuperated minor poets, and established canonical poets, this 
book poses questions about our notions of Victorian poetry—as an art form 
defined by Victorian poets and critics and a field of study continuously reshaped 
by contemporary academics. The inclusion of working-class street verse, for 
example, invites us to explore the selection processes with which we demarcate 
the field of Victorian poetry. And juxtapositions of high and low, major and 
minor texts suggest more diverse paths of literary influence and alternate models 
of intertextuality, which, in turn, allow us to reassess the role of verse as a genre 
of literature and a mode of public or political speech in Victorian culture.
 In negotiating the textual and contextual components of this agenda, Crime 
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in Verse reconsiders the historical conditions of and cultural responses to mur-
der in Victorian England. A topic of interest to writers of all genres and all peri-
ods, murder possesses a trans-historical and a trans-generic resonance and often 
seems a universally understood transgression and a well-worn literary trope. But 
a more specifically historicized examination of murder reveals its multiple and 
contested meanings. No singular notion of murder regulated the spectrum of 
commentaries on criminal matters ranging from apprehension and punishment 
to diagnosis and deterrence. And assessments of specific murders were inflected 
by unique combinations of circumstance and evidence and were openly debated 
in multiple public arenas ranging from the courtroom to the newspaper to the 
scaffold crowd. Entangled within the changing institutional mandates of legal 
codes, medical theories, and penal policies, the meanings of murder were also 
increasingly complicated by changing understandings and definitions of vio-
lence. Institutional and ideological reformulations of murder often met in dis-
tressing ways, leading to intense public scrutiny of crimes and punishments that 
enfolded politically contentious matters of class conflict (such as in the case of 
public execution) and gender inequality (such as in the case of wife-murder). In 
each of these contexts, determining the meanings of murder, the subjectivities of 
murderers, and the ethics of punishment became disconcertingly and frustrat-
ingly contingent.
 As the chapters that follow demonstrate, these contingencies, together with 
their attendant anxieties and the starkly unambiguous consequences of mur-
derous violence, allowed poets to manipulate the theme of murder for poetic 
innovation and political commentary. An emphasis on literary form may privi-
lege the same kind of de-contextualized—and de-moralized—evaluations of 
criminal artistry advocated by Thomas de Quincey, who sought, however play-
fully, to evaluate murder as a “meritorious performance” (987) and to assign 
aesthetic value to particular crimes. But, because of the counterdiscursive ways 
in which poets often managed the theme of murder, a discussion of the more 
topical agendas and specific aesthetic practices involved in these texts further 
underscores murder’s status as a diversely mediated act. Because murder has 
both a complex social history and a rich literary history, examining connections 
between modes of poetic expression and epistemologies of murder is accom-
plished most efficiently by linking textual minutiae and generic features to more 
local and specific cultural debates in which murder appears most politically con-
tentious and poetically productive. Accordingly, while sustaining a focus on the 
strategic uses of poetic textuality, Crime in Verse subdivides its arguments about 
the poetics of murder into three separate chapters that explicitly align generic 
form and topical content.
 The first chapter, “Murder, Execution, and the Criminal Classes,” balances an 
analysis of the politically immediate content of murder and execution ballads 
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with an overview of their evolution and reception. Imagining the voices of 
astonished witnesses and condemned murderers, these ballads, sold and sung 
in the streets, explored the shock of murder and the pathos of execution in 
ways that challenged class-based ideologies of crime and problematized hier-
archies of poetic value. Constituting one of the most profitable branches of the 
broadside print industry, which flourished for most of the nineteenth century, 
crime ballads demonstrate a certain degree of generic cohesion, and thus despite 
significant shifts in classed definitions of criminality and adjustments to judicial 
applications of capital punishment, ballads written decades apart share funda-
mental rhetorical and structural characteristics. Yet, individual street ballads 
also register specific changes in criminal law, publicly aired attitudes towards 
particular crimes, and the micropolitics of individual murder trials and death 
sentences. While negotiating the mandates of genre, the tensions of class, and 
the unfolding histories of criminals, the broadside ballad industry developed 
and marketed the largest and most cohesive body of crime in verse. For these 
reasons, a careful study of the generic and discursive features of these texts assists 
us in accessing Victorian ideologies about those who commit crimes and those 
who write poems and expands our awareness of the cultural practices and social 
spaces of Victorian verse.
 Chapter 2, “The Murderous Subject and the Criminal Sublime,” moves from 
the working-class poetry of the street to the middle-class poetry of the drawing 
room—and from historically based fictions of crime and punishment to wholly 
imagined accounts of malice and madness. Pairing contextual references to psy-
chological theories, criminal laws, and controversial trials with a discussion of 
dramatic poetry’s capacity for sustaining irony and indeterminacy, this chapter 
explores the representation of murderous subjectivity in Browning’s “Porphyr-
ia’s Lover,” “My Last Duchess,” and “The Laboratory” (1844) and Dante Gabriel 
Rossetti’s “A Last Confession” (1870). In these texts, Browning and Rossetti 
coordinate interests in the generic attributes of the dramatic monologue and 
the specialist language of mental science. Working together, the violent themes, 
formal structures, verbal complications, and metrical patterning of these poems 
produce commentaries on mid-century medicolegal theories, which challenged 
longstanding notions of criminal responsibility with exculpatory arguments 
about homicidal lunacy. Inviting—but frustrating—readerly attempts to deter-
mine the sanity or insanity of their violent speakers, these meticulously crafted 
monologues uphold the obscurity of murderous subjectivity, and in doing 
so, produce a topically resonant version of the sublime. Dramatic portraits of 
deviance, as many studies of the dramatic monologue have previously argued, 
influenced the themes and forms of Victorian poetry in important ways, but 
foregrounding the epistemological contingencies and political contentiousness 
of murder allows us to consider the mystified and mystifying murderous sub-
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jects of this hybrid form in terms of both poetic experimentation and cultural 
critique.
 Examining accounts of domestic murder in the verse novel and the verse 
drama, chapter 3, “‘Household Law’ and the Domestication of Murder,” also 
stresses connections between generic hybridity and the intertextual frameworks 
and political entanglements of criminal discourse. Browning’s The Ring and 
the Book and two closet tragedies, Edward Robert Bulwer Lytton’s Clytemnestra 
(1855) and Amy Levy’s Medea (1884), place the problems of marital unhappiness 
and gender inequality on a trajectory of murderous consequence. Their domes-
tic murder plots register substantial changes in the laws governing marriage 
and divorce and dramatize frustration with entrenched ideologies of patriarchal 
domesticity. Their murderous violations of hearth and home mark the increas-
ing criminalization of domestic abuse and the implications of a new divorce 
court, which, opened in January 1858 and resembling a criminal court model, 
enforced England’s newly revised matrimonial laws, established a public record 
of private conflict, and supported a print media culture of domestic scandal. 
As domesticity encountered criminal and matrimonial law, and as courts and 
newspapers broadcast the details, an explicitly adversarial and combative version 
of marriage gained currency.
 Variously imagining murderers, motives, and victims, and written decades 
apart, these three dramatic poems produce strikingly similar commentaries on 
the failures of domestic idealism and discipline. As they use wife-murder, hus-
band-murder, and child-murder to imagine the gendered aspects of murderous 
agency, they establish a range of intertextual references and metatextual mean-
ings. Browning, mixing his “fancy” (I.679) with the “pure crude fact” (I.35) of 
the “square old yellow Book” (I.32), transcribes the documents of a seventeenth-
century Roman murder trial and, in very explicit terms, submits the case to 
the judgment of his contemporary audience. Lytton and Levy, condensing high 
Greek tragedy into closet dramas, generate new psychological portraits of Cly-
temnestra and Medea and recast the deterministic powers of fate as the control-
ling forces of patriarchy. In reformatting and reforming old domestic crimes, 
each of these poets invokes a long history of domestic alienation in order to 
express the modern urgency of domestic reform.
 As these brief chapter summaries suggest, historicizing murder while exam-
ining the components of poetic genre requires that strands of criminal discourse 
and varieties of poetic utterance be differentiated in order to speculate about 
how these modes of representation are intertwined. Nonetheless, a common 
system of cultural logic and aesthetic value unites the distinct agendas of each 
chapter and the specific meanings of each poem. The most succinct expression 
of this common logic forms the epigraph of this introduction. Wilde’s claim that 
“[t]here is no essential incongruity between crime and culture” both alludes to 
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and destabilizes the categories used to “other” criminals and abhor their crimes, 
particularly violent criminals and crimes. Insisting that crime and culture are 
congruous, Wilde suggests the uncanny and unsettling ways in which murder-
ous violence might be considered not as a terrible social anomaly but as a pro-
found cultural symptom.
 Wilde’s critique of incongruity appears in “Pen, Pencil and Poison” (1889), a 
witty and “brief memoir” of the famous nineteenth-century murderer, Thomas 
Griffiths Wainewright—a man who “followed many masters other than art, 
being not merely a poet and a painter, an art-critic, an antiquarian, and a writer 
of prose, an amateur of beautiful things and a dilettante of things delightful, but 
also a forger of no mean or ordinary capabilities and a subtle and secret poisoner 
almost without rival in this or any age” (993). As such, Wainewright represents 
a figure of high culture and, more generally, a member of British culture. Bor-
rowing his title phrase from Swinburne, Wilde lists Wainewright’s professional 
implements—pen, pencil, poison—and thereby aligns writing, drawing, and 
killing as modes of expression. In the biographical overview of Wainewright 
with which Wilde begins his essay, he makes this association more explicit, not-
ing that, having mastered the arts of drawing and painting early in life, “[i]t was 
not till much later that he sought to find expression by pen or poison” (994). 
Sustaining this witty subtext throughout the essay, Wilde goes on to document 
Wainewright’s “achievements in the sphere of poison” (995), multiple poison-
ings for financial gain, which resulted in the deaths of his uncle, his mother-in-
law, and his sister-in-law, among others.
 In arranging the details of Wainewright’s life, Wilde strategically empha-
sizes—in order to deconstruct—the apparent signs of incongruity, documenting 
Wainewright’s aesthetic sensibilities and social connections in order to address 
a collective misunderstanding of the relationship between crime and culture. A 
repeated reference to the fact that Wainewright was “susceptible to the spiritual 
influence of Wordsworth’s poetry” (994) and “Charles Lamb’s friend” (993), for 
example, allows Wilde to dismiss theories of crime and stereotypes of criminals 
while aligning this murderer’s tastes, aspirations, and society with those of his 
readers. When claiming kinships of intellect and sensibility with notable and 
accomplished cultural elites, Wainewright proves most threatening to the reas-
suring binary logic of normalcy and deviance. In concluding his character study, 
Wilde openly challenges the opinion of the recent Wainewright biographer, W. 
Carew Hazlitt, who claimed that “his love of art and nature was a mere pre-
tence and assumption” (1007), and he likewise critiques the habit of “others” to 
“den[y] to him all literary power” (1007):
The fact of a man being a poisoner is nothing against his prose. The domestic 
virtues are not the true basis of art, though they may serve as an excellent 
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advertisement for second-rate artists. . . . That he had a sincere love of art and 
nature seems to me quite certain. There is no essential incongruity between 
crime and culture. We cannot re-write the whole of history for the purpose 
of gratifying our moral sense of what should be. (1007–8)
Wilde’s assertions clearly configure an aestheticist argument, which separates the 
criteria for assessing art and judging morality, but they also challenge the appar-
ent desire to protect the refinements of artistic creation from the vulgarities of 
criminal transgression. Because Wainewright signifies artistic sensibility, literary 
talent, class privilege, and murderous cunning, Wilde’s pointed insistence on the 
sincerity of his “love of art and nature” is equally an insistence on recognizing 
the congruities of crime and culture.
 In the case of Wainewright, Wilde suggests, applications of “moral sense” 
function as attempts to deny Wainewright-the-murderer legitimate membership 
in the culture and the class of which he was, in fact, a part. Attempts at scouring 
away this unwanted stain, with condemnations of his crimes or dismissals of 
his art, evince more fundamental cultural logics used to dispense with disturb-
ing crimes—through acts of dissociation and defamiliarization. Wainewright’s 
proximity to the centers of cultural power and the realms of artistic celebrity 
incites such acts: “he is just a little too modern to be treated in that fine spirit 
of disinterested curiosity to which we owe so many charming studies of the 
great criminals of the Italian Renaissance from the pens of Mr. John Addington 
Symonds, Miss A. Mary F. Robinson, Miss Vernon Lee, and other distinguished 
writers” (1008). Wainewright also approximates ordinary Britons in distressing 
ways: “But had the man worn a costume and spoken a language different from 
our own, had he lived in imperial Rome, or at the time of the Italian Renais-
sance, or in Spain in the seventeenth century, or in any land or any century 
but this century and this land, we would be quite able to arrive at a perfectly 
unprejudiced estimate of his position and value” (1008). Inconveniently mod-
ern and undeniably English, the murderous Wainewright presents an interpre-
tive problem; he cannot be relegated to the realms of “disinterested curiosity” 
or “charming studies,” and his cultural worth cannot be properly estimated or 
unanimously esteemed.
 The rhetorical frameworks and spectacular punishments of nineteenth- 
century England, of course, systematically positioned the criminal at the mar-
gins of or beyond the borders of normative society by configuring crimes as the 
nearly exclusive domain of a delinquent class and by punishing crimes through 
official rituals of exclusion—incarceration, transportation, execution. Wilde uses 
Wainewright to scrutinize the moralizing tendencies of art criticism, admiring 
Wainewright not for his talents or character but for the mischief that he does 
to moral and criminal codes. With Wainewright as a case study, he can critique 
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the political convenience of troping the criminal other, particularly when he 
records Wainewright’s stubborn resistance to such othering techniques. Though 
Wainewright was never charged with the murders he was widely known to have 
committed, he was subject to such exclusionary acts when he was convicted of 
forgery and transported to Van Diemen’s Land in 1837. His punishment, Wilde 
speculates, might also be plotted on an axis of crime and culture: “to a man of 
his culture,” he explains, transportation was “a form of death” (1005). His social 
death imminent, Wainewright spent time in Newgate, where his cell became 
“a kind of fashionable lounge” visited by “[m]any men of letters,” and where 
he proudly continued to “hold the position of a gentleman” (1006). “I occupy 
a cell with a bricklayer and a sweep,” he reportedly exclaimed, “but they never 
offer me the broom!” (1006). Chronicling Wainewright’s life, Wilde explains 
that, admitting no fall from the upper classes and no affinity with the putative 
criminal classes, the peerless Wainewright left England aboard a transportation 
ship among a group of convicts that he disdainfully characterized as “country 
bumpkins” (1006). Wainewright’s description of his shipmates might appear an 
argument for the incongruity of culture and crime—he is the grand and snob-
bish exception to a rule separating ordinary gentlemen and common criminals. 
Yet, more characteristically, his comments serve a performative function: with 
them he stages his resistance to his literal and figurative cultural exile.
 According to Wilde’s concise little study, Wainewright employs this strategy 
repeatedly, placing and replacing himself at the center of culture and thus resist-
ing the pressures of criminal law and social outrage. He connects, for example, 
the deviant motivations of criminal acts to the normative values of the market-
place when he interprets his forgeries for financial gain—and perhaps implicitly 
his murders for the same reason—in terms of capital speculation. To an insur-
ance agent who visited Wainewright and announced, “crime was a bad specu-
lation,” Wainewright replied, “Some of your speculations succeed, some fail. 
Mine happen to have failed, yours happen to have succeeded. That is the only 
difference, sir, between my visitor and me” (1006). In this denial of difference, 
with which Wainewright willfully aligns himself with the centers of social power 
and the activities of the market economy, Wilde finds support for his contention 
that crime and culture correlate in significant ways. Imagining Wainewright’s 
journey to Van Diemen’s Land, Wilde supposes, “Crime in England is rarely 
the result of sin. It is nearly always the result of starvation. There was prob-
ably no one on board in whom he would have found a sympathetic listener, or 
even a psychologically interesting nature” (1006). Embedded in this reference to 
Wainewright’s psychological alienation is a theory about the social foundations 
of criminal motive. Wilde suggests that, whereas most English crimes bespeak 
social conditions of poverty, starvation, and class oppression, the crimes of the 
well-fed, well-bred Wainewright, who committed forgeries and murders for 
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capital gain, constitute a symptom of an acquisitive society or a sinister expres-
sion of its economic values. In this sense, the crimes of the greedy gentleman and 
the starving bumpkin simply represent two poles of the binary class model that 
defined nineteenth-century British culture.
 A self-described “gentleman” among “bumpkins,” a convicted forger among 
respectable businessmen, and a poisoner among poets—one “who might have 
poisoned Lord Tennyson, or Mr. Gladstone, or the Master of Balliol” (1008)—
Wainewright, as Wilde represents him, functions as a symbol and symptom of 
nineteenth-century British culture. He exposes unsettling congruities between 
a singularly transgressive criminal and a collectively disciplinary culture. “[T]oo 
modern” to be regarded with disinterest, he activates anxieties about the pres-
ence of crime in modern metropolitan-industrial Britain and what many per-
ceived as its appalling conditions of moral and social corruption. Such anxieties 
about an unprecedented national increase in crime and a marked degeneration 
of national character established crime as a central metaphor for modernity, 
and this metaphoric status helped to publicize the specialized discourses of 
social science, medicine, law, psychology, and, eventually, criminal anthropol-
ogy that emerged to explain and deter crime. Everyone, it seemed, whether 
imagined or imagining oneself as a potential criminal or a potential victim, had 
a stake in this ongoing conversation. For this reason, representations of murder, 
with great semiotic efficiency, could address questions of institutional control 
and ideological conflict while conjuring the intertextual network of discourses 
used to define criminality, apprehend criminals, judge crimes, and measure 
punishments.
 When crime and culture are reconnected, murderers are never entirely unfa-
miliar; they come to signify ominous expressions of common cultural values, 
and their actions appear transgressive variations on established cultural prac-
tices. Murder demands a public response (an explanation, a trial, a death pen-
alty), but it also is a response. This discomfiting paradox informs the poetics of 
murder—and the political resonance of murder—explored in this book. Just 
as Wilde linked murder to other modes of expression, the poems under con-
sideration in this study grant murders and murderers an expressive function. 
Operating as symbols and symptoms, murderers, however ethically abhorrent, 
psychologically grotesque, and socially marginalized, are always in some way 
addressing, contesting, or implicating the centers of culture—scrutinizing its 
institutions and enacting its ideologies—through acts of extreme violence.
 The fundamental logic with which Wilde dismantles the presumption of 
incongruity in his analysis of Wainewright is given a more nuanced articulation 
and wider application in Peter Stallybrass and Allon White’s influential study, 
The Politics and Poetics of Transgression (1986). Observing that “what is socially 
peripheral is so frequently symbolically central” (5), they define their sense of a 
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“politics and poetics of transgression” with an examination of center-margin 
and high-low dynamics that establish “symbolic repertoires at borders, margins 
and edges” (20). With an emphasis on the “interrelating and dependent hierar-
chies of high and low” (2) and an insistence on their dialectical relations, they 
consider “how each extremity structures the other, depends upon and invades 
the other in certain historical moments, to carry political charge through aes-
thetic and moral polarities” (3–4). As they “[map] domains of transgression 
where place, body, group identity and subjectivity interconnect,” they “illumi-
nate the discursive sites where social classification and psychological processes 
are generated as conflictual complexes” (25). Stallybrass and White demonstrate 
the resonance of their theoretical claims by conceptualizing a variety of sites, 
“the human body, psychic forms, geographical space and the social formation” 
(2), but their terminologies and their Foucauldian interest in the “outsiders-
who-make-the-insiders-insiders (the mad, the criminal, the sick, the unruly, the 
sexually transgressive)” (22) easily accommodate a more focused examination 
of murder, a discursive site and an extreme transgression, which registers and 
generates “conflictual complexes” at the intersection of social prohibitions and 
individual agency. Expressing and transgressing cultural norms and prohibi-
tions, murders and murderers carry a political charge, as they expose the limits 
of and undermine confidence in social hierarchies and disciplinary authorities. 
Conjoining social and psychological conflicts, occupying the margins and hail-
ing the centers of culture, murders evoke power struggles between the state and 
its subjects and troubling intimacies between perpetrators and victims, and they 
produce a corresponding and unsettling set of interpretive questions—about 
the identities of perpetrators and victims, about the circumstances of terrible 
violence, and about the efficacy of punishments.
 In Victorian England, the attempt to reverse the disruptive effects of murder 
through the application of the death penalty offers one of the most conspicu-
ous reifications of the margin-center logic of transgression. Scaffold theatrics 
positioned the hanging bodies of criminals at the center of an observing citi-
zen-crowd in an effort to reinscribe state power on the bodies of the “outsiders-
who-make-the-insiders-insiders.” Yet, when carefully staged public executions 
produced a spectacle of death-dealing violence and sanctioned killing in the 
name of state, the reprehensible behavior of the margin met the righteous 
behavior of the center in profoundly contradictory ways. Particularly in con-
troversial cases, the compounded and charged meanings of capital punishment 
raised questions about who occupies or what constitutes the stabilizing center 
and the transgressive margin of Victorian culture.
 In the murder poems comprising this study, the problems of mapping mar-
gin and center and differentiating congruities and incongruities are reiterated 
in pointed representations of specific locales where socially prescribed and 
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individually transgressive identities collide and conflict. While depictions of 
crime scenes, execution scaffolds, murderous psyches, and violated homes serve 
the purpose of institutional and ideological critique, the complexities of poetic 
voice, inflecting the psychologies and identities of their killers, further refine 
their portraits of “conflictual complexes.” In imagining the social and psycholog-
ical sites of murder, these poems delineate the social contours of transgression 
by exposing the anxieties and confusions that surrounded murder and by play-
ing with the margin-center logics that structured and regulated epistemologies 
of crime. With these interpretive operations in mind, we can see more clearly the 
formal and thematic links between the politics and the poetics of murder.
 Stallybrass and White’s notion of politics and poetics, and their commentar-
ies on the margins and centers of discourse formation, also signify with respect 
to the cultural status of poetry—both high and low—in the Victorian era. Just 
as the meanings of murder were shifting, so were the agendas and markets of 
verse, and for this reason, mapping intersections between poetic production and 
criminal discourse benefits from recent scholarship on intersections between 
verse forms and cultural politics. A specific interest in understanding the posi-
tion of poetry and the concerns of poets in a post-Romantic, novel-oriented age 
has become an important part of contemporary scholarship on Victorian poetry 
and has yielded several important studies of the political and aesthetic life of 
Victorian poetics. In particular, Isobel Armstrong’s Victorian Poetry: Poetry, 
Poetics and Politics (1993), Antony Harrison’s Victorian Poets and the Politics of 
Culture: Discourse and Ideology (1998), and E. Warwick Slinn’s Victorian Poetry 
as Cultural Critique: The Politics of Performative Language (2003) have produced 
comprehensive theoretical arguments and practical demonstrations of poetry’s 
political interests by integrating the practices of formal analysis and cultural 
studies.
 Armstrong’s Victorian Poetry advocates a rereading and rehistoricizing of 
Victorian poetry in order to uncover Victorian poetry’s “cultural project” (8) 
and its connection to “modern problems” (ix). At the outset of her book, Arm-
strong establishes a division between democratic and conservative approaches to 
poetry, which, borrowing an image from J. S. Mill, she describes as “two systems 
of concentric circles” (ix). Within these circles, Armstrong sees the experimen-
talism of Victorian poetry, and rescuing Victorian poetry from the neglect of 
twentieth-century criticism (a consequence of the Modernist projects of reject-
ing the immediate past and extolling aesthetic self-referentiality), she reexam-
ines the modern sensibilities of the Victorians: “To see yourself as modern is 
actually to define the contemporary self-consciously and this is simultaneously 
an act which historicizes the modern” (3). Victorian “modernism,” she notes, 
“as it emerges in its poetics, describes itself as belonging to a condition of cri-
sis, which has emerged directly from economic and cultural change” (3). As a 
Int rod uc t I o n
result of the “historicized consciousness” (6) of Victorian poetics, “[t]eleology 
is displaced by epistemology and politics because relationships and their repre-
sentation become the contested area, between self and society, self and labour, 
self and nature, self and language and above all between self and the lover” (7). 
Armstrong later depicts this phenomenon as a “shift from ontology to epis-
temology” (16). Revisiting the split between the Victorians and the Moderns, 
Armstrong explains that whereas the Victorians “strive to give a content to these 
problems, political, sexual, epistemological, and to formulate a cultural critique, 
the moderns celebrate the elimination of content” (7). Because of these poetic 
proclivities and these critical silences, Armstrong contends, “[t]he task of a his-
tory of Victorian poetry is to restore the questions of politics, not least sexual 
politics, and the epistemology and language which belong to it” (7).
 Laying a foundation for the recuperation of poetry’s politics, Armstrong enu-
merates several sets of tensions that structure the linguistic and epistemological 
projects of Victorian poetry. She negotiates—or, in her words, “circumvent[s]”—
the interpretive dilemma of political unconsciousness and intentionality with “a 
more generous understanding of the text as struggle. A text is endless struggle 
and contention, struggle with a changing project, struggle with the play of ambi-
guity and contradiction” (10). Doing so “gives equal weight to a text’s stated 
project and the polysemic and possibly wayward meanings it generates” (10). 
This notion of struggle accommodates the burdens of poetry’s unsettling (and 
self-consciously modern) content while offering a context for considering for-
mal structures and verbal ambiguities. In the “underlying element of struggle 
in poetry of this period,” she argues, we see “its engagement with a content, its 
political awareness” (11).
 This sense of poetry’s “aestheticised politics” and “politicised aesthetics” (8) 
allows Armstrong to elaborate her very influential notion of “double forms.” 
Though inspired by the innovations of dramatic poetics, such doubling effects 
are not exclusively the prerogative of dramatic poetry and may be observed in 
“[o]ther devices, such as the framed narrative or the dream, dialogue or parody” 
(13). These features render the poem a feat of simultaneity in which the text 
functions both as “the subject’s utterance” and “the object of analysis and critique” 
(12). As such, the “double poem” becomes a “deeply sceptical form” as it engages 
“an expressive model and an epistemological model simultaneously” (13):
Epistemological and hermeneutic problems are built into its very form, for 
interpretation, and what the act of interpretation involves, are questioned in 
the very existence of the double model. It must expose relationships of power, 
for the epistemological reading will explore things of which the expressive 
reading is unaware and go beyond the experience of the lyric speaker. It is 
inveterately political not only because it opens up an exploration of the unsta-
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ble entities of self and world and the simultaneous problems of representation 
and interpretation, but because it is founded on debate and contest. (13–14)
Presenting Victorian poems as “responsive” (15) rather than “symptomatic” 
(15), Armstrong replaces feminist and Marxist notions of a “political uncon-
scious” with an active poetics that “dramatises relationships of power” (16) and 
leverages its historicized sensibilities for the “systematic exploration of ambigu-
ity” (16) while insisting upon an “epistemological uneasiness in which subject 
and object, self and world, are no longer in lucid relation with one another but 
have to be perpetually redefined” (17). As these “double forms” encourage both 
“sceptical” and “affirmative” responses, they “compel a strenuous reading” (17).
 Armstrong’s rereadings of Victorian poetry have several important applica-
tions for examining the poetics of murder. Her fundamental points about the 
acts of self-historicization, the burdens of content, the struggles of the text, the 
problematization of epistemology, the dramatization of power relationships, 
and the objectification of interpretation help to clarify the “strenuous readings” 
developed by representations of murder. Subsequent chapters will bear out the 
particulars of those applications, but a brief reference to the epistemological 
(and meta-epistemological) dimensions of the poetics of murder is in order 
here. Viewed as a blight on a progressively civilizing and rapidly urbanizing cul-
ture, crime was repeatedly presented as a modern problem to be scrutinized and 
solved through modern means—whether it be the rationalization of criminal 
law, the transformative applications of penitentiary science, the policing of the 
“dangerous classes,” the scientific methods of statistical societies, or the late-
Victorian Darwinian approaches to criminal anthropology. As the fascination 
with civilization became an obsession with its corresponding failures, however, 
Victorians frequently claimed a responsibility to gather their intellectual and 
moral resources to control crime, while, at the same time, lamenting its unprec-
edented scale and frequency. Because such discussions of modern crime and 
punishment were concurrent with conversations about the modernization of 
poetry, the insights conveyed in Armstrong’s critical lexicon offer a foundation 
for viewing the subject of murder as an example of vexed modern content. It 
allows us to investigate the stresses and struggles built into verbal representa-
tions of extreme violence as particularly poetic strategies and to examine how 
poems encode—through double forms—the epistemological disturbances that 
murderous violence engenders.
 The rubric of strain and stress also corresponds to artistic debates about 
what it meant, in terms of form and content, to cultivate modern poetry. Bar-
rett Browning, in the voice of her poetess, Aurora Leigh, famously characterized 
the modern age in violent terms: “this live, throbbing age, / That brawls, cheats, 
maddens, calculates, aspires” (V.203–4), she argued, possessed poetic value and 
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energy, and for the poet to ignore this, she maintained, is “fatal” (V.210). The 
verbs that Barrett Browning selects to represent the activities of the Victorian 
age—“brawls,” “cheats,” “maddens,” “calculates”—suggest the appeal of the more 
transgressive and destructive forces of modernity, the allure of criminal plots 
for establishing a socially relevant aesthetic, the range of the political respon-
sibilities of the Victorian poet, and the kind of active principle observed by 
Armstrong. In this context, murder, though an age-old crime, offers a devastat-
ing and extreme example of the struggles of ordering a modern world, but it 
also curiously encompasses the fatalities of a poetry that ignores the violence 
of modernity. Barrett Browning, prefiguring Wilde’s later comments on crime 
and culture—with their suspicion of “disinterested curiosity” and “charming 
studies”—argues that the poet who, investing in high cultural prestige, prefers 
to depict the violence of the literary or historical past, is poetically irresponsible, 
uninventive, and irrelevant: “To flinch from modern varnish, coat or flounce, / 
Cry out for togas and the picturesque, / Is fatal,—foolish too. King Arthur’s self 
/ Was commonplace to Lady Guenever, / And Camelot to minstrels seemed as 
flat / As Fleet Street to our poets” (V.208–13). An unflinching look at the unro-
mantic and unchivalric violence of modern industrial culture, she maintains, 
will liberate the modern poet from the strictures of poetry’s past, for modern 
themes will inspire formal innovation. “Never flinch” (V.215), she commands, 
and then instructs her readers to “[t]rust” that “the spirit” will “make the form” 
(V.224–25).
 Considering relationships between the spirit of Victorian modernity and the 
form of Victorian poetry requires a closer examination of the most fundamental 
concepts of cultural studies criticism. In his book’s introduction, also concerned 
with interdependent social and formal functions, Harrison distills Foucauldian 
notions of discourse formation and renovates Marxist concepts of ideology in 
order to uncover how poems act “as social and cultural artifacts of historical 
importance” and “display subtle if not covert attempts to seize describable cate-
gories of cultural power by transmitting ideology . . . under the guise of eliciting 
pleasure” (1). Concerned with “middle-class writers,” and “a clearly established 
but nonetheless threatened” middle-class hegemony (2), Harrison explores their 
work as a “mode of cultural intervention” (1). Applying the insights of Terry 
Eagleton’s The Ideology of the Aesthetic (1990), Harrison considers artworks as 
“eminently contradictory” (3) and “ideologies as multiple” (4) as he traces how 
poetry appropriates and challenges ideologies through the “living sensibilities 
of its subjects” (3). He also cites Trevor Purvis and Alan Hunt’s definition of 
ideology, which, filtering Marxist understandings of ideology through Saussu-
rian and Foucauldian articulations of discourse, allows us to “grasp the way in 
which language and other forms of social semiotics not merely convey social 
experience but also play some major part in constituting social subjects (the 
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subjectivities and their associated identities), their relations, and the field in 
which they exist” (3).
 Harrison’s contention that “discursive practices can have ideological effects 
because they perpetually constitute and reposition the subjects engaged in them” 
(5) grants poetry’s formal practices particularly political functions: “the highly 
developed formulaic and conventional aspects of poetry as a linguistic medium—
its specialized verse forms, traditions of figuration, metrical structures, and so 
on, which carry with them certain experiential expectations—establish it as a 
remarkably useful example for understanding the ideological effects of discourse 
generally” (8). Drawing upon Purvis and Hunt, Harrison explains, “discourses 
operate as economies ‘with their own intrinsic technology, tactics, [and] effects 
of power, which in turn they transmit’” (3). In this way, Harrison positions his 
readers to understand the intricacies and economies of verse forms as discursive 
technologies. Involved in numerous ideological conflicts, competitions, collabo-
rations, and collisions, poems foster political meanings and perform “cultural 
work” (7) that “intervene[s] in discourse” and “accrue[s] power” (8). 
 With a similar interest in bridging formalist and cultural studies, Slinn’s 
Poetry as Cultural Critique notes that literary studies have sidelined “the inten- 
sive use of language in poetry” and foregrounded “thematic approaches to the 
politics of social discourse” (1). In order “to understand fully the function of fig-
urative language in cultural processes (of which poetry is the most sophisticated 
form),” he argues, “we need to restore attention to that language, no matter how 
specialized its use—without losing sight of its continuity with social and histori-
cal contexts” (1). Slinn “redress[es] the balance by analyzing poetic content and 
process in order to show how poetry may enact cultural critique through its self-
conscious formalism, its foregrounding of just those language acts that many of 
the literary scholars most sympathetic to cultural critique have seemed least to 
take into account” (1). In articulating this critique, Slinn extrapolates from Rob-
ert Con Davis and Ronald Schliefer’s Criticism and Culture: The Role of Critique 
in Modern Literary Theory (1991). He highlights their argument that critique 
need not be “applied exclusively to idealist discourses grounded in Reason” and 
cites their notion of “the study of literature as a form of cultural critique that 
examines the conditions and realization of discourse in its various groundings” 
(4). It is, in other words, an “institutional critique, which aims to discover the 
conditions and principles that govern existing institutions and cultural practices” 
(29). Slinn assembles a “range of contentious issues” to emphasize the scope of 
poetry’s project of institutional critique: “slavery, sexual politics, prostitution, 
pornography, male liberalism, consciousness, individual agency, aestheticism, 
representation, liturgical language, belief, philosophical idealism” (6).
 In establishing “continuity” between poetic form and historical context, 
Slinn dispenses with more conventional notions of poetry’s liabilities: that 
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poetry is “self-enclosed” because “highly organized” and “ideologically tainted” 
because “predominantly bourgeois” or that the lyric indeed embodies New 
Criticism’s “transhistorical essentialism” (9–10). To overcome binary divisions 
between materiality and ideology, intrinsic and extrinsic frames of reference, 
and mimetic and passive models of literary production, he, like Armstrong and 
Harrison, postulates a poetic practice of discursive simultaneity:
It is not a matter, in other words, of deciding whether the materiality of objects 
or the ideality of discourses provide the determining conditions for reality 
but of realizing—with both dialogism and textualism—that objects have no 
meaning outside a system of signification and that discourse performs no 
practice outside material existence. (23)
Slinn’s sense of poetry’s “performativity,” a textual characteristic but also a lit-
erary theory, allows the critic “to attend to the material particularity of the 
poem, to its specifically textual as well as contextual requirements” (24). Slinn 
maintains that poetry “is homologous with performatives insofar as generically 
it privileges self-reference, flaunts elocutionary effects, reiterates conventions 
and formulae, creates its own meaning, and, above all, does something with 
words” (25). Via performativity, “poem as verbal act, poem as performance art, 
performatives as portrayed content—formalism performs a double function, 
both linking and distinguishing poetry from its contexts” (25). Therein lie the 
poem’s capacity for and its mode of cultural critique: “poetry is more likely to 
expose, without necessarily subverting, enabling conditions” (29). As a poem 
simultaneously “reshapes” “reconstitutes” and “reiterates,” it performs “a double 
action” (23).
 Armstrong, Harrison, and Slinn each note that Victorian poetry, tradition-
ally construed as an aesthetic domain less amenable to political engagement or 
less susceptible to topical distractions, has been marginalized in the cultural 
studies milieu of contemporary Victorian scholarship. Creating a repertoire of 
new critical methods and readings, their scholarship has helped to transform 
the interpretive questions and strategies shaping Victorian poetry studies. Sig-
nificantly, as they seek to retell the story of Victorian poetry, they each theorize 
doubling as a formal practice and discursive function that allows the poem to 
participate in multiple arenas—to operate aesthetically because politically and 
vice versa. Whether conceptualized as a simultaneity rooted in performativity, 
a verbal technology rooted in discourse formation, or a double form rooted in 
epistemological contention, such awareness of the cultural and political inter-
ests of poetry provides an important foundation for examining the poetics of 
murder.
 While each of these studies privileges middle-class poetry and emphasizes 
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topical and political variety in order to demonstrate the ubiquity of the textual 
processes they theorize, their insights, which can also accommodate the poetry 
of the streets, provide multiple applications for a focused study of the poetics 
of murder. With poetry’s formal qualities marked as political engagement rather 
than aesthetic retreat, for example, the expressivist impulses of the condemned 
subjects of last lamentations may be considered in the context of the criminal 
law that condemns them. Their layering of affective tropes and legal discourse 
can be viewed as skeptical readings of state authority and ambiguous readings 
of individual transgression while their oft-noted poetic inferiority can be viewed 
as performances of working-class challenges to cultural authority and artistic 
propriety. Or, the metrical subtleties with which Browning and Rossetti modu-
late the voices of their murderous speakers can reveal exercises in textual stress 
and epistemological frustration—their poems “compel a strenuous reading” by 
invoking and reproducing the cultural debates surrounding newfangled theories 
of criminal insanity in early and mid-Victorian England. Further, observing 
the function of poetic genres as discursive technologies assists in sorting out 
the ways in which the adversarial language of the divorce court and the generic 
hybridity of the verse novel and the verse drama allowed poets to invoke legal 
and literary history in order to create historicized critiques of matrimonial law 
and domestic ideology.
 Such reassessments of Victorian poetics, and their applications for examin-
ing verse representations of murder, position this study on a broader terrain 
of historicist scholarship. In Practicing New Historicism (2000), Catherine Gal-
lagher and Stephen Greenblatt write of a “methodological eclecticism” (4) that, 
among other things, consists in “tracking the social energies that circulate very 
broadly through a culture, flowing back and forth between margins and center, 
passing from zones designated as art to zones apparently indifferent or hos-
tile to art, pressing up from below to transform the exalted spheres and down 
from on high to colonize the low” (13). The well-known New Historicist meta-
phor of circulation usefully links margin and center, high and low, in ways that 
are important for a study of murder and a study of poetry that seeks to revise 
assumptions about both. An emphasis on “circulation” encourages us to trace 
the movement of a theme—in this case, murder—but it also encourages the 
transgression of conventional and classed boundaries of poetic discourse. Social 
discourse (“hostile to art”) but also “low” discourse to which art and criticism 
are often hostile find common cause in representations of crime, which was 
itself often dismissively considered a “low,” vulgar, or sensational topic in Victo-
rian culture. On another level, the notion of “social energies” that intrigues Gal-
lagher and Greenblatt provides an apt term for describing the circulating social 
anxieties and cultural logics that determined and destabilized the meanings of 
murder.
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 But “social energies” also describes the interactive features of discourse and 
genre so important for explicating the poetics of murder. As Carolyn Williams 
has argued, “[t]he utility of the concept of genre for cultural study lies in its 
powerful fusion of historical and formal assumptions. For period study it is 
especially clear that the concept of genre enables a focus on synchronic rela-
tions while also depending upon the diachronic relations with antecedents of 
current practice” (519). Meanwhile, “discourse,” she argues, “resolutely trans-
gresses received genre categories, resolutely encompasses much more than lit-
erature, much more even than textual practices” (519), for “[t]he notion of a 
‘discourse’ is produced by grouping texts and practices across generic boundar-
ies” (519). Responding to Derrida’s reflections in “The Law of Genre,” Williams 
asks, “What is ‘the law of genre’ but the play of formalism and de-formation 
in sociocultural terms?” (520), and she asserts a program for cultural studies 
worth quoting in full:
At this moment in literary and cultural studies, it might help to think of “dis-
course” and “genre” as a dialectical pair, one foregrounding synchronic study 
and the other foregrounding diachronic study; one emphasizing historical 
discontinuity and the other emphasizing historical continuity; one tending 
(potentially, but not necessarily) toward thematic and the other toward for-
malistic oversimplifications. But these relations are now fluid, recombinant, 
open to exchange. Perhaps because of the powerful work the concept of “dis-
course” has done in the last couple of decades of Victorian studies, now is a 
good time to rework the concept of “genre” as a fully cultural as well as a liter-
ary category. Cultural studies has shown us that literary studies do not corner 
the market on formal analysis; and it might well be that in the play of genres 
we can find one perfect place to study the way culture takes form. (520)
The idea of discourse and genre as a “dialectical pair,” pulling in two directions 
while inspiring “recombinant” articulations and acts of “de-formation,” offers 
valuable insight for exploring the ways in which poetry and murder operate 
in a “fusion of historical and formal assumptions,” creating synchronic and 
diachronic chains of meaning and invoking the trans-generic and interdisci-
plinary pastiche of texts that characterized the criminal discourse of Victorian 
England.
 In his recent discussion of the “inter-generic competition and cultural trans-
formation” (“Novel Poetry” 493) marking the relationship between hegemonic 
realistic fiction and counterdiscursive poetic experiments, Dino Felluga consid-
ers the dynamics of genre in similar terms. Echoing the notion of social ener-
gies found in Gallagher and Greenblatt’s discussion, he writes, “Genre should, I 
would suggest, be understood as an unstable field of energies affected as much 
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by critical perception and debate as by specific structural features. In fact, I 
would go further: there is no such thing as a reference to a text that is not a 
performative ordering of that text’s textuality, that does not in itself conform to 
and enact generic conventions” (495). Citing Ralph Cohen’s point that genres 
and texts are marked by their “interrelationship with and differentiation from” 
other genres, Felluga describes this process as a “performative loop” of generic 
“identification” and “self-estrangement” (495). If we retain an appreciation for 
the counterdiscursive maneuvers of verse and the “performative loop” of textual 
meaning, but extend the scope of intergeneric identification and differentiation 
beyond a contest between novels and poems, we can use genre to conceptualize 
other textual and performative mediations of murder: the newspaper, the trial, 
the scaffold, the medicolegal treatise, the Greek tragedy, and the “old yellow 
Book,” for example, all serve within a system of “fully cultural” genres and dis-
courses, possess diachronic and synchronic markers, and encode varying degrees 
of identification, self-estrangement, and self-referentiality. From the lowly street 
ballad to the high Greek tragedy, we can see poets exploiting these multivalent 
qualities in their poetic representations of murder, which do not simply demon-
strate the due course of heteroglossia, but rather suggest the measured partici-
pation of poets in the literary development of verse and in social responses to 
murder.
 In acknowledging signs of participation, acts of intervention, and instances 
of differentiation, it is worth noting how poetic representations of murder, 
exploiting the performative features of verse, were poised to engage the dialectics 
of discourse and genre in ways that other textual forms were not. In the stories 
and testimonies of courtroom adversaries and witnesses, the social scientific 
and statistical data that quantified and charted a national crime epidemic, the 
biographical case studies that propounded etiologies for criminal lunacy, the 
newspaper reports that publicized shocking crimes and criminal trials, and the 
criminal acts, scandalous revelations, and detective plots of novels, murder was 
construed as a narrative event. At stake in the ceaseless activities of prosecut-
ing, theorizing, documenting, legislating, pathologizing, punishing, publishing, 
and reading crime are the production and management of knowledge about 
crime and punishment. As these examples attest, it was most often by analyz-
ing crimes as narrative constructs that Victorians attempted to comprehend 
murders and apprehend murderers. The fact that knowledge about crime and 
criminals was manufactured largely in narrative formats also helps to explain 
our contemporary focus on crime fiction; in the similarities between novels and 
other narrative forms—the trial, the newspaper report—we see obvious generic 
and discursive affinities.
 Precisely because of the predominantly narrative contents and contexts 
of criminal discourse, poems, operating in the performative mode that Slinn 
Int rod uc t I o n
identifies, could develop striking counterdiscursive representations of mur-
der and murderers. Poems, of course, by no means exclude narrative formats: 
street ballads reproduced, often in order to contest, the narrative imperatives of 
criminal trials, and with The Ring and the Book, Browning, transposing novel-
istic polyphony into dramatic verse, creates an excessively mediated, virtually 
indecipherable web of transgressive plots, suspicious characters, and unreliable 
narrators. Relying upon narrative structures and reproducing narrative episte-
mologies, however, they nonetheless consistently expose and destabilize their 
foundations by manipulating the formal features of verse or the cultural status of 
poetry. Last lamentations overturn criminal stereotypes when they foreground 
the affective voice, the lyrical sensibilities, and the verse-writing inclinations 
of the condemned criminal, and The Ring and the Book further complicates 
the psychologies and claims of its narrators with verbal twitches and metrical 
irregularities. Taking up the tools of verse, poets responded variously to more 
prevalent representational modes generated in the realms of officialdom, the 
forum of the popular press, and the literary marketplace, but as they exploit 
textual resources unique to verse form—lyrical voices and dramatic personae, 
metrical stunts and verbal surprises—their poems generate suggestive frictions 
that alert us to the performative strategies and verbal technologies shaping the 
poetics of murder.
 References to the chapters that comprise this study appear throughout this 
introduction, but a more substantial overview of the individual chapters helps 
to elucidate the structural logic of the book and demonstrate the relationships 
between the theme of murder, the genres of poetry, and the tools of criticism 
outlined here. Beginning the study of murder and poetry in the streets, chapter 
1 reads working-class crime ballads as inscriptions of class politics and interro-
gations of state discipline. While high poetry grappled with a changing market 
of literary consumption that privileged the novel, the market for street poetry 
flourished and expanded during the first half of the nineteenth century. Street 
ballads circulated in the thousands among the working classes, often attracting 
the attention and scorn of the middle and upper classes. As the author of an 
article in the National Review explained, “there is still a very large section of the 
British public, though probably a decreasing one, which must and will have life 
put into doggerel verse for its special delectation” (“Street Ballads” 415). The 
disappearance of these ephemeral texts into Victorian trash bins and library col-
lections have stalled the development of ballad exegesis. A selection of antholo-
gies and archives has inspired a few studies, but, for the most part, ballads have 
attracted more documentary than analytical approaches. Within an atmosphere 
of recovery created by a developing field of print culture studies, a growing 
interest in working-class studies, and a new commitment to cultural studies 
approaches to poetry, this chapter questions longstanding assumptions about 
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the transparency of this “bad” poetry and the cultural significance of translating 
life into “doggerel verse.” In important ways, the apparent badness of street bal-
lads establishes a central conceit of a street poetics that self-consciously flouts 
the standards of high poetry, and, in the case of murder and execution ballads, 
the judicial authority of high culture.
 Drawing upon the resources of library collections as well as ballad antholo-
gies, chapter 1 reappraises crime ballads by reconstructing their literary and his-
torical contexts and challenging critical dismissals of them as vulgar, sensational, 
and morally unsophisticated. Their popularity demonstrates a pervasive and 
continuous mediation of crime in verse, but close readings of these texts reveal 
that their popularity also signals a well-developed and widely disseminated 
political sensibility informed by the working-class experience of poverty, polic-
ing, and punishment. Quite often, these occasional poems announcing mur-
ders and executions posed challenges to class-inflected ideologies of crime and 
invited reflections on the disciplinary power of the state. With their aestheticized 
renderings of crime and punishment, balladeers, sometimes tacitly and some-
times explicitly, constructed verse arguments that critiqued the disproportionate 
supervision of the working classes and protested the systematic discrimination 
of judicial practices.
 Murder and execution ballads appeared in two main formats: third-person 
“astonishing disclosures,” which alerted their audiences to the graphic details of 
crimes, and first-person “last lamentations,” which informed the public of the 
tragic aspects of executions. Sometimes constituting portions of larger broad-
sides and sometimes circulating as lone poems, ballads alerted audiences to 
their perspective and voice through the use of title phrases that marked them as 
“accounts,” “full particulars,” and “disclosures” or “sorrowful lamentations” and 
“copies of affecting verses.” The third-person ballad constructed the persona of 
the astonished witness, and the first-person ballad imagined the persona of the 
condemned criminal. Under close examination, the significance of these generic 
differences becomes strikingly apparent. Astonishing disclosures, for example, 
develop a political aesthetic in gruesome accounts of murders and descriptions 
of crime scenes. Deploying sublime images of violence, these graphic represen-
tations create highly condensed explorations of moral disorder. Their graphic 
detail—from exacting portrayals of the bloody remains of murder to imag-
ined accounts of the frantic struggles of victims—simply overwhelms ready-
made ethical dichotomies and longstanding legal definitions. Emotionally and 
intellectually overwhelming, murder becomes a mode of expression, as Wilde 
suggested, and, as such, murder prompts acts of interpretation by astonished 
witnesses and ballad audiences seeking to address the moral and epistemological 
questions raised by outrageous crimes.
 First-person lamentations, in contrast, were advertised by publishers as verse 
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autobiographies. Outpourings of dreadful memories and terrifying fears, they 
were alleged to be written by condemned criminals in their cells on the eve of 
execution. With the persona of the criminal poet, these ballads destabilized ethi-
cal commonplaces and legal fictions by linking the sentimental poet and the vio-
lent murderer, thereby challenging a practice of capital punishment predicated 
upon the irremediable monstrosity of the condemned and the unimpeachable 
righteousness of the state. Slinn reminds us that “[f]ictive speech acts and real 
cultural practices are inseparable activities” (17), and he quotes Barbara John-
son’s suggestive example: “If people are put to death by a verdict and not by a 
poem, it is not because the law is not a fiction” (17). A similar trope of mutual 
performativity operates in last lamentations in which balladeers pitted lyrical 
sensibilities against legal reasoning, thus suggesting that when a condemned 
criminal is exonerated in a street poem and not in a courtroom, it is not because 
the law is not a fiction. With their politically adept applications of poetic license, 
last lamentations frequently privileged the authenticity of the lyric over the arti-
fice of the law, problematizing trial verdicts and sentences and establishing skep-
tical readings of murder trials and scaffold deaths.
 Removing murder from the context of retributive justice, the poems dis-
cussed in chapter 2 exchange the problems of judicial review for those of medi-
cal diagnosis. As the idea of the criminal lunatic was continuously revised during 
the nineteenth century, interpretations of a murder’s meaning, long predicated 
on legal procedures that pronounced judgments and meted out punishments 
by reading the details of the criminal act, were increasingly complicated by new 
theories of the criminal mind, which offered intricate definitions and expan-
sive case histories to determine the responsibilities of and possible treatments 
for criminals. In differentiating and combining criminality and insanity, theo-
ries of homicidal lunacy and the extensive lists of symptoms that accompa-
nied them synthesized Victorian moral values, legal codes, and mental sciences 
in disconcerting ways. Mental scientists expounded and applied their theories 
while attempting to establish the legitimacy of their knowledge and negotiate 
the conflicts between punishment and treatment. Meanwhile, their medicole-
gal analyses of specific cases, appearing in specialist texts, in courtroom testi-
monies, and in popular print, created rifts between theoretical abstraction and 
legal concreteness. In the charged environment of murder trials, the increasingly 
obscured boundary between sanity and insanity frustrated collective desires to 
define murder and punish killers and pitted the authority of medical experts 
against the fears of a concerned citizenry and the traditions of learned jurists.
 The troubling distractions of complicated insanity defenses, “not guilty on 
the ground of insanity” verdicts, and new asylum treatments in cases of extreme 
violence and astonishing cruelty define the poetics of murder in Browning’s 
“Porphyria’s Lover,” “My Last Duchess,” and “The Laboratory” and Rossetti’s 
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“A Last Confession.” While Harrison emphasizes the notion that power circu-
lates via discursive formations and that poems participate in this circulation 
via verbal and formal interventions, these dramatic poems suggest that anxiety 
circulates through these same discursive formations and that poets may exploit 
the curiosity and confusion surrounding these anxieties to simultaneously aes-
theticize and politicize murder. As they enforce tensions between psychological 
strands of medicolegal theory and commonsense traditions of criminal law, 
these dramatic representations of murderous subjects develop a criminal sub-
lime, which upholds the fundamental obscurity of the murderer.
 Demonstrating a shared interest in exploring criminal psychology and dra-
matic poetry, Browning and Rossetti prompt readers to consider the clinical or 
evidentiary meanings of their characters, and, situating their murderers outside 
the realm of judicial accountability, they withhold the comforts of moral resolu-
tion. Because they avoid normative scenarios of crime and punishment, their 
depictions of unapprehended killers allow them to imagine the states of con-
sciousness and the problems of expression that characterize murderers—and 
that interest poets. With the careful modulation of voice, they establish the same 
conditions for epistemological doubt and ethical impasse that accompanied 
the medicolegal debates of the mid-Victorian period. Furthermore, in placing 
acts of murder and symptoms of madness in the context of sexual power and 
gendered violence, they generate a tension between the familiarity (literary or 
cultural) of violent sexual passions and the unfamiliarity of clinical medicolegal 
logic.
 Balancing the discourses of sins and symptoms, Browning and Rossetti leave 
readers to question whether their speakers rehearse conventional stories of sexu-
ally charged violence or present medical specimens of a new diagnostic theory. 
In courting confusion, they aptly exemplify the kinds of doubling elaborated 
by Armstrong; they seize upon the strangeness of modern content and exploit 
the epistemological disturbances of a “double form” in order to develop an aes-
thetically playful but ethically serious mode of political critique, which enfolds 
questions about the codes of sexual power and the discipline of mental science. 
Compressing the voice of the murderous subject into a verbally dense transcript, 
each of these poems renders decisions on the matter of malice and madness 
impossible, and the persistence of indeterminacy sustains the aesthetic force of 
the criminal sublime.
 Chapter 3 explores representations of domestic murder, which, reposition-
ing center and margin, portray the home as a breeding ground for murder-
ous intentions and actions. Aligning interests in generic hybridity and gender 
ideology, Browning’s epic verse-novel, The Ring and the Book, and Lytton’s and 
Levy’s closet verse-tragedies, Clytemnestra and Medea, emphasize the social con-
structedness and historical contingencies of both gender and genre, in order to 
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question the literary, legal, and ideological conventions and codes determin-
ing spousal relations. In imagining the devolution of domestic proprieties into 
criminal tendencies, these texts do not simply sensationalize the home, ruining 
cozy domestic interiors with bloody outbreaks of murderous violence. Rather, 
they embed outrageous acts of murder within complex portraits of premedita-
tion and determination. Suggesting the psychological origins of violent agency, 
but explicitly tying them to domestic ideology and matrimonial law, they locate 
the origins of domestic murder in social institutions and cultural traditions. 
Whether hiding systematic abuse or fostering violent rebellion, these poems 
suggest, the private home is subject to the laws of a disciplinary state and the 
willfulness of outraged individuals. As such, it weakens and endangers—rather 
than strengthens and protects—its inhabitants.
 The political arguments of these three poems become most apparent when 
viewed in light of mid-century marriage debates, which accompanied the rene-
gotiation of matrimonial law and the public scrutiny of domestic violence. A 
wealth of contemporary scholarship has made us aware of the intricacies and 
contradictions of the middle-class separate spheres doctrine, which stressed the 
natural complementarity of empowered males and compromised females and 
mandated multiple strategies of paternalist protection and patriarchal disci-
pline. Yet, while this optimistic vision of comfort and control circulated widely, 
Victorians also negotiated another model in which the home was populated not 
by angelic mothers and judicious fathers, but by self-interested legal adversaries 
negotiating the double binds of the state’s disciplinary power and the husband’s 
domestic authority. Deployed, like its idyllic counterpart, to discipline married 
couples and uphold gender hierarchies, this combative version of marital rela-
tions was given renewed public force in parliamentary debates about marriage 
reform and divorce law. With the establishment of a divorce court, which was 
modeled on the criminal court, and the incremental criminalization of certain 
forms of domestic abuse, the imperatives of an adversarial domesticity were 
frequently cited in the court and in the press. Stripping away the trappings of 
idealism and dismantling the façade of privacy, the very publicity of this model 
confronted Victorians with starkly pragmatic readings of the legal prohibitions 
and permissions of marriage contracts, while emphasizing the prerogatives of 
the state in sanctioning, enforcing, and dissolving marriages.
 This distinctly combative version of marriage constitutes the primary frame 
of reference for understanding both the political resonance and the generic 
innovation of each of these domestic murder poems. With murder representing 
in extremis the more sinister aspects of a pragmatic adversarial script, Brown-
ing, Lytton, and Levy consider the kinds of spousal conflicts debated in par-
liament and publicized in divorce trials. Offering no sanctuary and affording 
no pleasure, domestic intimacy is characterized by the escalating pressures and 
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accumulating resentments of everyday homelife—which culminate in extraordi-
narily violent methods of resistance and redress. In manipulating the domestic 
themes and narrative logics of already-plotted stories—of legal history, in the 
case of Browning’s seventeenth-century Italian murders, and theatre history, 
in the case of Lytton’s and Levy’s ancient Greek crimes—these poets produced 
topically resonant metatextual commentaries on legal, literary, and cultural rep-
resentation. Demonstrating how discourse and genre invoke synchronic and 
diachronic meanings, they forge intergeneric and intertextual links that enfold 
the disciplinary discourses of legal contracts and the melodramatic modes of 
public scandal. Implicating the long history of patriarchal power, and exchang-
ing narratives of melodramatic villainy for narratives of institutional failure, 
they render a binary schema of innocence and guilt (central to divorce courts, 
criminal courts, and public opinion) inadequate and irrelevant while imagining 
the systematic pressures of public interests and private wrongs that mark and 
mar the domestic idyll.
 In The Ring and the Book, for example, points of agreement in the mono-
logues of the murderer, Guido, and his victim, Pompilia, establish arresting con-
nections between divorce rights, husband rights, and murder rights. Providing 
rare moments of corroboration and consistency amidst a profusion of voices 
and a sprawling narrative, husband and wife (condemned murderer and dying 
victim) express strikingly similar interpretations of the domestic roots of their 
violent ends. As they both develop a cause-effect structure for their stories of 
marriage and murder, the unexpectedness of their coalescing voices establishes 
the interpretive authority of their critique and challenges the melodramatic 
codes shaping the public gossip and legal cases generated by their troubled mar-
riage and their violent deaths. Working on the smaller scale afforded by closet 
drama and shielded from the censoring protocols of public performance, Lytton 
and Levy modernize the stories of high tragic murderesses by establishing con-
gruities between the momentous agency of murderous violence and the every-
day slights of gender inequality. They thus complicate traditional plots, which 
connected Clytemnestra’s crimes to the deterministic forces of fate and Medea’s 
crimes to a particularly feminine variety of vengeful monstrosity. Regretting 
their misguided investments in patriarchal fantasies of domesticity, Lytton’s and 
Levy’s murderers select killing as a response to the claustrophobia of domestic 
alienation. Dragging their private wrongs onto a public stage, their crimes force 
a reckoning with domestic ideology. Pessimistic and critical, these renovations 
of the epic poem and the tragic drama objectify the contemporary discourses 
of marriage law and genres of domestic scandal and ask their Victorian readers 
to confront and interrogate their own investments in domestic ideology and 
interpretations of household law.
 As these chapters demonstrate, the theme of murder provided poets with a 
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content and a context for establishing political arguments and reviewing poetic 
agendas. While the politics of murder allowed poets to scrutinize the practices 
and relations of power informing crimes and punishments, it also informed 
their exploration of the interactions between genres of discourse and forms 
of verse. Literary murders may present readers with ancient crimes or familiar 
plots, but when examined in their immediate cultural context, they offer very 
nuanced examples of the dialectical and historical interplay of genre and dis-
course. As they affiliate themselves with and differentiate themselves from other 
modes of understanding crimes and apprehending criminals in Victorian Eng-
land, the murder poems explored in this study highlight the epistemological and 
interpretive dilemmas surrounding murders and murderers. Examining these 
tensions in a select number of texts, Crime in Verse offers a starting point for 
reimagining the intertextual and interdependent meanings of murder’s political 
charge and literary resonance, and it allows us to glimpse more fully the social 
life and “cultural work” of Victorian verse.
Murder, Execution, and
the Criminal Classes 
C h a p t E r  1
circulaTing in PrinT and in song, the two central genres of 
the crime ballad trade, the third-person “astonishing disclosures” 
of bloody violence and the first-person “last lamentations” of 
condemned criminals, reported horrific murders and recorded 
terrible executions in ear-catching rhymes.1 Marketed in oral 
performances by ballad singers, and often stamped with visually 
striking woodcut images or flanked by newsy prose reports, these 
songs of crime developed a remarkably public poetics, which, merging singsong 
rhythms, bloody excess, and sentimental rhetoric with case details and topi-
cal references, produced unexpectedly complex commentaries on the meanings 
of murderous transgression and capital punishment. When we remember that 
these verses were regularly sung and sold in Victorian streets and markets, the 
horizon of Victorian poetry and poetics broadens considerably.2 And if we con-
sider, as David Vincent does in Literacy and Popular Culture (1993), that they 
aided the advance of popular literacy—and that the “most striking character-
istic of the first phase of the expansion of imaginative literature was the sheer 
volume and noise which accompanied it” (201)—we can begin to imagine the 
volume and noise of street balladry as a significant part of Victorian literature 
and culture.
 The poetic and political significance of street balladry, however, has been lost 
within a long history of critical dismissals. Simply put, crime ballads suffer from 
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bad reputations. On the one hand, they seem to embrace, with morbid enthusi-
asm, the abject and gory elements of murderous violence. In “Execution of John 
Gleeson Wilson” (1849) (figure 1), for example, meticulous sketches of terrible 
wounds (a jellied head and three-inch gashes) join stock phrases of gruesome 
excess (“weltering in their gore” and “blood did flow profusely”) to produce a 
portrait of astonishing destruction. When ventriloquizing the voices of con-
demned murderers, on the other hand, last lamentations fascinated their audi-
ence with confessions of sin and professions of remorse. In “The Last Moments 
and Confession of Wm. Sheward” (1869) (figure 2), the killer remembers his 
outrageous wife-murder with sentimental regret: “I boiled her head, how sad to 
tell, / I was mad without a doubt, / I threw it in the different parts, / I placed it 
round about.”
 Responding to such representations of crime, many nineteenth-century 
critics cited the arraying of mutilated bodies as symptoms of working-class 
bloodlust and the sentimentalization of condemned murderers as inscriptions 
of working-class criminality. Yet, packaged in striking—and sometimes amus-
ing—rhymes and accommodating the particulars of historical crimes, the verse-
crimes of street literature frequently engaged stark appraisals of specific murder 
cases and confronted contentious issues in judicial and penal practices. At the 
very least, their public form and political content—and the image of Victo-
rians singing “pools of blood as thick as mud, from all of them could trace” 
or “I boiled her head, how sad to tell, / I was mad without a doubt”—should 
inspire new questions about criminal representation in both poetic and political 
terms.
 Yet, because applications of trite maxims, snippets of behavioral advice, and 
invocations of “feeling Christians” often accompanied such images of bleed-
ing and weltering, murder ballads have more recently been labeled prim nar-
ratives of moral danger or simple-minded endorsements of state power. Critics 
have interpreted the confessing and regretting criminals of execution ballads 
as conventionally guilty subjects, affirming the terrible necessity of their public 
deaths and ratifying the retributive authority of the state. In this view, ballad 
recommendations of religious piety and personal restraint appear to betray the 
political interests and belie the social experiences of their working-class authors 
and audiences. Submitting to a ruthless law of genre, crime ballads as a whole 
become the inadequate and incongruous sum of their stock moral pieties and 
their stark bloody minutiae, and individual crime ballads are merely the indis-
tinguishable products of a mechanized industry churning out unimaginative 
and inartistic reiterations of a strict melodramatic mandate. Caught between an 
uncompromising conservatism and an unabashed bloodlust, they are aestheti-
cally and ethically suspect.
Figure 1
Execution of John Gleeson Wilson. Courtesy The Newberry Library, Chicago.
Figure 2
The Last Moments and Confession of Wm. Sheward. Courtesy The Newberry Library, 
Chicago.
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 While an overemphasis on the poles of moral melodrama and vulgar gore 
has consistently diminished our confidence in the street ballad’s capacity for tex-
tual complexity and political sophistication, notions about the laws of genre and 
the conditions of production join expectations about the nature of authorship 
to further diminish their social status. Commissioned by enterprising printers, 
penned by anonymous “hacks,” and hawked in the streets by “the poorest of the 
poor” (O’Connell 168), street ballads flout our author-based and class-inflected 
definitions of literary creation. Lacking names and identities, ballad authors are 
chronically underestimated, and their verses, seeming to reflect the harried and 
impoverished existence of their authors, have rarely inspired careful literary 
analysis.3 Further incriminated by their association with a presumably delin-
quent and illiterate class, ballads and balladeers, emanating from and entertain-
ing the “dangerous classes,” acquire a criminal taint.
 This chapter seeks to extricate crime ballads from this limited conceptual 
paradigm by reviewing the analytical methods of ballad studies, the classed epis-
temologies of criminal discourse, and the cultural conditions of ballad produc-
tion. Outlining interpretive strategies derived from the generic conventions of 
crime balladry and the topical details of individual songs, it presents careful 
readings of specific texts and historical contexts in order to demonstrate the 
street ballad’s potential for poetic and political variety.4 When contextualized and 
individuated, connections between the details of crime ballads and the details of 
historical crimes become more apparent, allowing us to reconsider the semiotic 
operations that underpin these ostensibly contradictory assemblages of moral 
didacticism, bloody abjection, sentimental lamentation, and spectacular death.
 This approach also recognizes the usually unacknowledged distinction 
between first-person and third-person voices in ballad narratives, which orga-
nized criminal representations around the notions of astonished witnesses and 
lamenting criminals. Generalizing about the genre of “gallows literature,” com-
mentators have rarely distinguished the rhetorical significance and political rel-
evance of these two distinct voices, but in many cases ballad writers leveraged 
these fundamental differences in poetic voice and narrative perspective for both 
generic development and political argument. Indeed, a glimpse at even a relative 
few of the hundreds and hundreds of crime ballads preserved in library collec-
tions reveals that the anonymous poets of the ballad industry regularly applied 
the poetic tools of their trade to influence the generic evolution of the crime bal-
lad and to intervene in public discussions of criminal trials, laws, and theories.
 For this reason, the generic regularity and formal simplicity of street verses 
can be read as a verbal technology, which, as Harrison explains—via Purvis 
and Hunt’s idea of a “social semiotics” that “convey[s] social experience” while 
“constituting social subjects” (3)— performs “cultural work” (7). In this way, the 
lowly verses of the street, neither exploitative spectacles of gruesome misfortune 
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nor smug recitations of moral law, generated a multiplicity of formal strategies, 
aesthetic meanings, and political engagements and disseminated them in the 
streets and amongst the crowds of Victorian England. Viewed in this context, the 
apparent vulgarity of their art—the sensationalism of their themes, the expedi-
ency of their rhymes, the simplicity of their rhythms—serves a performative 
function in Slinn’s sense of the word: “both linking and distinguishing poetry 
from its contexts” (25), the ballad industry could pit its scrappy poetics of the 
street against the erudition of high literary culture and the authority of a disci-
plinary state.
Verse Crimes:
“Atrocious Rhymes” and “Lawless Meters”
Discussions of street ballads, like discussions of criminality, are steeped in the ide-
ology of class. When criminal representation and working-class authorship meet 
in the tradition of “gallows literature,” the pressures of class ideology become 
strikingly apparent. Amidst ongoing Victorian conversations about urban streets 
and urban squalor, street balladry was seen as a particularly criminal poetics. For 
this reason the textual practices and the critical reception of street ballads must 
be understood with respect to Victorian economies and geographies of crime 
and class.
 Though sometimes working at cross-purposes, the specialized rubrics of 
criminal discourse in nineteenth-century England often exploited the rhetorical 
convenience of an othered class while struggling to modernize and rationalize 
approaches to prevention and punishment. Across a range of projects—from 
establishing a police force and revising the criminal code to conducting sta-
tistical analyses and developing criminal anthropology—Victorians cited “the 
laboring classes,” “the criminal classes,” or the “dangerous classes” to organize 
vast amounts of data and reconcile competing theories. Reproducing this divi-
sive epistemology of class, various print media consistently located the working 
classes in a cultural realm distinct from that of the middle and upper classes. 
The most striking and well-documented example of this logic is Henry May-
hew’s influential London Labour and the London Poor (1861), in which, eagerly 
citing and applying the ethnological arguments of Dr. Andrew Smith, he cat-
egorizes London “street-folk” as a local variety of the “wandering tribes.” With 
enthusiasm and precision, Mayhew explains to his readers that there are “two 
distinct and broadly marked races, viz., the wanderers and the settlers—the vag-
abond and the citizen—the nomadic and the civilized tribes” (1). Following this 
schema, he finds in the “vagabonds and outcasts” (2) of Victorian London the 
characteristics catalogued in Smith’s work: overdeveloped jaws and cheekbones, 
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underdeveloped heads, and a “different language” spoken “with the intent of 
concealing their designs and exploits” (2). Casting himself as a “traveller in the 
undiscovered country of the poor” (xv) and submitting his work to his civi-
lized and settled citizen-readers, Mayhew promises an intimate “cyclopaedia of 
the industry, the want, and the vice” (xv) of the urban poor—a record of the 
their own stories told in their “own ‘unvarnished’ language” (xv). Interpreting 
his methodologies, contemporary scholars have underscored the ways in which 
Mayhew’s expedition metaphors and ethnographic taxonomies reinforced the 
racial, geographical, and linguistic separation of the poor from other classes 
of English Victorians.5 Underpinning this logic, as Simon Joyce indicates in his 
recent study of “literary geographies,” is Mayhew’s apparent preference for view-
ing “the London underclass as a distinctive social or cultural formation” rather 
than a “strictly determined economic class” (107).
 The compatibility of and the tension between ethnographic and economic 
explanations for crime can be glimpsed in popular texts, judicial procedures, 
and legislative committees where a causal correlation between class status and 
criminal behavior became an axiomatic construct for addressing the collective 
experience of crime and its attendant anxieties. Joyce isolates the interpretive 
significance of the relationship between the forces of “capitalist accumulation” 
and the features of criminal character in this public discussion:
[T]his is the key issue in midcentury debates about the etiology of crime, 
since there was a general agreement that its existence closely correlated with 
the quality of life in the slums: the question which followed was whether slum 
inhabitants themselves were to blame, or the social and economic conditions 
into which they were born and lived. (106)
Moreover, Joyce explains, the discourse of crime prevention stems from the 
“different answers to this question” which “helped to determine what com-
bative schemes were developed and practiced, ranging from conservative calls 
for more police and slum clearance, through liberal reform measures aimed at 
improving environmental and social conditions, to Chartist or socialist plat-
forms which saw those conditions as the by-product of political disenfranchise-
ment and capitalist economics” (106–7). But, Joyce aptly notes, the difference 
between left and right strategies can be “difficult to maintain in practice” (247), 
and his overview of etiological theories and “combative schemes” highlights 
not only the ubiquity but also the contingency of the epistemology of class as it 
became entangled in and destabilized by shifting political alignments, compet-
ing ideological constructs, and evolving urban geographies. In the case of street 
ballads, seen to represent the geographically determined criminal tendencies 
of slumlife and the culturally debased economies of cheap print, the processes 
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of entanglement and destabilization often played out in the context of specific 
murders and executions.
 The appeal of establishing ethnographic and geographic, rather than eco-
nomic, narratives of causation can be partly attributed to the popular and panic-
inducing phraseology of “the dangerous classes” (“les classes dangereuses”), which, 
as David Philips explains, was coined in Paris in 1840 by H. A. Frégier and “was 
quickly turned into English and applied by some writers to the dangerous lower 
orders of Britain as well” (81). “The image of the ‘dangerous classes,’” Philips 
explains, “united the threat to person and property of ordinary crime, with the 
wider threat posed to the whole society by a militant and possibly revolutionary 
working class” (81). At mid-century, as the demand for accurate and verifiable 
national crime statistics led to virtual inventories of these putative dangerous 
classes, questions arose concerning the effects of asymmetrical and inconsistent 
methods—across decades and regions—employed in collecting and interpreting 
the annual returns. While in 1810, when such data collection and analysis began, 
records suggested that “about one person in every seven was a pauper, a vagrant, 
or a criminal” (Radzinowicz 239), decades on, the measuring of crime rates was 
complicated by the redefining of criminal acts, and, as a result, “perception and 
practice were not completely synchronized” (Taylor 2). Nevertheless, as statistics 
were tabulated and published, vigilant Victorians began to carefully evaluate the 
meanings and interpret the warnings embedded in the numbers. In his review of 
a half-century of crime statistics, for example, Jelinger C. Symons analyzed the 
“fearful” social picture that recent statistics painted and warned Victorians to act 
immediately:
Every country has its dangerous class. It consists not only of criminals, pau-
pers and persons whose conduct is obnoxious to the interests of society, but 
of the proximate body of people who are within reach of its contagion, and 
continually swell its number. The magnitude of the dangerous class in Eng-
land probably exceeds that of any European nation, and is largely increasing. 
However essential some political reforms may be, and others may become, any 
indirect remedies for an evil so urgent as this may well be postponed to the 
consideration of prompt, practical and direct means of attacking it. (1)
In Symons’s desperate calls for an aggressive pragmatism—in order to prevent 
England’s sinking deeper into criminality than any other European nation—we 
can glimpse the reactionary agendas and the reformist molds that shaped crime-
class etiologies.
 Operating within a similar rhetorical framework, the author of “Causes of 
the Increase in Crime” (1844), published in Blackwood’s, explains that the work-
ing classes are criminal because they undergo a “demoralization among the vast 
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crowd” in which “restraints of character, relationship, and vicinity are, in great 
measure, lost . . .” (7).6 Their numbers and associations render them criminal 
because “individual responsibility is lost among the multitudes” (13). In the next 
volume of Blackwood’s, the journal presents a more overt Tory stance, accusing 
the Liberals of ignoring a profoundly disturbing increase in crime and seeking a 
misguided course of benevolent legal and prison reforms. Amidst metaphors of 
infectious contagion and rushing water, crime is presented as a problem of class 
uprising:
Let us therefore no longer deceive ourselves, or attempt to deceive others. 
Crime is making extraordinary and unprecedented progress amongst us; it 
is advancing with a rapidity unparalleled in any other European state: if not 
arrested, it will come to render the country unbearable; and will terminate 
in multiplying to such an extent “les classes dangereuses,” as they have been 
denominated by the French, as, on the first serious political convulsion, may 
come to endanger the state. (“The Increase of Crime” 545)
In proclaiming the “extraordinary” and “unprecedented progress” of crime, 
such public conversations stirred anxieties about working-class organizing while 
essentially placing responsibility for overcrowding and urbanization on the poor. 
Government responses included legislating increased police surveillance in poor 
areas; developing and revising penitentiary and prison systems; enforcing and 
manipulating existing criminal laws, such as the Vagrancy Act of 1824, which 
defined and criminalized “idle and disorderly” acts of “rogues and vagabonds”; 
and designing and passing new crime bills, such as the 1869 Habitual Criminals 
Act, which accommodated the supervision, surveillance, and suspicion of for-
mer offenders and future offenders with inferences about “circumstance” and 
“character” (Wiener, Reconstructing 150). Meanwhile, assessments of class also 
informed strict common law notions of individual responsibility, applications 
of the Royal Prerogative of Mercy, and movements for the abolition of public 
execution.
 While many discussions of working-class criminality imagined revolution-
ary upheaval and thus betrayed fundamental concerns about the accumulation 
of capital and the protection of property, reflections on murder also inspired 
wholesale indictments of the working classes. Sir Samuel Martin, a judge serv-
ing on the Capital Punishment Commission that oversaw parliamentary recon-
sideration of state execution in 1866, expressed the belief that murder is quite 
simply the exclusive domain of the lower classes:
[F]or the purpose of forming a real judgment upon the efficacy of Capital 
Punishments you must have recourse to persons who are well acquainted with 
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the lower classes in this country, and . . . no man who is not is competent to 
give an opinion on the subject. It very seldom occurs that any person in the 
middle class of life is indicted for murder. (Report of the Capital Punishment 
Commission Q 245: 36)
With no acknowledgment of the class inequalities inherent in policing citizens 
and indicting criminals, Martin maintains that “real judgment” on the “effi-
cacy of Capital Punishments” requires familiarity with working-class subjects, 
who constitute England’s reserves of potential murderers. In order to benefit 
from the working-class citizenry’s collective experience of and expertise in mur-
der—and with the integrity of important parliamentary deliberations resting on 
their insights—the commission summoned policemen, figures “well acquainted 
with the lower classes,” to describe and transcribe the working-class stance on 
murder and execution. Purporting to require access to their murderous voices 
and criminal psychologies, the commission hears the testimony of policemen-
informants, who, having interpreted physiognomies and overheard conversa-
tions, serve as character witnesses for and behavioral experts on the entirety of 
Britain’s working-class population. Although working-class Britons certainly 
performed police work, the commission’s decision to restrict their interviews to 
policemen reified the characteristic silencing of the lower classes in a national 
conversation largely about them.
 In Apprehending the Criminal (1992), Marie-Christine Leps presents an 
intertextual analysis of criminality in order to consider the “relation between 
the status of a discursive practice (as scientific, informative, or entertaining dis-
course), its mandate in the social production of knowledge, and the limits of 
its sayable” (3). Examining how criminology’s “textual production of ‘criminal 
man’ as an object of scientific knowledge was entirely determined by intertextual 
ideological maxims on race, sex, class, and morality” (47), she notes its role in 
“serv[ing] to legitimate the broader development of social management policies 
for the supervision, discipline, and control of the ‘lower orders’ through better 
knowledge of deviance in all its forms” (132). The press, meanwhile, “worked to 
incite, entertain, and distract the public into recognition of hegemonic truths” 
(132). Emerging from these discursive practices, Leps contends, was a norma-
tive “consensual ‘we,’” which, constituted “through its opposition to crime (eco-
nomic, political, moral) and its perpetrators” (73), formed a “public united in 
its need for protection from criminal deviance” (132). While Leps’s analytical 
conclusions highlight late-Victorian criminology in particular, her discussion 
of the construction of a consensual and concerned citizenry in opposition to a 
deviant and criminal class aptly characterizes the logic informing the theories 
and policies of earlier decades. Overlooking the generic strategies and political 
references of broadside ballads, Leps argues that “[s]uch measures were met with 
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silence: working-class groups did not voice any systematic opposition, as no one 
could effectively side with criminals in social discourse” (132).
 Insofar as genre can be construed as a system, the collective work of the 
crime ballads might be considered a fairly “systematic opposition” to circulating 
ideologies of criminality. In important ways, the class-inflected logics of criminal 
discourse, forged in the early-Victorian period, influenced the creation and the 
reception of crime ballads throughout the century. Responding to a hegemonic 
model that favored statistical prophecies of cultural doom, privileged the politi-
cal anxieties of the propertied classes, and supported the prejudicial inclinations 
of the judiciary, ballads often adopted a counterdiscursive stance. In their locally 
contextualized and aesthetically stylized representations of crime, street ballads 
broached class politics, criminal theories, judicial procedures, and penal policies 
in explicit and concrete terms. With the trope of the astonished witness and the 
criminal poet, ballads narrowed the distance between the criminal other and 
the “consensual ‘we.’” While often deconstructing institutional and ideological 
divisions between citizens and convicts, however, ballads also found ways to side 
against the state (and its binary logic) without simply siding with the criminal. 
Simultaneously advocating alternate readings of crimes, questioning already 
established punishments, and decrying the actions of murderers, ballads intro-
duced uncomfortable ambiguities and uncertainties into the discourse of crime 
and punishment. In doing so, they articulated a political sensibility concerned 
with the vexed and overdetermined relationship to poverty, policing, and pun-
ishment that characterized the lives of working-class citizens. Cultivating an aes-
thetic of immediacy and particularity—with eyewitness accounts of crimes and 
lyrical autobiographies of murderers—ballads claimed a poetic form of political 
speech with which to contest the ideological foundations of judicial and penal 
systems.
 While class operated as a heuristic for explaining crime, it also suggested 
associations between bad behavior and bad poetry. Given the widespread insis-
tence on the inherent deviance of the working classes, it is not surprising that 
street ballads about murder and execution, entangled within this network of 
presumptions about class and criminality, were often deemed accomplices to 
crime or that ballad singers, whose songs were believed to foster immorality and 
to glorify transgression, were suppressed by the police (Radzinowicz 275). Con-
fident that the slums produced criminals, not poets, critics envisioned causal 
links between ballad depravity and ballad production in London’s economically 
depressed Seven Dials district, where ballad printers operated and where “order 
[was] maintained by an extra force of policemen, and the first symptoms of riot 
[were] summarily suppressed” (Smith, The Little World 252). Even a somewhat 
sympathetic article in The National Review remains wary of the neighborhoods 
that curious parties must traverse in order to locate a ballad singer. Disgusted 
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by the abundance of debris and filth, the author proves mindful of the artistic 
void that will inevitably greet intrepid ballad scouts (and interested periodical 
readers) seeking out “some unspeakable ditty” sung in a “brazen twang” (398): 
“They will scarcely find a gleam of poetic power to repay them for weltering in 
whole seas of slip-slop” (“Street Ballads” 399). Punning, perhaps, on the gory 
“weltering” so common in ballad crime scenes, this author maintains that these 
intriguing but disappointing curiosities are both socially polluted and poetically 
debased.
 Like their working-class authors and audiences, these slum-dwelling bal-
lads are demoralized and disempowered, criminalized and ghettoized, silenced 
and suppressed. Marked by the class hierarchies of urban geography, they 
appear tainted by the vulgar technologies of mass-production. In them, the 
voices of the murderous poor flowed forth in badly composed songs, creating a 
flood of cheap commodities, defying respectable mores, and threatening public 
safety. Such frightful ideas about working-class production and consumption 
of ballads have contributed not only to scholarly dismissals of their aesthetic 
sophistication but also to widespread suspicion of their criminal tendencies. 
Appearing in late-Victorian England as the ballad trade waned, several classed 
ethnographies of the ballad trade paired aesthetic degeneration and moral 
debasement. John Ashton, who collected ballads as records of “social manners 
and customs” in Modern Street Ballads (1888) and lamented their late-nine-
teenth-century decline, nevertheless disputed their artistic value: “taking them 
as a whole, we must fain confess that art as applied to these Ballads was at its 
very lowest. Their literary merit is not great—but what can you expect for 
half-a-crown?” (Ashton vii–viii). Similarly, an article in The Quarterly Review, 
noting that “the metres employed” are “lawless” (“The Poetry of Seven Dials” 
385), explains, “though they teach little or no history, they show, at least, what 
kind of Poetry finds the most favourable reception and the readiest sale among 
our lowest classes” (404).
 When Francis J. Child, England’s dedicated collector of folk ballads, docu-
mented the “ancient national poetry” of the rural folk (366), he vigorously dif-
ferentiated England’s traditional rural populace from its modern urban masses: 
“The vulgar ballads of our day, the ‘broadsides’ which were printed in such huge 
numbers in England . . . belong to a different genus; they are products of a low 
kind of art, and most of them are, from a literary point of view, thoroughly 
despicable and worthless” (367). Child’s references to such “huge numbers” and 
“a different genus” suggest a hierarchical taxonomy of literary culture, in which 
ballads, by virtue of their accessibility and their modernity, occupy the realm of 
the “low,” the “despicable,” and the “worthless.” Fully invested in the cooptation 
and authority of rural peasant voices, the pastoral romance of national culture 
cannot abide or acknowledge the cultural evolution or literary innovation of a 
working-class population in an industrialized state. Degraded by urban locales 
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and signifying modern corruption, they defile a national culture and sully an 
antique past.
 With similar concerns, Sabine Baring-Gould, the collector responsible for 
preserving the British Library’s massive broadside collection, launched one of 
the most comprehensive assaults on the literary character of the street ballad. 
In an essay entitled “Broadside Ballads,” Baring-Gould criticizes, and virtually 
criminalizes, street ballad authors for favoring “the story of murder” and elevat-
ing the “vulgar assassin” to heroic status, and he explicitly blames street ballads 
for the sad demise of the “old romantic” ballads (190). Exhibiting a flagrant dis-
dain for national tradition and an “overweening” (212) faith in their own poetic 
powers, he explains, street balladeers audaciously penned their own unsavory 
verses while opportunistically purloining random lines from rural ballads when 
inspiration failed them. Instead of collecting and preserving the pastoral songs 
of the country folk, acts which would have popularized the ancient rural ballads 
and edified modern urban readers, “these pot-poets loafed about in the low 
London public-houses, where it was only by rarest chance that a country man, 
fresh from the fields, and woods, and downs, with his memory laden with the 
fragrance of the rustic music, was to be found” (213).
 Languishing in “public-houses” and possessing “neither taste, nor ear, nor 
genius,” they “poured forth floods of atrocious rhymes, and of utter balderdash, 
as was required as an occasion offered, and as they stood in need of half-crowns” 
(213).7 With “half-crowns” as their muses, these drunken bards alternately can-
nibalized ancient texts and spewed poetic filth. Aggravating these acts of gross 
literary indecency are their sinister affiliations with the morally unregenerate 
and economically opportunistic broadside print industry, which indiscrimi-
nately printed “the vile stuff composed by the half-tipsy, wholly-stupid band” 
(213) and, disseminating degenerate poetry throughout the streets and mar-
ketplaces of the nation, “did much to corrupt the taste of the peasant” (213). 
In Baring-Gould’s formulation, the positively criminal street-ballad writers, 
mired in urban sleaze, become “vulgar assassin[s]” guilty of the foulest of liter-
ary crimes. With “atrocious rhymes” and “vile stuff” as their weapons, they have 
driven ancient rural balladry, the literary essence of the nation, to an ignomini-
ous extinction.
 Baring-Gould’s accusations—in which aesthetic ineptitude and criminal 
aptitude as well as bad taste and bad manners come to define the murderous 
verses of the urban poor—participate in a larger aesthetic argument that demar-
cates the domains of artistic achievement and criminal sensibility along class 
lines. In an odd yoking of elderly women and the newspaper-reading masses 
(perhaps connected by a perceived lack of education or taste), Thomas de 
Quincey, the enthusiastic advocate of murder as fine art, dismisses the pos-
sibility of interpretive sophistication when the masses read about murder. In 
“On Murder Considered as One of the Fine Arts” (1827), he writes, “As to old 
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women, and the mob of newspaper readers, they are pleased with anything, 
provided it is bloody enough. But the mind of sensibility requires something 
more” (1008). De Quincey, interested in establishing a set of refined and struc-
tured aesthetic “principles of murder”—“not with a view to regulate your prac-
tice, but your judgment” (1008)—sees a lack of representational purpose and 
intellectual complexity in catalogues of bloody detail and gory imagery. In this 
formulation, the cognitive shortcomings of an unrefined mob and a populist 
aesthetic defined by quantities of blood combine to debase the aesthetics of 
murder. Along similar lines, in The Picture of Dorian Gray (1891), Wilde’s Lord 
Henry Wotton articulates late-Victorian aestheticism in classed terms when he 
confidently explains to Dorian that he is simply incapable of murder because 
“[c]rime belongs exclusively to the lower orders.” He adds, “I don’t blame them 
in the smallest degree. I should fancy that crime was to them what art is to us, 
simply a method of procuring extraordinary sensations” (252). Within this state-
ment about the procurement of “[e]xtraordinary sensations” lies an aesthetic 
distinction between the sensationalist excess of criminal acts and the intellectual 
restraint of aestheticist arts.
 Coded in various formats and cited with impressive frequency—by both 
historical figures and fictional characters with both playful irony and sincere 
gravity—these ideas about practice and judgment, sensibility and vulgarity, 
crime and culture, insist that the theme of murder presents a representational 
obstacle for the working-class imagination. Each of these literary theories of 
murder exhibits a characteristic reluctance on the part of the middle and upper 
classes to ascribe textual power to the lower classes, and, demarcating the realm 
of high literary culture, they also reflect a pervasive investment in the notion 
of their cultural illiteracy. Collapsing working-class subjects into an indistin-
guishable mass, adamantly denying them the ability to aestheticize crime, and 
liberally bestowing their ability to commit crimes, they uphold the criminality 
of the working classes while overlooking any artistic or political sensibility in 
criminal matters. Because crime substitutes for art, it would seem, the “lower 
orders” stand capable of committing murders but incapable of representing 
them.
 Retheorizing the “poetic power,” aesthetic sensibility, and cultural work of 
crime ballads—the most popular, profitable, and accessible genre of Victorian 
crime writing—requires consideration of these persistent stereotypes that shaped 
the content and the context of street literature. For with their representations 
of astonishment and lamentation, balladeers issued a substantial working-class 
reply to the nightmare of a dangerous and murderous mass. In “unvarnished” 
language and with a “brazen twang,” they challenged the totalizing categories of 
social scientific epistemologies, the ethical integrity of the criminal code, and the 
aesthetic and political discourses of the “consensual ‘we.’”
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“Wondering at Crime”:
Moral Pretexts and Criminal Politics
Confident of crime balladry’s ethnographic import, an article in The National 
Review presented it to a middle-class readership as “one of those windows 
through which we may get a glimpse at that very large body of our fellow- 
citizens of whom we know so little” (“Street Ballads” 399). When peering through 
this window, however, its author advocates reading practices that simplify bal-
lad ethics and depoliticize ballad contents. Distinguishing crime ballads from 
“political ballads,” which explicitly cite government legislation or specific states-
men, the essay examines a few murder ballads merely to exhibit their unifor-
mity: “the whole of the last dying speeches and confessions, trials and sentences, 
from whatever part of the country they come, run in the same form of quaint 
and circumstantial detail: appeals to Heaven, to young men, to young women, 
to Christians in general, and moral reflections” (405). Adding that “[w]e have 
seldom met with one of a different character” (405), the author strips these 
songs of poetic distinction, textual variety, and political intentionality while 
overestimating the significance and misrepresenting the consistency of moral-
istic frameworks.
 While many Victorian critics expressed disdain for the criminal reputations 
and murderous intentions of crime ballads, contemporary critics have estab-
lished a strong tradition of dismissing crime balladry on the grounds that it is 
poetically, politically, and morally conservative. Influenced by a critical legacy of 
ethnographic and historical analysis and limited by fixed definitions of politi-
cal speech and textual complexity, contemporary studies have emphasized the 
language of didacticism and the limitations of genre. These commentaries, sur-
prisingly consistent, almost always imagine a comparative narrative history in 
which ballads serve as foils to more successful and significant political protests 
or literary projects.8
 Accusations of conservatism have not gone wholly uncontested. Douglas 
Jerrold, for example, blamed the moral mandates of an increasingly conserva-
tive mainstream culture for the broadside ballad’s decline: “[t]he public ear has 
become dainty, fastidious, hypocritical; hence, the Ballad-Singer languishes and 
dies” (qtd. in Hindley, History xxxviii). More recently, acknowledging the threat 
of censorship, Richard Altick has suggestively articulated the dilemma of ballad 
morality as an imposition “from above” rather than an initiative “from below.” 
The moral frame, he argues, was often simply “a device employed by the printer’s 
hireling lyricists to fend off the persistent complaints of the pious that crime 
literature of the streets was morally poisonous” (49). Such reflections on the 
precise causes and effects of ballad moralizing remind us of the street ballad’s 
dynamic public presence, and they suggest that, in foregrounding aphorisms 
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and overemphasizing uniformity, we overlook other important features of the 
genre.
 Remedying the problem of critical literacy in the study of street ballads is 
most easily accomplished by examining ballads. For in them we see that mur-
der ballads join other surviving broadsides of various genres to reveal a con-
sistently and explicitly class-conscious approach to criminal representation, 
and even brief examples sufficiently demonstrate their aesthetic diversity and 
ethical nuance. Moral advice, for example, often appeared in precepts that were 
either marginal to or overwhelmed by the act of murder, and where tangential 
or inverted, such advisories subverted or obscured conventional moral author-
ity. At a time when emotional, psychological, and medical causes for crime were 
being considered, while common law rigorously resisted mitigation, traditional 
explanations continued to serve—often with ironic implications.
 In many ballads, for example, Satan, bearing the burden of some, if not all, 
criminal responsibility, introduces legal and ethical complications. “He was by 
Satan led” and “he with Satan did connive” frequently explained sin, absolved 
guilt, or sensationalized crimes. In the “Copy of Verses” printed or “Particulars 
of the Life, Trial, Confession, and Execution of Courvoisier” (1840) (figure 3), 
when the condemned aristocrat-killer cries out, “the fiend exulting stood before 
me / For he had worked my overthrow,” he disrupts the unitary nature of crimi-
nal responsibility. Moreover, interpreting his crime with a Christian mythos, 
this ballad criminal intimates the political versatility and ethical ambiguity of 
Christian discourse in which practices of retribution conflict with notions of 
forgiveness. In “Going to See a Man Hanged” (1840), Thackeray records the 
experience of witnessing Courvoisier’s hanging and reminds his readers that the 
ostensibly simple identity of Christian England is, in fact, politically complex. In 
a sharply ironic depiction of this Christian nation, he explains, “government, a 
Christian government, gives us a feast every now and then: it agrees, that is to 
say, a majority in the two houses agrees, that for certain crimes it is necessary 
that a man should be hanged by the neck” (157). In a similar way, in “The Life, 
Trial, Sentence, and Execution of S. Adams for the Murder of His Sister-in-Law, 
Martha Page” (1859), the condemned speaker challenges distinctions between 
himself and his audience using a Christian notion of original sin: “Do not con-
demn before you listen, / None is without their crimes on earth; / None without 
some stain upon him, / We are all sinners from our birth.” Whether constituting 
allusions to committed abolitionists or acknowledging an audience of fellow 
sinners, the “feeling Christians” so often hailed in street ballads, and so often 
decried by critics as evidence of political conservatism, evoke the moral com-
plexities of apprehending and punishing criminals.
 Further demonstrating the ways in which crime balladry created oppor-
tunities for interpretive license, “Miles Weatherhill, the Young Weaver, and his 
Figure 3
Particulars of the Life, Trial, Confession, and Execution of Courvoisier. Dying 
Speeches Portfolio 271: Hollis no. 8094160. Courtesy of Special Collections Depart-
ment, Harvard Law School Library.
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Sweetheart, Sarah Bell” (1868) challenges expected moral linkages between 
criminal acts and crime prevention. The lesson attached to Weatherhill’s slaying 
of Jane Smith, who interfered with his courtship of the young Sarah Bell, is not, 
“Thou shalt not kill,” but rather, “Where true love is planted, there let it dwell.” 
Targeting potential meddlers rather than potential rogues, the ballad proposes 
an unexpected schema of causation and remedy. If romantic chaperoning and 
sexual propriety incite lethal passions, and if didacticism should address the 
cause and not the effect, then the nurturing of “true love” offers a particularly 
pleasant solution to the national problem of crime.
 We might similarly consider the subversive meanings made possible by the 
subtleties of poetic form and literary language. For example, in another Cour-
voisier ballad, “Trial, Sentence, Confession, and Execution of F. B. Courvoisier 
for the Murder of Lord Wm. Russell” (1840), moral outrage is subjected to the 
humorous effects of alliterative flourishes when his murderous actions are diag-
nosed as a problem of “pilfering passions.” Not merely accidents of mass pro-
duction or hasty composition, such moments of suggestive irony and irreverent 
humor suggest the awareness of authors and audiences of their verbal and politi-
cal impact. Attentive to the interplay of genre and discourse, we can read such 
moments of poetic play and criminolegal wit in the context of Victorian laws, 
trials, and punishments in which they circulated.
 With more overt references to historical context, which generated institu-
tional critiques on a larger scale, ballads often redirected moral judgments away 
from the crimes and punishments of individual criminals and toward structural 
analyses of social inequalities. The song of the “Dreadful Murder at Eriswell,” for 
example, sidelines the condemnation of two poachers who murdered a grounds-
keeper, preferring instead to argue for the repeal of “those cursed Game Laws,” 
which “has been the cause, / Of many a life’s blood to be shed.” With such ethical 
surprises and political allusions, balladeers, enjoying the interpretive liberties 
conferred by poetic license, privileged topical assessments of the crimes they 
documented. Linking social inequalities to criminal activities, they defamiliar-
ized the moral conventions of criminal discourse and unraveled the didactic 
threads of a centuries-old genre. In these cases, ballads implicitly or explicitly 
absolved individuals of criminal responsibility while providing contexts that 
indicted social hierarchies. Representing crimes and punishments in both ethi-
cally playful and politically sobering ways, these maneuvers invited readers to 
reconsider the implications of particular crimes as well as more general theories 
of criminality.
 In some cases, specific crimes provided opportunities to overturn expedi-
ent divisions between the dangerous masses and the respectable classes. For 
example, “Murder of A Wife at Ashburnham, Near Hastings,” highlights a scene 
of inverted class relations when a group of “servants” and “labourers,” acting as 
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policing authorities, hunt Jeremiah Stubberfield, the son of an “aged, wealthy 
sire” who has fled after murdering his wife:
They did pursue the murderer,
They in numbers went along,
Searched the hedges and the ditches,
Dragged the river and the ponds;
Traveling “in numbers” (the stereotypical working-class mob), these upstanding 
laborers defy ordinary moral hierarchies when they take extraordinary measures 
to apprehend a wealthy, propertied, and hitherto respectable wife-killer. The 
crime’s political force takes shape in the image of household servants and farm 
laborers “pursu[ing] the murderer”—their fugitive master and landlord—across 
the countryside.
 Similarly, references to the physical and emotional pain of capital punish-
ment, the judicial context of all murder and execution ballads, created trou-
bling juxtapositions of disgust for perpetrators of outrageous violence, empathy 
for their unsuspecting victims, and sympathy for condemned criminals. “The 
Execution of Five Pirates” (1864), for example, emphasizes the contradictory 
responses elicited by execution: “And though they were not fit to live, / We pity 
to them on the gallows, / Englishmen could not deny.” The pairing of ethical 
disgust and undeniable pity, which reconnects marginalized criminals to main-
stream sentiments, is so common in crime balladry that we must consider it a 
central trope. When the processes of abhorring the crime and abhorring the 
punishment are conjoined, ballads express the irresolvable moral dilemma of 
capital punishment, which answers one killing with another.
 Reiterating this dilemma, ballads often realign margin and center in ways 
that recall Stallybrass and White’s definition of transgression. In tracing rela-
tions between social margins and symbolic centers, Stallybrass and White 
adopt Barbara Babcock’s definition of “symbolic inversion.” Babcock writes, 
“‘Symbolic inversion’ may be broadly defined as any act of expressive behavior 
which inverts, contradicts, abrogates, or in some fashion presents an alternative 
to commonly held cultural codes, values and norms be they linguistic, liter-
ary or artistic, religious, social and political” (qtd. in Stallybrass and White 17). 
In the aforementioned examples, from Satan manipulating murderers to poor 
laborers hunting wealthy wife-killers to bad pirates inspiring sympathy pangs, 
ballad writers deploy the rhetorical power of inverted meanings. Even in these 
brief excerpts, we can see how balladeers politicized as they publicized scan-
dalous crimes and spectacular punishments. Rather than simply applying the 
discourses of conventional moral authority, ballad writers often explored the 
classed politics and the collective experience of crime and punishment with 
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nuanced narrative details and allegorized symbolic inversions. Diminishing the 
significance of conventional moralistic framing devices, the inclusion of digres-
sive and unexpected references to mitigating factors, ethical conflicts, and class 
tensions opened up the street ballad genre to poetic and political variety.
 As balladeers exploited the poetic and political opportunities of historical 
crimes, they often exposed the internal contradictions and institutional inter-
ests of criminal policies. In “John Bull, Can You Wonder At Crime?” (figure 4) 
the narrator criticizes the privileged classes of the nation, with their “riches in 
heaps stowed away, / Mouldy with age and mildew,” for willfully mystifying the 
rising crime rate while impoverishing (and endangering) the working classes. 
Apostrophizing John Bull, and continuing with an ironically charged “sir,” the 
speaker suggests the economic roots of crime by noting discrepancies between 
England’s scenes of abject poverty and the hoarded wealth of the nation and 
its wondering elite: “Your gold to yourself you confine, / Where a little would 
make a great change, sir, / In our terrible increase of crime.” Describing tempta-
tion and desperation, the ballad contrasts the harassment and imprisonment 
of earnest, hard-working, “poor Costermongers” with the relative impunity of 
“grinning,” pick-pocketing “rogue[s].” Meanwhile, “poor needle girls,” who are 
“[t]rying their best to exist,” the ballad explains, inevitably resort to sexual labor: 
“Can you wonder at their prostitution, / When blood-sucking forms barely give / 
Enough to ward off destitution.” The narrator then admonishes “Mr. Bull,” ask-
ing him to acknowledge the modest aspirations and vulnerable sensibilities of 
these impoverished girls, as they function “[w]ith feelings as keen and as tender, 
/ As your proud city ladies, remember.” Having gentrified criminality with an 
indictment of the parasitic pastimes of the nation’s wealthy, the violent effects 
of capital accumulation, and the predatory varieties of roguish privilege, the 
narrator critiques, in an authoritative and commonsensical tone, the lingering 
perplexity of the nation: “And still you keep wondering at crime.”
 “John Bull, Can You Wonder at Crime” sketches an England in which the 
rarefied discourse of criminal theory and the policing mechanisms of the state 
justify the continued arrogance and privilege of an elite class, which masks its 
investments in the continuation of poverty with an anxious rhetoric about the 
“increase in crime.” Exasperated by this situation, which is presented in this bal-
lad as a calculated performance, the narrator commands, “Go and listen to the 
great pangs of hunger / And never more wonder at crime.” The narrator also pre-
scribes a remedy for both the disingenuous bewilderment of the nation and the 
debilitating suffering of the poor: “[j]ust visit the dens of the poor” and “scatter 
your hoarded up gold.” Demanding a redistribution of wealth and an end to 
mystification, the ballad narrator inverts the relationship between expertise and 
common sense and removes moral authority from the propertied classes and 
places it at the criminalized margins.
Figure 4
John Bull, Can You Wonder at Crime? © British Library Board. All Rights Reserved.
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 With a similar attention to the politics of crime and class, ballads about 
the metropolitan police, which constituted a ballad genre in their own right, 
problematized the deployment of a centralized police force and the recruitment 
of policemen from the working classes. These ballads frequently questioned the 
methods of distinguishing between the state and the people and scrutinized the 
practices of delineating power and its subjects. Proclaiming that “in the coun-
try all around, / The people do severely frown,” “Complaints Against the New 
Police” considers the financing of the new police force and documents the activi-
ties of a petitioning underclass. Their political organizing offsets the silencing 
tactics of an overzealous police state in which public speech constitutes provoca-
tion and justifies incarceration: “And if a word to them you say, / They’ll drag 
you off without delay / Unto the Station-House.” The persona of the upwardly 
mobile policeman also appears in many ballads. “I’m One of the New Police,” 
for example, highlights the performance quality of the uniform: “My gloves of 
white, my coat of blue, / My dignity increase” (qtd. in Hindley, Life 207).
 A long-running joke about police harassment constituted the most popular 
ballad characterization of the police, which began in 1829 with Peel’s Metro-
politan Police Act but which Hindley traces well into the Victorian era. In this 
comical scenario, policemen are presented as gluttonous mutton thieves who 
attempt to capitalize on the illusion of respectability and the access to authority 
(and mutton) secured by their uniforms. “The New Policeman, and the Somers 
Town Butcher” confronts the policeman and deconstructs his props:
Hollo! New Police,
Who in blue coats strut on,
Your fame you won’t increase
By stealing joints of mutton.
Who would e’er suppose,
In such handsome rigging,
Spick and span new clothes,
Men would go a prigging? (qtd. in Hindley 203)
With the anxious topic of crime depicted as a question of “prigging” and the 
mechanisms of state supervision reduced to “handsome rigging,” the ballad 
parodies cultural anxieties about increasing crime and mocks the disciplinary 
power of the police.
 In ballad scenarios of poetic justice, mutton-thieving policemen often 
suffer a humiliating comeuppance at the hands of an unsympathetic judicial 
bureaucracy. In “The Lamentation in Newgate of the Police-Man, Who Boned 
the Mutton,” the sentencing judge invokes the criminal stereotypes that code 
the desperation of urban poverty as the dissipation of a criminal class. As he 
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narrates his “downfall,” the lamenting policeman receives a judgment commonly 
passed on the poor in English courts:
“We are certain, Mr. Jones,
You intended for to take away
Both mutton, meat and bones.
You did not steal the meat for want
To pay you was not willing
When you stole the meat, you had
In your pocket fifteen shillings.”
Effecting a symbolic inversion and subversion of official power, this narrative 
logic is crucial to the ballad’s comedic and political content. In establishing his 
criminal intent, negating the existence of “want,” asserting his disdain for hon-
esty, ruling that he simply was not “willing” to pay, and concluding that he “must 
in confinement dwell,” the court demotes the policeman to the criminal classes. 
Replete with parodic reversals and comical self-references—from the exagger-
ated lamenting of the former policeman (“O the mutton! / That fatal bit of mut-
ton!”) to the contrived villainous testimony of the “cruel greasy Butcher”—this 
ballad manipulates the metonymic significance of the police in order to analyze 
the social effects of law enforcement and judicial practices. Applied to the police 
rather than the criminal, and mutton-thieving rather than murder, these lam-
entation tropes exemplify the self-parodic and self-reflexive engagements of the 
genre.9
 The ethical and interpretive dilemmas surrounding murder, of course, 
offered balladeers more shocking subject matter and inspired more complex 
representational strategies. When deploying murder for the purpose of cultural 
critique, ballads often broached their political arguments more forcefully and 
more gravely. Of murder’s symbolic function, Foucault writes, “Murder estab-
lishes the ambiguity of the lawful and the unlawful” (Rivière 206). This ambigu-
ity arises because “murder posits the relation between power and the people, 
stripped down to its essentials: the command to kill, the prohibition against 
killing; to be killed, to be executed; voluntary sacrifice, punishment inflicted; 
memory, oblivion. Murder prowls the confines of the law, on one side or the 
other, above or below it; it frequents power, sometimes against and sometimes 
with it” (206). A shorthand for dissecting the power relations that determined 
lawfulness and unlawfulness, murder effectively fragmented and condensed the 
circulating ideologies of crime and class. If murder “prowls” the borders of the 
lawful and the unlawful, it is not surprising that the class which was understood 
to exist at that same limit might buy and sell songs that scrutinized those expla-
nations.
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 Contemplating the criminal broadside’s popularity, Foucault reads its mar-
ketplace success as a fantasy of criminal resistance: “if these true stories of every-
day history were received so avidly, if they formed part of the basic reading of the 
lower classes, it was because people found in them not only memories, but also 
precedents; the interest of ‘curiosity’ is also a political interest” (Discipline and 
Punish 68). Yet, in perceiving ballad popularity as a mark of criminal potential—
and crime ballads as accomplices to or inspirations for crime—Foucault links, 
with stereotyping fascination, ballad reading and criminal activity. With respect 
to English street ballads in particular, “curiosity” and “political interest” intersect 
quite differently; the popularity of the crime ballads does not signify merely a 
fascination with blood or outlaws but, more, a critique of power. Because the law 
mandated death for murder and because most convicted murderers were work-
ing-class, the unlawful circumstances of particular crimes and the lawful deaths 
of the scaffold were of particular importance. And while murder exposed the 
relationships of power between the criminal and the state in the most explicit 
terms, it also accessed more intimate manifestations of power between murder-
ers and their victims. For this reason, the often overwhelmingly graphic repre-
sentations of specific crimes and the intricately politicized rendering of specific 
executions can be seen as attempts to claim interpretive authority.
 An interest in mediating authority also informed the ways in which ballads 
constituted their audiences. For example, although many crime ballads con-
structed their audience as a collection of morally edified innocents, an equally 
significant number acknowledged an audience of murder tale aficionados 
schooled in the astonishing violence of individual criminals and state policies. 
The verses in the “Life, Trial, Character, Confession, and Execution of Stephen 
Forward” (1866), for instance, construct readers as crime history enthusiasts: 
“Of all the crimes we ever heard, of all the crimes we read, / Sure none on earth 
did ever know, a more sad dreadful deed.” The narrator of the “Lamentation of 
J. Mapp” (1867) places Mapp’s crime within a comparative framework: “Such a 
dreadful murder, as you may see, / Which we may compare to the Alton trag-
edy.” Similarly, “The Liverpool Tragedies,” printed on the broadsheet “Execution 
of John Gleeson Wilson,” registers the crime’s magnitude by citing notorious 
murderers, such as James Greenacre, whose ballads sold well into the millions in 
1837. And “Lamentation of H. Lingley” (1867) references the notorious James 
Bloomfield Rush, whose execution ballad sold two and a half million copies in 
1849. Lingley, the ballad informs us, will die “[o]n the very tree where Rush met 
his fate” and will lie “[b]y the side of Rush in a murderer’s grave.”
 Such name-dropping implies a readership interested in historical crimes and 
executions and steeped in the knowledge of violent death, but it also reveals that 
ballad writers exploited anxieties about the pervasiveness of crime and invoked 
the prevailing crime-obsessed spirit of the age. The narrator of the “Lamentation 
of J. Mapp” reports:
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How sad and dreadful it is to state,
The horrid murders that have been of late;
In every quarter both far and near,
Such atrocious deeds before this no one did hear.
These intertextual and historicist references ask readers to assess individual 
crimes against a backdrop of cultural history and to consider their national 
significance. Offering rough sketches of unprecedented “horrid murders” and 
“atrocious deeds,” this comparativist mode undoubtedly served to heighten the 
marketplace appeal of ballads, but it also underscored the textual history of the 
ballads and the cultural literacy of their audience.
 In each of these ballad techniques—ethical ambivalence, symbolic inversion, 
legal intervention, historical contextualization—we can see efforts to renegoti-
ate moral equations and conduct political analyses. Their aesthetic innovation, 
political interests, and poetic variety remind us that crime balladeers continu-
ally renegotiated the relationships between generic conventions and historical 
events. As they selected content and shifted emphasis to create fictionalized rep-
resentations of actual crimes, they produced meaningful tensions between the 
details of historical cases and the details of ballad crimes. In these tensions, 
we can glimpse the political charge of ballad poetics. With arguments about 
the criminal tendencies and moral primness of crime ballads delineated and 
dismantled, the remainder of this chapter explores the specific representational 
strategies of astonishing disclosures and last lamentations and considers the 
relationships between poetic crimes and historical criminals.
The Aesthetics of Astonishment:
Acts of Murder and Scenes of Crime
Narrated from the point of view of an astonished witness, third-person aston-
ishing disclosures proclaimed the news of crime to a shocked and saddened 
citizenry, and deploying their rubric of astonishment and disclosure, they parsed 
the complex meanings of murder. Rarely depicted as isolated instances of appall-
ing deviance, murders appeared in these texts as socially entangled mishaps and 
wholly collective tragedies worthy of close scrutiny and sustained reflection. In 
privileging astonishment, they differentiated moral and aesthetic responses to 
crime. Their notorious “full particulars” of gruesome killings and blood-soaked 
crime scenes constructed a political aesthetic of murder rooted in the signifying 
power of murderous agency and hapless victimization.
 Assessing the aesthetic dimensions of murder, Joel Black writes, “Our reac-
tions to . . . fictional representations of murder may range from horror to admi-
ration, but whatever shock we experience will consist of aesthetic astonishment 
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rather than of moral outrage” (9). This distinction between “moral outrage” and 
“aesthetic astonishment” sheds light on the repeated ballad promise of aston-
ishing disclosures that would “make the blood run cold.” As stylized violence 
proliferates in these songs of murder, aesthetic astonishment overtakes moral 
outrage as the genre’s epistemological mode.
 As legend has it, James Catnach, the publisher credited with bringing the 
crime ballad to new literary heights and unprecedented sales in the first half of 
the nineteenth century, extolled the textual power of “the most beautiful mur-
der” (Mayhew 302) and thereby established a market value in which aesthetic 
criteria, not ethical dichotomies, informed the contemplation of “barbarous 
deeds” (Hindley, Life 361). The preference for contemplation over judgment also 
informed the advertising slogans used by ballad singers to peddle their scenes of 
murderous violence in the streets. Accordingly, “those connected with murder-
patter” (Mayhew 302) conceived of their economic opportunities in aesthetic 
terms: “There’s nothing beats a stunning good murder, after all” (223).10 Recall-
ing his own peripatetic investigations into the ballad trade while researching his 
History of the Catnach Press in August 1869, Charles Hindley explains that, even 
as a respectable scholar conducting research, he reacted not to the promise of a 
morality tale, but to the promise of gruesome detail:
[O]ur ears voluntarily ‘pricked up,’ on hearing the old familiar sounds 
of a ‘street, or running patterer’ with the stereotyped sentences of ‘Hor-
rible.’—‘Dreadful.’—‘Remarkable letters founds on his person.’—‘Cut down 
by a labouring man.’—‘Quite dead.’—‘Well-known in the town.’—‘Hang-
ing.’—‘Coroner’s Inquest.’—‘Verdict.’—‘Full particulars,’—‘Most determined 
suicide.’—‘Brutal conduct.’—&c., &c., Only a ha’penny—Only a ha’penny! 
(History x)
Conducting his study during the decline of the ballad trade, Hindley records his 
nostalgia for “old familiar sounds,” but, in isolating the resonant “stereotyped 
sentences,” he also documents the aesthetic project of the crime ballad market-
place. Framed in such energetic and exclamatory language, the components of 
“the most beautiful murder” privilege the poetics of astonishment and diminish 
the force of didacticism.
 With their emphasis on violent agency (“most determined”), passionate 
excess (“brutal conduct”), and gory minutiae (“full particulars”), these songs 
required audiences to confront and consider the contingent and contentious 
meanings of murderous violence. The narrative strength of bloody descrip-
tions and the iterative force of brutality contribute to what Martha Vicinus has 
described in general terms as the crime broadside’s ability to “provide forms 
and language for understanding the daily violence of one’s own life” and to 
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“provid[e] readers with a means of interpreting and managing violence” (Indus-
trial Muse 16). Astonishing disclosures in particular managed the theme of mur-
der by forcing questions about the particular causes, the collective effects, and 
the social consequences of extreme violence.
 Through the voice of an anonymous narrator, third-person ballads enu-
merate the full particulars of murders by elaborating on details gleaned from 
official sources. Such reconstructions embed the multiple perspectives of crimi-
nals, eyewitnesses, neighbors, policemen, and judges. Submitting details for our 
interpretation, ballad murders often involve planning stages, explanatory letters, 
and murderer-victim dialogues, which punctuate, disrupt, or incite violence, 
and they frequently dramatize fragments of official discourse, such as coroner 
reports or signed confessions, excerpts of which might be supplied in prose sec-
tions of the broadsides on which they appear. Recasting official information, 
ballads elaborate any idiosyncrasies that might serve the needs of aesthetic effect 
or political suggestion.
 The interplay of historical record and fictional elaboration extends to ballad 
crime scenes, the remains of murderous force discovered by authorities and doc-
umented by ballad narrators. Offering meticulous renderings of the grotesque 
arrangement or bloody disposal of bodies, crime scenes fulfill the promise of 
astonishment and disclosure with scenes of stylized gore. It is thus via the poet-
ics of astonishment that “full and energetic” representations of murder produce 
both riveting aesthetic scenes and complex ethical situations. The business of 
ballad writing mandated this aestheticized treatment of murder by attempting 
to supply the artistic flair overlooked by the historical criminal who, as Mayhew’s 
informer reports, had no “regard for the interest of art and literature” (225).
 In this strange collaboration, the murderer and the balladeer create gro-
tesque bodily texts that develop the aesthetically overpowering and culturally 
resonant anatomy of a murder. Not simply a sensational or disinterested aes-
thetic, “the stunning good murder” voiced concerns about the social origins of 
murderous transgression and the cultural conditions of astonishing victimiza-
tion. Exploring the social complexity of appalling violence, they demand inter-
pretation—not outrage. In explicitly framing this terrible aesthetic in stunning 
or astonishing narratives, street ballads popularized an aesthetic of the sublime. 
In A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and Beau-
tiful (1757), Edmund Burke argues that astonishment constitutes the “effect of 
the sublime in its highest degree” (101), and his reflections on bodily pain and 
hideous objects assist in sorting out the strategies with which the murder ballad 
scrutinized the baffling conflicts between individual agency and social prohibi-
tion that surrounded murder and execution.
 The affective force of astonishment also created opportunities for ethical 
impact, and, although critics have often aligned ballads with melodramatic 
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forms in order to underscore their textual incompetence, more recent articula-
tions of melodramatic forms are instructive in exploring the ethical complexi-
ties of ballad poetics. Peter Brooks’s “rehabilitation” (xi) of melodrama in The 
Melodramatic Imagination (1976), for example, defines melodrama as a “mode 
of excess” that deploys the “aesthetics of astonishment” in order to engage moral 
conflicts. Explaining that melodrama enacts rhetoric of “overstatement and 
overemphasis” (36), which forces a confrontation with an evil that “astonishes” 
and “disarms” (34), Brooks concludes, “melodramatic rhetoric, and the whole 
expressive enterprise of the genre, represents a victory over repression” (41). 
Forcefully depicting that which has been subject to “censorships, accommoda-
tions, tonings-down” in other literary forms, melodrama “achieves plenitude of 
meaning” (41).
 While ballads frequently privilege tragic plots or sublime aesthetics over 
melodramatic structures—and likewise astonishment over outrage—Brooks’s 
“rehabilitation” of melodrama usefully acknowledges the signifying complexities 
inherent in the ostensibly reductive exhortations and clichéd hyperboles that 
frequently operated in melodramatic texts—and in street ballads. Viewing street 
ballads in a similarly rehabilitative mode, we can see that, like stage melodra-
mas, they developed a confrontational aesthetics of astonishment and achieved 
a “plenitude of meaning” that produced an epistemology of ambivalence, differ-
entiation, and critique. With a plenitude of violence in particular, they fostered 
new levels of astonishment as they configured collective distress, and, in unset-
tling aphoristic equations of innocence and guilt, ballads rendered murders as 
reflections of, rather than deviations from, mainstream Victorian culture.
 Revising and challenging Brooks’s psychologized schema, Elaine Hadley’s 
Melodramatic Tactics (1995) envisions the “melodramatic mode” as an embodi-
ment of a “polemical” and “reactionary rejoinder to social change” (3). It is 
a textual project, which, through “a productive friction” or “a creative dis-
junction,” challenges cultural shifts within the market system of nineteenth- 
century capitalist production with a “resistant energy” that “emerges from what 
Jonathan Dollimore calls ‘the inevitable incompleteness and surplus of con-
trol itself ’” (10). Hadley briefly catalogues the stock features of this mode: “its 
familial narratives of dispersal and reunion, its emphatically visual renderings of 
bodily torture and criminal conduct, its atmospheric menace and providential 
plotting, its expressions of highly charged emotion, and its tendency to per-
sonify absolutes like good and evil” (3). Hadley’s list of melodramatic features 
lends insight into the causes and effects of ballad innovations, which deploy 
similar “melodramatic tactics” to explore the social dynamics of control. Their 
“emphatically visual renderings of bodily torture and criminal conduct” chal-
lenged the axioms of crime and class, and, applied to specific crimes, they also 
staged shocked and saddened reactions to crimes in order to demonstrate the 
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collectively shared experience of criminality and victimization. Hadley’s asser-
tion that the melodramatic mode “exerted an impact on the production of cul-
tural meaning” in spite of its existence as a “less autonomous” (10) discursive 
practice has useful applications for a revision of ballad hermeneutics. Such a 
definition of textual power accounts for multiple layers of crime ballad signi-
fication, from the conventional features of melodramatic emplotment, to the 
polemical qualities of “less autonomous” literature, to the culturally reactive 
force behind the melodramatic mode.
 Applying these critical insights, we can see the processes of what Hadley 
labels “productive friction” in ballad representations of murderous acts and 
crime scenes. With them, murder ballads frequently introduced troubling details 
that highlighted the intimate complexities of violent circumstances and insinu-
ated the epistemological shortcomings of legal fictions and judicial reasoning. 
While these astonishing disclosures explored obscure sequences of causes and 
effects and intentions and actions, they also addressed the painful consequences 
of collective reckoning. The bloody particulars of murderous violence suggested 
that, both literally and figuratively, murder is messy, and where De Quincey 
perceives bloodlust, ballad writers sensed, to borrow John Kucich’s phrase, “the 
political use of moral disorder” (2).
 Offering a particularly vivid and gory example of the ballad aesthetic of 
astonishment is the ballad of “The Liverpool Tragedies,” which was printed on 
the broadside “Execution of John Gleeson Wilson” (1849). This ballad engages 
the political uses of moral disorder by reconstructing Wilson’s murders of Mrs. 
Heinrichsen, her two children, and a female servant “for the sake of cursed gold.” 
Detailing these “dreadful murders” for “feeling christians,” the ballad invents 
snippets of dialogue to undertake the task of explication:
His bloody work he did commence all in the open day,
By striking at the children while their mother was away,
The servant girl did interfere, said, “should not do so,”
Then with a poker in his hand he gave her a severe blow.
Numberless times he did her strike till she could no longer stand,
The blood did flow profusely from her wounds, and did him brand,
Then the eldest boy of five years old, in supplication said,
“Oh master, spare our precious lives, don’t serve us like the maid.”
This darling child of five years old he brutally did kill,
Regardless of its tender cries, its precious blood did spill,
The youngest child to the kitchen ran, to shun the awful knife,
This villain followed after and took its precious life.
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In the “open day” a killer, with clearly inscribed motive and clearly expressed 
intent, commences his “bloody work” and destroys a household as his victims 
appeal to sympathy and attempt to escape. Garrett Stewart, who maintains that 
literary Victorians tended to die “vocally,” argues that deathbed conversations 
could “inscribe the indecipherable” (13). Like these more benign and less violent 
deathbed conversations, street ballad dialogues between murderers and victims 
allowed murder narratives to articulate the indecipherable nature of violent 
death and to accommodate the audience’s expectations of disclosure.
 The desperate final words of the servant girl (“should not do so”) and the 
“tender cries” of the five-year-old “darling child” attempt to check the forces of 
disorder. With their meager pleas for the preservation of their “precious lives” 
and “precious blood,” the ballad highlights Wilson’s merciless intentions and 
avaricious motives. Readers are asked to contemplate the intensity and inten-
tionality of his violent actions, for “[r]egardless” of moral arguments and “sup-
plication,” Wilson, wielding a “poker” and an “awful knife” and “striking at the 
children while the mother was away,” destroys their lives with “severe blow[s].” 
These murdered ballad-children embody uncorrupted innocence, but, in this 
contest between meek supplication and violent renunciation, they also signify 
ethical frailties and moral failures. Their invocations of mercy cannot check 
Wilson’s violence, and, unsuccessful in inspiring restraint and escaping Wilson’s 
weapons, the children emphasize the utter failure of the lawful, which, the bal-
lad suggests, even collective witnessing and state-sanctioned punishment cannot 
fully restore.
 While the broadside’s prose report portrays the murder victims in terms 
of conventionally gendered notions of vulnerability (“two unprotected women 
and two helpless children”), the ballad broadens the notion of victimization to 
include witnesses and survivors. The grief-stricken father, whose “hair [will] 
turn grey with grief,” mournfully acknowledges that “[n]o skill their lives could 
save,” and the citizens of Liverpool form a suffering collectivity, which laments 
the “fate of this poor family.” Just as, in the aftermath of the quadruple murder, 
“[t]housands did besiege the gates” of the hospital to ascertain the fate of the 
victims, “thousands did bewail” the victims’ sad ends. As the traumatized mem-
bers of the community gather together, we are told, “consternation did prevail.” 
Broadening the scope of the crime’s impact even further, the ballad also inter-
prets it in terms of national history. Noting that “[t]he like was not recorded in 
British history,” it dramatizes the inadequacies of moral authority and the pain 
of a national “tragedy.”
 Just as the murder dialogue, consisting of verbal supplication and violent 
dismissals, stages the inefficacy of moral law, the crime scene reiterates this sad 
failure in the brutalized bodies of the victims. In “The Liverpool Tragedies,” 
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the surgeon reads the crime scene in terms of both bodily abjection and social 
tragedy:
The surgeon thus describes the scene presented to his view,
A more appalling case than this he says he never knew,
Four human beings on the floor all weltering in their gore,
The sight was sickening to behold on entering the door.
The surgeon’s claim that he “never knew” a “more appalling case” and that the 
sight was “sickening to behold” attests to the unprecedented and, therefore, 
astonishing nature of the case. Here, the corpses “weltering in their gore” con-
front and overwhelm the surgeon, and the reader, with the “appalling” effects of 
murderous violence. The ballad then produces the precise details of the “sicken-
ing” scene:
The mother’s wounds three inches deep upon her head and face,
And pools of blood as thick as mud, from all of them could trace,
None could identify the boy, his head was like a jelly;
This tragedy is worse by far than Greenacre or Kelly.
With abject similes (“blood as thick as mud” and a head “like a jelly”), clinical 
details (“wounds three inches deep”), and the overall image of four bloodied 
and disfigured “human beings,” the ballad uses a melodramatic “mode of excess” 
to produce astonishment. This excess is reinforced by accentual stresses on the 
most grotesque elements: “pools,” “blood,” “thick,” “mud.” While critics consis-
tently note the visual impact of ballad gore, the aural impact produced by met-
rical arrangements, and, in these particular instances, sheer monosyllabic force, 
also contribute to the poetics of astonishment.
 In this way, ballads could use the bodies of victims to reject simple under-
standings of moral order and violent disorder. The interpretive process of 
reading the bodies of the victims is repeatedly invoked in the ballad trade. In 
a broadside printed by the infamous Catnach, under a woodcut entitled “The 
Arrest of the Prisoner,” a caption connecting murderous speech and violated 
corpse appears: “For murder, though it have no tongue, will speak with a most 
miraculous organ” (qtd. in Hindley, History 274). The heteroglossic layers of 
these lines from Hamlet invite more than a moral warning about clues and cap-
ture.11 The phrase turns an investigative notion into an aesthetic one by suggest-
ing the communicative value of the corpse, which utters a miraculous speech 
in a miraculous form—literally in the “organs” of the murdered. In the con-
text of ballad crimes, such grotesque utterances cannot be easily absorbed by a 
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disciplinary ideology or deflected by a didactic morality. In “The Liverpool 
Tragedies,” the “sickening” vision of four mutilated corpses signifies stark and 
brutal truths. As spectacles of violent disorder, they inform their audience that 
something is rotten in England, and eliciting astonishment and “consterna-
tion,” rather than outrage and panic, they propose grim reflections on crime as 
a shared social affliction.
 “The Liverpool Tragedies” links outrageous violence to the temptations of 
“cursed gold,” but more often, ballads, reflecting the historical realities of violent 
crime, reported the murders of acquaintances and family members. In these 
songs, ballad authors, exposing the cultural contours of “conflictual complexes,” 
often forged more explicit connections between transgressive behavior and 
social prohibitions. Finding congruities and continuities between criminal acts, 
cultural practices, and social pressures, they disputed essentialist class-based 
ideas of criminality, intervened in legal debates about mitigation, and inter-
rogated the principles of capital justice. “Verses on Daniel Good” (1842) (figure 
5), for example, reports the execution of Daniel Good, a gentleman’s coach-
man, convicted of the “barbarous and cruel” murder of Jane Jones, who “kept a 
mangle in South street.” The impending “recital” of his “wild deeds,” the narrator 
assures us, “[is] enough to turn your blood cold.”
 Good’s crime intrigued and disgusted the public because he murdered, dis-
membered, and burned his victim, who by most accounts was said to be living 
as his common-law wife and was often referred to in broadsides and news-
paper reports as “Mrs. Good.” Situating Good in a “gallery of evil men” (Men 
140), Martin Wiener explains that as models of civilized, rationalized, modern-
ized, middle-class manhood developed, masculine aggression in general—and 
extreme violence in particular—was most often associated with a reprobate and 
outmoded form of working-class masculinity. As a result, instances of impas-
sioned male violence, from the mild to the extreme, attracted increasing public 
scorn.
 Articulating such scorn, the judge at Good’s trial summed up his horrific 
crime as a murderous manifestation of his habitual sexual indulgence: “There 
is no doubt that it is the owing to the indulgence of your inclinations for one 
woman after another, that being tired of the unhappy deceased, and feeling that 
you could not enjoy to its fullest extent the fresh attachment you had formed, 
that you resolved upon destroying the unhappy woman who was the former 
object of your affection” (Times, 16 May 1842, 6).12 While in many ways, of 
course, Victorian gender ideologies accommodated and condoned erasures of 
feminine subjectivity and masculine prerogatives for “fresh attachment[s],” the 
combination of Good’s working-class masculinity and his apparently murder-
ous philandering suggested a menacing figure who perfectly embodied criminal 
alterity—in its classed and gendered forms.
Figure 5
Verses on Daniel Good.  Courtesy The Newberry Library, Chicago.
chAp ter 1
 Such casual links between murderous motive and sexual rakeism established 
the crime as a grotesquely disproportionate application of force. Compound-
ing these meanings was the gruesome fact that Good attempted to dismember 
the body of his victim and burn her remains in the stable of his employer. And 
further complicating the meanings of this astonishing brutality was the specula-
tion about his victim’s pregnancy at trial. Although the consulting trial doctors 
could not “speak with certainty” on the matter, they speculated that Jones was 
pregnant, and press coverage of the trial frequently concentrated on the death of 
the unborn child in order to make the case for Good’s barbarity (Times, 14 May 
1842, 8).
 Given this context, we can see that when this particular broadside ballad 
labels Good a “cold-blooded monster,” it upholds a well-established consensus. 
But the ballad also undercuts these more common readings in important ways. 
In a realignment of motive, it challenges popular belief in the motivating force 
of a “fresh attachment” by presenting the murderer lashing out at the respon-
sibilities of paternity. In contextualizing Good’s crime in these (unfortunately) 
familiar terms, the ballad connects his crime to the socially constituted pressures 
of paternal responsibility rather than to the sexual pleasures of a fickle working-
class rogue.
 Quite unequivocally the ballad confirms the pregnancy and claims that the 
illegitimate child inspires Good’s resolve “[t]o murder his victim and the babe in 
her womb.” The doubly murderous intent is then depicted in a dialogue between 
killer and victim and in the mutilation of her body, an act that confronts the 
socially inscribed meaning of one transgression in terms of another:
Then with a sharp hatchet her head did cleave,
She begged for mercy but none he would give,
Have mercy dear Daniel my wretched life spare,
For the sake of your own child which you know I bear.
In imagining the content of Jones’s appeals, the ballad deploys a common ballad 
trope of contrasting willful force and enfeebled resistance in carefully arranged 
murder dialogues that bespeak a disturbing intimacy. After Jones invokes moral 
obligations to “mercy,” her “wretched life,” and Good’s “own child” and accus-
ingly establishes his knowledge of the child—“which you know I bear”—Good 
verbally and physically rejects them:
No mercy, he cried, then repeated the blow,
Alive from this stable you never shall go,
Neither you nor your brat shall e’er trouble me more,
Then lifeless his victim he struck to the floor.
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In her desperate appeals to the imperatives of paternity, Jones cites moral obli-
gations, but according to the narrative logic of this ballad, such invocations 
only serve to incite his violence and inspire his categorical rejection of her pleas 
with a resounding “no mercy.” Because this dialogue of moral bargaining also 
builds upon public discussions of Good’s motives and Jones’s potential preg-
nancy, Jones’s references to his “own child” and Good’s merciless renunciation 
of parental responsibility complicate judicial interpretations of his case. Ridding 
himself of a “brat” and “trouble,” Good clearly defines links between intentions 
and actions.
 In the subsequent hiding of his crime, Good reinscribes his stated inten-
tions on the bodies of his victims, a number that the ballad decisively doubles. 
Rendering Jones’s pregnancy a medical certainty, the ballad depicts a gruesome 
disemboweling and affirms the existence of a distinctly formed unborn child. 
With great symbolic weight, Good separates mother and child, thereby portray-
ing a visual image of Good’s sexual sins and Jones’s fallen status:
And when she was dead this sad deed to hide,
The limbs from her body he straight did divide,
Her bowels ript open and dripping with gore,
The child from the womb this black monster he tore.
As stock phrases (“dripping with gore”) join significant topical references, the 
ballad interprets his crime. The astounding force of his attempt “to hide” this 
“sad deed” resonates in vividly descriptive verbs: “ript,” “divide,” “tore.” In this 
way, the details of the crime again encode both his murderous agency and his 
precise motivation.
 After the murder, we are told, “He made a large fire in the harness room, / 
Her head, arms, and legs in the fire did consume.” The disposal of the burned 
and mutilated body, catalogued as separate parts, establishes the astonishing 
crime scene, which is discovered by a policeman, who, looking for a pair of 
trousers that Good has stolen, interrupts Good’s act of incineration. As ordi-
nary policework intrudes upon extraordinary violence—as the search for a 
stolen pair of trousers becomes the discovery of a brutal murder—aesthetic 
astonishment is secured in the gaze of the unsuspecting witness: “When in 
searching the stable the body he spied, / Without head, legs, or arms, and ript 
open beside.” And though the ballad has already twice dwelled on the dismem-
berment of Jones, it repeats the “shocking” details once more in an account of 
Good’s trial:
And when he was tried, most shocking to state,
The evidence proved what I now relate,
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That Daniel Good murdered his victim Jones,
Then cut up and burnt her flesh and bones.
With stresses on violent actions—“cut” and “burnt”—and abject parts—“flesh” 
and “bones”—the ballad fulfills the mandates of astonishment. Significantly, 
although the crime is “most shocking to state,” “Verses on Daniel Good” insists 
upon a triple “recital” of Good’s horrific violence. Details of the murder, the 
crime scene, and the trial enable a persistent return to the terrible murder that 
defines the crime ballad’s poetic power and the audience’s political curiosity.
 In refusing to equivocate about the origins of motive, the nature of respon-
sibility, or the existence of the child—in confidently asserting what “evidence 
proved”—this particular narrative of Daniel Good insistently explains per-
sonal motives with respect to sexual and gender codes, and it thereby under-
cuts other circulating narratives highlighting his inexplicable monstrosity. The 
vulnerability of Jane Jones, a mangle keeper, arises from the intersection of her 
class disadvantages, her ambiguous common-law status, and her illegitimate 
pregnancy. She occupies a position fully outside the normative codes of sexual 
propriety, and she pays the exorbitant cost of sexual transgression even as—or 
precisely when—she attempts to appeal to domestic obligations and paternal 
responsibility. In the ballad, these codes clearly shape Good’s motive, which he 
unequivocally proclaims, despite the fact that the historical Good denied his 
sexual sins and his criminal guilt publicly throughout his trial and after. As the 
Times reported, Good “solemnly declare[d]” at every interview, “I never touched 
the body of the woman, alive or dead! so help me god!” (23 May 1842, 6). His 
continued insistence on his innocence, the Times explains, disrupted the seam-
less application of capital punishment: Good’s “obstinacy of denial . . . if truth-
ful, involved terrible ideas of judicial murder” and, “if false, involved hardly less 
terrible impressions of frightful, impenetrable obduracy of impenitence” (23 
May 1842, 6).
 In marked contrast, operating with an agenda of (astonishing) disclosure 
and (full) particularity, the ballad’s certainties complicate the ethics of guilt in 
a way that the historical Good’s repeated claims to total innocence could not. 
The ballad’s preference for a clearly defined motive, the rejection of paternal 
responsibility, and its confirmation of Jones’s sexual impropriety, which other 
reports obscured with references to “Mrs. Good,” forces readers to confront a 
vision of villainy and victimization in terms of sexual politics. Further under-
scoring this agenda is the fact that, while other ballads addressed subgroups of 
Victorian culture (e.g., “listen all ye virgins fair”), this ballad addresses no one 
in particular. It thereby privileges the “productive friction” of astonishing vio-
lence over a pat recommendation of normative sexuality. The implied method 
of crime prevention in this ballad scenario is not religion and education, as the 
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Times earnestly advocated for this “fatal fruit” of “rank soil” who “never had in 
his youth any religious instruction” and was “awfully utterly ignorant” (23 May 
1842, 6). Sidestepping clichéd moral instruction, “Verses on Daniel Good” insists 
upon a “recital” of the crime’s astonishing gore in order to suggest congruities 
between culturally defined hierarchies of sexual power and the tragically violent 
dynamics of sexual intimacy.
 In a similar mediation of familiar and unfamiliar violence, “Cruel and Inhu-
man Murder of a Little Boy by his Father” (1866) connects the unlawful hanging 
of a child to the lawful practice of execution. In the late 1860s, with execution 
theatrics and abolitionist arguments on the national political agenda, the notion 
of a father hanging his little boy underneath the city in a dark cellar and then 
hanging for the crime high above the crowd on a public stage easily accommo-
dated the methods of symbolic inversion so common in crime ballads. Accord-
ingly, in condemning the inhumanity and cruelty of an extrajudicial hanging of 
a boy by his father, the ballad questions the manner in which a paternalistic state 
disposes of its outcast criminals.
 In its prose report, this broadside emphasizes the obvious analogy between 
cruel murderer and cruel executioner: “the cruel father tied [the boy’s] hands 
behind, and had literally enacted the part of executioner of his own child, hold-
ing its legs, and forcing down its body to complete the strangulation of the poor 
boy.” In generating such detailed imagery the broadside exploits the audience’s 
familiarity with scaffold practices. As Thackeray noted, execution audiences wit-
nessed the stark demystification of the “drop into eternity”: “those who have 
paid for good places may see the hands of the government agent, Jack Ketch, 
coming up from his black hole, and seizing the prisoner’s legs, and pulling them, 
until he is quite dead—strangled” (157). The broadside’s execution analogy—
with its emphatic imagery of hands-on killing—is thus doubly significant. It 
underscores the murderous intentions of a reprehensible child-killer, but, recall-
ing familiar images of public execution, it insinuates the murderous inclinations 
(and inspirations) of the state.
 This parallelism between criminal and state violence serves the poetics of 
astonishment at work in the ballad; for, while the state presumably executes 
guilty criminals, John Richard Jefferys executes an innocent child. In problema-
tizing the categories of guilt and innocence, the ballad registers contempt for “a 
wretch named Jefferys,” a “sad, a base, and cruel villain,” who murders his own 
child in the Seven Dials district, a locale that is noted four times in the ballad. The 
Seven Dials district, of course, formed the center of ballad publication, and, thus, 
his crime astonishes the very community that reproduces his crime in verse:
His little boy named Richard Arthur,
By the wretched father, we are told,
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Was cruelly and basely murdered,—
The child was only seven years old;
The villain took him to a cellar,
Resolved his offspring to destroy,
Tied his little hands behind him,
And hanged the pretty smiling boy.
Like other ballads, this ballad highlights the failure of innocence in contrasting 
images of murderer and victim. Rather than adhering to stock conceptions of 
villainy, its suggestive allusions to the details of the historical case imbue its melo-
dramatic mode with “productive friction.” Contextual details about the child’s 
seventeen-week residency at his grandmother’s house and Jefferys’s three-year 
estrangement from the child’s mother, which also circulated in press accounts of 
the crime, focus attention on the pressures of a defunct family romance. Accord-
ingly, we are informed that Jefferys, enacting a “[v]engeance,” was “[d]etermin’d 
for to take his life” and that he “demand[ed] him” and “clandestinely took him 
away” because “he determined / Was his little boy to slay.” Acknowledging these 
circumstances, the ballad uses familial relations to comprehend Jefferys’s mur-
derous intentions and constitutes its audience as a collective of “kindest fathers,” 
“tender mothers,” “sisters, too, and brothers.”
 The murder is then rendered in striking detail. In the account of the hanging, 
the ballad abandons the previous hearsay mode (“we are told”), dispenses with 
hesitation (“can scarce reveal”) and supplies startling eyewitness detail:
Then he to the cellar took him,—
His heart was harder far than steel,
The wicked, base, inhuman monster,
His actions no one can reveal.
His only child, to hold beside him,
With rope he bound his little hands,
When behind his back he placed them,
He in the cellar did him hang.
In spite of the claim that “[h]is actions no one can reveal,” the narrator provides 
a concrete set of images, which are apparently gleaned from the familiar proce-
dures of hanging. Though the ballad insists on Jefferys’s “steel” cruelty, and later 
claims that “hanging is too good for such a villain,” it also tempers this condem-
natory posture by asserting that “[w]e all have got our cares and trials / And unto 
fate are compelled to yield.” Perhaps an allusion to stories that his wife had left 
him for another man (Times, 13 September 1866, 9), which were discussed in the 
press and at Jefferys’s trial, this platitude also suggests that “cruel monstrosity” 
can be sung as a matter of “fate.”
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 Whether intimating that the roles of murderer and victim are fated or that 
Jefferys might have yielded more gently to his “cares and trials,” the ethical ambi-
guities and private circumstances alluded to in the ballad effectively reinforce or 
recenter the poem’s scaffold imagery. The privatization of scaffold violence—its 
application in domestic disputes—elides the practices of state-sanctioned hang-
ing and “cruel and inhuman murder.” In this way, the murder’s eerie recasting 
of a “proper” hanging, in which the execution of personified innocence is car-
ried out by a guilty patriarch, offers an ironic symbolic inversion. It implies, of 
course, that the very means by which social order was to be maintained and 
by which violent criminality was to be suppressed actually inspires crimes and 
fosters violence. The uneasy parallel between Jefferys’s disturbing transgression, 
hidden in a cellar beneath the city, and the state’s spectacular hangings, elevated 
on public stages, disorients the poles of margin and center, the hierarchies of 
high and low, and the binaries of criminals and citizens. In this context, relations 
between transgression and retribution lose their explanatory power and their 
ethical clarity.
 Cases of infanticide signified quite differently when mothers murdered their 
children. Yet, even in maternal infanticide cases, the poetics of astonishment 
and the judicial treatment of murder often intersected in unexpected ways. As 
psychological theories and legal understandings of infanticide evolved, insanity 
defenses for infanticidal—particularly neonaticidal—mothers gained increas-
ing interpretive power, and ballads registered these legal changes and grappled 
with their ethical implications. As Lionel Rose affirms, in infant-murder cases, 
the “likelihood of a conviction for murder was negligible” and, after 1849, no 
women hanged for killing their newborn infants (77).When a rare murder con-
viction occurred, “the Home Secretary invariably reprieved mothers who killed 
their own infants under twelve months” although “the ordeal of formal sentence 
to death still had to be endured in court” (76).
 In spite of fairly consistent legal trends, representations of infanticide varied 
from sympathy to condemnation, and from pathos to outrage, and, as Christine 
Krueger argues, while mental science offered frank testimony on uncontrol-
lable impulses, affective and sentimental frameworks “were still swaying judges 
and juries in the 1850s” (275). In her study of Victorian discourses on child- 
murder, Josephine McDonagh asserts that medicalizing infanticide and patholo-
gizing women confirmed gendered prejudices about female mental weaknesses, 
secured the careers of medical men, and rhetorically diminished the necessity of 
repairing related social problems (125). Moreover, she explains, in the “phantom 
of public opinion” that constituted Britain’s child-murder “epidemic” (126), 
notions of Englishness or Britishness—riddled with assumptions about barbar-
ity and civilization—were granted more explanatory relevance than individual 
hardships, family influences, and compounded oppressions (127).13
 As mental science offered clinical solutions of cure and containment—while 
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national(ist) anxieties dulled reformist sensibilities and contextual insights—
ballad infanticides, functioning neither as instances of national degenera-
tion nor as symptoms of medical pathologies, resisted totalizing narratives 
by highlighting the astonishing and specific details of individual cases. And 
while ballads often responded sympathetically to circumstantial mitigation and 
physiological indicators of insanity and, thus, reflected the court’s increasing 
leniency, the spectacle of maternal violence continued to figure prominently. 
“Copy of Verses on the Murder of Two Children, By Their Mother, On Battersea 
Bridge” (1846), for example, examines the case of Eliza Clark, who threw her 
three young children into the Thames and was attempting to jump into the 
river herself when bystanders stepped in and detained her (Times, 18 May 1846, 
9). Two of her children drowned, and one survived. At trial, witnesses recounted 
instances of her motherly devotion and noted the perils of her domestic life, 
which was shaped by the stress of working-class poverty and the abuse of her 
alcoholic husband, a journeyman painter. The jury found her not guilty on the 
ground of insanity.
 This particular ballad, printed soon after the crime’s commission and, there-
fore, not privy to the facts of the case or the trial verdict, announces the astonish-
ing crime for public speculation. Neglecting any mention of Clark’s own attempt 
at self-murder, the ballad emphasizes the drowning of her children. An affront 
to parenting, her crime is unprecedented in “history’s annals,” and the opening 
lines proclaim, “Oh! list ye tender parents,” thereby submitting the case to sensi-
tive and sensible parents for scrutiny and judgment. The ballad forcefully pits 
Clark’s guilty criminal intent against the children’s sweet innocence: “Her three 
sweet little infants / She did intend to slay.” Such conventional diminutive phras-
ings—“three sweet little infants,” “three pretty smiling babes,” “pretty smiling 
boy”—are maintained throughout the text and uphold the astonishing contrast 
between unsuspecting innocence and calculating malice. Clark’s violation of 
maternal ideals inspires exclamatory pathos: “A mother, oh! how sad to tell.” The 
chorus of the song underscores the notion of her destructive agency, expresses 
the distress of documenting her crime and, thus, ensures the reiteration of sad-
ness and regret: “She threw her babes, how sad to name, / Into the fatal river 
Thames.”
 Placed beyond comprehension, Clark’s motivations and intentions are 
ambiguous, but a reference to her “wicked deed” implicates the inscrutability of 
her conduct rather than the possibility of mental sickness: “Whatever could her 
mind possess. / Such a wicked deed to do, / There is no one can imagine. / The 
neighborhood all through.” The unintelligibility of her deeds defies the collective 
imagination as she is subjected to the local standards of the “neighborhood.” Yet, 
while the ballad introduces the issues of psychological disorder and domestic 
abuse that surfaced in Clark’s case, it also undercuts them with the dismissive 
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assessments of local gossip and thereby looks skeptically at mitigating circum-
stances and criminal lunacy:
She said her husband her ill-used,
Which did affect her mind,
But such by neighbors is denied,
For he to her proved kind.
Here, the ballad records the social dynamics of psychological testimony. As Hil-
ary Marland has argued, the observations of neighbors and other lay-witnesses 
often influenced outcomes in infanticide trials, which in many cases “did not 
depend upon the evidence of a forensic expert or medical man experienced in 
treating insanity, but on the opinion of a surgeon or general practitioner and a 
collection of witnesses—neighbors, friends and passers-by—all of whom found 
it appropriate to comment on the woman’s state of mind and felt equipped 
to testify to the existence of insanity” (181). Positioning Clark’s mental state 
beyond imagination and discrediting her claims of domestic abuse through the 
citation of neighborhood testimony, the ballad insinuates that Clark was a pre-
meditating killer and a self-interested liar. Such narrative choices document the 
inconsistencies of insanity defenses and the disadvantages of abused wives in the 
arena of public opinion. Circulating in 1846, amidst contentious legal reconsid-
erations of domestic violence and medicolegal debates about insanity, Clark’s 
ballad reflects the profound difficulties of interpreting child-murder while, at 
the same time, retaining a primary interest in astonishing spectacle.
 A concern with the aesthetics of astonishment, of course, addresses the generic 
conventions of murder ballads, but it may also reflect the ballad’s timing with 
respect to the case. With limited press details to draw from and with the crimi-
nal case in progress, it carefully highlights the painful experience of witnessing 
such a public crime. It devotes an entire stanza, for example, to enumerating the 
children’s ages and describing their reactions as they are flung into the Thames:
The first was only ten months old
She in the river threw.
The second but two years and a half,
How sad, but yet how true;
The third a pretty smiling boy,
As I do now unfold,
Thrown by the mother in the Thames,
And he was five years old.
By cataloging each of her murderous actions, the ballad dramatizes the terror of 
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observing the destruction of innocence. The Thames, the “fatal river,” becomes 
both the weapon and the crime scene, and a subsequent stanza reports the tense 
rescue of the five-year-old, who, taken out in “an exhausted, wretched, / Sad and 
dreadful state” was saved “[f]rom a sad and watery grave.” The reclamation of 
the second child’s body and the total disappearance of the infant, who “far down 
the fatal stream / Was carried right away,” prioritize the suffering of the children 
over the desperation of the mother, whose psychological struggles remain unad-
dressed and whose suicidal efforts remain unacknowledged.
 These eyewitness details also stress the pain of the London citizenry, which 
suffers intensely when apprehending and contemplating the spectacle. In doling 
out sympathy to both victims and witnesses, the ballad rather explicitly addresses 
the poetics of astonishment that characterizes third-person crime ballads. The 
figure of a single witness, functioning as a readerly surrogate, is inscribed in the 
poem: “Upon the bridge at Battersea / A person did her see, / Commit this sad 
and horrid deed, / This dreadful tragedy.” And as the recovery of the children’s 
bodies ensued, the ballad records the community’s response:
Each side the river with folks was lined,
Who when the tale did hear,
Did cause each heart to beat.
And every eye to shed a tear.
In the beating hearts and teary eyes of witnessing “folks,” this “dreadful trag-
edy” configures the crime as a source of collective pain visible in “every eye.” 
The affective power of an astonishing crime defines the shared experience of 
murder.
 The final stanza returns to the figure of the murderous mother. A prisoner 
awaiting trial, she occupies a liminal position. “[C]onfined / Within a prison 
dark,” the ballad explains, the “cruel woman” confronts her own terror and ter-
ribleness: “Her dreadful deeds must surely strike / A terror to her heart.” The 
ballad then summarizes the consequences at stake in her case:
Investigations will take place,
And that most speedily
And if ’tis proved she is not mad,
Then she will punished be.
Abstaining from a pronouncement or judgment, the ballad adopts a tentative 
stance. In its final two lines, however, the ballad acknowledges the legal contest 
between criminal insanity and capital punishment that affects her case. As in 
numerous other ballads, Clark’s murders present the astonishing spectacle of 
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moral failure, but also the potential presence of madness. In highlighting sus-
taining ethical ambivalence and legal uncertainty, the ballad redirects attention 
away from legal judgment or moral outrage and toward the spectacle of mur-
dered children and the experience of collective pain.
 Also attempting to grapple with the social implications of murderous moth-
ers, “The Esher Tragedy” (1854) depicts Mary Ann Brough’s murders of her six 
children. The cultural connotations of her motherhood and infanticide are rein-
forced by the twice-mentioned fact that she once “nursed the blooming prince 
of Wales.” This revelation resonates on many levels, suggesting, for example, the 
precarious safety, criminal affiliations, or potential contamination of the royal 
family.14 Although Brough’s crime fully accommodated the sensationalizing 
tropes of criminal contagion and moral degeneration, the speaker of “The Esher 
Tragedy” emphasizes the pathetic dimensions of her crime with the narrator’s 
pleas for “feeling christians” to “give attention” and “sympathize with me” dur-
ing the “tale of sorrow.” This tragic frame is complemented by a prose report 
that reproduces text from Brough’s voluntary statement. Entitled “Confession of 
the Murderess,” the report details her decision to “go down and get a knife and 
cut [her] throat” after her children repeatedly wake her with requests for “barley 
water” late into the night. She notes, “I was bad all day; I wanted to see Mr. Izod, 
and waited all day. I wanted him to give me some medicine.” In representing 
this shift from suicidal to homicidal intentions, the broadside underscores the 
mitigating presence of insanity and emplots Brough’s case as a personal, psycho-
logical tragedy.
 In Victorian commentaries on her case, Brough’s tale shifted between medi-
colegal tragedy and sexual melodrama. Brough’s crimes became an important 
case study in medicolegal debates, and, because of the testimony of leading men-
tal scientists, she was eventually acquitted on the grounds of insanity and com-
mitted to Bethlem. In Trial by Medicine (1981), Roger Smith notes that Brough’s 
case riveted public attention not only because of the extent of her crimes and 
her former position as wet-nurse to the prince, but also because it assembled 
questions about insanity, adultery, and revenge. The press reported that just 
before the murders, Brough’s husband had confronted her with an accusation of 
adultery. As Smith argues, her case “had all the elements of a Victorian morality 
play” (158):
Many special legal elements and medico-legal problems came together at the 
trial of Mary Ann Brough. It was equally plausible to reconstruct her life in 
terms of depravity or of disease. The crime was child murder, with evidence 
of weakness following her last confinement. But her crime was also a venge-
ful act against her husband. Medical evidence played an important role in 
her defence, and though the jury found insanity, both lay and medical critics  
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considered it an “escape.” Her case is the most striking example of the con-
straints on meaning in Victorian discourses.15 (Trial 157)
Taking these easily sensationalized details of scandalous adultery and intimate 
revenge into account, we can see the extent to which the ballad sidelines them. 
Appearing early in the case and announcing the murder as event, “The Esher 
Tragedy” foregoes the widely publicized drama of marital infidelity and, instead 
of proposing a conventionally moralistic melodrama, favors a narrative of tragic 
mental illness.
 The text embeds official information in a summary of the tragic facts, 
“[w]hich causes each kind heart to bleed”: “’Twas with a sharp and fatal razor, 
/ She committed this foul deed, / And one by one she cut their throats.” Con-
ventional murder dialogues accommodate the recurrent ballad theme of moral 
frailty and enfeebled innocence. Her son, Henry, “cried aloud with eyes of pity, / 
‘Mother, dear, don’t murder me.’” And though behaving “like a demon fierce and 
wild,” she responds to her victim’s entreaties with an unsettling blend of moth-
erly affection and pathetic resignation: “‘My dear,’ said she, ‘it must be done.’” 
The juxtaposition of endearing appellations, methodical throat-cutting, and 
frenzied activity establishes the representational excess and friction fundamental 
to the poetics of astonishment. Together, such details achieve a “plenitude of 
meaning,” which cannot be reduced to a set of moral conventions or a theory of 
criminal malice. The murders, established as inevitable, are perpetrated with the 
“sharp and fatal razor”:
From bed to bed, and to each chamber,
This wretched woman she did go,
While all around her own dear children,
Streams of crimson blood did flow.
The shift to trochees in the final line of this stanza underscore the importance 
of ballad gore—crimson streams of blood overflow the well-defined boundaries 
of moral outrage and force aesthetic astonishment. Throughout this account, 
the baffled narrator explicitly voices such questions of astonishment: “What 
on earth could urge it on” and “Oh! what must be the woman’s motive.” These 
questions also enfold the ever present issues of crime prevention and criminal 
responsibility: “Did she think she’d done amiss, / Or did she think of death and 
judgment / To perpetrate a deed like this?” These overwrought questions direct 
audiences toward the difficult and painful ambiguities involved in contemplat-
ing extreme violence.
 In constructing the crime scene, the ballad renders a tableau of perverted 
domesticity, as the image of slumbering children transforms into a “surprising” 
scene of murdered children with ear-to-ear throat wounds:
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The dreadful sight was most surprising,
To behold these children dear,
How their cruel hearted mother,
Cut their throats from ear to ear.
Having presented these details, the ballad imagines Brough in “a prison’s gloomy 
cell, / Where midnight dreams to her will whisper / And her deeds of blood will 
tell.” Haunted by the “phantoms of her six dear children” and subject to “mid-
night dreams,” Brough experiences a fully psychologized tragedy. Somewhat 
sympathetically tracing Brough’s case from murder to crime scene to memory, 
the ballad forces uncomfortable linkages between suicide and homicide, moth-
erhood and infanticide, control and desperation, sanity and insanity.16
 More than a decade later, a broadside entitled “Barbarous Murder of a Child 
by a Schoolmistress” (1869) listed the ballad of Emma Pitt, who, “in such a 
barbarous manner killed / Her tender infant child.” Highlighting the alienation 
and vulnerability of the fallen woman, the historical circumstances of Pitt’s 
case reveal a debilitating social context in which the dangers of sexual trans-
gression, the terror of postpartum madness, and the strictures of respectability 
establish the conditions for a murderous breakdown. The Times reported Pitt, 
aged twenty-four, to be a “young woman of most respectable connexions” and 
a “mistress of the national school” who birthed her child alone and in secret. 
The judicial interpretation of her case hinged upon the mutilated state of the 
infant’s body, which bore the signs of excessive, “barbarous” force. In particular, 
the infant’s severed tongue and bruised body introduced a debate about whether 
or not the infant’s injuries were sustained before death but while the child had a 
“separate existence” (Times, 26 July 1869, 11). The presiding judge summarized 
the essential legal question: “Was the child an inhabitant of this world, having 
an existence independent of the mother, and was its life extinguished by the act 
of the mother?” (Times, 26 July 1869, 11). Ultimately, Pitt was found not guilty 
of murder but guilty of concealing the birth, and she was sentenced to two years’ 
imprisonment with hard labor.17
 The astonished narrator of this particular ballad intones moral conventions, 
faulting Pitt, a schoolmistress “[w]ell known for miles around,” for setting a 
“sad example” for her students. The narrator also apostrophizes an audience of 
concerned mothers, asking them to contemplate, in conventional ballad terms, 
an unprecedented horror that “we seldom find” in the “annals of history.” The 
words of the chorus reiterate this horror, intimating the distressing incongruity 
of a child-murdering schoolmistress: “This Emma Pitt was a schoolmistress, / 
Her child she killed we see, / Oh mothers, did you ever hear, / Of such barbarity.” 
Contemplating this “murderess”—“the author / Of this dreadful tragedy”—the 
narrator reassures readers on matters of justice, “When before a Judge and Jury, 
/ This monster soon must stand; / And if she is found guilty, / She her deserts 
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will get.” But collectively the ballad verses destabilize such moral confidence 
when considering the death penalty. Lamenting, “if she is found guilty, / How 
sad will be her case,” the narrator explains, “If she has a woman’s feelings, / 
She surely will go wild.” Though Pitt’s “barbarous murder” requires a public 
response, execution is not unqualifiedly condoned, and acknowledgments of 
sympathetic concern for her solitary suffering and her “womanly feeling” dimin-
ish her imputed barbarity.
 Offering a startling version of the speaking body, the historical particulars of 
Pitt’s crime fuel the poetics of astonishment. Accordingly, the ballad fixates on 
the removal of the child’s tongue from its mouth:
With a large flint stone she beat its head
When such cruelty she’d done,
From the tender roof of the infant’s mouth
She cut away it’s tongue;
Sad and wicked, cruel wretch,
Hard was her flinty heart,
The infant’s tongue from the body was
Wrapped in another part.
In fusing her weapon and her psyche—a “flint stone” and a “flinty heart”—the 
ballad enforces the notion that she is simultaneously, and contradictorily, “sad 
and wicked.”
 The crime scene also focuses on the displaced tongue of the victim: “The 
murderess placed in a drawer, / And it there, alas! was found.” In using the sev-
ered tongue as a central image and symbol, the ballad considers the origins 
and condition of Pitt’s murderous psychology. The tongue’s removal, with sym-
bolic resonance, suggests a desperate need to conceal and silence the child. The 
coroner’s statement, which is quoted in the broadside’s prose report, asserts 
that “the child was born alive and murdered by someone,” and this chronology 
and the violent intensity of Pitt’s actions suggest the possibility of postpartum 
derangement. The gruesome silencing depicted in the ballad, however, confers a 
communicative power upon the severed tongue. A “most miraculous organ” of 
speech, wrapped and hidden in a drawer, the tongue forces aesthetic memory: 
“And mother’s, miles round Wimborne, / Will remember Emma Pitt.” Laden 
with implications about her sexual vulnerability and her mental derangement, 
the traumatic image of the child’s tongue constitutes the interpretive crux of 
the legal case, and in the ballad directed specifically at mothers, disturbs the 
memory of “the barbarous Emma Pitt.”
 As a comparison of the ballads of Jefferys, Clark, Brough, and Pitt suggests, 
the ballad trade did not subscribe to uniform or stock responses to infanticide—
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or any other crimes. Rather, they examined a spectrum of conflicting forces 
in their stylized representations of lethal force, and they exploited significant 
case-specific circumstances to nuance the meanings of murders. Finding unset-
tling congruities between criminal acts and social pressures, they developed 
suggestive mediations of the familiar and the unfamiliar. In “Shocking Murder 
of A Wife and Six Children” (1869), the ballad writer explores the all-too-famil-
iar problem of urban poverty by conjoining expressions of astonishment and 
tropes of sentimentality to represent the murder-suicide deaths of an entire 
family.
 According to the Times, the father, Walter Duggan, a thirty-nine-year-old 
silversmith, who had recently been dismissed from work because he suffered 
from consumption, sent a letter to the police stating, “Your attendance will be 
required at the above house early this morning” (1 July 1869, 10).18 The contents 
of the home and the testimony of witnesses uncovered a tale of tragic misfor-
tune, and letters between Duggan and his brother documented a psychologically 
debilitating cycle of poverty and disease. At the inquest, the coroner summed 
up the unsettling revelation of this case: “It was deplorable to find people so 
despondent and distressed that they should be led to commit such fearful crimes 
in the very heart of the metropolis” (Times, 1 July 1869, 10). Ideologically and 
geographically central, this domestic tragedy unsettles the middle-class newspa-
per readership that witnesses this social failure occurring on a “street occupied 
by a ‘respectable class of artisans and their families’” (29 June 1869, 11). The 
Duggan case not only intimated the precariousness of respectable family life in 
London, but it also problematized the attribution of crimes to the “dangerous 
classes” and their displacement into urban slums. The verdict at the inquest 
stated, “Walter James Duggan and Emma Duggan murdered their children and 
afterwards destroyed themselves while in an unsound state of mind” (Times, 1 
July 1869, 10).
 In imagining the fatalistic resolve of the patriarch, the ballad highlights the 
confessional letter sent by Walter James Duggin—father, murderer, suicide—to 
the authorities:
To the police he did a letter send,
That he was about this life to end,
And that he had poisoned, he did declare
His wife, and his six children dear.
As the letter replaces the characteristic shocking moments of discovery in mur-
der ballads, Duggin’s actions appear less the sensational expression of an impas-
sioned killer than the pitiful communication of a poor unemployed worker, 
whose eviction, the broadside notes, was scheduled for twelve o’clock the day the 
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bodies were discovered. Presented in these terms, the deaths embody a desper-
ate response to escalating poverty. Privileging this reading, the ballad explicates, 
with mournful irony, the crime as a fulfillment of a paternal obligation to pro-
tect and provide: “Lest they should want, that fatal day, / His wife and children 
he did slay.”
 The crime scene, accordingly, depicts death as a form of protection from 
poverty: “They found him stretched upon the bed, / His troubles o’er—was cold 
and dead.” This unlawful “shocking sight” affords no weltering gore but rather, 
the fatal tableau of a Victorian family tragedy which “[c]aused in many an eye 
a tear.” The social conditions apparent in the arranged bodies signify impover-
ished and beleaguered domesticity:
They found upon another bed,
The ill-fated mother, she was dead,
While two pretty children we are told,
In her outstretched arms she did enfold,
As a family of abject corpses displays the affections and attitudes of ideal domes-
ticity, the ballad, deploying the common strategy of symbolic inversion, asks us 
to read the everyday conditions of poverty in astonishing images. The decom-
position of the loving family establishes a grotesque juxtaposition of excess and 
order with which the ballad indicts political indifference to poverty and the 
deterministic forces of economic struggles. Uninterested in ethical questions of 
agency or legal analyses of murder and suicide, the narrative of the “ill-fated” 
family confronts the marginalization and silencing of the diseased and disen-
franchised in the center of London.
 As Judith Walkowitz has written of the Jack the Ripper murders:
If, traditionally, the “classical” body has signified the “health” of the larger 
social body—of a closed, homogenous, regulated social order—then the 
mounting array of “grotesque,” mutilated corpses in this case represented 
the exact inverse: a visceral analogue to the epistemological incoherence and 
political disorientation threatening the body politic during the “autumn of 
terror.” (City 198)
Although Walkowitz speaks here about a very particular set of bodies at a very 
particular time and although she clarifies how such “visceral analogue[s]” easily 
served reactionary panic mongering, her explanation of the semiotic power of 
“mutilated corpses” aptly articulates the political charge of the violated bodies 
of third-person murder ballads. They offer collective testimony about the epis-
temological challenges and legal questions—the incoherence and disorienta-
tion—created by eruptions of murderous violence.
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 It is thus in their insistence on graphic violence and bodily gore that mur-
der ballads developed a poetics of critique with which to imagine congruities 
between crime and culture. With their revelations of astonishment and their 
attention to particulars, they complicated epistemologies of crime and repre-
sentations of murder, developing a genre of occasional poetry that encouraged 
public reflection and political skepticism while expressing collective anxieties, 
regrets, and fears. In presenting murder as an interpretive and interpretable act, 
and cultivating the political curiosity of their readers, ballads constructed mur-
ders and crime scenes as sites where “social classification and psychological pro-
cesses are generated as conflictual complexes.” Addressing precarious lives and 
fragile moralities, they reveal the capacity of verse forms to constitute public 
discourse and foster political debate.
On the Gallows High and in a Murderer’s Grave:
Last Lamentations and the Criminal Poet
While third-person murder ballads highlighted the social contexts and con-
sequences of astonishing crimes, first-person ballads focused on condemned 
murderers and their relationship to capital punishment. Cast as “last lamenta-
tions” or “copies of affecting verses,” these ballads were marketed as the overflow 
of powerful feeling on the eve of death, and, supplying condemned criminals 
with expressive sensibilities and lyrical voices, they established the persona of 
the criminal poet and the trope of public lamentation. Inspiring one Victorian 
commentator to quip, “every man who is hanged leaves a poem” (Literature 
of the Streets 73), the confessional verses and wistful voices of these poet- 
murderers imagined the psychologies of violent agency and the traumas of public 
execution.
 Central to the political context of lamentation poetics is the fact that this 
fictional affective voice enabled the condemned criminal to seize speech at the 
moment of official silencing by the state. Of their French counterparts, Foucault 
has argued that last lamentations posit the “lyrical position of the murderous 
subject,” and they “[mark] the place—fictitious, of course—of a subject who 
both speaks and is murderous” (Rivière 208). Imagining this “lyrical position” 
and highlighting the occasion that gained their voices a hearing, lamentation 
ballads emulated stage tragedies, procuring pity and inspiring fear as dispirited 
criminals were “launched into eternity.” In this way, criminal poets and their 
occasional poems examined matters of legal representation and political speech, 
which Foucault casts as “a subterranean battle . . . around two rights, perhaps less 
heterogeneous than they seem at first sight—the right to kill and be killed and 
the right to speak and narrate” (207).
 In Victorian England, this contest of speech rights and murder rights included 
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the state’s rights to disciplinary silencing. As the merits and methods of the 
death penalty were studied by the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment in 
the 1860s, Sir Samuel Martin confidently explained its awe-inspiring effects: “a 
sentence of death has a most serious effect upon all the people in court; you have 
perfect silence, as perfect as can be, all the people seem very much interested in 
it, and the sentence does carry a very strong impression upon the persons pres-
ent” (Report of the Capital Punishment Commission Q 246: 37). The versifying 
criminals and singing crowds of the lamentation trade disrupted the silencing 
mechanisms of capital punishment through the elaboration of poetic voice and 
the encouragement of public noise. Generating arresting connections between 
the historical criminal, the ballad criminal, and the ballad consumer, singing 
consumers might reproduce the “I” of the ballads and thus perform the identity 
of the murderer: “It is the song of crime; it is intended to travel from singer to 
singer; everyone is presumed able to sing it as his own crime, by a lyrical fic-
tion” (Foucault, Rivière 207–8). Public and performative, this criminal voice 
suggestively undermined distinctions between the condemned criminal other 
and what Leps terms the “consensual ‘we.’” Though the principle of scaffold 
deterrence was founded on the premise that an ignorant and impressionable 
working-class crowd would feel disgust for the criminal and respect for the state, 
the gruesome and violent nature of the hanging invariably elicited sympathy 
for criminals and disgust for the state. Working-class Britons in particular were 
familiar with the violence and suffering of scaffold deaths, and, accordingly, 
their execution ballads addressed scaffold suffering, giving voice, at this public 
silencing, to the violence witnessed by spectators.
 Exploring the political contentions of “perfect silence” and eternal silencing, 
execution ballads, and their generic features, reflect the evolution of nineteenth-
century criminal law. While the steel-frame printing press and the business savvy 
of urban printers stimulated the broadside trade early in the nineteenth century, 
specific alterations in English criminal law shaped the development of the crimi-
nal poet later in the century. As an article in the Quarterly Review explained to 
its Victorian readership, “The ‘Dying Speech and Confession Ballad,’ strictly so 
called, is said to have been unknown in the trade until the year 1820, when a 
change in the law prolonged the term of existence between the trial and death 
of the criminal” (“The Poetry of Seven Dials” 399). Mayhew reports, “‘Before 
that,’ I was told, ‘there wasn’t no time for a Lamentation; sentence o’ Friday, 
and scragging o’ Monday. So we had only Life, Trial, and Execution’” (283). 
While legal changes allowed more time for ballad composition, the continued 
reductions in capital crimes decreased the number of executions, and after 1837, 
executions for an offense other than murder became rare.19 Early nineteenth-
century balladeers often accommodated multiple executions with “lamentations 
and prison groans,” which catalogued the names—and sometimes listed brief 
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biographies—of several criminals to be executed while reserving fully drawn 
character studies for the most notorious criminals.20 In contrast, Victorian bal-
lad writers responded to a restricted capital code, a decrease in the number of 
hangings, and an almost total cessation of multiple hangings by developing the 
well-defined persona of the single murderous subject that came to define the 
genre. Exploiting these legal changes, ballad writers and publishers maintained 
the profitable relationship between execution and broadsheets.
 The poetic and political opportunities created by the newly individuated 
scaffold subject also contributed to the last lamentation’s concern with trial pro-
cedures and defensive testimony. Altering the nature of legal representation, 
the Prisoners’ Counsel Act of 1836 allowed defense counsel to address the jury 
on behalf of prisoners in capital trials while restricting prisoners from giving 
evidence in their own defense when such counsel was retained.21 Arguing that 
Victorian novelists investigated the contest between the passionate speech of 
criminals and the rational rhetoric of learned counsel engendered by the Pris-
oner’s Counsel Act, Jan-Melissa Schramm notes that Charles Dickens’s “fear that 
the professional rhetoric of the law displaces personal narrative was most pro-
nounced when he dwelt upon the plight of the prisoner condemned to death” 
(111). “His creativity,” she adds, “was activated by a profound interest in the 
ways in which punishment excluded men from the wider community of stories; 
he was interested in the ultimate obliteration of evidence” (111). Inserting their 
affective verses into the “wider community of stories” surrounding condemna-
tion and execution, last lamentations reflect a similar concern. Indeed, if any one 
consistency exists among the hundreds and hundreds of last lamentations circu-
lating in the Victorian era, it is that they privileged the personal testimonies of 
the hooded and bound criminals on the scaffold. Entering a charged legal arena, 
they assigned emotionally intimate and psychologically complex identities to 
criminals just as the state demanded death by public hanging and the anonymity 
of an unmarked grave.
 In restoring voices to silenced figures, many ballad writers exploited the con-
tested quality of criminal speech by mimicking official confessions and simulat-
ing legal testimonies. In these instances, as criminal poets narrated their crimes, 
ballads effectively reopened criminal cases and reassessed legal defenses. Casting 
doubts on established guilty verdicts and death sentences, they not only compli-
cated notions of criminal alterity, but also questioned the integrity of the judicial 
system. When criminals proclaimed murderous guilt and criminal responsibility 
at the same time, their speech established them as monumental transgressors 
and victims of state violence, positions that secured their status as tragic authors. 
In contrast, when they acknowledged violent acts but not malicious intents, 
they challenged murder charges and capital punishments. Whether rebutting 
intentionality or proclaiming responsibility, their expressions of mental stress 
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and emotional pain effected symbolic reversals of criminality that were founded 
on reformulations of guilt rather than on pleas of innocence. Adding personal 
narratives and verse soliloquies to the visual spectacle of execution, lamentations 
favored representations of psychological complexity and emotional vulnerabil-
ity that problematized legal fictions and punitive codes.
 Although their anonymity has aided their fall into literary obscurity, in 
their original context, it was authorial anonymity that authorized the lyrical fic-
tion of the criminal poet.22 Stitching together the case details, genre codes, and 
legal terms—and imagining the violent death of the author—last lamentations 
resemble Roland Barthes’ authorless text, which he describes as “a tissue of quo-
tations drawn from the innumerable centres of culture” (146) to be “disentan-
gled,” not “deciphered” (147), by readers. Along these lines, they foster the new 
kinds of interpretive questions that Foucault associates with the authorless text 
and an authorless analytic. Displacing the “tiresome repetitions” of the “author- 
function,” “[n]ew questions will be heard”:
“What are the modes of existence of this discourse?”
“Where does it come from; how is it circulated; who controls it?”
“What placements are determined for possible subjects?”
“Who can fulfill these diverse functions of the subject?”
Behind all these questions we would hear little more than the murmur of 
indifference:
“What matter who’s speaking?” (“What is An Author?” 138)
With attention to modes of contestation, citation, and circulation—as well as the 
constitution and determination of subjectivities—we can begin to understand 
the poetic performance of authorship and the political meanings of the criminal 
poet.
 At the most fundamental level, the murderer’s identity as a sentimental poet 
placed between murder and execution offers a striking inversion of murder-
ous guilt. If “every man who is hanged leaves a poem,” then every condemned 
murderer is a reflective poet whose own self-judgments, challenging judicial 
authority and legal reasoning, disrupt the edifying power of their public deaths. 
In “Trial and Sentence of George Britten” (1867), when Britten laments, “I have 
been the cruel author, / Of the cruel Woolverton tragedy,” his words express the 
condition of the criminal poet.23 An author of tragic violence and an actor in a 
violent tragedy, the lamenting and dying murderer alerts audiences to the pro-
found moral difficulties of assessing crimes and measuring punishments.
 In organizing this critical perspective, balladeers arranged strands of per-
sonal narrative, legal commentary, and social critique around the two events that 
conferred criminal identity, the murder and the execution. Because the criminal 
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poet is born “between two deaths—murder and execution” (Foucault, Rivière 
208), the violent actions of murderers retained aesthetic significance even as 
ballads attempted to explore the violent nature of execution. In fact, because 
graphic violence forced the coincidence of poetic sensibility and violent agency, 
ballad authors often used gruesome details to generate interpretive ironies and 
conflicts. The sentencing judge in “Life, Trial, Confession, and Execution of Mar-
tin Brown” (1868) remarks, “So sad a crime, and so revolting,” and such descrip-
tions of murder as both tragically “sad” and morally or aesthetically “revolting” 
dismantled distinctions between ordinary citizens and extraordinary criminals.
 This combination of the sad and the revolting forms the framework for “The 
Last Moments and Confession of Wm. Sheward” (1869), which highlights the 
psychological struggles encountered by Sheward, who embodies the dramati-
cally opposed identities of the criminal poet. Mediated by Sheward’s voice of 
grave sadness, the ballad records his wife-murder in 1851 and his confession and 
condemnation eighteen years later. The lamentation appears on a broadside that 
includes a report of the gruesome details of an apparently official confession:
He placed the head in a saucepan, and put it on the fire to keep the stench 
away. He then broke it up, and distributed it about Thorpe. He then put the 
hands and feet in the same saucepan, in hopes they might boil away. Carried 
portions of the body away in a pail and threw them in different parts of the 
city. The long hair on my [sic] return from Thorpe, he cut with a pair of scis-
sors in small pieces and they blew away as he walked.
The song that follows sets these details within the larger narrative frame of a “sad 
and wretched man, / Borne down in care and woe.” In emphasizing the personal 
tragedy of Sheward and elaborating the burdens of “care and woe,” the ballad 
decenters the narration of violence and highlights the psychology of guilt. The 
details within the ballad, therefore, though shocking, are relatively muted and 
impressionistic compared to the graphic precision of the prose report. Sheward 
recalls, “I her body into pieces cut,” but his recollections of the disposal of the 
body, so graphically depicted in prose, remain less clear in verse: “[I] scattered 
it around, / Here and there, I scarce knew where, / I placed it on the ground.” 
Responding to the needs of rhyme, the vague language here also intimates the 
peculiar circumstances of his confession to an eighteen-year-old crime.
 When reporting the more gruesome aspects of his crime, Sheward is con-
sistently concerned with the tragic nature of his narrative and the sadness of 
expressing his actions: “I boiled her head, how sad to tell, / I was mad without 
a doubt.” His reference to madness further dissociates him from his violence, 
which, the ballad repeatedly asserts, occurred eighteen years before his own vio-
lent death. Presented in this way, Sheward’s lament emerges from a confronta-
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tion with his contradictory selves: the past and the present, the violent and the 
sentimental, the criminal and the poet. The last lines of the ballad reiterate this 
grotesque combination of revolting violence and pathetic language:
I cut and mangled that poor soul,
My heart was flinty steel,
Her limbs and body strewed about,
In hedges, lanes, and fields.
This passage further underscores a contrast between two Shewards—the one 
who presently regards his wife as a “poor soul” and the one who eighteen years 
ago “cut and mangled” her and “strewed” her fragments in “hedges, lanes, and 
fields.” This juxtaposition of two selves develops the pitiable persona of the 
criminal poet who can simultaneously recall his own “heart” of “flinty steel” 
and express affection or sympathy for his victim, a “poor soul.”
 For the most part, Sheward’s ballad produces a murderous subject preoccu-
pied with portraying his intense emotional experience of an eighteen-year-old 
crime. Although the secret murder and gory dismemberment of a wife easily 
accommodates sensationalism, the ballad as a whole sidelines the crime and 
foregrounds the criminal. Explorations of psychological struggle are privileged 
over examinations of legal guilt, which Sheward repeatedly and unequivocally 
acknowledges: “I done that dreadful awful deed / Near eighteen years ago.” In 
a repetitive cycle, Sheward’s crime narrative is interrupted by reflections on the 
burden of guilt, the anxiety of discovery, and the compulsion to speak. This cycle 
implies that the conflict between silence and speech has “borne” Sheward “down 
in care and woe”:
Kept the secret eighteen years,
Within my guilty breast,
And till the same I did divulge,
I day nor night could rest.
With a restless need to “divulge” a “secret” lodged in his “guilty breast,” Sheward 
locates psychological guilt in a tension between anxious silence and confessional 
speech. He explains, “I’had no comfort day or night, / Until I did confess.” His 
wish to communicate, however, confronts the representational limitations of his 
unusual plight: “No pen can write, or tongue can tell, / My sad and wretched 
fate.”
 This reference to the limitations of “pen” and “tongue” also alludes to the 
eighteen-year delay between his secret crime and his public condemnation. 
Reinforcing the epistemological difficulties and ethical dilemmas of defining 
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murderous subjects and condemning them to death, his psychological confusion 
and emotional turmoil disarm moral outrage:
For eighteen years, in grief and tears,
I passed many a dreary night,
I had not one moment’s happiness,
Since I killed my own dear wife;
At length I did confess the deed,
For which I now must die,
For a murder eighteen years ago—
The which I don’t deny.
While highlighting an obligation to express his “grief and tears,” this passage also 
suggests that shame and remorse—not state protections or judicial resources—
discipline and punish the criminal. Sheward passed as a law-abiding family man, 
while “God’s all seeing eye” or “the eye of Justice,” powers that function in some 
ballad narratives, failed to apprehend his crimes. Rather than demonstrating 
that criminals are always subdued by society, Sheward’s ballad imagines crimi-
nals subduing and punishing themselves.
 In covering Sheward’s unusual case the Times also highlighted the unsettling 
gap between confessional truth and evidentiary truth and noted the difficulty 
of prosecuting in 1869 a crime that allegedly occurred in 1851. Detailing the 
“strangeness of the story,” the Times reports that when Sheward confessed his 
crime and asked to be taken into custody, a skeptical police force only reluctantly 
complied after some preliminary fact-checking (1 April 1869, 9). Adding to the 
peculiarity of Sheward’s case, the newspaper reports that once taken into cus-
tody, “the man had revoked his confession and affirmed his innocence of that 
crime, so that it was on a plea of ‘Not Guilty’ that the trial actually proceeded” 
(1 April 1869, 9). Although circumstantial evidence eventually corroborated 
Sheward’s confession to the court’s satisfaction, his defense counsel maintained 
that Sheward “had revealed nothing in his confession which might not have been 
collected from the facts already known to the public” (1 April 1869, 9). At trial 
the jury had to “decide between his acknowledgement and his recantation” (1 
April 1869, 9).
 The Times eventually came to agree with the state’s action in this case, but 
Sheward’s street ballad fixates on the peculiarities of the case. In imparting an 
obsessive quality to Sheward’s need to confess his crime, the ballad insinuates 
that criminal speeches and confessional narratives—speech acts rather than 
criminal acts—define relations between crimes and punishments. Continuing 
to highlight the slippage between truth and testimony the ballad rather mischie-
vously exploits the ironies of the state’s reversal. Initially hesitating to charge 
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Sheward, the state now insists upon his death. The limitations of judgment are 
embellished by references to letters of protest, which not only proclaim his inno-
cence but also deny the crime:
There was letters sent from different parts,
To say my wife did live,
To save me from the gallows,
But none would they believe;
Arriving from “different parts,” these letters imply widespread support for 
Sheward and challenge the authenticity of his official confession. With these 
epistolary protests and their implausible claims, the ballad raises questions 
about the methods of naming, judging, and punishing criminals. If execution 
constitutes a response to crime narratives, not criminal acts, and if criminals 
subdue and punish themselves, then judicial procedures and capital punish-
ments lose their authority.
 Just as “The Last Moments and Confession of Wm. Sheward” reconfigures 
Sheward’s particularly shocking acts of murder and dismemberment as a tale 
of care and woe, “Lamentation & Execution of James Longhurst” (1867) frames 
Longhurst’s “cruel murder” of seven-year-old Jane Sax—for which he “was 
doomed to die” at “Horsemonger lane on the scaffold high”—within a narrative 
of a “wretched youth.” The historical Longhurst was tried and hanged for mur-
der, but newspaper reports also attest to the fact that the murder followed a rape, 
and euphemistic references to the “terrible outrages [his victim] had suffered” 
appeared in newspaper reports (Times, 27 March 1867, 11). Accordingly, in his 
lamentation, Longhurst explains that first he “shamefully did her illtreat” and 
reports, “Then coward-like I drew my knife, / To rob this helpless child of life.” 
Longhurst recalls the murder in graphic detail: “I stabbed her in the throat—her 
blood did pour,— / Then left her welt’ring in her gore.” Continuing with the 
scene of discovery, he narrates a shocking attempt to conceal his crime:
She cried for help, did poor little Jane,
David Ensor to her assistance came;
Whilst I, a guilty wretch did stand,
And licked her blood from off my hand.
From the confession that he “did her illtreat” to the acknowledgment that he 
“stabbed her” to the claim that he “licked the blood from off [his] hand,” the 
ballad chronicles his descent into increasingly horrific behavior—from rapist to 
murderer to cannibal—and thus accommodates ballad conventions of grotesque 
violence.
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 In spite of Longhurst’s multiple affronts to ethical sensibilities and his dev-
astating violation of fundamental taboos, this ballad, embodying the political 
interests of lamentation poetics, forces the coincidence of violence and sensibil-
ity—tempering Longhurst’s outrageous conduct with multiple references to his 
remorse for the crime, his sympathy for his victim, and his terrified anticipa-
tion of his impending execution. Helping to sustain the sympathetic tones of 
his ballad voice, the broadsheet documents in its prose section the “Terrible 
Scene in the Prison with the Culprit” and highlights his remarkable display of 
“contrition” since his condemnation. The report relays the “frightful scene” of 
a “wretched youth” struggling against the certainty of his own violent death: 
“The moment the culprit saw Calcraft, the executioner, approach him with the 
straps to pinion his arms, he started back with an aspect of terror depicted on his 
countenance, and began to struggle violently with the turnkeys.” The report also 
speculates about the nature of Longhurst’s resistance: “The prisoner’s conduct 
seemed to be actuated by an uncontrollable horror of the executioner and the 
apparatus of death.” This vision of the terrible punishments of the state and the 
intense suffering of the condemned is supported by the historical Longhurst’s 
youthful appearance. He was described in the press as “short in stature and very 
boy-looking,” and before her death, his victim reportedly identified him with the 
words, “That boy did it” (Times, 27 March 1867, 11).
 In this context, the lamentation develops a fictional voice to reinforce the 
pathos of the historical Longhurst. Denouncing his crimes, the ballad Longhurst 
acknowledges his guilty agency and his shameful remorse: “James Longhurst, it 
is my name, / I’ve brought myself to grief and shame.” Highlighting her inno-
cence, his references to his victim as “poor little Jane” and a “helpless child” also 
underscore his regret. Having claimed his identity as condemned criminal, he 
also casts himself and his death in a family tragedy:
My tender parents came to visit me,
My heart was breaking their grief to see,
Tears from their eyes did in torrents fall,
While for mercy to my God did call.
Tearful parents and merciful prayers domesticate Longhurst, as he responds to 
the emotional pain of his grief-stricken family. He explains, “I hope that none 
will them upbraid, / While I am in my silent grave,” and like so many execution 
ballads, his song thus acknowledges the consequences of death penalties on the 
families of condemned criminals.
 Essentially imparting a plea for mercy, such details conjure the historical 
context in which the jury that found Longhurst “guilty” recommended mercy 
on the grounds that that his crime did not seem premeditated (Times, 27 March 
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1867, 11). The ballad’s, and the jury’s, interest in mercy reflects the ongoing 
conflicts between the state and its citizens when interpreting capital crimes and 
assigning capital punishments. Such conflicts consistently establish the founda-
tion for last lamentation voices, which depict the contest between the irrevocable 
decrees of condemnatory judgment and the ethical ambiguities in allocating 
mercy. The instability of interpretation is also underscored in Longhurst’s apos-
trophe to “[g]ood people,” whom he asks to “draw near” and listen to “[his] sad 
history,” from which, he surmises, they “will a warning take.” The particular 
instruction of this warning, however, remains wholly unspecified. While criti-
cal assumptions about the lamentation ballad’s habitual capitulation to state 
authority might lead us to find a simple advisory against bad behavior, the vari-
ous strands of Longhurst’s “sad history” also register a more emphatically critical 
commentary on state retribution.
 Casting the criminal as a beloved son facing “the apparatus of death” and the 
“silent grave,” the ballad constructs a personal tragedy, but the narration of his 
movement through the criminal justice system increases the scale—and signifi-
cance—of his experience: “Then I was taken for this cruel deed, / And sent for 
trial, as you may read; / At Kingston assizes, tried and cast.” In the courtroom 
scene of his sentencing, the ballad explicitly represents the language of law and 
punishment:
The Judge said, James Longhurst, you are guilty found,
You will go from here to London town
And there you’ll die a death of shame,
And meet your fate at Horsemonger lane.
This account of Longhurst’s sentencing, with its stresses on “die,” “death,” and 
“shame,” exposes the performative qualities of state authority, which fixes his 
criminal identity with the words “guilty” and condemns him to a “death of 
shame” using the deterministic rhetoric of “fate.” Yet, at the same time, the bal-
lad’s many empathic tones diminish the truth-claims of this judicial posture. In 
contrast to the imperious and anonymous judge, the personalized and conflicted 
criminal poet appears straightforward and sincere, conveying the most truth-
ful—because the most precisely rendered and emotionally fraught—account of 
capital punishment. In a curious realignment of political authority, the senti-
mental speech and emotional authenticity of the condemned criminal awaiting 
the “silent grave” suggests that the social rupture created by Longhurst’s terrible 
crimes will not be repaired with the execution of a “boy.”
 The tensions of speech and silence generate for Longhurst the same prob-
lems of communication that afflicted Sheward. Seeking to convey the suffering 
of the condemned criminal, Longhurst requires language unavailable in official 
discourses about criminal guilt and retributive justice:
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While I lay in my prison cell,
My state of mind no tongue can tell;
I could not rest by day or night,
Poor Jane was always in my sight.
In this fashion, the ballad situates the essence of murderous guilt—and the con-
sciousness of the criminal poet—somewhere between painful memories of vio-
lent agency and grim anticipations of violent death. Accordingly, Longhurst’s 
mournful and haunted attempt at articulation arises out of a confrontation 
with the “silent grave” and an obligation to “recall the past.” As the desire to 
speak and the difficulty of expression shape the experience of eternal silencing, 
the justifications for capital punishment are challenged by a troubled “state of 
mind” which both requires and defies communication.
 In yoking the violent criminal and the sentimental poet, blurring a presumed 
line between deviant criminals and normal citizens, Sheward and Longhurst 
invite reexaminations of their crimes and punishments. In consistently spot-
lighting the condemned criminals of scaffold dramas, rather than highlighting 
the hapless victims of terrible crimes, lamentation ballads do not simply dismiss 
victims, who often haunt their killers or elicit their sympathy, but they do redi-
rect attention to the definitions of criminal responsibility and the practices of 
execution that shaped the marketplace where ballads were sold and, of course, 
determined the immediate political context in which they were read. In their 
reevaluations of crimes and condemnations, lamentation ballads sometimes 
placed graphic imagery aside and concentrated instead on the legal language of 
criminal trials. As J. F. Stephen noted, “A crime being an act punished by the law 
as voluntary, intentional, and malicious, and the act being admitted, or proved, 
the only way in which criminality can be disproved is by rebutting the ordinary 
presumptions of will, intention, or malice. If either of these presumptions is 
rebutted, crime is disproved” (General View 86). Seizing upon these important 
distinctions, and undercutting legal fictions with lyrical fictions, balladeers often 
entangled murders in impressionistic memories of inexplicable impulses in ways 
that challenged guilty verdicts and death sentences.
 In the “Execution of F. Hinson” (1869), for example, Frederick Hinson details 
his murder of the “false-hearted” adulteress, Maria Death. Tinkering with the 
legalities of the historical Hinson’s case, the ballad rehabilitates his murderous 
character by failing to acknowledge sexual improprieties shaping his conduct. 
Hinson’s victim was his cohabitating mistress, not his legal wife (who lived else-
where), yet, as the Times reported, in spite of the taint of adultery and illegiti-
macy Hinson “laboured under the hallucination that he was justified in taking 
the life of the woman under the belief that she had proved unfaithful to him, 
and that, though not in law his wife, he regarded her as such in all respects.” The 
report also adds, “It may also be remembered that he has two young children, 
chAp ter 1
one by his wife, who is still living, and the other by the murdered woman” (13 
December 1869, 6).
 Perhaps because of its legal and ideological liabilities, this lamentation ballad 
avoids Hinson’s domestic scandal completely. Hailing an audience of “[y]oung 
men and maidens” as well as “[y]ou married and you single all,” Hinson instructs 
his audience to “list to my sad lamentation” and to “pity, pity my downfall.” 
Although Hinson specifically warns “young men” against the passions that lead 
to crime and punishment—“Your passions curb, ’ere ’tis too late”—his narrative 
privileges moral justifications and legal defenses rather than cautionary tales and 
behavioral advice.
 Hinson mystifies the circumstances of his crime by piecing together a crude 
psychology of impassioned jealousy, and he questions the murder charge by sit-
uating the crime in the context of his victim’s adultery: “When I found she was 
false-hearted, / Jealousy filled my mind, ’tis true.” Building a case for adulterous 
provocation, Hinson connects his jealousy to his desire to maintain both mar-
riage and family: “I grieved from her for to be parted, / For I loved her, and our 
offspring too.” With the mad passions of jealousy, the legal mitigations of adul-
tery, and the ideological force of domesticity invoked to explicate and expiate his 
crime, Hinson also intimates that he was mentally absent—rather than willfully 
present—at the time of the murder. Effectively disavowing legal responsibility, 
he proclaims, “Recall the dead I never can, / I saw her fall, and gazed in sadness, 
/ A guilty and heartbroken man.” Unlike other ballad criminals who confess to 
stabbing, ripping, mangling, and boiling, Hinson admits only that he “saw” and 
“gazed” and thereafter became “a guilty and heartbroken man.” Hinson further 
diminishes culpability by describing his victim’s provocative behavior. When he 
finds her “[i]n company with that treacherous man,” he explains, “One kindly 
word from her would saved her / And stay’d alas my murderous hand.” Maria 
Death, however, “braved [his] anger” and provoked his “murderous hand.”
 With murderousness attributed to his “hand” and his victim cast as an 
unrepentant adulteress, Hinson’s ballad revisits the prerogatives of enraged and 
wronged husbands, which informed Hinson’s defense at trial where, pleading 
“temporary insanity,” he requested a reduced charge of manslaughter on the 
basis of provocation (Times, 13 December 1869, 6). As Wiener has explained, 
while provocation as a mitigating factor in wife-murder had less and less impact 
on judges as the nineteenth century wore on, it continued to sway juries and 
influence public opinion (Men 199). At the same time, “[k]illings on the basis 
of sexual unfaithfulness,” characterized by familiar circumstances and the use 
of weapons, “presented a unique and stark situation for the criminal justice 
system: a confrontation between the worst provocation and the clearest intent 
to kill” (204). This gap between judicial and public opinion helps to explain the 
defensive strategies of this particular lamentation ballad, which counteracts the 
murder,  ex ec ut I o n,  And t h e  cr I m I nAl  clAss es 
historical Hinson’s known impropriety with the ballad Hinson’s projected righ-
teousness. The ballad rather explicitly alludes to this rift between the judiciary 
and the public when Hinson claims to be “condemned by some, [but] by many 
pitied.”
 Amidst the contradictions and ironies of criminal and matrimonial law that 
influenced Hinson’s case, the notion that Hinson was done in by impropri-
ety—not murder—informed public commentary on his case:
When Frederick Hinson went to the Newgate gallows in 1869 for killing his 
apparently unfaithful common-law wife, the author of a printed circular 
asking for his reprieve acknowledged, while decrying, this distinction: “Had 
Hinson been married to the woman he murdered, thousands of people would 
have commiserated with him, and have considered him partially justified. It is, 
therefore, a morbid caprice to say he ought to be hanged because he was not 
married to the woman. He considered her his wife, she had children by him, 
and it appears that he had used her well.” (Wiener, Men 207)
Resurrecting the failed defensive strategies invoked at trial and infusing his 
reflections with affective tones, the ballad similarly negotiates a culture of con-
sent for wife-murder in order to question the legal and moral grounds of his 
execution. More interested in the classed injustices of capital punishment than 
the gendered injustices of marriage law, this ballad, like many others, contests 
the murder conviction and the capital sentence by upholding the domestic privi-
leges of men. The ballad Hinson, a legitimate and proper patriarch, claims the 
rights to violence unavailable to his improper historical counterpart.
 Accordingly, as the condemned Hinson awaits execution in his prison cell, 
he is victimized by memories of his crime and haunted by the apparition of his 
victim:
My days are spent in lamentation,
My sleepless nights were spent in prayer,
My mind was filled with agitation,
For Maria’s shade was always there.
Engaged in “lamentation” and “prayer,” Hinson becomes a family man of deep 
religious faith whose ignominious death contrasts his respectable life:
At Wood Green I was respected,
With all around in peace did dwell,
Now broken-hearted and dejected,
I pine within a gloomy cell.
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His piousness is also underscored as he links justice to an anticipated meeting 
with “[his] offended God.” Wondering to himself, “How can I meet my heavenly 
father, / Or dare to him for mercy cry,” and hoping, “the Lord [will] have mercy 
on my soul,” Hinson characterizes his ballad as a “dying prayer” and admonishes 
his audience, “My dying prayer do not be scorning.”
 Rehabilitating Hinson in this way, the ballad redefines his crime—he loved 
Maria and wanted her to stay—and his execution—his “poor darling orphans” 
will be left behind. Wholly invested in domestic propriety, callously thwarted 
by an adulterous “wife,” and mercilessly condemned by a home-wrecking state, 
Hinson is rescued from the criminal margin and restored to the ideological cen-
ter where he performs the roles of moral teacher, loving father, devoted Chris-
tian, peaceful neighbor, and pitied victim. In this instance, the reflective criminal 
poet rather pointedly dismantles legal arguments and exploits gender inequali-
ties to protest a state execution.
 Also intervening in judicial procedures is the “Lamentation of Samuel 
Wright” (1864) (figure 6), which aggressively challenges the legal language of 
intent in Wright’s case. In doing so, the ballad fully relies on the notorious facts 
of his condemnation and execution, which many Victorians of all classes pub-
licly denounced as a case of judicial murder. A London bricklayer, Wright was 
executed in 1864 for killing his “mistress,” and, as the Times reported, Wright had 
no defense counsel and pleaded “Guilty” at trial. After rejecting the prosecutor’s 
suggestion to the court that Wright obtain access to legal counsel and reconsider 
his plea, the judge sentenced Wright to death a mere three days after the crime 
was committed. Wright was then executed less than a month after his sentenc-
ing, despite a fully articulated public outcry. The speed with which Wright’s case 
moved through the criminal justice system was often cited as a fundamental 
injustice in his case, and the circumstances of his trial and execution featured 
prominently in abolitionist arguments and the deliberations of the Capital Pun-
ishment Commission.
 In his reflections on the abolitionist movement in Victorian England, Alfred 
Dymond cites Wright’s case as tragic consequence of a flawed system of capital 
punishment:
But the year 1864 was marked by events that hastened affairs to a crisis. The 
execution of Samuel Wright, in the teeth of public opinion, for an offence 
that would probably be denominated murder in no other civilized country, 
without even the form of a trial, or the slightest means of defence, upon the 
ipse dixit of a judge whose sage opinion was founded upon ex parte deposi-
tions taken before the police magistrate, and after every class of the people 
had in turn prayed that his life might be spared—this case brought home to 
men’s minds the conviction that not in the humane professions of the law’s 
Figure 6
Lamentation of Samuel Wright. Trials Broadside 205: Hollis no. 6909725. Courtesy of 
Special Collections Department, Harvard Law School Library.
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administrators, but in a radical alteration of the law itself, was alone to be 
found safety from judicial error. (295)
Upon Wright’s conviction, working-class citizens, as well as members of the 
judiciary and proponents of abolition, mobilized to save him. Many Londoners 
boycotted his execution in protest, and, as the Times documented, as the scaffold 
was erected for Wright, a handbill condemning the execution circulated through 
the crowd:
A Solemn Protest against the Execution of Wright—Men and women of 
London, abstain from witnessing this sad spectacle of injustice. Let Calcraft 
and Co. do their work this time with none but the eye of Heaven to look 
upon their crime. Let all window shutters be up and window blinds be down 
for an hour on Tuesday morning in Southwark. Englishmen, shall Wright be 
hung? If so, there is one law for the rich, and another for the poor. (Times, 13 
January 1864, 12)
Acknowledging these protests and referencing the charged political context of 
capital punishment debates, “Lamentation of Samuel Wright” contests the legal-
ity of his sentence and reiterates class critiques of his criminal case.
 As the circulating handbill attests, “the spectacle of injustice” embodied 
interlocking problems of class oppression and legal representation. A widely 
acknowledged procedural travesty, one which necessitated the “radical altera-
tion of the law itself,” Wright’s trial also functioned as a disturbing counterpoint 
to murder cases in which access to learned legal counsel and applications of 
criminal insanity theories conspired to allow financially privileged and socially 
empowered killers to “escape” justice. As Wright was going to his death for a 
crime that was arguably a case of manslaughter, the audaciously unremorse-
ful and unapologetically misogynist George Victor Townley, responsible for the 
more heinous and premeditated murder of his fiancée, who had recently broken 
their engagement, received respite three months after his trial and sentencing 
and was removed to an insane asylum for treatment.24
 Though controversial insanity defenses were by no means unfamiliar to 
Victorians in 1864, the uncanny timing of the two cases attracted particularly 
intense public scorn. On 11 January 1864, just as the Home Office was rejecting 
Wright’s final petition for mercy and upholding his hasty conviction and sen-
tencing, Townley was being transferred from Derby Gaol to St. George’s-in-the-
Field’s Criminal Lunatic Asylum in London (Times, 12 January 1864, 9). In light 
of the Townley reprieve, Wright’s case symbolized the extreme vulnerability of 
the working classes within a biased and inconsistent criminal justice system, and 
among the taunts from the crowd at Wright’s execution were: “Shame,” “Judicial 
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murder,” and “Where’s Townley?” (Times, 13 January 1864, 12).
 Explicitly concerned with the Wright-Townley scandal, “Lamentation of 
Samuel Wright” dispenses with conventional moral frames entirely and opens 
with the criminal poet exclaiming, “Oh! friends,” and insisting, “You cannot 
fail to pity me.” Contrasting the disingenuous and unscrupulous qualities of 
Townley’s “escape,” the speaker signals his own integrity and honesty with a 
frank and direct proclamation of his involvement in the death of Maria Green. 
He then goes on to carefully scrutinize criminal responsibility and construct a 
legal defense, which interrogates definitions of murder and methods of sentenc-
ing. In this fashion, the street ballad grants Wright the opportunity to testify at 
length on his own behalf using legal language that the ill-informed and unrepre-
sented historical Wright was seemingly unaware of and incapable of articulating 
at his hasty trial “three or four short days after” the crime. Wright, with his right 
to speak restored, denies intent in wholly unambiguous statements: “I never 
had the least intention, / The female, Maria Green to slay.” He also dismisses 
premeditation: “I never once deliberated / Or meant Maria Green to kill.” The 
crime, he explains, occurred in “a moment of excitement”:
Aggravated, I her blood did spill,
I scarcely knew I had committed,
The dreadful deed when it was done,
I was unconscious of the murder,
From the place did not attempt to run.
In refuting the murder conviction, Wright cites the forces of “drink and cursed 
aggravation” and euphemistically professes that he “her blood did spill.” While 
Wright clearly denies malice aforethought, he consistently acknowledges his 
actions—even those taken in court: “At the Bar, I pleaded, ‘Guilty.’” This state-
ment, of course, reflects the actual plea of the historical Wright, but, in the 
context of the Townley case, its reiteration here also contributes to the ballad’s 
emphatic representation of Wright’s personal integrity. Fraught with meaning, 
his plainspoken plea also alludes to the historical Wright’s initial ignorance of 
legal distinctions between murder and manslaughter and reminds readers that 
his death hinges on his political disenfranchisement, not his murderous guilt. 
That he killed Maria Green is not in question, but the ballad’s rehearsal of this 
defense echoes and addresses public calls for a judicial review of his case.
 The defensive posture assumed in this ballad is reinforced with an allusion 
to dedicated protesters—a network of friends and the working-class commu-
nity—intervening on his behalf. Proclaiming, “Friends, for me have persevered, / 
To save me from the gallows high,” Wright acknowledges the inadequacy of their 
pleas in a summary of the class injustices of his case:
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Alas! For me there is no mercy,
Every boon they did deny,
While others who was tried for murder,
And doomed to die upon the tree,
Through friends and money have been pardon’d
Who deserved to die as well as me.
In this comparative study of judicial procedures, the “boon” of money and the 
doom of poverty indict the effects of class privileges on the criminal justice sys-
tem. With the claim that Townley “deserved to die as well as me,” Wright does not 
simply contest capital punishment but rather cites the bias of class that informs 
all judicial procedures. Gatrell has argued that execution ballads of the 1860s 
were politically “safe” because Parliament was scrutinizing capital punishment 
and “abolitionism was in fashion” (Gatrell 164). Yet, as Wright’s ballad dem-
onstrates, the case-specific analyses and the dynamics of poetic voice allowed 
balladeers to extend their commentaries beyond the rhetorical fashions of aboli-
tionism and enfold life-and-death questions about class stratification and, in this 
particular case, the moral and legal economies of criminal psychology.
 In fact, Wright interprets the verdict in his case wholly in terms of class con-
flict without any apparent concern for abolition as a political agenda:
But, oh! my friends, you must acknowledge
What I say has oft been said before,
Some laws are made to suit two classes,
One for the rich, one for the poor;
So it is with me and Townley,
A reprieve they quickly granted he,
He was, rich, and I was poor,—
And I must face the fatal tree.
Apostrophizing his “friends,” Wright articulates the social necessity of his death 
(“I must face the fatal tree”) in terms of “rich” and “poor.” And, as this criminal 
poet articulates what “has oft been said before,” his personal tragedy, which he 
characterizes as the case of “me and Townley,” points to the vulnerability of the 
working classes in the criminal justice system: “On earth there is a great distinc-
tion, / The poor must die, the rich they’ll save” (emphasis added). Ordained by 
laws “made to suit two classes,” Wright’s death on a “gallows high” and his disap-
pearance into a “murderers grave” are depicted as wholly overdetermined. The 
necessity of his death even disturbs the leveling force of “the grave.” Although 
Wright announces, “But well we know, when Death approaches, / There’s no 
distinction in the grave,” in the political context of his execution and Townley’s 
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institutionalization, this maxim only serves to reinforce the material disadvan-
tages of class hastening Wright to an unmarked murderer’s grave.
 His delivery of emotionally wrought “adieus” to his “dearest children” and 
his “loving parents dear” and his thanks to his friends and neighbors who “did 
their best [his] life to save” heighten this effect. But the ballad’s last four lines 
revert to legal discourse, as Wright concludes with the self-defense plea that 
informed public protests on his behalf. “My wretched victim strove to stab me, 
/ With a bright and deadly knife,” he explains, and this introduction of a “bright 
and deadly knife” into the ballad further complicates the relationship between 
the condemned killer and the murder victim by displacing the language of intent 
onto the victim (“strove to stab me”) and the imagery of sensational violence 
onto her weapon (“bright and deadly knife”). The final two lines encapsulate the 
persona of this criminal poet: “And I in a sad fit of frenzy, / Admit I took away 
her life.” With this earnest and emotional voice, simultaneously bidding farewell 
and articulating mitigation, the ballad again sharply distinguishes between man-
slaughter and murder and pits the desperate expressions of sorrow against the 
looming condition of silence.
 While Wright’s ballad documents a particular instance of widespread public 
sympathy for a condemned criminal at a time when abolition was “in fashion,” 
other ballads demonstrate that the trope of the criminal poet also produced 
critical readings of class conflict and criminal justice against the grain of main-
stream public opinion. In 1840, when Francis B. Courvoisier, a valet and a Swiss 
national, murdered his aristocratic English employer, Lord William Russell, his 
crime dramatized very specific early-Victorian anxieties about class. Accom-
modating conventional stereotypes of a deviant and dangerous class, the class 
politics of his crime, the public stature of his victim, and the newspaper coverage 
of his trial mobilized elite Victorians, and his public hanging brought members 
of the aristocracy and the literati—including Thackeray and Dickens—into the 
scaffold crowd. Inciting public paranoia and outrage, Courvoisier’s crime and 
punishment were consistently narrated in terms of working-class threats to the 
property and persons of the upper classes. With Victorian England’s upper-
class citizens playing the curious and horrified potential victims of working-
class violence, the cultural scripts generated to explain his case sparked what 
Richard Altick has termed a “Victorian servant-neurosis” (220). Documenting 
the symptoms of this upper-class pathology, he cites diarist Charles Greville 
who explained that the Courvoisier case “frightened all London out of its wits”: 
“Visionary servants and air-drawn razors or carving-knives dance before every-
body’s imagination and half the world go to sleep expecting to have their throats 
cut before morning” (220–21).
 Motivated by the immense popularity of Courvoisier’s case, ballad publish-
ers printed an array of broadsheets containing assessments of his crime and cop-
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ies of his affecting verses. Though divergent in detail and emphasis, these ballads 
consistently highlighted the same motive for the killing: Lord Russell discovered 
Courvoisier’s thefts and terminated his employment, so Courvoisier resolved 
to murder him.25 Establishing causal links between property crimes and vio-
lent crimes, of course, easily confirmed prejudices about a criminally oriented 
underclass. Yet, the lyrical voice and narrative perspective of the criminal poet 
also confused that logic. The “Copy of Verses” printed in “Particulars of the Life, 
Trial, Confession, and Execution of Courvoisier,” for example, in addressing the 
classed tensions of Courvoisier’s crimes, renders the evolution from robbing to 
killing as a condition of master and servant relations—not from the perspective 
of the nervous propertied classes but, rather, from the perspective of a compro-
mised and delinquent employee.
 Invoking commonplace explanations for Courvoisier’s motivation and con-
demnation, the ballad describes the murder of Lord Russell as the actions of 
a servant being discharged without recommendation. Reflecting a precise cir-
cumstantial motive, it sidesteps the more common panic-inducing scenarios 
of a “frightened” London subject to revolutionary uprisings. A self-reflective 
criminal poet, Courvoisier acknowledges his misdeeds and regrets his errors in 
judgment, but he links them to the more local conditions of Russell’s household 
and the idiosyncrasies of his own character in ways that temper paranoid or 
neurotic readings of his crimes. Courvoisier laments, “I valet was unto Lord 
Russell / Who lived in Norfolk Street, Park Lane, / Where I might have lived a 
life of comfort / But for one thing which gives me pain.” In mournful retrospect, 
elaborating the “one thing which gives [him] pain,” Courvoisier contemplates 
his folly and hubris in expecting that daily pilfering would not be noticed or that 
servants would not be monitored:
I day by day my master plundered,
And did the property conceal,
Thinking I should not be suspected
And no one could the tale reveal;
He explains that Lord Russell, upon discovering Courvoisier’s theft, “threatened 
that he would discharge me, / From his service the next day.” “It was then,” this 
ballad version of Courvoisier states with absolute precision, “I formed the horrid 
plan, / For to commit the awful crime.” Far from denying malicious forethought 
or criminal intent, he affixes the moment of murderous inspiration and expli-
cates his “horrid plan” as a response to the threat of a “discharge.” Reiterating 
this notion, Courvoisier explains that, amidst the wealth and comfort of Rus-
sell’s home, he made his murderous decision on “the fifth of May” at the precise 
moment when “my master . . . threatened to discharge me.” And, operating in a 
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confessional mode, unlike the historical Courvoisier who acknowledged his guilt 
but demanded to be “defend[ed] to the utmost” by counsel (Cairns 130), the bal-
lad Courvoisier infuses his recollections with the affective tones of lamentation 
poetics while intimating the difficult circumstances of the servant class.26
 In contextualizing Russell’s murder in this way, and in reconstructing the 
notorious character of the historical Courvoisier, the ballad refuses to reproduce 
simple causal links between crime and class. While arguments about the dan-
gerous classes typically imagined working-class crime in generalist and reduc-
tive formulae of urban “demoralization” or collective rebellion, the criminal 
poet, redirecting attention toward the particular anxieties of a particular servant 
on a particular day, casts his violence not as a collective assault on aristocratic 
privilege but as the bad decision of a discharged servant. As in many ballads, 
Courvoisier’s verses also provide gory recollections of the murder: when “all 
was hushed in sleep,” he explains, “I armed me with a fatal knife, / And sought 
the chamber of my master, / Determined for to take his life.” And, in a moment 
of graphic reportage, the ballad forces the coincidence of sensitive poet and 
murderous agent: “His throat I severed in an instant,” he explains, and “from the 
wound life’s blood did flow.” In this striking symbolic inversion of power rela-
tions, such details connect issues of agency and premeditation to the theme of 
Courvoisier’s desperation.
 In this “instant,” which occurred in his “master’s chamber” where “in peace 
Lord William [was] sleeping,” however, a more famous and more menacing mur-
derous agent appears. Just as Courvoisier “severed” the throat and the “blood did 
flow,” he explains, “The fiend exulting stood before me / For he had worked my 
overthrow.” If only for a moment, the appearance of the “fiend” shifts the ethical 
terms of the narrative, muddling criminal responsibility and displacing agency. 
Fulfilling the codes of lamentation poetics, this symbolic imagery is also joined 
by emotional reflections. Courvoisier remembers his murderous actions with 
regret, and he frames his narrative, after all, with a dreadful awareness that he 
is “doomed to die a death of shame.” He then addresses his futile attempts to 
conceal his guilt:
In my innocence I still persisted,
But God ordained it otherwise,
A British jury found me guilty,
And I am to answer with my life.
Subject to the powers of three inexorable forces, an overthrow by “the fiend,” the 
ordination of “God,” and the verdict of “a British jury,” Courvoisier, a multiply 
disadvantaged servant and foreigner, must confront his overdetermined scaffold 
fate: “blood for blood will be required, / And I must the dread forfeit pay.” While 
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the historical Courvoisier manifested the nightmare of a revolutionary criminal 
class and his execution encapsulated the disciplinary authority of a “consensual 
‘we’” (who attended in the tens of thousands), the ballad’s application of lam-
entation poetics interferes in both constructions. A throat-severing murderer, 
an anxious thieving servant, and a condemned criminal poet, this particular 
version of Courvoisier fragments readings of the historical Courvoisier’s crimes, 
the nature of his character, and the necessity of his public death.
 If songs about crime offered ballad writers opportunities to contest charges, 
convictions, and sentences, songs about execution afforded the possibility of 
interrogating the spectacle of public hanging. The verses printed on the broad-
sheet entitled “Life, Trial, Sentence, and Execution of Catherine Wilson, for the 
Murder of Mrs. Soames” (1862) (figure 7) foreground the subjective experience 
of the criminal in the condemned cell and at the scaffold. Between twenty and 
thirty thousand spectators attended the execution of Catherine Wilson, who, 
in 1862, was the first woman to be hanged at the Old Bailey in fourteen years 
(Times, 21 October 1862, 5). Public interest in her case was also increased by the 
eerie signs of calculating intent apparent in murder by poisoning, the crime for 
which she was convicted, and in the possibility of many more poisonings, which 
she was assumed to have committed but for which she was never tried.
 Judith Knelman explains that because Wilson “posed as a nurse,” her “per-
version of medical assistance” made her seem especially “diabolical” (72). As 
an alleged serial poisoner, “who supported herself by killing off acquaintances 
for their money and possessions” (72), she inspired “not one application to the 
Home Secretary for remission of her sentence, not even from the Society for the 
Abolition of Capital Punishment” (73). Because “through wholesale poisoning 
she managed to uphold her position reasonably well in middle-class London 
society” (72), Wilson presumed to outwardly mimic but secretly undermine 
the tenants of bourgeois respectability. The notion of an aggressive murderess 
opportunistically using her role as caretaker and cunningly exploiting the cover 
of femininity constituted aggravating factors in the eyes of the court, the press, 
and the public.
 Negotiating these contentious issues, the ballad emphasizes the public spec-
tacle of femininity and feminizes the psychological traumas of condemnation. 
Unlike many ballads, this one identifies a tune to which this crime ballad can 
be sung: “Ave Maria.” And with this ambitious musical allusion, it constructs a 
distinctly feminine criminal poet—or poetess—who reflects on the irrevocable 
sentence of death and her fate as a convicted poisoner. Anxieties about her “last 
night on earth” and her imminent public death, rather than recollections of her 
crime, convey her murderous subjectivity and establish her affective persona. In 
contrast, her ominous crimes, multiple poisonings, occupy a single stanza:
Figure 7
Life, Trial, Sentence, and Execution of Catherine Wilson, for the Murder of Mrs. Soames. 
Trials Broadside 233: Hollis no. 8120856. Courtesy of Special Collections Department, 
Harvard Law School Library.
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Such deeds I did commit in life,
For the sake of worldly gain;
I have seen my victims lay and die,
In anguish and in pain.
I gave, as they thought, friendship’s cup
And good news to them did bring.
Poor souls, they little thought,
That it was the adder’s sting.
Taking responsibility and outlining motivation, Wilson elaborates the sinister 
guises (the “friendship’s cup” and “good news”) and financial motives (“worldly 
gain”) of her crimes—the details that generated disgust for Wilson and support 
for her execution.
 Having revealed her murderous duplicity and her base materialism and 
arranged her victims into a collective of “poor souls,” Wilson focuses solely on 
the projected scenes of her hanging and its tragic qualities, which are under-
scored by the rare spectacle of a condemned woman: “Oh what a death for a 
woman to die, / That is scarcely in her prime.” With the assertion that she is 
“scarcely in her prime,” the ballad alludes to newspaper reflections on Wilson’s 
sexual appeal. The Times reported that Wilson was rumored to be a “good- 
looking woman,” who was “well dressed on her trial,” and speculated that the 
execution crowd “went to see, not a triumph of justice and an object of indigna-
tion, but something more hideous and revolting even than ordinary executions” 
(22 October 1862, 6). Continuing this analysis of the convict and the crowd, the 
Times asserts:
Such was the respectable and prepossessing person who was to walk out of a 
window in the Old Bailey with her hands pinioned behind her, ascend a scaf-
fold, be tired with a cap, noosed, and let go like a dog whose transgressions 
have provoked this requital, or who is no longer worth his keep. A woman 
dangling in mid air in broad daylight, in a London street, and over the heads 
of an immense rabble of low men and low women, is certainly a most disgust-
ing sight. (22 October 1862, 6)
The severe criticism of Wilson’s trial and execution in the Times serves as a strik-
ing example of the classed and gendered semiotics of public execution. It is not 
only the hanging of a woman that so distresses this writer, but also the fact that 
a well-comported, “good-looking,” “respectable and prepossessing,” figure will 
be “noosed, and let go” in front of and “over the heads of” representatives of the 
low and criminal classes. 
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 Just as the historical Wilson’s gender and class complicated the spectacle of 
her execution, it informs the ballad’s approach to her lyrical voice. Exploiting 
and objectifying feminine passivity and sentiment, this ballad uses the affective 
power of a woman’s lament to intimate the perversity of state killing. High-
lighting her lack of agency, Wilson announces, “What would I give one hour 
to live— / But my life I cannot save” and reports, “A warning voice rings in my 
ear,” calling, “Catherine Wilson now prepare for death / Upon the gallows high.” 
Breaking from the lamentation trope of criminals haunted by their victims, this 
ballad criminal is instead haunted by a vision of her own impending victimi-
zation:
Since my sentence has been fixed,
On my bed I cannot rest,
Horrid visions haunt my pillow,
My mind is sore distressed.
Wilson’s victims, in contrast, are presented as sympathetic witnesses whom she 
envisions “around [her] bed, / Interceeding for [her] soul above.” With some 
irony, then, her victims, but not the state acting on their behalf or the public 
supporting her execution, apprehend the tragic weight of her circumstances and 
assist in the reclamation of her soul.
 Also included in these “horrid visions” is Wilson’s abject and anonymous 
decay in the “murderer’s grave.” She reflects, “No stone will mark the spot, / My 
body burnt with lime.” Wilson’s self-directed terror is then interrupted by the 
internalized disciplinary voice of the state proclaiming, “Prepare to die, for in 
one hour, / You are a mass of lifeless clay.” Such blunt and abject articulations 
of her humiliating death—the “mass of lifeless clay” and the “body burnt with 
lime”—serve to underscore the violent consequences of execution.
 Wilson’s ballad fully exploits the illusion of the criminal poet hastily and 
desperately penning verses as execution day breaks, for Wilson continues to 
express her sorrows even as the “hangman stands with rope in hand.” Record-
ing the erection of the scaffold, she exposes the mise-en-scène of public hanging 
and highlights the integral set piece that transforms judicial killing into social 
justice:
The dull sounds of the workmen’s hammers
Ascend unto the sky,
Erecting of the fatal place
For the prisoner to die.
These details attribute a calculating intent and mechanized agency to the state, 
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for with them Wilson establishes the scaffold as a stage, the “fatal place” where 
“the prisoner” plays a role in a traditional and tragic political drama. As she 
writes her own tragedy, she exposes the performative, disciplinary function of 
her scaffold death, and her speech personalizes the spectacle of her public suffer-
ing. With a dirge-like pace and tone, she describes the procession:
The hangman awaits to pinion me—
The procession moves along—
The dead bell strikes out a dreadful peel—
Hark! I hear the busy throng,
The multitude will gaze on me
As they did on those before.
The ballad’s review of the “dreadful peel” of bells, the sounds of the “busy 
throng,” and the “gaze” of the “multitude” implies the routine and ritualistic 
history of this punitive drama and the role that Wilson, like “those before,” will 
play in this terrifying spectacle of justice.
 At the ballad’s conclusion, Wilson projects the moment of her death: “The 
signal given—the bolt is drawn— / Catherine Wilson is no more.” The cessation 
of her life and her speech is further realized in the chorus: “Catherine Wilson 
thus did die, / A dreadful death upon the gallows high.” Formally and forcefully 
encoding the theme of interrupted speech, the ballad contrasts the impersonal 
and performative authority of state punishment with the intimate and authentic 
expression of criminal lamentation, and with the refrain of the chorus, it explic-
itly depicts the tragic conclusion implied in all execution ballads—the violent 
death and the eternal silence of the criminal poet.
 Reproducing, in order to interrogate, the contests of speech and silence 
involved in judicial procedures, last lamentations restored the voice of the con-
demned criminal to the proceedings that ritualized and celebrated his or her 
violent death. As they restored and often rehabilitated the personal identities of 
murderers, they presented criminals as psychological subjects rather than spec-
tacular objects. Their strategies of political resistance are rooted in the public-
ity of execution and the performativity of verse. The memorable speech of the 
criminal poet—exploiting the idea of authenticity associated with constructions 
of lyrical expression—disrupted the semiotic operations of and moral argu-
ments for capital punishment. And complicating the public deaths of historical 
criminals, they blurred divisions between the “consensual ‘we’” and the criminal 
other and established congruities between criminal acts and cultural circum-
stances.
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“I Shall Be Read By My Peers”:
A Poetry of Critique
While the enormous sales of murder and execution ballads alert us to their pop-
ular appeal, more precise readings of individual ballads reveal their remarkably 
innovative approach to murder—one that reconstituted working-class audi-
ences as critical, rather than criminal, subjects. The qualities that contributed 
most to crime balladry’s public stature and cultural significance—their circu-
lation in large quantities, their noisy presence in the streets, their availability 
in cheap print, their political immediacy, their anonymous authorship, their 
working-class audience—have fostered a long tradition of scholarly neglect. But 
contemporary theoretical frameworks, which have privileged questions of genre 
and discourse and examined the influences of literary markets and print media, 
enable us to reconsider their contributions to Victorian culture. “Genre” and 
“discourse,” of course, have been fundamental to studies of crime in the novel, 
but as these terms increasingly inform analyses of poetry, particularly in terms 
of cultural circulation and political participation, they foster new understand-
ings of crime balladry’s fundamental generic tropes (criminal acts, crime scenes, 
and criminal poets) and formal qualities (simple rhythms and crude rhymes) 
with respect to legal and literary representation.
 While providing new foundations for ballad exegesis, these theories of dis-
course and genre also encourage reconstructions of the field of Victorian poetry 
in ways that allow us to reconsider the literary legacy of the crime ballad. In par-
ticular, Williams’s description of genre “as a fully cultural as well as a literary cat-
egory” and her interest in genre and discourse as a “dialectical pair” recombining 
and deforming thematic and formal codes of representation illuminate the ways 
in which individual crime ballads (as technology, as performance) responded to 
the class ideologies and disciplinary institutions informing criminal discourse. 
This concept of dialectical pairing allows us to read Victorian poetry as a net-
work of shared and contested formal techniques, generic conventions, aesthetic 
tropes, and verbal technologies—just as we read criminal discourse as a network 
of shared and contested institutional mandates, political interests, epistemologi-
cal modes, and specialist terminologies.
 Reviewing recent work in and suggesting future priorities for the field of 
Victorian poetry studies, Armstrong considers a network of poetry in similar 
terms:
If we take seriously the idea of networks, of intertext, of multiple inter-rela-
tions and connections, if we take seriously the notion of poetry as technology, 
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then we will not understand the cultural work of the poets or the poetics and 
formal experiment of different groups by remaining with the “minor,” the 
“marginalized,” for that is to reinforce the categories we mean to challenge.  
. . . The whole point of a network or a field is the different ways of cutting or 
crossing it, ways that we constitute ourselves. . . . Landon–Tennyson, Chartist 
poetry–Browning, Michael Field–Wilde, street ballads–Swinburne’s ballads, 
sensation novel–sensation poem–sensation journalism, railways–the poetics 
of railway time, these are just a few ways of constituting networks. (“The 
Victorian Poetry Party” 25)27
New pairings of high and low or marginal and central texts—and recognition of 
their formal, thematic, and discursive affiliations—produces a vision of Victo-
rian poetry as an open system of intertextual exchange less beholden to hierar-
chies of literary form and social class.
 In imagining new constellations of texts, we can begin to look at how poets 
themselves invoked textual networks in their own stylistic appropriations and 
textual allusions. For example, the tale of Robert Browning quoting from “a 
ghastly [ballad] stanza” on James Thurtell’s murder of William Weare (“His 
throat was cut from ear to ear / His brains they battered in”) signifies, perhaps, 
not a passing sensational interest or an insignificant biographical tidbit, but a 
curiosity about and a recognition of the multiple realms of verse (Paul 338). 
Similarly, Browning’s reference to crime balladry in The Ring and the Book, in 
which Guido fears the poetic power of “portraiture in white and black / Of dead 
Pompilia gracing a ballad-sheet” (XI.1827–28), forms a part of the verse novel’s 
self-reflexive representations of legal and literary intertextuality.28
 Offering a much more comprehensive example of poetic networks, Wilde’s 
“The Ballad of Reading Gaol” pairs aesthetic images and political arguments in 
ways that suggest a strategic identification with the public poetics of the “crimi-
nal” classes. To be sure, the ballad form was in no way the exclusive domain of 
street poetry. A nineteenth-century revival of the literary ballad, a Romantic 
tradition of lyrical balladry, and a popular tradition of political balladry, devel-
oped by Chartists and Irish nationalists among others, all inform the literary 
context of Wilde’s poem. Signifying its more immediate political context and 
content, however, are the striking resemblances between the language and logic 
of “The Ballad of Reading Gaol” and the language and logic of execution bal-
lads. In one of his lectures on poetry’s modes of redress, Seamus Heaney usefully 
acknowledges the poem’s broadside genealogy: “Obviously, in one way, there is 
something entirely conventional about the subject of murder and retribution, 
the setting of gaol yard and gaol cell, the cast of warder and hangman and chap-
lain, the dreadful props of gallows and quicklimed grave—all of these things 
belong in the tradition of the broadside ballad” (Heaney, “Speranza in Reading” 
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92).29 Yet, in addition to the most obvious features of “subject,” “setting,” “cast,” 
and “props,” the structural foundations of the poem’s critique—the elabora-
tion of lyrical criminal subjects (the narrative “I” and the “wistful” killer), the 
invocation of the tragic and the sublime (emotional terror and bodily pain), the 
scrutiny of speech and silence as disciplinary technologies, and the correlation 
of individual suffering and collective guilt—recall the conceptual terrain of the 
broadside ballad.
 Highlighting the plight of the condemned criminal, the poem’s dedication 
registers an intent to memorialize Charles Thomas Wooldridge (“C. T. W.”), but 
Wilde, like anonymous balladeers before him, also uses the emotional appeal 
and the life-and-death urgency of a particular capital case to construct a more 
wide-ranging critique of the institutions and ideologies supporting all aspects of 
“Man’s grim Justice” (3.187). Aligning himself with the condemned murderer—
“A prison wall was round us born, / Two outcast men were we” (2.73–74)—the 
speaker establishes two criminal personae with which to circulate through the 
prison grounds and record the procedures of incarceration and execution. Refer-
ences to “a hangman close at hand” (3.84), a “little heap of burning lime” (4.59), 
and the anonymous “dishonoured grave” (4.128) evoke the imagery of the street 
ballad and the obsessive concerns of the criminal poet.
 Granting access to the interior of the prison and the minds of the prison-
ers, Wilde elaborates the psychological traumas of punishment—stony hearts 
and spectral visitations—in ways that further these associations. Casting prison 
life as a repetitive course of pathos and fear, the speaker proclaims, “Alas! it is 
a fearful thing / To feel another’s guilt!” (3.91–92), and recalls execution day as 
a distressing combination of the routine and the sublime: “And Horror stalked 
before each man, / And Terror crept behind” (4.47–48). At the end of the ballad, 
having reviewed the grotesque images of a quicklimed corpse lying in a “pit of 
shame” (6.2), the speaker remarks, “And there, till Christ call forth the dead, / 
In silence let him lie” (6.7–8), thus exposing the conflicts between the mandates 
of Christian ethics and the measures of capital punishment. Mediating the full 
particulars of prison life through the affective tones of the speaker, and develop-
ing ironic links between individual and institutional acts of violence, the poem 
uses the authenticity of the suffering criminal to diminish the ethical authority 
of the state.
 While “The Ballad of Reading Gaol” does not rely solely on the manipulation 
or citation of the generic codes of crime balladry, it does similarly exploit the 
political immediacy of its themes in order to manage its polemical and emo-
tional content. Within the more sensational story of a murder and execution lie 
important reflections on prisoners who have not killed and will not be killed but 
who are subject nonetheless to the silencing and humiliating procedures that 
Wilde condemns. In this respect, Wilde’s ballad exhibits a pointed engagement 
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with the late-Victorian discourse of prison reform. Penning his ballad just after 
his own release from prison in 1897, he inserts himself into parliamentary and 
public debates surrounding the 1895 Gladstone Report on prison reform that 
preceded the 1898 Prisons Act. As Seán McConville notes in English Local Pris-
ons: 1860–1900 (1995), the pressing problem of penal reform initially suffered 
from neglect in the periodical and newspaper presses, but Wilde, via letters to 
the Daily Chronicle and the publication of “The Ballad of Reading Gaol,” helped 
to publicize the contentious issues of inadequate diet, unproductive labor, and 
enforced silence as well as the “ill-treatment in prison of children and the weak-
minded” (708).
 At the same time, Wilde’s ballad registers a late-Victorian disillusionment 
with the centralization of prison management and a growing distaste for the 
uniform treatment of all prisoners, which became increasingly problematic with 
the growth (and acknowledgment) of a more heterogeneous prison population. 
Lumping together “shrewd professional burglars, prostitutes, drunken brawlers, 
juvenile delinquents, weak-minded vagrants, respectable clerks who had suc-
cumbed to temptation and pilfered the cash register, misdemeanants who could 
not pay fines, and so on” (Wiener, Reconstructing 367–68)—and, we might add, 
a celebrity author for acts of “gross indecency”—late-Victorian prisons finally 
forced difficult questions about regulating prison culture.
 In Crime and Criminals (1910), R. F. Quinton offers an account of the reas-
sessment process that finally began, in 1894, “after sixteen years experience of 
prison centralization” (190), when Home Secretary Asquith finally assembled 
a committee, to conduct a “strict investigation and overhaul” of “the whole 
prison system,” its “administrative machinery,” and the “conditions under which 
prisoners are confined” (192–93). Asquith’s committee recommended abolish-
ing unproductive labor, improving the classification system, developing penal 
reformatories for young prisoners, establishing special sentences for “habitual 
criminals,” designating training prisons for officers, and including medical rep-
resentatives on the Prisons Board (Quinton 193). With such changes, the com-
mittee noted, “the system should be made more elastic, more capable of being 
adapted to the special cases of individual prisoners” (193).
 The particularities of this reformist agenda, especially a concern with the 
identity and integrity of individual prisoners, structure the speaker’s many 
observations of prison culture—informing both the critical arguments and the 
lyric tones of his critique. Arguing that “every prison that men build / Is built 
with bricks of shame” (5.15–16), Wilde highlights tensions between the sensibil-
ity of the criminal subject and the suffering of the criminal body. “And by all 
forgot, we rot and rot, / With soul and body marred” (5.65–66), the narrator 
explains, and the conditions of mental and physical decay constitute a spiritual 
death, which parallels the gruesome physical death of the executed prisoner. 
An “open grave” (3.60) awaits the condemned man, and a “numbered tomb” 
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(3.72) houses the speaker. The poem’s attention to the physical space of prison 
life, like the street ballad’s attention to the structures and stagecraft of scaffold 
death, exposes the performative technologies of state discipline. Subject to the 
monotony of unproductive labor—“We turn the crank, or tear the rope, / Each 
in his separate Hell” (5.57–58)—prisoners succumb to the dehumanizing effects 
of psychological alienation. Regimented exercises render prisoners a “herd of 
brutes” (4.50) watched over by “strutt[ing]” (4.49) warders in “uniforms spick 
and span” (4.51)—descendants, perhaps, of the new police of ballad infamy who 
were said to “strut” in “spick and span” uniforms while stealing mutton. Intensi-
fying the brutishness of the prisoners, this well-supervised routine is contrasted 
with the degrading, but no less supervised, neglect of sanitation: “Each narrow 
cell in which we dwell / Is a foul and dark latrine” (5.37–38). Similarly, a diet 
of “brackish water” (5.43), which “[c]reeps with a loathsome slime” (5.44), is 
served with portions of “bitter bread” (5.45), carefully weighed in scales but full 
of “chalk and lime” (5.46).
 As these images of abjection and alienation address concerns about the rights 
and wrongs of individual prisoners, they also contribute to a more broadly con-
ceived indictment of the collective guilt of a disciplinary culture whose “shame” 
forms each brick of its prison walls and whose indifference sanctions the wrongs 
catalogued by Wilde. In emphasizing the privatized sufferings of prisoners, 
and thus sidelining the publicized crimes of criminals, the poem privileges the 
notion of social shame over the notion of individual guilt—an argument that 
appears most conspicuously in the reiterated line, “Each man kills the thing he 
loves,” as well as the accompanying qualification, “Yet each man does not die” 
(1.54). For this reason, perhaps, Wilde’s speaker claims indecision on the mat-
ter of “whether Laws be right / Or whether Laws be wrong” (5.1–2). The terms 
“right” and “wrong” are simply too reductive to accommodate the excesses of a 
sinning and punishing society or the belatedness of prison reforms.
 A schema of ethical and epistemological paradox, which insists upon estab-
lishing congruities between criminals and citizens, is unique neither to Wil-
de’s crime ballad nor to the street ballad. But considered together, their verbal, 
generic, and discursive parallels reflect shared political and critical postures. 
While its historical context explains the poem’s manipulation of the theme of 
murder and the discourse of crime, the multiple implications of genre are best 
understood via notions of poetic performativity. Because poetic performativ-
ity, as Slinn argues, involves self-conscious engagements with literary form and 
political content, “both linking and distinguishing poetry from its contexts,” 
Wilde’s late-career turn to crime balladry stages an affiliation with a working-
class genre and its audience.
 Exchanging the stance of the dandy for the persona of the ex-convict, Wilde 
imagined his audience as a criminal class and himself as a criminal poet. In 
a letter to Robert Ross, Wilde recommended that his ballad be published in 
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Reynold’s Magazine because it “circulates among the lower orders, and the crimi-
nal classes, and so ensures me my right audience for sympathy” (Letters 661). 
Making the same case to Reginald Turner, he explained that it constitutes “an 
organ that appeals directly to the criminal classes, so my audience is gathered 
together for me” (662), and to Leonard Smithers, he explained that it “circulates 
widely amongst the criminal classes, to which I now belong, so I shall be read 
by my peers” (663). His concerns about audience, peers, and sympathy suggest 
the poem’s role in refashioning his public persona, reconstituting his profes-
sional relationship to literary culture, and fulfilling his personal and political 
commitment to penal reform upon his release from prison, a task that required 
him to negotiate markets for publication, genres of literature, and modes of 
“propaganda” (Letters 661)—which, he explained, characterizes the content of 
the poem after the lines, “For his mourners will be outcast men, / And outcasts 
always mourn” (4.137–38). Precisely because Wilde’s ballad was not relegated to 
the streets and because it also exceeds the length and scope of the typical street 
ballad, Wilde’s mingling of high and low literary styles can be read in terms of 
Felluga’s “performative loop” of “identification” and “self-estrangement,” which 
he defines via Cohen’s notion of genre as an “interrelationship with and a dif-
ferentiation from” other forms and texts (495).
 Insofar as Wilde’s ballad has often been viewed as a strange break with his 
literary past or a symptom of his altered post-prison consciousness, the generic 
and discursive associations of the ballad form—including its affiliation with 
the criminal classes—offer a way to reconsider “The Ballad of Reading Gaol” as 
another example of Wilde’s textual appropriations, performative aesthetics, and 
thematic interests. In her examination of the sexual economies and aesthetic 
theories influencing Wilde’s work, Regenia Gagnier reads Wilde’s ballad as a 
“solemn” version of Wilde’s formerly “light” expressions of paradox with which 
he interrogated the “politics of inside/outside social relations” (145). A similar 
interest in the politics of exclusion and inclusion inform the meanings of the 
ballad genre, the performance of criminality that Wilde implies, and the poem’s 
status as a mode of institutional critique.
 Applying Armstrong’s image (via Mill) of Victorian poetry as a “system of 
concentric circles,” we can imagine these circles not only as domains of dem-
ocratic and conservative ideologies but also as domains of institutional and 
aesthetic discourses, of high and low genres, and of classes of authors and audi-
ences. In tracing the poetic and political uses of murder across systems of over-
lapping circles and intertextual networks, we can reconnect Wilde’s ballad, and 
street ballads, to the generic and discursive practices that they reproduced and 
interrogated. It is, thus, perhaps unexpectedly, not only through examinations of 
literary or sociopolitical themes, such as the theme of murder, but also through 
considerations of generic form that we can reassess the role of the working 
classes and the place of print culture in Victorian poetry studies.
The Murderous Subject and
the Criminal Sublime 
C h a p t E r  2
in March , following the jury’s acquittal of the infamous 
Daniel M’Naghten, the Times printed the following lines “On a 
Late Acquittal” by Thomas Campbell:1
Ye people of England! exult and be glad,
For ye’re now at the will of the merciless mad.
Why say ye that but three authorities reign—
Crown, Commons, Lords?—You omit the insane!
They’re a privileg’d class, whom no statute controls,
And their murderous charter exists in their souls.
Do they wish to spill blood—they have only to play
A few pranks—get asylum’d a month and a day—
Then heigh! to escape from the mad-doctor’s keys,
And to pistol or stab whomsoever they please.
Now, the dog has a human-like wit—in creation.
He resembles most nearly our own generation:
Then if madmen for murder escape with impunity,
Why deny a poor dog the same noble immunity!
So, if a dog or man bite you, beware being nettled,
For crime is no crime—when the mind is unsettled.
0
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With their brisk tetrameter and straining anapests, these satirical verses cap-
ture the collective frustration of Victorians who, observing murder trials and 
scrutinizing insanity defenses, feared the disappearance of legal consequences 
for insane criminals “whom no statute controls.” While legal terminology had 
long addressed mental states as fundamental elements of crime, the elaboration 
and application of counterintuitive concepts of criminal lunacy in the 1830s 
and 1840s challenged traditional notions of madness and malice and provoked 
concerns about new forms of legal “immunity” and “impunity.” At M’Naghten’s 
trial the mandate of judging his crime according to the features of the act suc-
cumbed, at the request of defense counsel, to a process of applying theories of 
the mind.2 Examined through the lens of a newfangled science, his conduct—his 
fatal shooting of Edward Drummond, private secretary to Prime Minister Rob-
ert Peel, and his expressed intention to attack Peel in order to elude murder-
ous Tories—confounded legal practices of regulation and redress.3 Informed by 
competing interpretive frameworks and sensationalized by the role of political 
figures and parties in his violent actions and expressed intentions, his acquittal 
appeared to secure the “murderous charter” of a “privileg’d” criminal class and 
to threaten England with an ascendancy of the “merciless mad,” who baffled 
legal reasoning and flouted judicial authority.
 As “On A Late Acquittal” suggests, the legal and the symbolic meanings of 
M’Naghten’s case highlighted concerns about the power of the state to interpret 
criminals and punish crimes. Immediately after the trial such concerns inspired 
a government inquiry into the judicial status of insanity pleas, which resulted 
in the articulation of the “M’Naghten Rules.”4 The particulars of M’Naghten’s 
case—the pathologizing of his character and the decriminalization of his con-
duct—also participated in a broader cultural renegotiation of responses to insan-
ity. Several converging early-Victorian projects, the centralization of a national 
asylum system, the professionalization of mental science, and the publication 
of new mental science theories, as well as the increased use of insanity defenses 
at murder trials, confused already difficult distinctions between madness and 
malice and character and conduct.5 Changes in the diagnosis and treatment of 
insanity, which began in the late eighteenth century, combined with the early-
Victorian revision of the criminal code and abolitionist scrutiny of capital pun-
ishment to complicate the meanings of murder. And as medical theories began 
to disrupt fundamental but troubled legal fictions, an obligation to ascertain and 
enforce responsibility continued to nag the collective conscience.6 Disturbing 
the boundary between the normative citizen and the criminal other—and the 
alignment of “Crown, Commons, Lords”—the resulting confusion and conflict 
placed the discourses and the methods of interpretive power under intense scru-
tiny and inspired public bouts of sober reflection and sensational alarm.
 Responding to the highly publicized interpretive crisis surrounding 
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M’Naghten’s acquittal, an editorial in the Times requested clarification of the 
psychological theories invoked at his trial. Noting that the Times had respectfully 
withheld comment or question while the trial unfolded, the author, “in a spirit 
of humble and honest earnestness, of hesitating and admiring uncertainty, and 
of almost painful dubitation, ask[s] those learned and philosophic gentlemen 
to define, for the edification of common-place people like ourselves, where san-
ity ends and madness begins; and what are the outward and palpable signs of 
the one or the other?” (6 March 1843, 4). Continuing in this mock-obsequious 
tone, the editorial upholds a division between the values of “common-place” 
people and mental scientists while asking specific questions about the medical 
testimony in M’Naghten’s case, which, the writer reports, included a diagnosis 
of “homicidal monomania” and a “conviction that the prisoner had laboured 
under a morbid delusion of which this murder was the climax” (6 March 1843, 
4). In the interests of self-preservation and public safety, the author explains, 
“simple folks” require an “accurate and general description” of monomania so 
that persons may take precautions against a “monomaniacal pistol or a climac-
teric stiletto” (6 March 1843, 4). In spite of any intellectual merits or practical 
applications, however, the medical theories in question offer this writer no sense 
of justice. Agreeing that murderous monomania might be “highly curious . . . 
in a medical point of view,” the author concludes, “it is but poor consolation to 
reflect that a fellow man has been prematurely cut off from the duties and enjoy-
ments of a well-spent life by the unsuspected blow of an assassin who ‘laboured 
under a morbid delusion, of which murder was the climax’” (6 March 1843, 4). 
The finality and fatality of murder, a transgression posing ontological and ethi-
cal as well as legal and psychological questions, renders the notion that “crime is 
no crime—when the mind is unsettled” wholly unsettled and unsettling.
 With their agitated and sardonic tones, these two texts document the anxiety 
and the rhetoric that characterized Victorian conversations about mental science 
and criminal responsibility, especially in cases of murder. Struggling to compre-
hend shifting epistemologies while desiring straightforward notions of criminal 
guilt or accessible diagnostic definitions of insanity, a “nettled” public requested 
descriptions and symptoms with which they could decode criminal behavior 
or recognize mental debility. The question of where sanity ends and madness 
begins, and a corresponding search for a stable boundary that might resonate 
with fundamental and familiar ethical sensibilities, was frequently linked to fears 
about the demise of common sense within the legal system. In the Juryman’s 
Guide (1845), Sir George Stephen charts a devolution of sound moral and legal 
judgment: “Our fathers and grandfathers troubled their heads but little with 
such subtleties in criminal proceedings; if their practice was less remarkable for 
its humanity, it certainly was more distinguished by good sense than our own” 
(485). As collective “good sense” gave way to medical specialization, the juror’s 
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task of determining consciousness of right or wrong during a crime’s commis-
sion became increasingly difficult. Sensitive to the severity of capital punish-
ment, mental scientists publicly doubted the average juror’s qualifications for 
rendering verdicts in murder cases: “To the solving of this difficulty, our juries 
are, as at present constituted, totally unfit. Respectable men, but ignorant alike 
of the constitution of the human mind in health and of its varied symptoms 
in disease, it is strange they have ventured, and been so long suffered, and that 
too when the life of a human being hangs in the scale, to decide this important 
question” (“Criminal Insanity” 39). The marginalization of “unfit” jurors sym-
bolized the predicament of all citizens and institutions seeking to assess moral 
character, define criminal conduct, and convict indicted criminals. Entangled in 
early-Victorian debates about capital punishment, murder further complicated 
these problems as jurists and doctors competed for the right to sentence and 
execute or to diagnose and treat convicted murderers. Amidst this struggle for 
interpretive and disciplinary power, the authority of “common-place” citizens, 
commonsense ethics, and common law traditions seemed imperiled—subject to 
the whims of mental scientists or the “will of the merciless mad.”
 The conflict between good sense and new science was fueled not only by the 
sensational appeal of murder but also by the publicity of insanity. Despite the 
reputation of mental science as a highly specialized and fundamentally imprac-
tical form of knowledge, Victorians were consistently exposed to and engaged 
with its ongoing developments. Public lectures, political pressure groups, and a 
series of legislation advanced the cause of a humane national asylum system that 
could assist in negotiating criminal punishments and medical interventions.7 
And just as the government was seeking to rationalize and institutionalize its 
responses to insanity, a flurry of comparative statistics warned that the condi-
tions of modern life were effecting a dramatic increase in England’s rates of 
insanity.8 Keeping laypersons conversant with the subject, a flourishing print 
culture granted access to theories of madness in a variety of formats. Joining 
satirical verses and skeptical editorials (and broadside ballads) were newspaper 
transcripts of criminal trials, book reviews of mental science theories, psychol-
ogy articles in mainstream periodicals, and monographs targeting a generalist 
readership. In 1843, the Times reviewed, with recommendation, Dr. Forbes Win-
slow’s Plea of Insanity, in Criminal Cases, noting that “[i]t is his object to estab-
lish, that the capability of distinguishing right and wrong, which is the admitted 
legal test of responsibility in criminal cases, is most fallacious in its character” 
and to make a case for a “disease . . . seated in the moral affections or propensi-
ties” rather than in “ideas” (4 March 1843, 3). This favorable review, appearing 
as Winslow’s medical testimony at the M’Naghten trial was coming under public 
scrutiny in the aftermath of his acquittal, afforded the public some perspec-
tive on the case. While the press provided opportunities to browse and peruse, 
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the “learned gentlemen” of mental science attempted to translate, disseminate, 
and legitimize their work, and, fostering medicolegal literacy, they sometimes 
addressed the general public directly. J. C. Prichard’s On the Different Forms of 
Insanity, in Relation to Jurisprudence (1842), for example, condensed the major 
points of his groundbreaking and specialized Treatise on Insanity (1835) in order 
to establish a resource for ordinary citizens subject to mental illnesses and legal 
interventions.
 As the combined effects of trial publicity, institutional reform, and moral 
panic created a marketplace for the circulation of medicolegal theories and 
secured their place in the public imagination, their potential for metacommen-
tary on aspects of character and acts of interpretation inspired literary innova-
tions. Exploring how narrators access and mediate subjectivity in order to assess 
character and conduct, scholarship on the novel has made particularly produc-
tive connections between developments in literary form and cultural scripts of 
selfhood. Tracing Brontë’s examination of “the problems associated with the 
decipherment of external form” and “the issues of individual responsibility and 
control” (56), Sally Shuttleworth’s Charlotte Brontë and Victorian Psychology 
(1996) documents the rhetoric of Victorian psychology used by first-person 
narrators to selectively interpret “act and impulse” according to contrasting ver-
sions of the self as a “unified, self-determining agent” or a “fragmented site of 
conflicting forces” (56). Also attuned to narrative strategies and, of course, par-
ticularly relevant to this study, Rodensky’s The Crime in Mind analyzes fictional 
representations of legal predicaments. Because “[d]etermining whether or not 
a defendant had committed a crime meant (and means) judging an external 
and an internal element” (3), Rodensky argues, the novel’s “power to represent 
the interior life of its characters” (7) allowed writers to address public concerns 
about ascertaining a crime’s internal element and assessing a criminal’s legal 
responsibility.
 Whether first-person or third-person, the narrators of Victorian novels cre-
ated vantage points from which to explore diagnostic gazing and disciplinary 
surveillance, as Shuttleworth concludes, or narrative omniscience and subjective 
transparency, as Rodensky demonstrates. Interacting with the languages of men-
tal science and the dilemmas of criminal law, in order to consider correlations 
between external and internal manifestations of the self, Victorian novelists 
deployed a multifaceted notion of character as a literary trope, a psychological 
concept, and a legal construct. Exploiting the transgeneric and interdisciplin-
ary meanings of genre and discourse (Williams’s “dialectical pair”), novelists 
imagined the “interior life” and psychological foundations of their fictional 
characters while engaging the cultural resonances of the word “character”—a 
mechanism of self-government, a collection of behaviors, a force of the will, a 
subject of the law.
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 Similarly attentive to dialectical relationships between discourse and genre 
and textual mediations of intentions and actions, this chapter examines the 
dramatic monologues of four murderers whose speech unsettles distinctions 
between willful agency and uncontrollable impulse and thus reproduces the 
same interpretative tensions that defined medicolegal debates. The four murder-
ers in question, the speakers of Robert Browning’s “Porphyria’s Lover” (1836), 
“My Last Duchess” (1842), and “The Laboratory” (1844) and Dante Gabriel 
Rossetti’s “A Last Confession” (1870), complicate fundamental questions of char-
acter and conduct by combining dismaying accounts of murder and bewildering 
eccentricities of speech. Entangling speech acts and criminal acts, these dramatic 
poems deny or destabilize the kinds of perspective that narrative fiction often 
imagined or affirmed, and in doing so they align the interpretive difficulties of 
dramatic poetics and criminal politics.
 Exploring modes of poetry and epistemologies of murder, these monologues 
exemplify Slinn’s definition of poetic performativity—the “double function” of 
poetry’s formalism, simultaneously “linking and distinguishing poetry from its 
contexts” and thereby revealing a “continuity” between verse forms and his-
torical contexts (25). The dramatic monologue’s “lyrical-dramatic-narrative 
hybrid[ity]” in particular allows Browning and Rossetti to reproduce the strug-
gles of legal judgment and medical diagnosis (Slinn, “Dramatic Monologue” 80). 
Speaking of Browning’s early monologues, Slinn explains, “Through absorb-
ing all three views (expressive, dramatic, fictive), Browning makes possible the 
politics of the dramatic monologue. The expressive subject becomes a matter of 
psychological process, objective drama becomes a matter of public representa-
tions, and poetic fiction becomes a matter of cultural construction and discur-
sive practices” (“Dramatic Monologue” 90). Such an awareness of the genre’s 
performative hybridity—which recognizes a dynamic interaction between the 
literary significance of lyrical, dramatic, and narrative representational modes 
and the cultural meanings of psychological processes, public representations, 
and discursive practices—provides a way to examine the intertwined political 
and aesthetic effects of these murder poems. With their now familiar assort-
ments of strange scenes, sinister murders, and grotesque characters—a cottage 
assignation, a lover-murderer, a companion-corpse; an art tour, an arrogant 
aristocrat, a curtained wife-portrait, an unsuspecting envoy; a toxic laboratory, 
an angry courtesan, a mercenary chemist; a deathbed confession, a dying revo-
lutionary, an attending priest, a ghastly hallucination—these poems exploit such 
poetic and cultural resonances. Inflected by unusual arrangements of character 
and circumstance, their crimes and their speech are also informed by expres-
sive idiosyncrasies and metrical oddities. The controlled iambs, tidy couplets, 
and contorted dactyls of Browning’s poems and the verbal excess and narrative 
circularity of Rossetti’s monologue serve to complicate their murderous subjects 
and exacerbate the difficulties of interpretation.
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 As they shade understandings of character and conduct, the imbrications 
of dramatic scene, narrative fragments, and lyrical voice operate, in Harrison’s 
terms, as discursive technologies producing “ideological effects” and doing 
“cultural work.” Contrasting the novel’s explorations of surveillance and trans-
parency, these poems, lacking narrator-intermediaries and limiting readerly per-
spective, cultivate obstruction and obscurity. Expressing their selves and their 
crimes, their murderous speakers signal unmediated and unregulated access. 
Yet, their dense monologues elaborate and conflate the signs of malice and 
the symptoms of madness, compelling readers—lay alienists, amateur jurists, 
poetry enthusiasts—to oscillate between definitions of insanity and criminality. 
As Smith argues, discussions of criminal insanity involved “the substitution of 
alternative languages to describe a single crime” and required people to shift 
between mental science and criminal law (“Boundary” 371). At the same time, 
more general ethical sympathies and “a basic tension between the power of the 
individual and the power of the collective” also formed a context for evaluative 
disagreement (“Boundary” 376). The tensions created by “alternative languages” 
and discursive struggles allowed dramatic poets to develop the psychological and 
the political intrigues of their murderous speakers. Here, Stallybrass and White’s 
“conflictual complexes,” derived from tensions between “social classification 
and psychological processes” and between social prohibitions and individual 
agency, are configured by poets, enacted by murderer-speakers, and experienced 
by readers as a struggle for interpretive power.
 Exercises in poetic complexity and epistemological frustration, these mono-
logues generate aesthetic effects from the interpretive controversies that informed 
the context of their composition and publication, and while their dramatic sce-
narios accommodate historical explanations, they do more than locate psycho-
logical conditions in social histories. Just as medical theories defamiliarized legal 
fictions and ethical commonplaces, the medicolegal ambiguities of these poems 
defamiliarize the more familiar literary tropes and cultural ideologies informing 
their themes of sexual violence, class privilege, courtly corruption, and revolu-
tionary fervor. Exploring historically contingent or sanctioned violence while 
engaging medical explanations of causation and consequence, their insistence 
on the obscurity of murderous subjectivity allows them to place the violent acts 
of their speakers within the familiar contexts of sexual conflicts and gender hier-
archies and to locate them within an epistemological contest between volitional 
agency and diseased determinism.9 Blending explanatory frameworks of the past 
and present—historicizing, criminalizing, pathologizing—the poems use their 
murderous speakers to engage contemporary anxieties about murder’s cultural 
congruities and incongruities and explore social sites of institutional control and 
ideological conflict.
 Such an emphasis on the contingent status of the murderous subject sup-
ports a reconsideration of the more general historical relationship between 
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psychological theories and dramatic poetics, which has been well documented 
in Ekbert Faas’s Retreat into the Mind (1988). Noting that the 1830s ushered in 
the dramatic experiments of Browning and Tennyson and psychological theories 
that blurred distinctions between mental soundness and mental disorder, Faas 
argues that mental science and dramatic poetry, both privileging examinations 
of character over evaluations of conduct, were deeply intertwined Victorian 
phenomena.10 As the destabilizing of the individual subject and the lyric poem 
found common ground in new articulations of mental science, dramatic poems 
were drawn into the national conversation on insanity when mental science 
journals offered clinical analyses of dramatic monologues and mainstream peri-
odicals printed suggestive juxtapositions of poetic and psychological texts (46). 
Because mental scientists sometimes cited dramatic poems to demonstrate their 
theories, Faas explains, monologues “were thought of as objective, case-history-
like studies” (14), for “what such scientific studies described in the abstract, a 
poem might often render far more plausibly, perhaps even more accurately, in 
concrete” (174).
 Without diminishing the significance of these observations about the coin-
cident paths of poetry and psychology, it is worth reconsidering the case study 
approach which Faas attributes to Victorian readers and pursues in his study, 
for it implies a passive model of literary production and, in these instances, 
separates the theme of criminal lunacy from the particularities of poetic device. 
Neither case studies nor legal testimonies, the speech of verbally complex and 
psychologically obscure murderers poses unsettling questions about plausibility 
and accuracy. Fracturing the speech of the expressive criminal and prolong-
ing the struggles of interpretation, Browning and Rossetti construct a poetics 
of indeterminacy so that, rather than concretely embodying the abstractions 
of mental science, the unknowable killer embodies an aesthetic of the sublime 
rooted in questions of subjectivity and what Burke, describing the book of Job, 
articulates as the “terrible uncertainty of the thing described” (106). The sub-
lime always involves “some modification of power” (107), and a writer’s use of 
a “judicious obscurity” (103) can reproduce the causes and elicit the affects of 
sublimity. Burke’s examples—a fear of death, a sense of danger, perceptual dif-
ficulty, emotional distress, and bodily pain—are remarkably apt for articulating 
the inexplicable force of or considering poetic representations of murderous 
agency, whether emanating from a maddening disease or a malicious will. Judi-
ciously obscure, the sublime criminal developed in these poems pits the desire 
for moral discernment against the anxiety of epistemological doubt and the pos-
sibility of medical diagnosis against the certainty of terrible disgust. Politically 
and poetically skeptical and mischievous, rather than satirical and polemical, 
these monologues, to borrow Armstrong’s phrase, “compel a strenuous reading” 
of the medicolegal theories, criminal codes, and collective fears complicating 
murder in Victorian culture.
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“Enveloped in Obscurity”:
Madness, Badness, and Mental Science
In order to consider the poetics of the criminal sublime—and the complex inter-
actions between the formal strategies, generic structures, and medicolegal dis-
course with which Browning and Rossetti manipulate the theme of murder—it 
is important to note that conversations about criminal lunacy pivoted around a 
desire for and the denial of a distinction between willful agency and pathologi-
cal determinism.11 As Smith argues, the simplest distinction that “corresponds 
to common Victorian usage” was that medical explanations were “determin-
ist” and legal explanations were “voluntarist” (Trial 10–11). Beginning in the 
1830s, however, reformulations of madness challenged this distinction, generat-
ing interpretive battles between modern theories and legal, ethical, and medical 
traditions and inspiring public reflections on the discourses and methods used 
to apprehend criminals.
 In 1835, Prichard published his Treatise on Insanity and Other Disorders 
Affecting the Mind, in which he presented the typology of criminal madness 
that remained the standard for the next twenty years. Dedicating his treatise to 
French psychologist, J. E. D. Esquirol, whose research constitutes the majority 
of Prichard’s source materials, Prichard imported prominent continental theo-
ries of criminal insanity into English discourse.12 Early in his Treatise Prichard 
explains that the work grew out of his earlier essay on insanity in the Cyclopaedia 
of Practical Medicine (1833), a project that convinced him of England’s need to 
modernize its approach to mental pathology. The Treatise refines and expands 
Prichard’s original encyclopedia essay, offering a schema, already established in 
continental psychology, of two principal manifestations of insanity: an intellec-
tually based insanity, which disrupts reasoning faculties to varying degrees, and 
an emotionally based insanity, termed “moral insanity,” which leaves reasoning 
processes unaffected.13 Emphasizing a fundamental difference between intel-
lectual and moral insanity and dismissing the need for extensive subcategories, 
Prichard argues that madness appears in two forms:
[It is] a chronic disease, manifested by deviations from the healthy and natural 
state of the mind, such deviations consisting either in a moral perversion, or 
a disorder of the feelings, affections, and habits of the individual, or in intel-
lectual derangement, which last is sometimes partial, namely, in monomania, 
affecting the understanding only in particular trains of thought; or general, 
and accompanied with excitement, namely, in mania, or raving madness; or, 
lastly, confounding or destroying the connections or associations of ideas, and 
producing a state of incoherence. (Treatise 7)
In advocating this succinct but comprehensive typology, within which all 
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varieties of madness could be placed, Prichard sought to simplify and advance 
society’s understanding of madness, but because his definitions (with the pos-
sible exception of raving madness) challenged ethical commonplaces and volun-
tarist-determinist distinctions, they caused instead a “profound sensation in the 
legal and psychological world” (Tuke, Prichard and Symonds 1).
 For moral insanity, Prichard provides the following definition: “madness 
consisting in a morbid perversion of the natural feelings, affections, inclinations, 
temper, habits, moral dispositions, and natural impulses, without any remark-
able disorder or defect of the intellect or knowing and reasoning faculties, and 
particularly without any insane illusion or hallucination” (Treatise 6). It is a 
“form of mental derangement in which the intellectual faculties appear to have 
sustained little or no injury” but in which “the moral and active principles of 
the mind are strangely perverted and depraved, the power of self-government 
is lost or greatly impaired; and the individual is found to be incapable, not of 
talking or reasoning upon any subject proposed to him; for this he will often do 
with great shrewdness and volubility, but of conducting himself with decency 
and propriety in the business of life” (Treatise 4). As Ann Colley observes, the 
disorder, “almost too ‘Victorian’ to be true,” pathologizes failures of “self-gov-
ernment,” “decency,” and “propriety” (15). In elaborating on this condition in 
its murderous form, Prichard explains, “M. Esquirol has repeatedly declared his 
conviction that there exists a species of homicidal madness, in which ‘no disorder 
of intellect can be discovered’; the murderer is driven, as it were, by an irresistible 
power” (Treatise 388). By definition the morally insane person violated fun-
damental ethical principles, but when manifesting itself as homicidal lunacy, 
moral insanity exceeded the limits of plausibility. Overtaking one’s moral capac-
ity while leaving the intellect intact, the disease linked an uncanny psychology, 
a monumental transgression, and an ill-defined “irresistible power” in ways that 
often seemed too un-Victorian to be true.
 In popularizing the term “moral insanity,” Prichard sought to establish a 
paradigm-shifting psychological concept that would parallel the diagnostic 
achievement of “monomania,” a term that Esquirol substituted for “melan-
choly” in 1820. In coverage of criminal lunacy, in popular and specialist texts 
alike, “moral insanity” shared the limelight with “monomania,” the predominant 
form of intellectual madness, which affected only “particular strains of thought.” 
Naming and defining temporary and localized manifestations of mental break-
down, theories of moral insanity and monomania claimed that intermittent or 
even singular episodes of madness could be spliced with moments of clarity and 
rationality of varying duration and degree. In affirming the possibility of singu-
lar manifestations and unanticipated eruptions of madness (the “monomaniac 
pistol” or the “climacteric stiletto”) these classifications of madness supported 
a spatial model of the mind in which specific faculties or regions of the mind 
succumbed to madness while others remained unaffected.
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 Such definitions of insanity further complicated the already vexed problem 
of ascertaining mens rea—of assessing relationships between the internal fea-
tures of character and the external features of conduct. Partial insanity all but 
eliminated boundaries between the sane and the insane, and as Smith explains, 
criminal law could not accommodate such a radically compartmentalized sub-
ject: “Medical and non-medical writers referred to ‘partial insanity’ as a legally 
problematic area. This term could mean either insanity coming and going (with 
lucid intervals or sane periods) or insanity limited to certain mental faculties. 
Given that responsibility was a unitary concept, it was a severe problem to deter-
mine the responsibility of the partially insane” (Trial 37). As Prichard himself 
acknowledged, the notion of moral insanity, a state in which reason and mad-
ness coexist, deviated from English cultural and legal assumptions about insan-
ity and irresponsibility:
I must first observe that no such disorder has been recognized in the English 
courts of judicature, or even admitted by medical writers in England. In 
general, it has been laid down that insanity consists in, and is co-extensive 
with, mental illusion. English writers admit only that form of insanity which 
the Germans term wahnsinn; they know nothing of moral insanity either as 
requiring control in the exercise of civil rights, or as destroying or lessening 
culpability in criminal ones. (Treatise 380)
Making note of this gap between medical and legal discourses, Prichard cites 
jurists whose rulings illustrate that insanity had traditionally denoted a delu-
sional and hallucinatory subject in English law. As a result, he explains, it is 
“very difficult to maintain a plea on the ground of insanity in this country, with 
a view to the removing of culpabilities in a criminal accusation” (382). Relying 
on interrogation and testimony in scrutinizing mental states, the law saw mental 
competence when morally insane criminals displayed sensibility, logic, and “great 
ingenuity in giving reasons for the eccentricities of their conduct” (Treatise 14). 
As Smith argues, Prichard “recognised two of the key medico-legal problems 
which the notion of moral insanity created: the possibility that cognitive dis-
order was not necessarily present in insanity, and that insanity and eccentricity 
were continuous” (Trial 38). Similarly challenging conventional ideas of insan-
ity and eccentricity, theories of monomania located insanity in “one subject” or 
“one train of ideas” (Treatise 6) and thus asked juries to parse the thoughts of 
criminals and to determine incompetence in a person who reasoned well on all 
subjects except for the very actions under scrutiny at trial. 
 Witnessing the trials, acquittals, convictions, or sentences of the criminal 
justice system, an often incredulous public construed these theories of partial 
insanity as overly intellectualized and contrived conveniences for defense coun-
sel—especially when the accused did not inspire sympathy or identification, 
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the threat of hanging implied a motive for launching an implausible medical 
defense, or, as in the Townley case, an insanity plea signaled class privilege.14 
Exploiting such skepticism, it was not unusual for jurists to deflect the challenge 
that mental science posed to juridical procedures in a language of plainspoken 
common sense. Discussing the problem of jurors and the probability of insan-
ity, James Fitzjames Stephen described the plea argument for moral insanity as 
“generally speaking, at least as consistent with the theory that he was a great fool 
and a great rogue, as with the theory that he was the subject of a special dis-
ease, the existence of which is doubtful” (General View 96). Stephen’s archetypes 
(“great fool” and “great rogue”) undermine the specialist discourse of mental 
science, which, advocating for a “special disease” and espousing professional 
interests, claim an interpretive power that thwart the interests of commonplace 
citizens and common law traditions. Alert to juridical predicaments and public 
relations, mental scientists frequently sought to address public skepticism and 
legal dilemmas directly. Challenging the law’s interpretive practices, an article 
in the Journal of Psychological Medicine and Mental Pathology argued that the 
imperatives of courtroom theatrics and the processes of the human mind are 
simply incompatible: “Our courts of justice, whether civil or criminal, demand 
that the evidence shall on all occasions, be clear, conclusive, and indisputable. 
But, unhappily, the human mind, when affected by disease, cannot in every case 
have its morbid features unveiled in open court” (“The Plea of Insanity” 184). 
While these comments critique the differences between the mechanisms of the 
mind and the court, in alluding to “morbid features” that cannot be “unveiled,” 
they also point to the central problem of psychological obscurity.
 As charges of implausibility, if not absurdity, were lobbed at mental scientists 
from the realms of common sense, the admission of obscurity became a recur-
ring theme in mental science texts. Sorting rogues from lunatics in his efforts to 
legitimize moral insanity, Prichard admits that the “precise limitation of insan-
ity and eccentricity is very difficult to discover” (Treatise 383) but provides a 
list of characteristics “to lessen the ambiguity” (397) in murder cases. Quoting 
Esquirol, Prichard notes that periods of homicidal lunacy are often “preceded by 
other striking peculiarities of action” or “a total change of character” and that 
homicidal lunatics “have attempted suicide,” have “expressed a wish for death,” 
and have sometimes “begged to be executed as criminals” (397). He also adds 
that their “acts are without motive” and “in opposition to the known influences 
of all human motives” (398). After the crime, he explains, the criminal lunatic 
“seeks no escape or flight; delivers himself up to justice; acknowledges the crime 
laid to his charge; describes the state of mind which led to its perpetration: or he 
remains stupefied and overcome by a horrible consciousness of having been the 
agent in an atrocious deed” (398). Another crucial distinction between the crim-
inal and the lunatic lies in the processes of premeditation: “The murderer has 
th e murderou s sub j ec t  And t h e  cr I m I nAl  subl I m e 
generally accomplices in vice and crime: there are assignable inducements which 
led to its commission, motives of self-interest, of revenge, displaying wickedness 
premeditated. Premeditated are in some instances the acts of the madman; but 
his premeditation is peculiar and characteristic” (398). Catalogued and inven-
toried, these signs and symptoms nonetheless fragmented unitary concepts of 
selfhood and responsibility. Asking Victorians to believe that two mental states, 
long considered mutually exclusive, might coexist with disastrous and horrifying 
results, these elaborate illnesses required close readings of eccentricities, pecu-
liarities, and behaviors preceding and following a crime—but not of the terrible 
crime itself.
 Most importantly, such interpretive methods conflicted with conventional 
concepts of the will. Central to coding agency and determinism and considering 
criminal responsibility and criminal lunacy, the will inhabited legal phrasing 
(“willful murder”) and informed psychological theories, and the idea of partial 
insanity was bewildering in part because the will, like responsibility, had long 
been a unitary—albeit multipurpose—concept. As the locus of character, the 
will was a site of self-regulation, and as the force of conduct, it was a subject of 
judicial discipline. “Individual wills,” Smith argues, “were facts to Victorians” 
(Trial 73), and the embodied wills of ordinary citizens or extraordinary crimi-
nals seemed more real than the speculative abstractions of mental science. Ste-
phen, highlighting the will’s tangible qualities, presents it as a series of physical 
reactions:
The man wishes in that peculiar way which is called willing, and thereupon 
the different members of his body go through certain motions. The muscles of 
the calves and thighs raise the trunk; the head and the hands assume a certain 
position; the shoulders are thrown back; the head is erected; the tongue, the 
mouth, the throat, and the cheeks, all do their parts in saying what the mind 
has thought of saying, resolved to say, intended to say, and now says. What the 
nature of this crisis is, how such a wish differs generically from other wishes, 
why it instantly fulfils itself, are questions which have never been answered; 
but about the fact there can be no doubt. Every human creature attaches to 
the words ‘to will,’ or their equivalents, as vivid a meaning as every man with 
eyes attaches to the words ‘to see.’” (General View 77)
Though linked to “crisis,” the verb “to will” appears as an extension of wishing 
and desiring, and, resonating as clearly as the verb “to see,” it constitutes an 
empirically “vivid” form of agency.
 In various formats and contexts beyond the realm of medicolegal debates, 
the will figured prominently—in popular ideas of self-help, self-control, and 
self-reliance, in philosophical formulations of cognition and consciousness, and 
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in theological interpretations of human and divine purpose. Often described 
as an empirical reality, the will also inspired acts of faith in preventive mea-
sures and asylum treatments stressing moral management and attempting cures. 
Veida Skultans argues that “[f]aith in man’s powers of emotional self-discipline 
and control created a different outlook towards the possibility of a complete 
cure of nervous disabilities” (English Madness 56) and informed an optimistic 
strain in asylum practices: “Foremost among moral causes are lack of modera-
tion and excesses of all kinds. Given this aetiology of insanity, moral factors are 
seen as forces against insanity. Habit, perseverance, the will and character may 
each constitute such a counteracting force” (Madness and Morals 2–3).
 The paradoxical corollary to this self-disciplinary schema appeared in for-
mulations of the will that suggested individuals might be responsible for their 
own mental illnesses. In The Victorian Will (1989), John R. Reed explains that 
both material and moral schema for explaining insanity “were concerned with 
the large question of responsibility and stressed discipline as a safeguard against 
madness. In doing so, [the] advocates of improved self-government assumed 
some power in the self, ordinarily defined one way or another as will, that could 
oversee that process of self-government” (133). Eager to uphold the notion of 
responsible self-regulation, John Barlow’s On Man’s Power over Himself to Pre-
vent or Control Insanity (1843) defines “mental derangement” as a breakdown of 
the will. Arguing that “the difference between sanity and insanity consists in the 
degree of self-control exercised” (45), Barlow finds records of individual failure 
in alarmist reports on recent increases in insanity cases: “of these cases it is cal-
culated that less than three hundred in one thousand are the result of disease, or 
of unavoidable circumstances, thus leaving above seven hundred resulting from 
bodily excess or mental misgovernment” (49). With a similar interest in moral 
causes and effects, William Carpenter, in Principles of Mental Physiology, with 
their Applications to the Training and Discipline of the Mind, and the Study of its 
Morbid Conditions (1874), compares monomania to “intoxication by Hachisch” 
(672) and argues that strict applications of the will at the onset of morbid ten-
dencies can contravene full-scale mental disorder: “many a man has been saved 
from an attack of Insanity, by the resolute determination of his Will not to yield 
to his morbid tendencies” (673). Because of such links between moral willing 
and mental failing, individuals are always at least “remotely responsible” for 
their psychological health, their mental disease, and their transgressive actions 
(672). Written thirty years apart, these statements demonstrate the lingering 
interpretive power and ideological work of the will in medical, legal, and moral 
discourses. 
 While mental scientists inserted ideas about pathology into discussions of 
crime, the role of the will in considering legal and moral questions of character 
and conduct created a circular logic that implicitly, if not explicitly, reinstated 
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voluntarist notions of responsibility and thereby cast distinctions between crim-
inality and lunacy into further obscurity. When asylums and advocates of moral 
management used responsibility to structure medical treatments for the insane, 
for example, they too suggested that the criminal lunatic was always at least a tad 
guilty. Discussing Samuel Tuke’s Retreat at York, which established the precedent 
for moral management when it was founded in 1792, Foucault labels the asylum 
a “Quaker world” where routines of labor and the cultivation of self-conscious 
moral guilt combined to restrain inmates (Madness 247). The result, he argues, 
was the “marking out and glorifying [of] a region of simple responsibility where 
any manifestation of madness will be linked to punishment” (246). Because the 
inmate is asked to “feel morally responsible for everything within him that may 
disturb morality and society” (246), Tuke’s asylum “organized [guilt] for the 
madman as a consciousness of himself” (247) and thus “substituted for the free 
terror of madness the stifling anguish of responsibility” (247).
 Prichard also advocated “moral discipline” and “personal controul” as poten-
tial treatments for insanity (Treatise 297). Revealing the contrasting interests of 
theory and practice, however, his typologies, particularly his understanding of 
moral insanity, challenged the optimistic principles of management and orga-
nization that underwrote the projects of asylum reform and the profession-
alization of mental science. His treatise characterizes the prognosis for moral 
insanity as “more unfavourable than in other forms of mental derangement” 
(25) and admits, “it must be confessed that this subject [of moral insanity] is as 
yet enveloped in obscurity” (114). This obscurity persisted (indeed increased), 
and writing almost ten years later in the Plea of Insanity, in Criminal Cases, his 
colleague, Dr. Winslow, echoed this sentiment. Asking, “Can we safely draw the 
line of demarcation between vice and moral disease? Where does one commence 
and the other terminate?” (60–61), he promises only unsatisfactory answers, for 
the “subject is necessarily involved in many obscurities” (61). Such claims about 
obscurity also informed practical arguments about policy and reform. In An 
Inquiry Concerning the Indications of Insanity (1830), Dr. John Conolly’s persua-
sive argument for the reform of asylums and the revision of the criminal code 
is accompanied by the striking claim that medical men “have sought for, and 
imagined, a strong and definable boundary between sanity and insanity, which 
has not only been imaginary, and arbitrarily placed,” but “considered a justifica-
tion” for “unnecessary and afflicting measures” (295–96). While in the interests 
of reform, such insistence on the obscure and imagined features of mental sci-
ence intentionally troubled the practices of traditional legal, moral, and medical 
institutions, they also generated broader epistemological questions about the 
nature of interpretation.
 As they produced and encountered interpretive obstacles and frustrations, 
medicolegal debates about criminality continued to inspire contests between 
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lay and specialist heuristics. In the 1860s, Dr. Henry Maudsley, the foremost 
mental scientist of the late-Victorian period, retrieved old commonplaces in 
order to explain to his readers that “[i]t is not possible to draw a distinct line of 
demarcation between insanity and crime, either when we have to deal with them 
socially as events or when we investigate their causation in a scientific spirit. 
There are criminals who are more mad than bad, insane persons who are more 
bad than mad” (Pathology of Mind 82). Appearing with almost comical absurdity 
in an ambitious work attempting to link the material and immaterial aspects of 
the mind and “to integrate psychology, reflex physiology, and psychiatry into a 
single synthetic whole” (Bynum 240), this phrasing is historically instructive. 
Marking criminal insanity in vague degrees along a mad-bad continuum, Maud-
sley’s claim, and his plainspoken lexicon, underscore the lingering difficulties in 
distinguishing between criminality and insanity whether for social or scientific 
purposes.15
 Medicolegal debates attracted the attention of a range of Victorians—crimi-
nals, advocates, journalists, poets, scientists, jurists, citizens—eager to imagine 
boundaries between madness and badness or to insist upon the impossibility 
of the task. Sustained for decades, the discursive ironies, circular logics, and 
cultural anxieties characterizing these interpretive struggles inform Browning’s 
and Rossetti’s dramatic explorations of murderers, which not only offer repre-
sentations of strange killers but also integrate textual and cultural matters of 
interpretation. The stubborn obscurity of the murderous subject constitutes the 
poetic and the political appeal of the criminal sublime, and the persistence of 
that obscurity foregrounds problems of interpretation in medicolegal contexts 
and poetic texts.
Moral Insanity and Malicious Intent 
in Robert Browning’s “Porphyria’s Lover”
A “judicious obscurity” defines one of Browning’s earliest dramatic experi-
ments, “Porphyria’s Lover,” a poem that mixes old themes of sexual violence 
with new formulations of homicidal lunacy. The entanglement of sexual malice 
and homicidal madness develops a tension between competing epistemologies: 
the speaker’s thoughts and actions are congruous with gendered and classed 
manifestations of power, but they also engage incongruities between traditional 
concepts of badness and emergent theories of madness. Failing to lessen the 
ambiguities of the text, an inventory of signs and symptoms merely produces 
a collection of points and counterpoints that alternately provoke and obstruct 
attempts to understand this dramatic character in moral, medical, and literary 
terms. Informing these interpretive struggles, the speaker’s candid account and 
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artful rhetoric, the reader’s exegetical agendas and inconclusive inventories, and 
even the God who “has not said a word” evoke the questions of interpretive 
authority and the experiences of epistemological frustration surrounding the 
murderous subject.
 These interpretive struggles also inform critical attempts to sort out the 
poem’s psychological and sexual content and contextualize its generic form. For 
two reasons in particular the poem has been viewed as a case study of homicidal 
lunacy: because, accompanied by its poetic twin “Johannes Agricola in Medita-
tion,” it appeared under the heading “Madhouse Cells” in printings between 1842 
and 1863 and because its two primary antecedent texts, John Wilson’s “Extracts 
from Gosschen’s Diary” (1818) and Brian Procter’s “Marcian Colonna” (1820), 
explicitly depict homicidal lovers and episodes of madness.16 The paratextual 
marker “Madhouse Cells,” of course, encourages a diagnosis of lunacy.17 Faas 
attributes confessionals, madhouses, and prison cells to the pressures of the 
marketplace: “By and large, reviewers tolerated the portrayal of mental perver-
sion only as long as it was done the way in which an alienist would diagnose a 
morally insane delinquent so as to have him hospitalized for further observa-
tion and treatment” (185). Linking publishing strategies and generic qualities, 
he notes that “[l]ike Victorian asylums, dramatic monologues in this sense are 
a means of sequestration, particularly of their authors’ own morbidities. Wher-
ever they deal with mental aberrations, they are ‘madhouse cells’ like ‘Porphyria’s 
Lover’ and ‘Johannes Agricola in Meditation’” (185). Added, perhaps, to ori-
ent readers by contextualizing the speakers of both poems, the heading might 
also constitute an allusion to anxieties about murderers and madmen during a 
decade in which asylum treatments and criminal codes were under scrutiny and 
in flux.
 In what remains the most comprehensive examination of Browning’s negoti-
ation of psychological discourse and poetic genre, Michael Mason describes the 
poem as an “extraordinary” and “sophisticated” representation of “alien states of 
mind” (265) which constitutes the “bedrock” (253) of Browning’s innovations 
in dramatic poetry. Distinguishing itself from its sources, which suggest moral 
insanity but have difficulties with “their pictures of relatively cool, reflective 
homicidal lunacy” (258) and “fall back on the stock notion of lunacy as mania 
marked by delusions” (265) to solve the dilemma of motivation, “Porphyria’s 
Lover” sustains the dispassionate voice of the speaker who might even be con-
strued as “an anti-lunatic, an illustration of how an act conventionally referable 
to insanity might be the act of a rational being” (257). For Mason, its “analysis 
of homicidal lunacy” blends Browning’s “theory of psychological consistency 
and contemporary ideas of rational lunacy” (264). Finding the coherence of 
character amidst the contingency of circumstance, the poem suggests that “[t]he 
distinction between the ‘circumstances’ of loving and murdering is dispelled 
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when both are seen as the same ‘primitive colour’ of the soul’s spectrum” (254). 
The logical continuities of “alien impulses” and “familiar and accepted impulses” 
(254) create a “strange but plausible” (255) mental state and a “surprisingly 
sympathetic” (254) figure, which reflects the humanizing effects and reformist 
agendas of new psychological theories.
 In considering how the poem manages insanity as a theme and a theory, a 
greater emphasis on the obscurity of this dramatic character and the controversy 
of homicidal lunacy restores the poem’s more skeptical ironies—which inform 
the conjoined agendas of generic development and cultural engagement. Rather 
than containing a madman or affirming mental science, Browning draws both 
the contours of moral insanity and the lineaments of criminal malice, and, thus, 
while the poem signals an interest in examining insanity as a mental disease, it 
demonstrates an equally strong interest in exploring murder as a criminal act 
and sexual power as a violent motive. Seeking to negotiate the poem’s sexual and 
psychological content, scholars have tended to see gendered violence and homi-
cidal lunacy as incompatible themes requiring one to choose between a sexually 
charged (and class-inflected) motive or a psychologically diseased impulse. The 
relationships between these themes are difficult to disentangle, but a focus on 
epistemological struggle allows us to reconsider their interrelatedness as poetic 
strategies of cultural critique.
 In creating a speaker who slips between two baffling identities, Browning 
highlights the fundamental irreconcilability of abstracted medical theories and 
commonsense readings of male sexual passions. Assessing several of Browning’s 
homicidal lovers and husbands, Daniel Karlin, using the phrase “sexual hatred,” 
locates these passions in a tension between masculine entitlements and sexual 
desires, and he sees this particular murder as an attempt on the part of the 
murderer, a sullen working-class cottage-dweller, “to achieve the desired balance 
of power in his relationship” (214) with his victim, who dutifully prefers his 
company to a “gay feast” but also disloyally prioritizes “vainer ties” over sexual 
commitment. Informing Karlin’s reluctance to think of this poem as “about” 
insanity, this emphasis also leads to his glossing of the paradoxes of character 
and conduct. He notes, “[h]e may be mad, but he hasn’t lost his mind” (212), 
and concludes that his actions constitute “an insanely logical act of redress” 
(214). Also interested in the dynamics of sexual power, Armstrong examines the 
speaker’s violent objectification of the feminine in terms of a cultural “pathol-
ogy of sexual feeling” (“Browning” 288). If we understand this poem to be about 
articulating and examining the paradoxes of medicolegal debates, the simulta-
neity of madness and badness—and the comparable interpretive value of and 
competition between an entrenched gender-class system and a new mental sci-
ence—become central to the poem’s meaning, for they constitute fundamental 
tensions and epistemological resources in a cultural debate over the meanings 
and motivations of murder.
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 The distinction between the impassioned heat of sexual jealousy and the 
reasoning cool of moral insanity, for example, was a central feature in early-
Victorian reconfigurations of homicidal lunacy. Criminal cool defines the mor-
ally insane subject, who, without frenzy or fever, transcribes criminal impulses 
into rational statements. Prichard quotes French psychologist M. Broussais, fol-
lowing Pinel, who describes moral insanity as a “chronic and apyretic” disease, 
which often includes “a delight in destroying” and “an impulse unreasonable 
. . . to inflict suffering upon the friends whom he tenderly loves, and to put 
them to death” (Treatise 113). This “delight in destroying” resonates with the 
aesthetic enjoyment of Porphyria’s lover as he adores her propped, dead body 
and constructs an apparently reasoned explanation for his actions. Broussais 
labels the illness “extremely obstinate” and notes its potential to “conceal itself 
under the appearances of calm, of joy, of benevolence, until the lunatic finds the 
opportunity of executing his horrible project” (113). Such attributes apply to 
Browning’s infamous speaker, who stages the passive and sulking reception that 
draws Porphyria to her death, and then, with an uncanny equanimity, narrates 
the incident in well-measured iambs.
 But the speaker, we discover, maintains his blasé posture and produces his 
dispassionate account in the presence of a murdered corpse, which, embodying 
a dead silence, inflects the meanings of his speech and troubles interpretations of 
his violence. In her essay “Browning’s Corpses,” Carol T. Christ notes that Brown-
ing “frequently stages poems in the presence of a corpse” (393). “These poems,” 
she explains, “reflect importantly upon his understanding of writing poetry,” for 
“he sees the dead body as the object that can constitute its own representation” 
(393). Complicating the diagnostic process is the abject body, which, Kristeva 
agrees, is fundamentally disruptive: “from its place of banishment, the abject 
does not cease challenging its master” (2). Because it speaks for itself, the mere 
presence of the murdered corpse undermines the speaker’s narrative authority. 
While an actual medical examination or legal interview would take place away 
from the corpse and thus prioritize the speech of the murderer, here the victim’s 
abject presence, the corpse’s self-constituting meaning, upstages the speaker and 
challenges the detachment required for clinical diagnosis.
 Juxtaposing a traumatic murder and a theoretical madness, this impos-
sible fictional scenario starkly represents a fundamental tension of medico-
legal debate—the conflicts between condemning or pathologizing murder. 
When summing up the implications of moral insanity in his Treatise, Prichard 
remarks:
On the whole it seems fully manifest that there is a form of insanity, existing 
independently of any lesion of the intellectual powers, in which, connected 
in some instances with evident constitutional disorder, in others with affec-
tions of the nervous system excited according to the well-known laws of the 
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criminal economy, a sudden and often irresistible impulse is experienced to 
commit acts which under a sane condition of mind would be accounted atro-
cious crimes. . . . It must be allowed that instances may and do occur in which 
the discrimination would be difficult between manifestations of insanity and 
acts of a criminal nature, and that this difficulty would be increased by the 
admission of a form of insanity free from hallucination or illusion. (397, 
emphasis added)
While Prichard’s methodology includes a suspension of judgment, Browning’s 
side-by-side positioning of murderer and victim forces readers to imagine the 
possibility of moral insanity while confronting the certainty of an atrocious 
crime and considering the “well-known laws of the criminal economy.” In this 
way, “Porphyria’s Lover” produces the epistemological stress and moral unease 
that mental scientists sought to contain with lists of symptoms and categories 
of illness.
 Bringing together the themes of desire, disgust, and diagnosis, Porphyria’s 
corpse also highlights the verbal ironies that became fundamental to dramatic 
poetry. Christ proposes that “[i]n Browning’s poetry in particular, the anima-
tion of corpses is closely connected to his conception of the dramatic impulse 
and to the form of the dramatic monologue” (394). In “Porphyria’s Lover” this 
connection is suggested when the speaker’s rhetoric animates Porphyria’s corpse: 
“[Browning] portrays this attempt as a macabre project on the part of the living 
to use corpses to support their own fictional construction of reality” (393). His 
descriptions of Porphyria’s dead body simultaneously illuminate aspects of his 
psyche and reinforce Porphyria’s status as a corpse. He enthusiastically explains 
that “her cheek once more / Blushed bright beneath my burning kiss” (47–48) 
but then subtly, and perhaps inadvertently, reveals the more grim reality: “this 
time my shoulder bore / Her head, which droops upon it still” (50–51). In the 
contest between lively blushing and deathly drooping, the significance of deathly 
drooping wins out—with ironic effects.
 Likewise, the bizarre metonymy of the following passage introduces a reveal-
ing manipulation of the “will”—the contentious keyword of criminal law and 
moral management. In this instance, the speaker transfers his own will to his 
victim, or, more pointedly, to his victim’s “head”:
The smiling rosy little head!
So glad it has its utmost will,
That all it scorned at once is fled,
And I, its love, am gained instead, (52–55)
The enthusiastic attribution of consciousness to a lifeless “smiling rosy little 
head,” coupled with the dehumanizing declaration that “it” is finally enjoying 
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“its utmost will” and that “its love” is “gained” again, conjoins the atrocious 
crime and the obscure murderer. These jarring ascriptions of agency constitute a 
rhetorical tic, the same one that leads him to assign destructive intentions to the 
“sullen wind” (2) that “tore the elm-tops down for spite” (3) and “did its worst 
to vex the lake” (4). The scattering of passions and wills also informs the poem’s 
strange final tableau. Announcing, “And thus we sit together now, / And all night 
long we have not stirred,— / And yet God has not said a word!” (58–59, empha-
sis added), the speaker implies that the two lovers are acting in concert, a claim 
attributable to moral insanity but also verbal irony. And punctuated with an 
exclamation point, this declaration of impunity also suggests a sinister satisfac-
tion with his homicidal work and thus introduces another irreconcilable piece 
of evidence.
 Such instances suggest that the speaker might be struggling for interpretive 
power, not with an “irresistible power.” But while the concept of moral insanity 
offered a term with which to define the disturbing calm that some criminals 
demonstrated, mental scientists claimed that the disease was also marked by a 
loss of control: “The morbid and irregular excitement of the active propensities, 
and the total want of self-controul, which are so conspicuous in moral insanity, 
display themselves in various ways” (Prichard, “Insanity” 829). This paradox 
informs the poem’s instability. Prichard explains that morally insane subjects 
“often display great ingenuity in giving reasons for the eccentricities of their 
conduct, and in accounting for and justifying the state of moral feeling under 
which they appear to exist” (Treatise 14). Such verbal ingenuity applies to the 
speaker’s account of his crime:
That moment she was mine,—mine, fair,
Perfectly pure and good: I found
A thing to do, and all her hair
In one long yellow string I wound
Three times her little throat around,
And strangled her. (36–41)
While his claim that he “found / A thing to do” acknowledges murderous 
agency in somewhat oblique terms, his strikingly frank and precise admission 
that he “strangled her” suggests the calm of the morally insane criminal. Just 
as the speaker unflinchingly details his crime, however, metrical irregularities, 
such as the iteration of stresses in “mine,—mine, fair,” register the possessive 
intensity of the speaker and disrupt the mad cool of the poem’s well-regulated 
cadences.
 As the murderous subject oscillates between control and chaos, the text 
begins to implicate the intellect, which was believed to operate independently 
from moral-emotional manifestations of lunacy. The speaker’s seemingly 
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delusional animations of the corpse, his confident protest, “No pain felt she— / 
I am quite sure she felt no pain” (41–42), and his disturbingly calm case for 
murder indicate moral insanity. But other features of the poem imply a more 
malicious “macabre project” and introduce the sinister possibility that a coher-
ent and controlling will informs his speech and actions—or that this possessive 
lover simply “wishes in that particular way which is called willing” (Stephen, 
General View 77). Several of these ambiguities emerge from the genre’s hybrid 
characteristics. As the speaker imparts a narrative structure to the events shaping 
his all-night vigil, contradictions between its narrative, expressive, and dramatic 
meanings generate frictions between genre and discourse.
 As early as the opening stanzas, theories of moral insanity and ideas of crim-
inal premeditation are combined. The speaker, telling the story of his violent 
agency, begins by contrasting his careworn passivity with Porphyria’s careless 
activity. He begins an account of his crime and its circumstances with references 
to his performance as a brooding lover who waits for Porphyria to arrive amidst 
a storm to which he “listen[s] with heart fit to break” (5). In contrast, upon her 
arrival, Porphyria “shut[s] the cold out and the storm” (7), builds a fire, and 
initiates sexual intimacy. When “last, she sate down by my side / And called me” 
(14–15), the speaker explains, he maintains a purposeful and indignant silence, 
which leads her to approach him sexually and submissively:
When no voice replied,
She put my arm about her waist,
And made her smooth white shoulder bare,
And all her yellow hair displaced,
And, stooping, made my cheek lie there. (15–19)
As Porphyria unwittingly places herself in the position of murder victim, uncov-
ering the fetishized “smooth white” skin and letting down the “yellow hair” that 
he will transform into a murder weapon—as emotional manipulation becomes 
physical destruction—the speaker’s nuanced account implies a performance of 
emotional instability and a manipulation of sexual power.
 As the poem progresses, Browning continues to assemble symptoms of dis-
ease and evidence of malice. Throughout the poem, the lover marks moments of 
decision and acts of manipulation. His silence entices Porphyria into a vulner-
able state and elicits the very words that establish motive and opportunity. She 
sits, he recalls, “Murmuring how she loved me” (21) but explaining that she is
Too weak, for all her heart’s endeavour,
To set its struggling passion free
From pride, and vainer ties dissever,
And give herself to me for ever. (22–25)
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At this point where the secrecy of their transgressive affair is affirmed, the idea 
that “passion sometimes would prevail” (26) informs his anger and increases 
Porphyria’s danger. The speaker uses Porphyria’s murmurings of love, her refusal 
to “give herself to [him] for ever,” and her “weak” submission to “vainer ties” to 
interpret his own violence. Reading these important lines as an “interpretation 
of Porphyria’s actions,” Karlin considers the poem as a “struggle in the speaker’s 
mind between two judgments of Porphyria: one that she is weak and selfish, the 
other that she is strong and devoted” (209). But they are equally an interpreta-
tion of his own actions—a reading or misreading of his crime as the freeing of 
a “struggling passion.” Along these lines, he rather selectively misrecognizes her 
words as a declaration of complete devotion:
  . . . at last I knew
Porphyria worshipped me: surprise
Made my heart swell, and still it grew
While I debated what to do. (32–35)
Perhaps more than any other, this brief passage compresses the unsettling dif-
ficulties of diagnosis. The character’s presumptions about Porphyria’s worship-
ful sentiments, his use of the word “surprise,” and his swelling heart suggest 
the category of moral insanity as a disease that arises out of emotional excess 
and irresistible impulse. The character’s internal debate, however, reproduces 
the problems inherent in separating responsible criminals from irresponsible 
lunatics. That the speaker “debated,” and that he recollects a process of debating, 
insinuates intellectual clarity and willful agency.
 Compounding these medicolegal meanings, Browning gives his speaker an 
ironic edge, which creates even more startling contrasts between the slyly perfor-
mative and the insanely frank. When he claims, “she guessed not how / Her dar-
ling, one wish would be heard” (56–57), the speaker reveals a smug awareness of 
his own interpretive license in deciding that Porphyria might welcome her own 
murder as an appropriate relief from the burdens of pride and vanity. Even if a 
reader were to ascribe every other utterance in the poem to symptoms of moral 
insanity, this passage poses problems, for with these words the speaker acknowl-
edges a calculated interest in the advantages of interpretation. To a significant 
extent, this interpretive tension pivots around questions of intention. Prichard 
explains that morally insane acts are “not the result of fancied provocation” or 
“the revenge of supposed injury, but [of] an immediate impulse arising sponta-
neously in the mind, which is diseased only in its moral constitution” (Treatise 
112). But the lover’s motive, of course, can be construed precisely as a vengeful 
response to a “supposed injury” arising from Porphyria’s commitment to “vainer 
ties” and, if arising from a partial rejection, the murder seems less a consequence 
of partial insanity than of “sexual hatred.” Defying more commonsense attitudes 
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about violent passions, the placement of this character in the category of moral 
insanity or in a madhouse cell courts medicolegal controversies about mur-
derous charters and murderers’ impunity, which, of course, the speaker boldly 
claims for himself at the end of the poem.
 As chilling examples of the kinds of linguistic betrayal central to the dramatic 
monologue, the speaker’s interpretive gestures present readers with a medicole-
gal dilemma. Offering no psychological revelations or interpretive advantage, 
they generate a dramatic irony that foregrounds the “substitution of alternative 
languages” and increases the frictions between epistemological frameworks. It 
is thus in the courting of controversy and confusion that the thematic strands 
and generic innovations of the poem come together. Readers consider the ter-
rible familiarity of a sexual violence congruous with patriarchal power and the 
theoretical possibility of a mental disease incongruous with common sense. As 
generic design and discursive tension conspire to obscure murderous subjec-
tivity, the only certainty of the poem is the murdered woman. The relation-
ship between this obscurity and this certainty generates the ambiguities that 
inform the poem’s cultural critique: the murderer expresses a “pathology of 
sexual feeling” which afflicts lovers and lyrics while the violent manifestation 
of moral insanity provokes unsettled and unsettling questions about character 
and conduct. Confronted with a shocking instance of transgressive conduct but 
offered only a partially contextualized rendering of character, the reader can 
document and denounce the conduct, but criminal character and murderous 
agency remain inexplicable.
 The obscurity of Porphyria’s lover produces an eerie effect, which suggests 
that Browning is less interested in launching a full critique of mental science 
than he is in distilling specific poetic effects from a collective frustration with 
violent crimes and medicolegal dilemmas. Commenting on the features of the 
genre, Christ has identified the discovery of the (speaking) subject as the aes-
thetic pleasure of the dramatic monologue: “The form allows a wide range in its 
application of irony, permitting the poet to create grotesque characters whose 
distortions we delight in discovering (like the speaker of “My Last Duchess”) 
and characters whose blindness is shown to be our own” (“Introduction” 5–6). 
Although such distortions lay the foundation for the dramatic monologue’s 
notorious grotesqueries, “Porphyria’s Lover” distinguishes itself by thwarting 
discovery and delight. Subjecting the politics of crime to an aesthetic of the sub-
lime, Browning’s early foray into dramatic poetry uses the imaginary speech of 
an imaginary murderer to scrutinize an imaginary boundary between madness 
and badness.
 As an exercise in “judicious obscurity,” the poem demonstrates Burke’s point 
that “[i]t is one thing to make an idea clear, and another to make it affecting 
to the imagination” (103): “And I think there are reasons in nature why the 
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obscure idea, when properly conveyed, should be more affecting than the clear. It 
is our ignorance of things that causes all our admiration, and chiefly excites our 
passions” (105). As the murderer, amidst the sciences and laws that attempt to 
explain him, remains sublimely inexplicable, “ignorance” becomes a problem of 
discourse. Murder has always been terrible, but when the discourses that societ-
ies use to apprehend murderers conflict, plunging them into deeper obscurity 
or elevating them to a position of impunity, obscurity accumulates political and 
poetic force. It is this force that animates “Porphyria’s Lover.”
“Single-Eyed Insanity” and Aristocratic Vanity 
in Browning’s “My Last Duchess”
Browning’s poetry continued to explore the obscurity of the murderer in the 
1840s as public controversy over criminal lunacy intensified. While “Porphyria’s 
Lover” generates poetic speech and aesthetic effects from the materials of moral 
insanity, two monologues of the 1840s, “My Last Duchess” and “The Labora-
tory,” explore its intellectual counterparts, monomania and mania. After out-
lining his theory of moral insanity in the Treatise, Prichard sketches these two 
variations of intellectual insanity in the following terms:
1. Monomania, or partial insanity, in which the understanding is partially 
disordered or under the influence of some particular illusion, referring to 
one subject, and involving one train of ideas, while the intellectual powers 
appear, when exercised on other subjects, to be in a great measure unim-
paired.
2. Mania, or raving madness, in which the understanding is generally 
deranged; the reasoning faculty, if not lost, is confused and disturbed in 
its exercise; the mind is in a state of morbid excitement, and the individual 
talks absurdly on every subject to which his thoughts are momentarily 
directed. (6)
The specific symptoms of these two illnesses—the singular fixation of monoma-
nia and the impulsive vigor of mania—accommodate suggestive configurations 
of dramatic, lyrical, and narrative modes. In both “My Last Duchess” and “The 
Laboratory” notions of homicidal lunacy as a struggle between excess and con-
trol are embedded in speech patterns and formal structures.
 Integrating interlocutors (the envoy and the chemist) into the poems’ dra-
matic scenes, however, Browning also engages notions of criminal plotting. 
Speaking to subordinates, the duke and the courtesan delineate the practical 
motives and tangible benefits of their murders, and their self-serving arguments 
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and presumptions of impunity trouble distinctions between malice and mad-
ness. Because of the remarkable similarities between these medical typologies 
and Browning’s poems—and because of the historical timing of their composi-
tion and publication—they too merit closer attention as exercises in “judicious 
obscurity.” While joined together by their careful depictions of dramatic cir-
cumstances, their explicit references to historical context, and their well-crafted 
allusions to intellectual insanity, these poems develop the obscurity of the mur-
derous subject in different ways and thus merit separate discussions.
 A general inventory of symptoms inspires one to diagnose the Duke of Fer-
rara with a severe case of monomania, and in contemporary criticism, unques-
tioningly categorizing the Duke in these terms has become fairly commonplace 
if not axiomatic. However, in the 1840s, as we have seen, monomania, invoked 
at trial but satirized by skeptics and scorned by jurists, was a contentious theory 
and a controversial diagnosis. Revisiting the symptoms of monomania helps to 
clarify the poem’s specific allusions to the disease, but it also helps to demon-
strate how the occasion of his speech and the gist of his argument offer equally 
significant indications of the Duke’s malicious intent. Rather than clarifying 
things, the historicization of his character and his conduct exacerbates problems 
of interpretation by producing a tension between two fundamental modern per-
spectives: a disdain for outmoded and corrupt aristocracies (and an increasing 
disdain for wife abuse and domestic violence) and a frustration with newfangled 
and obscure medical theories.18 Whether exhibiting a peculiarly aristocratic and 
misogynistic form of badness or a distinctly intellectual and partial form of 
madness, the Duke belongs to a “privileg’d class whom no statute controls.” 
Exploiting this coincidence of immunity and impunity, the poem cleverly entan-
gles cultural anxieties about interpretive authority and disciplinary power.
 As a concentrated and localized form of insanity, monomania required clini-
cal close reading in order to be detected and treated and, thus, the poem’s align-
ment of medical diagnosis and poetic exegesis serves the theme of murder and 
madness particularly well. In his Treatise, Prichard explains that the individual 
suffering from monomania appears calm but that upon close inspection “it will 
be found that his mind is in many respects in a different condition from that of 
perfect health” (28). Described as “single-eyed insanity” or “self-concentration 
on a criminal object,” monomania was linked to localized malfunctions within 
the regulatory systems of the will and the intellect (Stephen, Juryman’s Guide 
156). In cases of monomania, Prichard explained, “[t]he will seems in fault or 
defective as much as or more than the power [of reasoning]” (Treatise 120), and 
as a “partial derangement of the understanding,” it “is characterised by some 
particular illusion or erroneous conviction impressed upon the understand-
ing, and giving rise to a partial aberration of judgment. The individual affected 
is rendered incapable of thinking correctly on subjects connected with the 
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particular illusion, while in other respects he betrays no palpable disorder of 
mind” (26).
 Like other forms of insanity, however, monomania was also linked to con-
cerns about intellectual and behavioral excesses, particularly an “[e]xcess of self-
love,” which was considered an “ingredient in every modification of monomania” 
(Treatise 33). The monomaniac “fancies himself a king, the pope, a favourite 
of heaven” (33), and the monomaniacal illusion is “always some notion as to 
the powers, property, dignity, or destination of the individual affected, which 
is engrafted upon his habitual state of desire or aversion, passion and feeling” 
(34). As such, monomania, Stephen argued, could be prevented by a judicious 
regime of self-government and a calculated avoidance of self-indulgence in all 
things: “Men who habitually practise self-control, not merely over their acts, 
but over their inclinations, are never betrayed into such excesses; but those who 
allow thought to ramble at pleasure into excess, give reigns to the passion, till it 
becomes uncontrollable, and sets consequence at defiance; this, in the slang of 
science, is called monomania; or in simple English, lunacy on a single subject” 
(Juryman’s Guide 156). Amidst these Victorian arguments about the regulation 
of “acts” and “inclinations” and the risks of excessive self-love and freely reign-
ing passions, Browning’s Renaissance Duke—whose ancient class privileges and 
immense self-regard underwrite self-indulgence and wife-murder—seems to 
embody a perfect clinical specimen of monomania. 
 Helping to secure the theme of lunacy on a single subject, the poem’s title, 
“My Last Duchess,” which was changed from its original title, “Italy,” in 1849, 
privileges the Duke’s monomaniacal expression and perspective. Supporting 
the implications of this reiterated phrase, the Duke’s monomaniacal symptoms 
emerge most clearly when viewing and describing the painting of his last Duch-
ess. He exhibits signs of “single-eyed” madness as he levels his possessive gaze 
(and directs his interlocutor’s gaze) at the lifelike portrait of the Duchess: “That’s 
my last Duchess painted on the wall, / Looking as if she were alive” (1–2). And 
when, in an ostensible tribute to the artist’s skill, the Duke proclaims, “I call / 
That piece a wonder, now” (2–3), the lively image of the capitally punished “last 
Duchess” produces an unsettling chain of speculation. Attempting to establish 
his interpretive control over the painting, he establishes a pretense for explicat-
ing “the depth and passion of its earnest glance” (8), his particular obsession, by 
informing his listener that “never read / Strangers like you that pictured coun-
tenance, / . . . / But to myself they turned / . . . / And seemed as they would ask 
me, if they durst, / How such a glance came there” (6–12). Within this claim that 
everyone who sees the painting questions the glance lies a contrived parentheti-
cal reference to his complete control over the painting—“(since none puts by / 
The curtain I have drawn for you, but I)” (9–10). As his interests in control of 
the painting and displays of his power chart the course of his apparently mono-
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maniacal logic, the Duke betrays both a single-eyed focus on a single object and 
an excessive regard for his own interpretive authority.
 With his disorders of the mind artfully preserved in and demonstrably aggra-
vated by the painting, however, the Duke’s acts of interpretation are fraught with 
difficulties. Explaining “[h]ow such a glance came there” (12), he postulates and 
repostulates the origins of the insubordinate “spot of joy” (21), the very thing 
that “disgusts” (38) him. His multiple conjectures—that “Frà Pandolph chanced 
to say ‘Her mantle laps / Over my Lady’s wrist too much,’ or ‘Paint / Must never 
hope to reproduce the faint / Half-flush that dies along her throat’” (16–19) and 
that the Duchess interpreted such flattery as “courtesy” (20) and “cause enough 
/ For calling up that spot of joy” (20–21)—reveal the circularity of his think-
ing. In a remarkably single-eyed reading of the painting, he betrays an agitated 
and exaggerated focus on the “glance,” the “spot,” and the “[h]alf-flush.” Having 
commissioned, and now displaying and explicating the painting, he reproduces 
and reencounters the disgust for a “heart . . . too soon made glad” (22). Still 
cycling through this monomaniacal loop, at the end of the poem, before turning 
his attention to marital bargaining and to Neptune “[t]aming a sea-horse” (55), 
the Duke repeats the idea with which the poem begins, “There she stands / As if 
alive” (46–47)—a double-edged affirmation of his fixation and her death.
 These densely and intricately layered verbal symptoms generate important 
tensions within the poem. As he shifts from displaying his painting to critiqu-
ing his Duchess, the Duke highlights two sets of acts and inclinations, which 
assemble and fragment the elements of the poem’s dramatic scene and the 
speaker’s essential character. The Duke, attempting to combine an art tour (as 
object lesson) and a marriage negotiation (as financial transaction), functions 
as a willfully murderous husband performing rhetorically strategic maneuvers. 
But, reacting (or overreacting) to the image of the painted and murdered Duch-
ess and reasoning spuriously on the meanings of blushes, glances, and smiles, 
he malfunctions in ways that signal the presence of an expressive and excessive 
monomaniac. As the obscurity of the murderous subject arises from these ten-
sions between rhetorical performance and expressive dysfunction, the poem 
offers a particularly striking example of the double functions of poetic form by 
sustaining the interpretive possibilities of two competing frames of reference. 
A “deeply sceptical” double poem in Armstrong’s sense of the word, the poem 
becomes “an expressive model and an epistemological model simultaneously” 
(Victorian Poetry 13) and thereby situates itself within a mid-century context of 
medicolegal debate.
 The poem’s rigid formal structure also contributes to this tension. Its regu-
lated and rhyming couplets have been read as an assertion of authorial pres-
ence or evidence of the speaker’s calculating interests, but in creating a tension 
between poetic voice and poetic form, the couplets engage medicolegal strate-
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gies of interpretation.19 Placing the symptoms of unregulated excess against a 
backdrop of well-maintained order, the meticulous symmetry and economy of 
the couplets highlight the asymmetry and excess of an intellectual disease—they 
supply the ordered form over which the Duke’s enjambed lines and contorted 
sentences spill. Combining the use of the rhymed couplet with a “syntax that 
enjambs more lines than it stops,” Tucker argues, the poem “bears witness to a 
conflict between conventional form and informing spirit” (Browning’s Beginning 
177). Situated within the context of medicolegal debates, this conflict addresses 
very specific questions about assessing the external form of murderous conduct 
and the internal “informing spirit” of the murderous subject.
 Such distinctions become increasingly troubled as the poem forges links 
between the Duke’s desire to control interpretations of his painting and his 
desire to control interpretations of his crime. In what appears to be a self-con-
scious rhetorical maneuver, which acknowledges the historical context in which 
the murder of a wife was lawful in cases of a wife’s adultery, the Duke makes 
a charge of adultery by finding willful slights and betrayals in her blushes and 
smiles. In demonstrating the husband rights of honoris causa, the intentionally 
murderous but apparently monomaniacal Duke hovers between Renaissance 
and Victorian understandings of murder. Conjoining the immunity of insanity 
pleas and the impunity of aristocratic privilege in this way, the poem reproduces 
the epistemological and ethical discomfort surrounding medicolegal reconfigu-
rations of agency.
 A desire to condemn the Duke as a bad aristocrat is thus consistently under-
cut with his resemblances to a mad monomaniac. As the Duke makes his provo-
cation argument, the anxious suppositions that constitute his case against the 
Duchess suggest the influence of “misanthropical monomania,” a “very frequent 
form of the disease” in which the lunatic “fancies himself the object of hatred 
and persecution, of secret machinations, of plots of all descriptions, sees enemies 
in his dearest friends, suspects poison in his food, and imagines that injuries of 
every kind are perpetrated or at least designed against him” (Prichard, Treatise 
33). He explains his injuries by ascribing unrestrained and unregulated excess 
to his wife: she “liked whate’er / She looked on; and her looks went everywhere” 
(23–24). Further accommodating an argument for disease, the Duke’s brief cata-
logue of the Duchess’s domestic insubordination merely includes her enthusi-
astic responses to “[t]he dropping of the daylight in the West, / The bough of 
cherries some officious fool / Broke in the orchard for her, the white mule / 
She rode with round the terrace” (26–29). With this list, which finds evidence 
of adultery and provocation for murder in a sunset, a bough of cherries, and 
a white mule (the “officious fool” remains grammatically subordinated), and 
the Duke’s indignant exclamation, “Sir, ’twas all one!” (25), Browning stretches 
the Duke’s critique to the point of absurdity. In not being the single object of 
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her smiles, he finds himself persecuted—cuckolded—by an odd assortment of 
tempters who are hardly the usual suspects in criminal conversation suits and 
wife-murder cases. Continuing with this line of thinking, the Duke describes her 
behavior as a discourteous, if not contemptuous, act of under-ranking:
 . . . She thanked men,—good! but thanked
Somehow—I know not how—as if she ranked
My gift of a nine-hundred-years-old name
With anybody’s gift. (31–34)
Finding “plots” and “machinations” in his wife’s smiles and courtesies, the Duke 
suggests the intellectually and misanthropically disordered murderous subject 
who “fancies” and “imagines” injuries “of every kind.”
 And yet, just as Browning develops these psychological pathologies, the 
monologue shifts from an elaboration of perceived betrayals to a discussion of 
disciplinary domestic management. In these lines, which escalate from matters 
of discipline to methods of punishment, the Duke not only establishes the signs 
of willful agency and malicious intent, but also expresses a record of tactical and 
analytical thought on those very matters. Having disingenuously asked, “Who’d 
stoop to blame / This sort of trifling?” (34–35), the Duke develops a self-reflexive 
commentary on the power of rhetoric and the force of the will as he reflects on 
the dilemma of “lesson[ing]” without “stooping”:
. . . Even had you skill
In speech—(which I have not)—could make your will
Quite clear to such an one, and say, “Just this
Or that in you disgust me; here you miss,
Or there exceed the mark”—and if she let
Herself be lessoned so, nor plainly set
Her wits to yours, forsooth, and made excuse,
—E’en then would be some stooping; and I chuse
Never to stoop. (35–43)
With these reflections on his tenuous verbal skills and her potential verbal 
retorts, the Duke reveals that the problem of words and wills is not simply a mat-
ter of his “skill / In speech” but one of the will and “wits” of the Duchess. Added 
to his existing list of her offenses—smiles, looks, blushes—this allusion to her 
“wits” affirms that what “disgusts” him is the fact that she embodies agency. This 
agency—her capacity for “excuse” and other forms of defiance—informs the 
preference for murderous “commands” that he reveals a few lines later. He thus 
suggests that the expression and authorizing of his will is best accomplished not 
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with a lesson but with a murder. Connecting his will to her death—and suggest-
ing that murder is a mode of expression and instruction—these lines challenge 
applications of mental science theories of monomania, which replace assess-
ments of criminal responsibility and moral agency with clinical and detached 
observations about intellectual disorder and mental strain.
 Further complicating efforts to define and reconcile the internal and external 
elements of his crime is the fact that the discussion of the will is punctuated with 
expressions of rhetorical self-consciousness, which further entangle the signs 
of aristocratic reserve and monomaniacal symptoms. Returning readers to the 
tensions between rhetorical and expressive speech, the Duke’s self-interruptions, 
“how shall I say,” “I know not how,” and “(which I have not),” suggest a kind of 
mental duress. Attentive to this relationship, Tucker explains:
Browning never created a more patently skillful speaker, and it is a measure 
of the Duke’s conversational skill that his critics have generally dismissed the 
hesitant gesture repeated in these lines as an item from his rhetorical stock 
of commonplaces. But when a skilled rhetorician reaches three times in the 
space of fifteen lines for the same commonplace, especially for this one, the 
commonplace is no longer common but an expression of a private struggle. 
(Browning’s Beginning 178)
Already apparent in the poem’s many contrasts between order and disorder, 
this struggle is also registered in the Duke’s brief reference to his interlocutor 
at the end of the poem. Attempting to depart the Duke’s company, the envoy 
elicits the Duke’s exclamation, “Nay, we’ll go / Together down, sir!” (53–54), 
and this attempt registers, within the poem, the difficulties and discomforts of 
apprehending this murderous subject, who, rather than displaying his powers, 
has betrayed his strange pathologies. Compensating, perhaps overcompensat-
ing, for his loss of control, the Duke’s closing exclamation about and identifica-
tion with his prized Neptune sculpture—a “rarity / . . . cast in bronze for me!” 
(55–56)—appears as an attempt to regain his equilibrium. Moving his gaze from 
the vivid painting to the bronze sculpture, he attempts to reassert the authority 
that was lost in his encounter with the painted and murdered Duchess.
 And yet, situated between the Duke’s discourse on lessoning wives and the 
envoy’s gesture of departure is the poem’s carefully crafted representation of 
murder. Encrypted in three short statements, this representation fully privileges 
the internal elements of murderous intention over the external element of mur-
derous action: “This grew; I gave commands; / Then all smiles stopped together” 
(45–46). The synecdochic “all smiles stopped” recalls the Duke’s monomaniacal 
fixation. But, the strict verbal economy of this confession, ominously rendered 
in perfectly communicative gaps, and its curious separation of intention and 
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action highlights the speaker as an aristocrat who commissions both works of 
art and acts of murder. Not the physical agent of the crime, he is quite simply 
mens rea laid bare. In underscoring a hierarchical system of “commands” and 
services, the Duke’s statements adhere to medicolegal visions of the archetypal 
murderer with his “accomplices in vice and crime,” “assignable inducements,” 
“motives of self-interest,” and “wickedness pre-meditated.” In spite of the poem’s 
many compelling signs of intellectual disorder, then, the monologue upholds a 
strikingly literal representation of criminal responsibility.
 In doing so, the poem also references “the well-known laws of the criminal 
economy.” Prichard explained that murderers “seldom shed more blood than is 
necessary for the attainment of their object” (On the Different Forms 127) while 
lunatics act “without motive” and “in opposition to the known influences of all 
human motives” (Treatise 398). The Duke, dwelling on the possibility of a large 
dowry, courtesy of the Count’s “known munificence” (49), pursues the interests 
and objects of the murderer. Prefacing his remarks on dowry, the Duke states, 
“I repeat” (48), thereby marking a conscious and consistent interest in a large 
dowry and a new wife. Promising to restore, even perhaps increase, the value of 
his “nine hundred years old name” (33), his expectations about wifely behavior 
and his demands upon the Count’s “munificence” render the murder itself a 
readable expression of aristocratic malice.
 Collapsing a single-eyed art tour and a scheming marital negotiation into 
one scene and one monologue, Browning entangles the attributes of dramatic 
poetics, the terms of medical diagnosis, and the signs of criminal guilt. In tinker-
ing with theories of monomania, Browning casts a skeptical eye at the minuscule 
distinctions necessary to detect insanity and affirm malice. As “My Last Duch-
ess” explores the problem of distinguishing between a criminally self-interested 
motive and an insanely excessive self-love, it generates another inconclusive 
inventory of madness and badness. Among his Victorian readership, the political 
resonance of this critical gesture and its attendant interpretive frustrations could 
only be increased by the Duke’s excessive indulgence in and stark expressions 
of aristocratic entitlement and male privilege. For these aspects of his appar-
ent impunity, however subtly, enfold the frequently classed contexts of insanity 
defenses and the gendered dynamics of violence. And, more generally, amidst 
the middle-class ascendancy of the reading public and the cultural descendancy 
of the aristocratic ruling class, a bad aristocrat with a mad obsession produces a 
particularly politically charged version of the criminal sublime.
The Extravagance of Mania and the 
Economy of Murder in Browning’s “The Laboratory”
Although “The Laboratory,” which first appeared in Hood’s Magazine in 1844, 
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has received less attention from contemporary scholars than its aforementioned 
counterparts, it performs “cultural work” very similar to that of “Porphyria’s 
Lover” and “My Last Duchess.” Set in the ancien régime, this dramatic mono-
logue records the voice of an embittered courtesan undertaking preparations 
for the murder of her romantic rival. As she prattles and exults, the chemist-
interlocutor silently distills arsenic for her fully articulated murderous purposes. 
In presenting a character in the plotting stages of a murder, “The Laboratory” 
imagines the expression of intent and the experience of malice in explicit terms. 
In the 1840s, in spite of the fact that the M’Naghten Rules had recently codi-
fied the notion of “knowledge of right and wrong at the time of the crime,” 
these internal elements of crime remained central issues about which mental 
scientists, criminal courts, and the general public disagreed. At trial, the rules 
continued to be inconsistently evaluated and applied, and the reconstruction of 
these mental states involved vexed readings of medical interviews, courtroom 
testimony, and cross-examination. In “The Laboratory” Browning approaches 
the question of mental states by retaining an unsettling obscurity as the speaker 
fluctuates between manic disarray and rational premeditation. While the busi-
ness transaction between the courtesan and the chemist records malice afore-
thought and the poison suggests measured calculation, the speaker’s verbal style 
and energy bespeaks intellectual chaos. 
 In both manner and content, the speech of the courtesan-poisoner signifies 
the intellectual disorder that Prichard associated with mania. She represents a 
murderous mania so erratic and so frenetic that “The Laboratory” seems to 
mock the criminal cool associated with moral insanity and depicted in “Por-
phyria’s Lover.” As Prichard speculates, mania is moral insanity’s intellectual 
antithesis, but it also distinguishes itself from the more somber intellectual mad-
ness of monomania: “[t]he phenomena of mania in its ordinary form are very 
distinguishable from those of monomania. The aspect, the voice, the gestures 
of the lunatic in the active state of maniacal derangement, form a contrast with 
the retired and morose habits of the sullen monomaniac” (“Insanity” 834). A 
more extroverted disease, mania, a “general disturbance” of the intellect, counts 
among its symptoms the transformation of the subject’s speech patterns: the 
manic subject “utters rapid and confused sentences in a hurried and impetuous 
manner” (834).
 The symptoms of energy and vigor, disorder and speed, impetuosity and 
verbosity, underscore the disease’s links to willfulness in action. When manifest-
ing itself as “exaltation,” Prichard explains, mania generates a violent and active 
will (Treatise 9). The manic person generally exists in a state of “raving mad-
ness” in which “the mind is perpetually in a state of confusion and disturbance, 
which affects all the intellectual faculties, and interferes with their exercise even 
for the shortest period” (71). Mania also differs from monomania in that the 
derangement does not involve a circumscribed set of ideas; it infects completely, 
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and, thus, “the patient talks with vehemence, or raves on every subject which for 
the moment occupies his attention” (72). Playing upon the idea of disordered 
subjectivity, “The Laboratory” constructs a peculiar vision of premeditation.
 Replete with striking sound effects, the poem’s twelve quatrains of mostly 
end-stopped rhyming couplets establish a sense of manic speed and energy. The 
couplets do more than quicken the pace, however, for like “My Last Duchess,” 
“The Laboratory” contrasts structural order and mental disorder. Though pre-
dominately anapestic tetrameter, the pace is disrupted by rhythmic accidentals 
throughout, and each line’s metrical oddities jar against the perfect couplets, cre-
ating a confusing incongruity. The impact of these metrical idiosyncrasies gains 
strength from the poem’s syntax. The speaker shifts erratically between sets of 
commands, questions, and exclamations, which are generously punctuated with 
question marks, dashes, and exclamation points. Within each sentence, phrases 
strung together with commas compress a multitude of thoughts and impulses 
into each of the well-crafted quatrains. The resulting sense of confusion feeds 
the poetics of indeterminacy, as one wonders whether to privilege the poem’s 
perfectly end-stopped sentences and phrases as evidence of rational order or to 
emphasize the speaker’s verbal density and strained metrical arrangements as 
symptoms of manic disorder.
 The poem’s verbal profusions and unusual metrics garnered attention upon 
its publication in Dramatic Romances and Lyrics in 1845, when critics com-
mented on the rhythm of the first lines of the poem, which thrust unsuspecting 
readers into the erratic consciousness of a plotting killer:
Now that I, tying thy glass mask tightly,
May gaze thro’ these faint smokes curling whitely,
As thou pliest thy trade in this devil’s-smithy—
Which is the poison to poison her, prithee? (1–4)
Tennyson called the opening line a “very difficult mouthful” (qtd. in Woolford 
and Karlin, Poems 219), and Elizabeth Barrett Browning criticized the poem’s 
“perplexed” rhythm and “clogged,” “forced” expression (qtd. in Woolford and 
Karlin 221–22). In a letter to Robert Browning, she explained:
And the Laboratory is as hideous as you meant to make it:—only I object a 
little to your tendency . . which is almost a habit . . & is very observable in 
this poem I think, . . of making lines difficult for the reader to read . . see the 
opening lines of this poem. Not that music is required everywhere, nor in 
them certainly, but that the uncertainty of rhythm throws the reader’s mind 
off the rail. . & interrupts his progress with you and your influence with him. 
(Letters, ed. Kintner 131)
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With hurried anapests and laborious dactyls, Browning manipulates the dif-
ficulties of reading in order to characterize the anxious, plotting murderer. The 
wayward and impulsive rhythms of the monologue form the objective correla-
tive of the homicidal lunatic’s psychology. As she eagerly anticipates her crime, 
the speaker’s troubled language operates as a readable symptom while, of course, 
enabling Browning’s lively prosodic experimentation.
 While concerned with the aural signification of lunacy, Browning also 
exploits the generic opportunities of dramatic poetics by sketching the sinister 
dramatic setting emphasized in the title. A laboratory, of course, symbolizes 
intellectual concentration rather than mental derangement, and this laboratory, 
a well-described “devil’s-smithy,” constitutes the transgressive margin where the 
murderous plot takes shape. Inspired by this grotesque scene, Rossetti’s first 
watercolor, using distorted perspective and dark colors, places the figures in a 
laboratory filled with distillation equipment, poisonous concoctions, and scat-
tered books. Amidst such symbols of terrible intent, the speaker and the chemist 
examine the jewels with which she will pay for the poison that “does it all” (36). 
In the poem, Browning focuses on the toxicity of the poison and marks the 
laboratory as a dangerous place where the speaker and the chemist must wear 
masks to prevent exposure to fumes and dust. At times, the speaker’s careless-
ness is contrasted with the chemist’s apparent cautiousness. She says, “Is it done? 
Take my mask off! Nay, be not morose” (41), and then imagines that her revenge, 
because of its singularity of purpose, grants her immunity from toxins—and 
remorse: “If it hurts her, beside, can it ever hurt me?” (44). Upon leaving, how-
ever, as she revels in her destructive power, the speaker takes a precautionary 
measure: “But brush this dust off me, lest horror there springs” (48).
 This scene in a laboratory creates a clear portrait of premeditation. The 
vengeful murderer procures her deadly weapon, observes the distillation, revels 
in the process, and praises the scientific precision of the fatal poison. She marvels 
at the aesthetic intrigue of the pastes and powders, the gum and the “gold ooz-
ings” (14) and the “soft phial, the exquisite blue, / Sure to taste sweetly” (15–16). 
She commends the concentrated and easily disguised power that poison repre-
sents:
Had I but all of them, thee and thy treasures—
What a wild crowd of invisible pleasures—
To carry pure death in an ear-ring, a casket,
A signet, a fan-mount, a filigree-basket! (17–20)
The speaker even incorporates the poison’s aesthetic attributes into her murder-
ous plot; condensed, portable, discrete, and, perhaps, sweet, it will lure her vic-
tim to her death. Criticizing the “too grim” (25) color of the chemist’s mixture, 
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she exclaims, “Let it brighten her drink, let her turn it and stir, / And try it and 
taste, ere she fix and prefer!” (27–28). In marked contrast, the speaker then hopes 
that her victim’s dying body will record the violent and vengeful nature of the 
crime, thereby conveying a message to the lover who will witness her death: “Let 
death be felt and the proof remain: / Brand, burn up, bite into its grace— / He 
is sure to remember her dying face!” (38–40). In this way, murder will serve an 
expressive purpose.
 In elaborating this character, Browning draws upon popular notions of poi-
soners whose methods revealed dispassionate intention and calculated premedi-
tation. The speaker prefers poison because: “[i]t kills her, and this prevents seeing 
it close” (42). Poisoning, of course, was also frequently perceived as a particularly 
feminine crime. Browning underscores the gendered aspects of his character and 
her conduct when the speaker self-consciously alludes to her status as a woman 
who kills as she boasts that she ignores the prescribed role of a rejected woman: 
“they believe my tears flow / While they laugh—laugh at me—at me fled to the 
drear / Empty church, to pray God in, for them!—I am here” (6–8). With these 
last words—“I am here”—the speaker unequivocally proclaims her transgressive 
agency and murderous pride.
 Undoubtedly, Victorian stereotypes of the ancien régime also contribute to 
this poem’s representation of criminal guilt. Suggesting a gendered economy of 
courtly crime, arising from social and sexual corruption, the speaker’s jostled 
commentary conveys a conventional motive of sexual jealousy:
For only last night, as they whispered, I brought
My own eyes to bear on her so, that I thought
Could I keep them one half minute fixed, she would fall
Shrivelled; she fell not; yet this does it all! (34–37)
The trochaic weight of “Shrivelled” intensifies the speaker’s destructive anger, 
and the speaker’s initial attempts at shriveling her rival with the application 
of a sustained gaze suggest an impractical foolishness if not a manic delusion. 
Regardless, however, the escalation from staring to poisoning highlights her vio-
lent, criminal resolve. At the end of the poem, Browning again indicates corrup-
tion and excess when the speaker offers a most improper sexual payment to her 
chemist-accomplice as she leaves to “dance at the king’s” (48): “Now, take all my 
jewels, gorge gold to your fill, / You may kiss me, old man, on my mouth if you 
will!” (45–46). This offer constitutes a symbolically apt exchange: the courtesan 
offers sexual and material compensation for the murderous powers with which 
she hopes to regain the sexual and material benefits of courtly favor. As Brown-
ing sketches a criminal motivation derived from courtly culture, he configures 
her transgression, perhaps paradoxically, as a reasoned and strategic attempt at 
social survival in a corrupt system.
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 And yet, amidst all of the signs of criminal malice, symptoms of madness con-
tinue to accumulate. Against the backdrop of poisonous chemicals, the speaker 
carefully observes the preparation and boldly issues commands: “Grind away, 
moisten and mash up thy paste, / Pound at thy powder,—am I not in haste?” 
(9–10). Such exclamations, indicative of both passion and calculation, simulta-
neously point to mania and to reason. As we have already seen, Prichard deems 
the homicidal lunatic a singular actor while the murderous criminal employs 
“accomplices in vice and crime” and acts upon “assignable inducements” and 
“motives of self-interest, of revenge” while “displaying wickedness pre-medi-
tated” (Treatise 398). At the most fundamental level, the monologue underscores 
criminal collaboration: the chemist silently perfects the poison while the speaker 
volubly plots her crime. Even though the speaker marvels at the power con-
centrated in a minute form, she doubts the poison’s efficacy in destroying her 
victim’s large body:
What a drop! She’s not little—no minion like me;
That’s why she ensnared him: this never will free
The soul from those strong, great eyes:—say, ‘no!’
To that pulse’s magnificent come-and-go. (29–32)
Her concern that her rival’s size, which constitutes her ensnaring attractiveness, 
might also immure her to the carefully distilled poison underscores the social 
and material interests informing her murderous plans—the sexual competition 
at court and the importance of masculine favor. But it also explains the speaker’s 
references to the economy of her crime and the exorbitant costs of murder. “The 
delicate droplet,” she notes, is gained at the expense of “[her] whole fortune’s 
fee!” (43).
 This economy of crime recalls the “criminal economy” with which Prichard 
differentiates “[t]he insane homicide,” who “often kills a number of victims at a 
time, slaughtering all within his reach,” and the murderer, who “seldom shed[s] 
more blood than is necessary for the attainment of [his] object” (Treatise 127). 
The speaker of “The Laboratory,” awed by the power of poison, considers the 
potential for killing more rivals and imagines increasing the swath of her mur-
derous spree:
Soon, at the kings, but a mere lozenge to give,
And Pauline should have just thirty minutes to live!
But to light a pastille, and Elise, with her head,
And her breast, and her arms, and her hands, should drop dead! (21–24)
In imagining the growth of her destructive realm and the death of her rival in 
a blazon of the sexualized attributes against which she competes, the courtesan 
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expresses a dream of an efficient but unchecked power in a way that conforms 
to Victorian notions of manic impulse.
 After much waiting, rehearsing, and anticipating, the speaker concludes with 
a payment and a departure. At the end of the poem, the chemist and the reader 
witness a murderer, poison in hand and motive intact, setting out to commit 
a fully premeditated crime. The speaker’s departing statements adhere to the 
poem’s overall pattern of juxtaposing manic energy and malicious intent. But 
even here, “The Laboratory” exemplifies poetry’s potential to develop the con-
tentions of legal and medical discourse by embedding alternative meanings in 
verbal style and dramatic form. The speaker’s ebullient manner and excessive 
payment combine with her self-possessed murderous intent to blur the bound-
aries between criminality and insanity. Her symbolic resonance emerges from 
the conflation of two stereotypes: the sexually corrupt courtesan and the morally 
deviant poisoner. Planning a crime congruous with the sexual politics of courtly 
culture and incongruous with the cold persona of the female poisoner, she, too, 
enforces the obscurity of the murderous subject.
 Taken collectively, “Porphyria’s Lover,” “My Last Duchess,” and “The Lab-
oratory” demonstrate Browning’s use of the dramatic monologue to conjoin 
irreconcilable subject positions by jumbling murderous content and mad form, 
and vice versa. As a result, decisions on matters of character are impeded. In 
exploring the Derridean deferrals of meaning that characterize Browning’s texts, 
Tucker explains:
Browning’s moral doctrine of incompleteness finds a clear aesthetic analogue 
in his poetics. From the formal effects of its largest structures to the minutiae 
of its verbal style, Browning’s is an art of disclosure, an art that resists its 
own finalities. He typically prolongs the curious action of his longer poems 
and his plays through strategies that defer and thus continually anticipate 
what another author might make the narrative or dramatic climax. . . . [I]t 
is essential to an understanding of Browning’s dramatic irony to see irony as 
a way of composing a question for the reader’s benefit without resolving it. 
(Browning’s Beginning 5)
In these three poems, Browning’s approaches to questioning, anticipating, and 
deferring serve to invoke and interrogate the discourses of law and medicine as 
they intersect with and diverge from the discourses of gender and class. Con-
fronted with voices of violent killers, readers attempt—and indeed are invited 
to attempt—to locate that speaker discursively while the text resists interpreta-
tion.
 Though the sublime aesthetic effects of this obscurity and “disclosure” con-
stitute poetic achievements in their own right, they also implicate the uncom-
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fortable limitations of a medicolegal discourse “involved in many obscurities” 
and challenging commonsense ethics. These epistemological tensions compli-
cated social responses to the problem of crime and frustrated the public’s desire 
for a coherent discourse and settled law with which to categorize and contain 
unruly subjects. In this sense, these monologues can be understood with respect 
to Slinn’s arguments about speech act theory and Victorian poetry’s project 
of critique, which arises from poetry’s deliberately formalist engagement with 
cultural discourse. Slinn explains that the poems surveyed in his study address 
important Victorian cultural issues but makes the distinction that “[t]he poems 
do not resolve these issues but expose their complexities”: “These poems show 
how deliberately conceived performative language may focus central cultural 
issues in an era, since, while determinedly tied to the terms of specific speech 
acts, their themes encompass several of the significant debates in mid-nine-
teenth-century England” (6). In a similar way, Browning’s interest in cultivating 
the complexity and obscurity of murderous subjects establishes the formal and 
cultural significance of these three texts, which align, in order to explore, poetic 
and political acts of interpretation.
“Guilty But Insane”: Frenzy and Agency 
in Dante Gabriel Rossetti’s “A Last Confession”
Lacking the strict verbal economy of Browning’s dramatic monologues, Ros-
setti’s “A Last Confession” has been viewed as a slightly inferior and derivative 
Browningesque specimen of the form. In this poem, a wounded Italian revolu-
tionary confesses to a Catholic priest as he lies on his deathbed. His confession 
recounts his lustful and murderous desire for a young woman whom he raised 
from youth—after finding her abandoned by her parents, who “left her to God’s 
chance, / To man’s or to the Church’s charity” (87–88) rather than watch her 
starve during a famine. The blank-verse poem consists of five hundred and fifty-
eight lines, fifty of which are a “rude” and “ill rhymed” (278) Italian folk song 
into which the speaker lapses during the course of his confession. Set in Austria-
occupied Italy and narrated by a patriotic outlaw, the poem partially emplots 
the Italian struggle against occupation. The poem’s historical context, Rossetti’s 
self-proclaimed pride in its Italian subject, and its original composition between 
the revolutionary days of 1848 and the fall of the republic in 1849 have directed 
critical analyses toward political allegory.20
 A focus on political allegory, however, cannot fully address Rossetti’s use of a 
sexually motivated crime to center the monologue—nor can it fully account for 
the text’s aesthetic interests in Pre-Raphaelitism and Art Catholicism.21 Although 
there are arguably several aesthetic and thematic projects embedded in the poem, 
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the problem of murderous subjectivity, which informs the speaker’s consistent 
swaying between expressions of madness and malice, centers the political refer-
ences and aesthetic features of the poem. Significantly, the trauma that terrifies 
the speaker and compels his speech is not his revolutionary activity, of which 
he remains proud, but his murder of a young woman, the former foundling 
child whom he raises and then murders when, in her adolescence, she assumes 
her independence and resists his possessive eroticism. In fact, his revolutionary 
political activities and his aestheticized sexual passions—as he represents them 
in his confessional narrative—always pivot around his terrible identity as a killer, 
and his character is defined by his narration of murderous intent, wrought, he 
explains, when “[h]er eyes looked on me from an emptied heart / When most 
my heart was full of her” (455–56).
 Because Rossetti’s politics have sidelined critical discussions of the poem’s 
links to medical debates, a reconnection of text and context is needed. With 
the exception of Faas, modern critics have not explicitly linked “A Last Confes-
sion” to theories of mental science. Yet, even Buchanan’s famously insensitive 
critique in “The Fleshly School of Poetry: Mr. D. G. Rossetti” (1871) documents 
the Victorian sensitivity to the intricacies of transgressive subjectivity. While 
Buchanan’s comments primarily focus on the “naughtiness” (337), “nastiness” 
(338), and “fleshly feeling” (339) in Rossetti’s Poems, in comparing Rossetti’s 
visual and verbal arts, he also expresses a discomfort with the preponderance 
of mental disorder: “There is the same thinness and transparence of design, the 
same combination of the simple and the grotesque, the same morbid deviation 
from healthy forms of life, the same sense of weary, wasting, yet exquisite sensu-
ality; nothing virile, nothing tender, nothing completely sane” (emphasis added, 
336–37).22 Buchanan’s reaction underscores the cultural anxieties and aesthetic 
agendas surrounding sanity and insanity, and it alerts us to Rossetti’s manipula-
tion of that elusive boundary.
 In many ways, it seems, “A Last Confession” generates a poetics of “nothing 
completely sane.” A focus on the speaker’s mental states and the problems of 
mental norms and aberrations reveals how fully Rossetti’s poem engages the 
central difficulties of medicolegal debate—the discernment of mental defect 
and the enforcement of criminal responsibility. Although the poem’s somewhat 
un-Browningesque metrical regularity and narrative expanse have deflected 
attention away from its careful manipulation of the dramatic monologue form, 
Rossetti fully exploits the genre’s integration of dramatic setting, lyrical voice, 
and narrative structure to obscure the nature of the speaker’s murderous sub-
jectivity. The confessional setting, allegorizing judicial authority, introduces the 
polarities of criminal lunacy and criminal law into the poem. With questions of 
salvation and damnation looming, the monologue pivots around the declaration 
and denial of responsibility. The speaker, recalling his sexual past and securing 
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his spiritual future, must explicate his crimes and his sins, as well as his self. In 
exploring the relationships between self and sin, character and conduct, Rossetti 
turns to elements of lyrical stylization, which allow the speaker to alternately 
embody madness and badness. While the speaker constructs, in a confessional 
mode, a moral history of his own character, problems of will and responsibility, 
control and excess, character and circumstance, emerge. The poem’s narrative 
expanse allows Rossetti to enfold the testimony of a criminal and the mental his-
tory of a lunatic, and the modulation of poetic voice enables him to inflect mad 
symptoms with criminal motivations. By pairing moments of frenzied disorder 
with instances of rhetorical spin, Rossetti generates the same kind of sublime 
obscurity that we see in Browning’s monologues.23
 As we have seen, in contending with new theories of criminal madness, Vic-
torians often longed for a clear mark of distinction between the criminal and the 
lunatic—something completely sane or insane. The ethical and legal difficulties 
created by monomania and moral insanity inspired some mental scientists to 
reinstate frenzy and delusion as requisites of criminal insanity—distinctions 
that many jurists had demanded all along. In 1848 an article in the Journal of 
Psychological Medicine and Mental Pathology proclaimed, “We think the opinion 
that there is a sudden frenzy, an instantaneous eclipse of reason at the moment 
of the act, is preferable to, and more in consonance with moral science, than 
the hypothesis of medical jurists, who hold that the monomania, whether it be 
homicidal, suicidal, or incendiary, &c., may terminate in the execution of the 
deed, without frenzy or disorder of the intellect” (“Homicidal Insanity” 331). 
These gestures towards frenzy sought to resurrect common sense and to offer 
certainty in legal and medical matters: “Besides, in our opinion, a disorder of 
the reason will always be more easily appreciated and verified by the common 
sense of mankind than a perversion of the will joined to an effective lesion with-
out frenzy in the act, which no one, after all, is able peremptorily to prove . . .” 
(331). In sum, the author explains, “We reject that species [of homicidal insan-
ity] which is said to be without frenzy in the act” (333).
 Because Rossetti’s Italian patriot exists in emotional extremities and because 
he locates his crime in the “whirling brain’s eclipse” (536), “A Last Confes-
sion” seems to respond directly to a growing nostalgia for frenzied madness. 
The speaker consistently exhibits signs of manic disorientation. Throughout 
the poem, Rossetti supplies vivid hallucinations, which record the shifting and 
disoriented mental states of the speaker: he dreams of his victim wringing out 
her bloody hair, envisions her bloodied form presiding over the confession, and 
hears her mocking laughter over and over again. At one point, the speaker warns 
the priest of her maddening presence: “she’s at your back: / Gather your robe up, 
Father, and keep close, / Or she’ll sit down on it and send you mad” (440–42). 
This warning, of course, implies a cause for the speaker’s guilty, hallucination-
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induced raving—he is rendered insane by his own crime. But hallucinations, 
he attests, have always formed a part of his mental history, and he thereby sug-
gests that a preexisting madness informs his crime. When the speaker recalls his 
desperate walk to meet his victim “that last day / For the last time” (7–8), he is 
accompanied by various manifestations of his victim’s past selves:
  . . . Ah! And everywhere,
At places we both knew along the road,
Some fresh shape of herself as once she was
Grew present at my side; until they seemed—
So close they gathered round me—they would all
Be with me when I reached the spot at last,
To plead my cause with her against herself
So changed. (10–17)
In imagining himself flanked by versions of his victim’s younger, more compli-
ant self, who will support him when he goes to “plead [his] cause,” the speaker 
represents conventional notions of delusional madness. The vivid and repetitive 
imagery of his imaginings form a kind of dreamscape, which, as J. B. Bullen has 
argued, “imparts to it an almost obsessional quality; the moments of hallucina-
tion and trance suggest the operation of strongly irrational forces, and the gaps, 
the omissions, and the strange time scheme, all work against coherence, ration-
ality, and control” (111).
 With respect to the poem’s processes of characterization, such features have 
easily claimed the spotlight. Faas argues that the speaker’s struggles to narrate his 
crime “actualize the process of memory” (158) and explains, “The speaker just 
barely realizes how forcefully certain memories throng into his consciousness, 
striving for utterance; but as readers we come to recognize a set of monomaniac 
obsessions, which escalate to the point of providing the irresistible impulse for 
the murder. Except for feeling rejected by one he loves and who once loved him, 
the speaker lacks all immediate motivation for his deed” (160). Accordingly, 
Faas interprets Rossetti’s use of the confession in this poem as another example 
of a poetic case study: in suppressing “factual motivation” the poem presents “a 
chain of mental events, which, like the case history of a psychotic, accounts for 
an otherwise incomprehensible act” (160). Yet, such comparisons to psychosis 
or even monomaniacal impulse imply a psychological determinism that cannot 
fully account for the speaker’s—and the poem’s—obsessive return to questions 
of will and responsibility. Though I will later address Rossetti’s measured atten-
tion to criminal intent, including what appears to be the damningly suggestive, 
well-developed, and immediate motive of sexual jealousy, I first want to discuss 
the ways in which the poem’s representation of insanity extends beyond super-
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ficial signs of frenzy and delusion and thus complicates questions of etiology. 
While the poem’s historical context and narrative detail collaborate to highlight 
the problems of memory and the origins of motive, they also serve the poem’s 
entanglement of criminal responsibility and lunacy and its obscuring of mur-
derous subjectivity.
 When speculating about the causes of insanity, Victorian psychologists cited 
both moral traumas and physical defects. Prichard, reproducing Esquirol’s asy-
lum data, documents several moral and circumstantial factors, including “domes-
tic grief,” romantic disappointment, political upheaval, economic hardship, 
religious fanaticism, “reverses of fortune,” “offended self-love,” “disappointed 
ambition,” and “misanthropy” (Treatise 178). Such instances of moral causation 
could, of course, implicate the will of the sufferer: “By too great indulgence and 
a want of moral discipline, the passions acquire greater power, and a character 
is formed subject to caprice and to violent emotions: a predisposition to insan-
ity is thus laid in the temper and moral affections of the individual” (“Insanity” 
848). Meanwhile, physical causes included natural constitution, age, sex, celibacy 
(unmarried status), passionate temperament, prior attacks, and brain disorders, 
and, primarily among the “lower orders,” liquor and opium, blows to the head, 
intestinal irritations, irregularities of uterine function, and metastasis (848–49). 
Prichard also cites Esquirol’s study of 323 committal cases between 1811 and 
1812, which revealed that “domestic chagrins” accounted for 105 cases and that 
“disappointments in love” counted for 45 cases (850). As these situations also 
accounted for a great many murders, it is easy to see how attempts to establish 
causation disturbed the boundaries of insanity and criminality.
 Such assessments of physical and moral factors suggest that the speaker’s 
apparent madness is fully overdetermined. His personal history includes most 
of the moral causes listed by Prichard and completely violates Victorian stan-
dards of moral discipline. Prior to meeting and adopting the foundling girl, 
the speaker reveals, he spent his life “alone, / As any hiding hunted man must 
live” (97–98). His wandering outlaw existence, he explains, was characterized by 
“nights in hiding, worn and sick / And hardly fed” (57–58), and even as a young 
man, he states, “the cause which gave / The wounds I die of now had brought 
me then / Some wounds already” (95–97). His rootless life stems from political 
passions, which Rossetti also links to both mental and moral aberrations.
 Describing himself as a “moody comrade” (252), the speaker explains how 
the violent intensity of revolution bred his emotional instability. It was, he con-
fesses, “[a] game to play, a love to clasp, a hate / To wreak, all things together 
that a man / Needs for his blood to ripen” (261–63). The (over)ripened blood 
and the nationalist fixation, however, both contribute to his increasingly unbal-
anced sensibility, “till at times / All else seemed shadows” (263–64). At the same 
time, the physical stress of his mortal wounds disrupts the course and clarity 
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of his confession: “Ah there! My wounds will snatch my sense again: / The pain 
comes billowing on like a full cloud / Of thunder, and the flash that break from 
it / Leaves my brain burning” (404–7). Thus emphasizing his lack of sense, he 
ascribes to himself clear symptoms of insanity.
 Intimating a catalogue of causes, “A Last Confession” also entertains the pos-
sibility of hereditary insanity. The speaker traces his sacrificial lineage through 
his revolutionary father:
    . . . Italy,
The weeping desolate mother, long has claimed
Her sons’ strong arms to lean on, and their hands
To lop the poisonous thicket from her path,
Cleaving her way to light. And from her need
Had grown the fashion of my whole poor life
Which I was proud to yield her, as my father
Had yielded his. (253–60)
In the context of mental science, this revolutionary legacy carries both ideo-
logical and biological implications. Though the poem was first composed in 
1848–49, when natural constitution and heredity were generally understood to 
be potential factors, by the time “A Last Confession” had been abandoned, bur-
ied, exhumed, revised, and published in 1870, mental science had quite system-
atically applied Darwinian principles to established theories of moral disorder; 
the notions of hereditary influences of the thirties and forties succumbed to 
concepts of hereditary determinism later in the century. Dr. Henry Maudsley, a 
rising star in mental science in the 1860s, proclaimed the insane to be the “step-
children of Nature” (Body and Mind 43) and determined both crime and mad-
ness to be “antisocial products of degeneracy” (Pathology of Mind 78).
 In spite of the materialist ambitions of these late-Victorian theories, how-
ever, they nonetheless retained the language of moral imperatives and failures. 
For Maudsley, self-discipline was necessary not simply to assuage individual 
passions, but also to temper inherited traits. In extracting insanity from the 
“haze which metaphysics has cast around it” (Body and Mind 42), Maudsley 
highlighted the inherent biological limitations of individual minds, or rather, 
brains. Noting that both criminals and madmen suffer from the “tyranny of a 
bad organisation” (Body and Will 281), Maudsley classified them both as mani-
festations of degeneracy, abnormality, and fragmentation: “we find, when we 
inquire what are the broad features of this unsoundly leavened mental tempera-
ment, that they mark, first, a partial degeneration or at any rate an incomplete 
sanity of moral feeling, and, secondly, a corresponding impairment or incom-
plete development of will” (284). Eliding the two subjectivities, criminal and 
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lunatic, “[t]he degeneracy,” he explains, “whether it be into madness or into 
badness, will be marked by some defect of moral feeling and will” (285).24
 While Maudsley’s theories cannot be cited as influences on the original 
structure and language of Rossetti’s poem, the discourse of criminal insanity 
that circulated in the 1860s just prior to the publication of Rossetti’s Poems, in 
which “A Last Confession” first appeared, offers a context for thinking about the 
speaker’s mental states and the poem’s critical reception. Maudsley, despite his 
belief in hereditary pathologies, advised the self-regulation of the will, which he 
described as “the supreme function of mental organisation” and the “most deter-
mined” evolutionary “event” that distinguishes humans from other mammals. 
When subjected to rigorous supervision, the will, which assembles the forces of 
the “infinite past,” “present moods,” and “present acts” and constitutes “a whole-
some system of feeling and discipline,” provides a resource for counteracting 
crime and insanity (Pathology of Mind 37). As Reed points out, this attention 
to the developmental and regulatory processes of the will further complicated 
the relationship between personal history, criminal madness, and individual 
responsibility: “Maudsley offered to do what he felt metaphysicians could not 
do—explain the gradual formation of the concrete will by recurrence. Through 
repetition, ‘will remembers and learns to will, exercise building up faculty and 
conduct character,’ so that a man is shaped by his circumstances” (141).25 Com-
plementing Maudsley’s physiological mandate, this equation accounts for brain 
functions and genetic propensities, but it also implicates the development of 
individuals as moral agents. If questions of madness and criminality extend 
far into one’s past, operations of the will, no matter how seemingly minute or 
insignificant, require constant vigilance and intervention.
 Of course, moral discipline had long figured in mid-Victorian regimens of 
self-control, from the self-help manuals of Samuel Smiles to the moral ther-
apies of lunatic asylums. As Smith explains, the problem of moral habit was 
“reinforced” by physiologists, such as Maudsley, who “portrayed habits becom-
ing built into the body’s fabric” (Trial 82). Because long-term self-regulation 
could fortify an individual and, thus, allow him to retain rational control in an 
emotionally charged situation, mental breakdowns and behavioral transgres-
sions raised questions about conduct and character, which, in turn, produced 
an expanded notion of responsibility: “Responsibility ensued, not necessarily 
because any particular movement was intended, but because a chosen life his-
tory led to that movement. . . . [T]he moralist’s attention was not limited to 
the present; it illuminated the past when the possibility of immorality began” 
(82). Madness and badness, therefore, take on biographical and historical sig-
nificance: “The insanity defence dramatised the switching between languages 
of moral choice and determinism, both between medical and legal discourses 
and within the medical discourse itself. The difficulty was exacerbated by the 
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problem of earlier responsibility for later conduct; the boundary of crime and 
insanity became a question of biography” (82).
 It is not surprising, then, that biographical questions of moral lassitude and 
transgressive conduct sustain the narrative structure of “A Last Confession” 
or that the formalities of confession perform a critical function in the text’s 
slippage between confirming and denying the force of moral habit. Foucault 
describes confession as a “ritual of discourse” which “unfolds within a power 
relationship” in “the presence (or virtual presence) of a partner who is not sim-
ply the interlocutor but the authority who requires the confession, prescribes 
and appreciates it, and intervenes in order to judge, punish, forgive, console, 
and reconcile” (History 61–62). Hence, when the speaker repeatedly inserts the 
address “Father” into his confession, he reinforces the presence of this silent 
interlocutor, and he highlights his continued investment in this ritual with 
potential spiritual rewards. Throughout the monologue, the speaker indicates 
his hope that the confession might offer an escape from damnation, which he 
believes is imminent. Yet, as Christopher Nassaar has argued, “His appeals to the 
Father for sympathy are pathetic, since murder is a cardinal sin for which no 
forgiveness is possible, as the speaker knows full well” (36). The speaker’s wish 
for salvation, amidst the apparent certainty of damnation, establishes a crucial 
affective tension in the poem; afflicted with the extremes of hope, despair, regret, 
and delusion, the speaker suggests a lifelong pattern of willful dissipation.
 In The Power of Lies (1994) John Kucich critiques Foucault’s “account of 
the omnipresence in Victorian culture of confession” (17), claiming that it 
neglects the “new spaces for lying” (18) opened up in this discourse of the self. 
A deceptive approach to confession, he argues, constitutes a rejection of the 
“institutional technologies of truth” or “a repudiation of the political structures 
associated with ‘truth’ production” (19). Along these lines, we might consider 
the ways in which Rossetti’s poem opens up new spaces for rhetorical argument. 
At the very least, Kucich’s more flexible understanding of confession explains 
why Rossetti’s speaker fluctuates between confessional supplication and rhetori-
cal opportunism. Confounded by the priest’s associations with both reconcili-
ation and punishment, the speaker oscillates between a confession of sin and 
an argument for absolution. He thus weaves strands of testimony and advocacy 
into his narrative history of delusion and frenzy. Instead of casting the speaker 
as a prostrated figure appealing for absolution or an unequivocal madman rav-
ing about the past, Rossetti creates a complex and murky transgressive subject, 
who, beset by fears of eternal punishment and emboldened by sexual jealousy, 
deploys alternating strategies of supplication and persuasion.26 With some irony, 
at a time when priestly powers were being subverted by secular legal and medi-
cal authorities, Rossetti depicts the speaker’s religious confession as an outright 
negotiation of the secular voluntarist/determinist distinction so important to 
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medicolegal discourse and thus diminishes fundamental matters of spiritual 
interpretation.27
 Accordingly, while Rossetti uses the confessional setting to allegorize the 
disciplinary authority of judicial proceedings and thereby imply the desperate 
circumstances of the criminal standing in judgment, he renders the ritual of 
religious confession incomplete and improper. Fulfilling the codes of the genre, 
the priest remains completely silent, and the poem ends before he can answer 
the speaker’s inquiry about potential “hope.” More importantly, in the process of 
confessing, the speaker breaches confessional etiquette and implies a wholesale 
rejection of the very authority from which he seeks protection. Although the 
speaker often strives to follow the scripted performance of the penitent, he just 
as frequently deviates from the script and challenges the proceedings. His obses-
sion with damnation leads him to intimidate the priest: “. . . perhaps you do not 
hear; / But you must hear. If you mistake my words / And so absolve me, I am 
sure the blessing / Will burn my soul” (415–18). After admonishing the priest for 
any potential misinterpretation of his narrative, the speaker repeats the warn-
ing and boldly threatens the priest, arguing that if he absolves him because of a 
mistaken interpretation of his crime, then he too will suffer damnation:
  . . . If you mistake my words
And so absolve me, Father, the great sin
Is yours, not mine: mark this: your soul shall burn
With mine for it. (418–21)
The speaker even imagines the priest’s painful cries in hell; recalling religious 
paintings of hell’s torments, the speaker first imagines himself shrieking Latin 
phrases in hell, but then corrects himself: “Nay, but I know, / ’Tis you shall shriek 
in Latin” (423–24). Calling attention to his inadequate knowledge of Latin in this 
way, he subtly informs his listener of his own religious lapses and secular priori-
ties. Envisioning the priest’s hellish ravings, the speaker disrupts the confession’s 
ritual functions, and in twice repeating the phrase, “If you mistake my words, 
/ And so absolve me,” Rossetti’s speaker highlights the difficulties and conse-
quences of interpretation which complicate criminals, lunatics, and poetry.
 Rossetti exploits such difficulties in a variety of ways, but he most consis-
tently positions the problem of interpretation as a discursive loophole that can 
be exploited by his self-conscious and murderous speaker. For example, when 
the speaker disrupts his own confession with a full-scale metacommentary on 
language and representation, he deliberately casts himself and his crime as epis-
temological problems. Early in the monologue, he insists on his own inscrutabil-
ity: “Father, you cannot know of all my thoughts” (6). He goes on to obscure his 
crime in tautologies:
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O Father, if you knew all this
You cannot know, then you would know too, Father,
And only then, if God can pardon me.
What can be told I’ll tell, if you will hear. (17–20)
Later, the speaker argues that his clear thoughts of the past are obscured by the 
inadequacies of language: “You do not know how clearly those things stood / 
Within my mind, which I have spoken of, / Nor how they strove for utterance” 
(106–8). Announcing his frustration, he explains that the conventions of narra-
tive and the limits of language cannot accommodate the complex circumstances 
of his transgression:
You see I cannot, Father; I have tried,
But cannot, as you see. These twenty times
Beginning, I have come to the same point
And stopped. Beyond, there are but broken words
Which will not let you understand my tale. (426–30)
As we learn that this monologue marks his twentieth attempt, his “broken 
words,” symptoms of the limits of expression, prevent judgment. Yet, as Fou-
cault has also noted, confession is “a ritual in which the truth is corroborated by 
the obstacles and resistances it has had to surmount in order to be formulated” 
(History 62). Therefore, if we apply Kucich’s comments on lying, we can fully 
articulate the interpretive dilemma that Rossetti outlines—“broken words” can 
signify either a corroboration of the truth or a manipulation of the ritual.
 As I have been arguing throughout this chapter, the obscurity of the murder-
ous subject engenders the sublime aesthetic that characterizes these particular 
criminal monologues and connects them to medicolegal debates. However, when 
the speaker insists on his own obscurity, he raises additional questions about 
mad posturing for the purposes of legal defense. As Victorians worried about 
the conveniences and injustices of insanity pleas, mental scientists discussed the 
possibility of defendants and defense counsel using ambiguous theories to their 
personal and professional advantage. Like Prichard, Winslow consoled readers 
with a reminder that willful crimes were almost always discernible by motive, 
premeditation, intention, and avoidance of detection. Quoting a colleague, he 
explains, “The moral circumstances which precede or accompany crime gener-
ally show whether they are the result of criminal intentions or derangement of 
the intellect; that is to say, that in a real criminal there is always some motive 
of personal interest by which the moral cause of his act may be known” (Plea 
78). In “A Last Confession,” the notion of epistemological impasse corresponds 
to Victorian discussions about impunity and responsibility, and the speaker’s 
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repeated references to verbal frustration suggest a guilty conscience and the 
vestiges of criminal intent.
 With the many subversions of the confessional power relationship, the 
speaker appears to craft his words in order to shape the meaning of his trans-
gression, and in his muddled attempts to claim his unattainable salvation he 
pastes together a two-pronged defensive argument, which reintroduces the 
problem of balancing contradictory explanations of character and conduct. On 
the one hand, his extraordinary biography, riddled with hallucinatory disrup-
tions, evinces a degree of irresponsibility that would support a special verdict of 
“not guilty on the ground of insanity.” Yet, his memories, and his insistence on 
his victim’s sexual guilt, implicate the murder as a crime of passion, provoked 
by what he perceives as the inconstancy and potential harlotry of his beloved. 
Such details, of course, render him more criminal than lunatic. Regardless of 
the logical and strategic problems that these two strands of narrative argument 
encounter singly or together, they enfold medicolegal questions that compel 
readers to contemplate his confession in terms of madness and malice. In the 
juxtaposition of these two defensive strains, however, Rossetti generates an irony 
that thwarts any resolution or verdict on the precise mad-bad distinction that 
the poem invokes.
 To a large extent, the poem’s problems of interpretation emanate from the 
speaker’s reiteration of a provocation argument, as they continue the pattern 
of confessional subversion and narrative digression. The speaker revels in sex-
ual memories, creating the ethical disgust and moral unease necessary to stage 
the contest between madness and badness. His recollections of the sumptu-
ous girl-object, who provokes his murderous rage, infuse his confession with 
a self-indulgent impertinence and, at times, threaten to desecrate the holy sac-
rament from which he seeks to benefit. Rossetti shocks his audience with the 
speaker’s child-loving: describing a good-bye kiss, he recalls, “She was still / A 
child; and yet that kiss was on my lips / So hot all day where the smoke shuts us 
in” (198–200).28 Shortly after this statement, the speaker attempts to sanctify this 
transgressive desire. He admits that it changed from “the father’s, brother’s love” 
(202) to a violent sexual passion: “And my heart beat with so much violence” 
(214). But he then compares that sexual passion to a “holy thought / Which is a 
prayer before one knows of it” (203–4). While his passionate excess and sexual 
frankness may recall Prichard’s list of the symptoms and origins of insanity, such 
moments of metaphorical recovery also suggest self-interested verbal manipula-
tion. When he utters, “May I find you yet / Mine when death wakes? Ah! be it 
even in flame, / We may have sweetness yet” (484–86), Ronnalie Howard has 
explained, “[h]is passion for her (even now that she has been some time dead)—
more sensual, more powerful, more jealous than he admits—at last betrays him 
into blasphemy” (“Rossetti’s ‘A Last Confession’” 27). As the speaker’s fleshly 
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revelations continue to mock the pretense of professed guilt or the necessity of 
spiritual salvation, his earlier insistence on the priest’s inability to understand 
sexual desire and womanly duplicity dismisses his judging authority altogether. 
A proper assessment of his crime, he explains, requires sexual familiarity with 
women: “What would you have me tell you? Father, father, / How shall I make 
you know? You have not known / The dreadful soul of woman” (448–50). For 
the speaker, this dreadfulness is rooted in inconstancy, which he understands as 
a problem of memory, one that “[f]orgets the old and takes the new to heart, 
/ Forgets what man remembers, and therewith / Forgets the man” (451–53). In 
explaining his crime as a response to the provocation of dreadful womanhood, 
he sets it, in his estimation, beyond the priest’s comprehension.
 In addition to highlighting the priest’s shortcomings on matters of inter-
pretation, which, as the speaker argues earlier, might lead to the priest’s own 
condemnation in hell, the speaker also continues to note that the inefficiencies 
of representation conspire to obscure his demonstration of provocation. Sig-
nificantly, one of the reasons why the speaker must generate such a full account 
of the past is that his provocation defense hinges upon the degeneration of his 
victim’s laughter from “the sweet sound / Which rose from her sweet child-
ish heart” (48–49) into “another laugh” (48), the sound of an adult woman, 
who embodies a state of maturation that he likens to harlotry. According to his 
cause and effect narrative, when his victim laughingly dismisses his “parting gift” 
(25), a knife “with a hilt of horn and pearl” (5), he stabs her because her laugh 
resembles the “coarse empty laugh” (517) of a “brown-shouldered harlot” (513) 
whom he saw and heard as he passed through the marketplace en route to their 
meeting at Iglio. The harlot, we learn, laughed as a man “munched her neck with 
kisses” (518); and together the sexualized and racialized image and the distorted 
laugh generate his murderous disgust.
 This changed laugh figures prominently throughout the poem, and the 
speaker is frustrated by his inability to precisely mimic the laugh for the pur-
poses of the priest’s assessment: “Father, you hear my speech and not her laugh; 
/ But God heard that. Will God remember all?” (46–47). While the crime had 
no human witnesses, the speaker suggests, God’s awareness of—and proper 
assessment of—the provocative laugh and the sinning woman might pardon 
him. Adding another layer to his defense, the speaker explains that the similar-
ity between the two laughs symbolized “all she might have changed to, or might 
change to” (524). At the very least, his displacement of sexual transgression 
onto his victim establishes an attempt to exploit Catholic proscriptions against 
sexual sinning. Her guilty betrayal or, he intimates, her potential corruption, 
therefore, justify murder as a necessary form of paternalistic correction and 
protection.
 Rossetti’s own comments on the poem help to clarify these passages. In “The 
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Stealthy School of Criticism” (1871), Rossetti responds to Buchanan’s criticism 
of the grotesquely depicted harlot in the marketplace, particularly the line that 
depicts a man “munch[ing] her neck with kisses” (519). Rossetti contextualizes 
the scene in the following terms:
The first of these unspecified quotations is from the Last Confession, and is 
the description referring to the harlot’s laugh, the hideous character of which, 
together with its real or imagined resemblance to the laugh heard soon after-
wards from the lips of one long cherished as an ideal, is the immediate cause 
which makes the maddened hero of the poem a murderer. Assailants may say 
what they please; but no poet or poetic reader will blame me for making the 
incident recorded in these seven lines as repulsive to the reader as it was to 
the hearer and beholder. Without this, the chain of motive and result would 
remain obviously incomplete. Observe also that these are but seven lines in 
a poem of some five hundred, not one other of which could be classed with 
them. (793)
Rossetti’s explanation of this offending passage mingles the language of insan-
ity with the language of criminality. His reference to the “chain of motive and 
result” that produces the “maddened hero” and his comment on the “immedi-
ate cause which makes” the speaker “a murderer” reveal his interest in murder 
and madness as related features of mental crisis. The term “maddened” is also 
suggestively ambiguous; it partially describes, rather than unequivocally defin-
ing, the speaker’s state of mind. Furthermore, Rossetti’s use of the phrase “real 
or imagined” underscores his refusal to verify the perceptions of his speaker 
and suggest his deliberate use of the genre’s dramatic irony to generate a fun-
damental obscurity. The poem’s internal logic supports Rossetti’s assertions 
about narrative progression, for the speaker obsessively returns to the problem 
of narrating cause and effect. Indeed, both the political and sexual content of 
the speaker’s life story imply a cause and effect narrative of homicidal madness. 
Yet, ironically, the very fact that the speaker constructs the narrative in these 
terms raises the possibility of a willful criminality that is self-protective and 
opportunistic.
 Pivoting as it does around the sexual identity of the victim, the speaker’s 
narrative requires details of his victim’s sexual development. In fact, a pattern 
emerges in the speaker’s digressions; they typically serve to mark the girl’s sexual 
development and his corresponding sexual desire—the relationship between 
her body and his will. Although he punctuates such digressions with apologies 
for his “foolish tales” (342) and for “speaking to [the priest] of some matters / 
There was no need to speak of” (104–5), her imputed sexual guilt—her teas-
ing and pre-adolescent flirtations with the speaker, her possible affair with a 
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German lover, her potential future sexual promiscuity, her maturation into wom-
anhood—structures his narrative arrangement and argument. The digressions, 
therefore, betray a rhetorical purpose while, at the same time, underscoring the 
speaker’s lifelong and habitual lack of moral discipline. This pattern redirects 
his confessional biography to the discourse of moral habits, indicating both the 
“problem of earlier responsibility for later conduct” and a criminal conscious-
ness of guilt that challenges his status as an overdetermined madman.
 An awareness of the ironic effects of the text’s dueling subjectivities helps 
to explicate the speaker’s strange account of the sexual triangulation between 
a Cupid figurine, the speaker, and the “merry loving child” (143). Dwelling on 
their happier years, the speaker recalls that his first gift to her was “[a] little 
image of a flying Love / Made of our coloured glass-ware, in his hands / A dart 
of gilded metal and a torch” (145–47). Prompted by her curiosity about the 
figurine, the speaker provides her with “strange old tales” (151) of Venus and 
Cupid, and so begins her sexual education. The child, he explains, insisted that 
they hang the cupid on the wall above her bed, and as he held her up to ham-
mer the nail, she “laughed and laughed / And kissed and kissed [him]” (166–67) 
until the cupid “slipped and all its fragments strewed the ground: / And as it fell 
she screamed, for in her hand / The dart had entered deeply and drawn blood” 
(169–171). The speaker then recollects that, as he comforted the crying child and 
bandaged her bleeding hand, he exclaimed, “‘Oh!’ / I said, the while I bandaged 
the small hand,— / ‘That I should be the first to make you bleed, / Who love 
and love and love you!’” (172–75). According to the speaker’s account, this erotic 
subtext is then continued by the sobbing child: “‘not for the pain at all,’ / She 
said, ‘but for the Love, the poor good Love / You gave me’” (177–79).29
 Because this memory records the girl’s symbolic defloration—complete with 
jouissance, blood, pain, tears and mutual professions of love—it substantiates his 
accusations of inconstancy and sexual guilt. In his post-exhumation revisions 
to this passage, Rossetti substituted the memory of a Cupid icon and a secular 
lesson in erotic love for the original scenario, which involved a “little image of 
great Jesus Christ” and a religious lesson about “the wondrous things of Faith.”30 
These alterations suggest the role of this passage in delineating the speaker’s 
character—and considering old sins and new sciences. A gesture toward reli-
gious education would exhibit a level of moral clarity and rectitude that this 
speaker, as a portrait of murderous obscurity, cannot possess. And while the 
revised account is certainly tinged by the speaker’s unreliability and raises the 
specter of monomaniacal obsession, it also marginalizes him with respect to 
Victorian attitudes about moral self-regulation and sexual propriety. Constitut-
ing a part of his history of self-indulgent transgression, this cupid scene extends 
the questions of responsibility further into his past; mad or bad, this murderer 
embodies guilt.
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 The speaker’s subsequent lapsing into an Italian folk song functions almost 
identically, as the song resonates with the speaker’s defensive testimony about 
his victim’s sexual precocity. Remembering the song, the speaker explains that 
one day, as he brooded over politics, the child was “[l]eaping about the place 
and laughing” (271). After he “did almost chide her” (272), the girl “knelt / 
And putting her two hands into [his] breast / Sang [him] a song” (272–74). 
Both her song and her posture encode expressions of sexual desire and submis-
sion. As Bullen argues, “It is a sexually aggressive piece about a woman whose 
physical beauty is ignored by her male lover and who then wonders how to 
attract him. In the monologue it is rendered in the vernacular, creating a sharp 
contrast with the discourse of the narrator and stressing the ‘otherness’ of the 
girl’s femininity” (114). The song, therefore, marks the speaker’s preoccupation 
with the girl’s role as a sexual temptress and reinforces his claims to provoca-
tion. Certainly, as a representation of a lyrical folk voice, the song also serves 
to authenticate the speaker’s identity as an Italian patriot and to demonstrate 
Rossetti’s own Italian credentials. The fatally wounded guerilla soldier lapsing 
into a folk song during his deathbed confession solidly confirms his national 
allegiance and suggests mental duress. But Rossetti also suggestively frames this 
song with respect to the rhetorical opportunism seen in other passages. The 
speaker offers the song as another example of his mental strain and confusion: 
“That I should sing upon this bed!—with you / To listen, and such words still 
left to say!” (333–34). Not completely distracted, however, the speaker manages 
to interrupt himself and redirect his priest-interlocutor to his central purpose. 
When the speaker, once again, self-consciously highlights his narrative disorder, 
Rossetti foregrounds the most substantial features of the confession—post-
ponement and evasion.
 With great consistency, postponement remains the narrative’s fundamental 
structural feature as the speaker puts off an account of his terrible crime. When 
the speaker finally begins to narrate the murder, after twenty prior attempts 
and in the five-hundred-thirty-first line of the poem, his words encapsulate 
the contest between criminal intention and mad confusion. In murdering the 
woman, he expresses his will in a set of trochaic commands that demand her 
obedience:
“Take it,” I said to her the second time,
“Take it and keep it.” And then came a fire
That burnt my hand; and then the fire was blood,
And sea and sky were blood and fire, and all
The day was one red blindness; till it seemed,
Within the whirling brain’s eclipse, that she
Or I or all things bled or burned to death. (531–37)
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The metrics of this account of the crime imply both mental duress and terrible 
consequence. With the phrase “one red blindness” Rossetti disrupts the iambic 
pace and forcefully stresses the sustained intensity of the speaker’s murderous 
will. Situating his violence “[w]ithin the whirling brain’s eclipse,” the speaker 
obscures his criminal agency, and he erases distinctions between himself and his 
victim in the unpunctuated listing and blurred vowel-sounds of “she / Or I or 
all things.” Such renderings deny the agency that the words “take it and keep it” 
explicitly denote.
 A tension between agency and absence is reinforced a few lines later when, 
describing the scene immediately after the murder, the speaker suggests a con-
tinued “eclipse” of consciousness: “And then I found her laid against my feet / 
And knew that I had stabbed her, and saw still / Her look in falling” (538–40). 
In contrast, however, he then sums up the horrible event by remembering his 
commands and imagining her obedience: “For she took the knife / Deep in her 
heart, even as I bade her then, / And fell” (540–42). Here, as throughout the 
poem, Rossetti refuses to resolve the questions raised by the speaker’s conflicting 
expressions of willful intention and mental absence. Upholding the obscurity 
of the murderous subject, Rossetti presents a speaker who may be a criminal 
interested in obfuscating responsibility or a madman suffering the effects of an 
eclipsed consciousness.
 These ambiguities are further reinforced at the end of the poem when the 
apparition of the murdered woman traumatizes the speaker precisely because 
she records her obedience to his commands: “And she keeps it, see, / Do you 
not see she keeps it?—there, beneath / Wet fingers and wet tresses, in her heart” 
(543–45). Like the self-constituting corpse in “Porphyria’s Lover,” her violated 
corpse—imagined and animated—provides an abject image of his murder-
ous outrage. As such, this hallucination introduces another version of the text’s 
unsettling oppositions; her bloody image suggests the material effects of his 
terrible conduct, and, yet, because imagined, it raises additional questions about 
the internal processes of the criminal mind. Even though the speaker conforms 
to definitions of delusional lunacy as he announces her bloody presence, the 
image of her hair and body saturated in blood returns readers to the brutality of 
his crime. Overpowering the mad imagery of the “whirling brain’s eclipse,” the 
image bespeaks commonsense definitions of terrible intent, particularly because 
the weapon is tied symbolically to their relationship. Significantly, then, at the 
end of the poem, she removes the knife that he has “bade” her to keep in her 
heart:
. . . For now she draws it out
Slowly, and only smiles as yet: look, Father,
She scarcely smiles: but I shall hear her laugh
Soon, when she shows the crimson steel to God. (555–58)
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This challenge, we may presume, has been the inspiration for the speaker’s has-
tening confessional pace, for just prior to describing this vision, he confirms 
that he has “told all,” and in a moment of apparent lucidity requests a prompt 
judgment from the priest: “tell me at once what hope / Can reach me still” (554–
55).31 And so, having stretched this unsettled and unsettling account across five 
hundred fifty-eight lines of verse, Rossetti leaves the speaker and his readers 
suspended on the brink of judgment.
 In tying heavenly judgment to an examination of “the crimson steel,” Ros-
setti also alludes to procedures of earthly judgments, as murder weapons could 
be introduced as evidence of intent at trial (Chadwick 389). Furthermore, the 
poem leaves readers with a collection of ambiguous circumstantial evidence, 
which includes markers of opportunity and motive. For example, prior to their 
meeting, his victim established that this would be their final meeting: “that last 
day / For the last time, she said” (7–8)—thus placing his rejection well before 
she laughs (like a harlot) when he presents her with the knife. The speaker pur-
chases the knife en route to meet her, and the meeting takes place “in the first 
thin shade o’ the hills” (39) along a stretch of beach amidst loud sea sounds. 
The secrecy of the meeting is justified by his fugitive status and his references 
to spies. Yet, he eludes these spies in the marketplace with the help of a “poor 
painted mountebank” (499), who costumes him in “patches and a zany’s gown” 
(506) and incorporates him into his act. The secret meeting place, affording him 
protection from spies, also offers him the opportunity to commit murder. With 
such substantial allusions to conventional notions of evidence, Rossetti adds 
another layer of complexity to the poem’s representation of murder.
 With the speaker’s fluctuations between self-control, self-indulgence, and 
self-betrayal, Rossetti creates a character that embodies the tyranny of disorga-
nization. In employing a circular defensive rhetoric—in building the case for his 
victim’s provocation and his mental absence—the speaker inadvertently records 
a disturbing history of sexual transgressions, unclaimed sins, and moral lapses. 
With questions of responsibility attended to but unresolved, the poem questions 
the interpretive authorities and the imaginary boundaries separating criminality 
and madness. At the same time, it implies that the speaker may suspect—and 
that readers may prefer—certain fundamental distinctions between the criminal 
and the lunatic. 
 In this way, “A Last Confession” resonates with the elision of the two catego-
ries articulated by late-Victorian psychologists. While the criminal, organized 
and responsible, and the lunatic, disorganized and irresponsible, continued to 
inform a troubled dichotomy, late-Victorian alienists seemed less interested than 
their mid-century counterparts in formulating checklists and taking inventories 
for differentiating the two. Revised and published in the wake of several contro-
versial criminal insanity trials in the 1860s, about which leading mental scientists 
were very publicly at odds, “A Last Confession” sketches a portrait of a man who 
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is, perhaps, both certainly guilty and undeniably insane.32 In that sense, the pres-
ence of the will and the absence of the intellect, which characterize the speaker’s 
account of the murder, recall J. F. Stephen’s claim about the essential attribute of 
criminal responsibility: “guilt turns upon the wilfulness of the act and not upon 
the insanity of the prisoner” (Papers 81). A definition of a legally responsible but 
mentally incoherent subject was finally formalized in 1883 with the passing of 
the Trial of Lunatics Act, which created the special verdict “guilty but insane.” 
“This phrase,” Smith explains, “responded to the Queen’s concern, following an 
assault upon her, that the verdict of ‘not guilty on the ground of insanity’ was 
not a deterrent,” but it “upset legal minds because it found both guilt and a lack 
of mens rea” (Trial 18). As it attempts to reconcile the irreconcilable, this legal 
phrasing also signals an effort to address the epistemological conflicts between 
mental science and criminal justice and to alleviate the social anxieties gener-
ated by morally offensive characters and extraordinarily violent conduct. In the 
interests of disciplinary authority, the state reinvests in the interpretive power of 
criminal guilt. 
Poetic Stress and Epistemological Distress
These four murder monologues, of course, are not the only poems to use mur-
der and madness as thematic resources for poetic experimentation and political 
engagement. But these poems distinguish themselves by approaching murder 
and madness as shared problems of medical, legal, and literary discourse. In this 
way, they align the difficulties of reading the criminal, the lunatic, and the poem. 
And while each of these poems uses the theme of murder to develop multiple 
aesthetic projects—from deconstructing lyricism to historicizing character to 
scrutinizing gender—it is the theme of murder that centers their political and 
poetic meanings. Conflating mad excess and criminal control, and entangling 
theories of mental science, definitions of criminal law, and codes of dramatic 
poetics, they generate a particularly topical and sublimely obscure vision of the 
murderous subject—which frustrated readers and, often, disgusted critics.
 In Victorian Poetry, Armstrong makes the point that “stress” and “conflict” 
underlie the formal complexities of Victorian poetry: “To understand what is 
stressful, and why, it is important to link linguistic and formal contradictions 
to the substantive issues at stake in the poems—issues of politics, gender and 
epistemology, the problem of relationship and the continual attempts to reinvest 
the content of self and other” (11). In these particular poems, the patterns and 
pulses of language, the intentions and interests of speakers, and the structures 
and props of dramatic scene work together to determine and distort the mean-
ings of murders and the identities of murderers. As they present readers with 
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diverse and inconclusive inventories of sins and symptoms, they signal their 
participation in a broader cultural debate about immunity and impunity. Using 
poetry’s formal qualities to invite but frustrate the interpretation of crimes and 
poems, they use epistemological stress to support aesthetic innovation and 
establish modern content.
 While the “judicious obscurity” of these sublime killers challenged the inter-
pretive powers of both judicial and medical authorities, it also challenged cul-
tural expectations about poetic authority and artistic achievement. The specific 
aesthetic effects and epistemological distress of such representations are reflected 
in critical responses, which suggest that while poets were willing to contem-
plate murders and lunatics, critics were expecting to contemplate conventionally 
virtuous intentions and noble actions. As poets objectified and examined the 
struggles of interpretation in their poems, critics bristled and blushed at their 
contorted forms and transgressive themes. In the ongoing dialogue between 
poetic texts and critical responses, an interesting pattern emerges: the tension 
between textual innovations and readerly expectations is repeatedly described 
as a tension between the sane and the insane. Revealing the subtleties and the 
pervasiveness of medicolegal anxieties, such articulations of literary taste and 
poetic madness pit the morally unregulated and criminally minded poet against 
the offended and baffled public. 
 For this reason, Buchanan’s critique of Rossetti’s predilection for “nothing 
completely sane” or a critic’s claim that “[f]or a long time we were inclined to 
believe [Browning] really insane” (qtd. in Litzinger and Smalley 113) allows us to 
gauge the ethical stress of apprehending murderers and the epistemological dis-
tress of ascertaining madness. When reviewers attempt to establish and uphold 
the boundary between the sane and the insane, they also define the boundaries 
of poetic transgression. Regretting that Browning is “an artist working by incon-
gruity,” Bagehot remarks, “he has failed in fascinating men and women of sane 
taste. We say ‘sane’ because there is a most formidable and estimable insane taste” 
(61). For similar reasons, perhaps, the reviewer that categorizes Browning as 
“really insane” also notes his apparently willful insistence on unintelligibility and 
denounces the “muddiness of style” and “muddiness of matter” (Litzinger and 
Smalley 113) inherent in his work. Using such medical metaphors to define liter-
ary value and uphold literary tradition, critics diagnose insanity—and punish 
criminality—with harsh indictments of the degenerated tastes and unregulated 
aesthetics of modern poetry. The critic, in these cases, inherits the problem of 
distinguishing madness and badness.
 While the related problem of murder was vexing courts, it, too, was irri-
tating critics. Writing in 1849, and deploring the obscurity and contingency 
of murder in Browning’s poetry, one critic simply protests that “in our eyes, 
murder is always murder” (qtd. in Litzinger and Smalley 126). Written at the 
chAp ter 2
height of medicolegal controversies, this confident, tautological quip reminds 
us of the political immediacy of murder poems. As the persistence of medical 
obscurity threatened to overwhelm legal distinctions between criminal agency 
and mad determinism—at a time when mental science charged itself with estab-
lishing accuracy in clinical diagnosis, balancing the ethics of state punishment, 
and rationalizing treatments through scientific advancement—dramatic poetry 
addressed the concomitant fear that emerging psychologies could, in fact, para-
lyze the judicial institutions and dismantle the ethical principles that comprise 
and sustain Victorian culture.
 Attempting to manage the reception of his shady characters and their bad 
deeds, Browning included this now famous advertisement in Dramatic Lyrics 
in 1842: “Such Poems as the majority of this volume might also come properly 
enough, I suppose, under the head of ‘Dramatic Pieces’; being, though often 
Lyric in expression, always Dramatic in principle, and so many utterances of 
so many imaginary persons, not mine.” While his explanation formally discon-
nects the poet and the speaker and thus establishes a dramatic “principle” of the 
“imaginary,” the dramatic fictions of “Porphyria’s Lover,” “My Last Duchess,” 
“The Laboratory”—and, we might add, Rossetti’s “A Last Confession”—forged 
strong links to the real problems of persons and boundaries complicating epis-
temologies of murder in Victorian England. As they assist poets in scrutinizing 
an imaginary boundary, the expressive efforts (“so many utterances”) of these 
imagined murderers constitute pointed allusions to codes of responsibility and 
pleas of insanity. And, as they encourage skeptical reflections on the intertwined 
but competing domains of mental science, legal precedent, gender politics, and 
ethical commonsense, they link the cultural politics of poetry to the criminal 
politics of lunacy. 
“Household Law” and the 
Domestication of Murder 
C h a p t E r  3
in robErT broWning’s The Ring and the Book (1868–69), 
Guido Franceschini’s defense lawyer, Arcangeli, imagines the 
aggravations that the Fisc, Bottini, will heap upon the charges 
against his client for the brutal murders of his wife and her par-
ents. Among these projected aggravations, which constitute a 
“[p]arasite-growth upon mere murder’s back” (VIII.1109), lies 
the fact that the murders were committed in the victims’ home:
Third aggravation: that our crime was done—
Not in the public street, where safety lies,
Not in the bye-place, caution may avoid,
Wood, cavern, desert, spots contrived for crime,—
But in the very house, home, nook and nest,
O’ the victims, murdered in their dwelling-place,
In domo ac habitatione propria,
Where all presumably is peace and joy. (VIII.1243–50)
Guido’s “hurly-burly case” (VIII.106), therefore, confronts the problem of 
domestic ideology. As Arcangeli meanders through his legal analysis, Guido’s 
offenses against domesticity contrast his own domestic obsessions, evident 
here in the idyllic connotations and confident stresses of “house, home, nook 
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and nest.” Betraying his preoccupation with the domestic idyll, his monologue 
consistently returns to the pleasures of dinner, the prideful satisfactions of 
fatherhood, and his preference for “home-sanctitudes” (VIII.1765), which he 
succinctly catalogues as “my fry, and family and friends” (VIII.1746). As these 
domestic desires overpower his professional and public ambition and offset Gui-
do’s violent affronts to domestic pieties, they also expose the mercenary posture 
of Arcangeli’s legal strategies and thereby burnish his legal integrity. In building 
such a character, as Alexander Welsh has noted, Browning develops a “playfully 
absurd defense” (Welsh 209) that satirizes this particular defense lawyer while 
questioning the mechanisms of legal inquiry.1
 Particularly relevant to a discussion of the poem’s domestication of murder, 
are the ways in which Arcangeli’s investments in domestic “peace and joy” com-
plement the home’s more violent tendencies. The intersection of Guido’s domes-
tic villainy and Arcangeli’s homespun languor allows Browning to acknowledge 
the violent permissions and intimate consequences of state and symbolic laws 
governing marriage and family in Victorian England. With these complemen-
tary characters, Browning’s epic poem isolates the same variables that underlie 
Mill’s critique of legal permissions and domestic customs in On the Subjection 
of Women. Written in 1861 but published in 1869, Mill’s text defines the home 
as a site of “domestic slavery” and husbands as “despots” and “tormentors”: “I 
have no desire to exaggerate, nor does the case stand in any need of exaggera-
tion. I have described the wife’s legal position, not her actual treatment. . . . If 
married life were all that it might be expected to be, looking to the laws alone, 
society would be hell upon earth” (286). Explaining that not all despots exercise 
the extent of their powers and that husbandly despotism is frequently precluded 
or mitigated by genuine “feelings and interests,” Mill writes, “The despotism 
of Louis XVI was not the despotism of Philippe le Bel, or of Nadir Shah, or of 
Caligula; but it was bad enough to justify the French Revolution, and to palliate 
even its horrors” (286). According to Mill, however, in order to ensure wives’ 
rights the law should grant protections—not permissions—simply because of 
the ubiquity of abuse: “laws and institutions require to be adapted, not to good 
men, but to bad” (287).
 In a perfect inversion of Mill’s reformist proposition, the ease with which 
Arcangeli abandons “home-joys” for murder rights demonstrates exactly how 
laws and institutions are “adapted” to “bad” men. Tellingly, as permissions 
accrue, Arcangeli’s “home sanctitudes” are configured as excessive and expedient 
fantasies, which serve to muddle rational and moral judgments and to obscure 
the legal definitions and patriarchal ideologies governing spousal relations and 
family life. In characterizing Arcangeli as a mercenary lawyer, a prideful patri-
arch, and a self-proclaimed homebody, Browning ridicules his sentimentalizing 
and mystifying ethos. Aware of his own compromised ethical and legal rigor, 
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Arcangeli seeks to obscure, or mitigate, it with rhetorical special effects. Having 
scoured “Law, Gospel and the Church” (VIII.729) for support and having “eccle-
siasticized” (VIII.1742) his brief, he will “[r]egularize,” “emphasize,” “latinize,” 
and “lastly Cicero-ize” (VIII.1743–44) it in order to mimic a proper defense. In 
his capacity as defense lawyer, Arcangeli quite adeptly exchanges the “home-joys” 
model for an “[h]onoris causa” (VIII.424) model, which establishes the “natural 
ground” (VIII.479) of “complete revenge” (VIII.478) for an uncompromising 
“household law” (VIII.483). In this way, a strategy of “[e]xplaining matters, not 
denying them!” (VIII.315), reveals wife-murder to be perfectly congruous with 
matrimonial law.
 In 1851, eighteen years before the publication of The Ring and the Book and 
On the Subjection of Women, the sinister ethos of such “household law”—and 
the galling impunity of wife-murderers—inspired Mill and Harriet Taylor to 
submit an editorial missive to the Morning Chronicle. After several wife-mur-
derers had recently enjoyed the benefits of judicial leniency, Mill and Taylor 
angrily deconstructed the legal and cultural logic of husbanding, which simul-
taneously charged husbands with protecting and excused their abusing. They 
explain that in cases of wife-murder or child-murder, “[t]he crime is greater; for 
it is a violation of more solemn obligations—it is doing the worst injury where 
there is the most binding duty to cherish and protect” (28 August 1851, 4). It is 
also “baser” because “the culprit” targets the trusting and the weak (4). Assess-
ing the chronic cultural problem of “domestic ruffianism,” they intimate that 
the domestic sphere is, in fact, an ideal criminal locale where “[t]he domestic 
tyrant can perpetrate his tyrannies with the utmost facility, and need never wait 
for an opportunity; a stronger motive therefore is required, when the brutality 
exists, to deter from its indulgence” (4). As they assert the language of criminal 
intent—the issue at stake in the acquittals and reduced charges that so appalled 
them—they argue that an abiding cultural faith in domestic privacy accom-
modates criminal opportunity and motive. Because criminal intent is frequently 
dismissed or explained away by lenient judges, they quip, “[t]he vow to protect 
thus confers a license to kill” (4).
 Attesting to the long history and lingering problem of such domestic license, 
Browning’s Arcangeli and Guido, the gourmand and the murderer, constitute a 
particularized version of Mill’s and Taylor’s legal critique. Both enjoying vary-
ing degrees of “license,” and both beneficiaries of patriarchal permissions and 
practitioners of patriarchal excess, they represent the contradictions of domestic 
ideologies. In partnering Arcangeli, as defense counsel, and Guido, as defendant, 
Browning asks readers to recognize the interdependencies of their ostensibly 
opposing versions of domestic nostalgia and to revisit the longstanding and as 
yet unresolved dilemma of domestic authority. Arcangeli longs for “home-joy” 
with its attendant entitlements—paternalism, comfort, and indulgence—while 
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Guido longs for domestic tyranny with its attendant entitlements—control, 
dominance, and impunity. Both claim domestic ideology as the foundation for 
their personal identities, both secure for themselves the position of the patriarch, 
and both assert husbands’ murderous rights with reiterations of “household 
law.” With them, Browning exposes the seductive powers and practical misuses 
of domestic ideologies while giving material force to the abstractions of family 
law. In interrogating the domestic politics of this “hurly-burly case,” he forces 
the intersection of another pair of ostensibly antithetical conceptual catego-
ries—criminality and domesticity. And establishing congruities between these 
two concepts, he encourages further reflection on legal discourses and social 
institutions as forces that determine and domesticate violence.
 Examining dialectical relationships between poetic forms, generic codes, 
and cultural discourses and tracing the gendered structures of “household law,” 
this chapter explicates Browning’s inquiry into the precariousness of domestic 
protections, affections, and permissions and applies these analytical and con-
textual insights to the explication of two “minor” dramatic poems that imagine 
the murderous prerogatives of wives. Juxtaposing Browning’s massive, canon-
ical verse-novel with two lesser-known verse dramas about Greek houses in 
ruin, Clytemnestra (1855) by Edward Robert Bulwer Lytton (Owen Meredith) 
and Medea, A Fragment in Dramatic Form, After Euripides (1884) by Amy Levy, 
allows us to explore the poetics of domestic conflict and consider the gendered 
aspects of murderous rage. On the most fundamental level, these three texts 
are linked by their pointedly counterintuitive and unsentimental rendering of 
domestic spaces as “spots contrived for crime,” and in domesticating crime, they 
also share a reliance on historical transposition to generate political meanings. 
Browning, of course, distills The Ring and the Book from the historical resources 
of the now infamous “yellow notebook,” while Lytton and Levy modernize two 
classical murderous women, Clytemnestra and Medea, who have long embodied 
the traumatic threat of domestic breakdown.
 As they exploit the opportunities of historical displacement for the purposes 
of contemporary gender debate, Browning, Lytton, and Levy all similarly scru-
tinize domesticity and rescript its patriarchal customs as criminal tendencies. 
Built upon the private and public foundations of matrimonial law, they sug-
gest, the “house, home, nook and nest” is hostile to romance and amenable to 
violence. And, because the theme of murder entangles social prohibitions and 
individual agency, it allows these poets to simultaneously imagine the institu-
tional and ideological mechanisms of oppression (and resistance) and scruti-
nize the discursive modes, generic forms, and interpretive practices of sensation 
and scandal. Challenging the legal melodramas of the courts and the press with 
epic and tragic reconfigurations of marital breakdown, these poets historicize 
and contextualize both acts of murder and representations of transgression as 
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products of legal, sexual, and gender codes. Enacting and analyzing murderous 
scenarios, in which marriage contracts and domestic bargains are violently dis-
solved and broken, husbands, wives, and children detail the failures of marital 
commitments and the pressures of domestic confinements. With such ongo-
ing commentaries and metacommentaries, Browning, Lytton, and Levy fully 
exploit the generic citation and differentiation integral to the hybrid forms of 
the verse novel and the verse drama in ways that highlight the semiotic shifting 
and semantic maneuvering that informed the vexed gender politics of marriage, 
domesticity, and criminality. 
“Bad Bargain[s],” “Decent Couple[s],” and 
Adversarial Domesticity
In order to fully understand the domestication of murder in these three poems, 
a glimpse at the discursive arena in which they circulated is in order. Although 
a full rendering of the dense history of marriage and divorce in the nineteenth 
century lies well beyond the scope of this chapter, consideration of the political 
arguments, cultural anxieties, and textual practices that shaped Victorian mar-
riage reform and domestic ideologies allows us to appreciate the incisive argu-
ments of Browning’s, Lytton’s, and Levy’s poetic critiques. Several recent literary 
and historical studies have explored the marriage reforms of nineteenth-century 
England, which dealt with issues of divorce, abuse, custody, and property, and 
examined the modes of representation—from matrimonial legislation to press 
coverage to feminist polemic to prose fiction—with which Victorians docu-
mented and interpreted these changes.2 In particular, scholars have isolated the 
middle-class cult of domesticity as the dominant ideological model of homelife, 
and they have delineated its sentimentalized and pacified concepts of gender 
difference and its vision of a home-sanctuary illuminated by the hearth and 
protecting its inhabitants from public corruption.3 In his recent study of domes-
tic masculinities, John Tosh explains that within the paradigm of the separate 
spheres romance, the home was a place where “masculine and feminine were 
brought together in a proper relation of complementarity” (7). In this scenario, 
private households self-regulate through the organization of virtues and plea-
sures—Arcangeli’s “home-sanctitudes.” As it evolved into “a privileged site of 
subjectivity and fantasy” (4) and was increasingly “identified with childhood, 
innocence and roots,” Tosh explains, the home, contrasting the corrupt public 
sphere, came to be identified “with authenticity itself” (3).
 Most often, the public-private balancing act of this middle-class idyll consti-
tutes our primary departure point for understanding Victorian domesticity, and 
a sense of the “authenticity,” pervasiveness, and influence of this model almost 
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always orients our studies of nineteenth-century domestic culture. In their exact-
ing study, The Spectacle of Intimacy (2000), for example, Chase and Levenson 
navigate their “discontinuous history” (6) by counterposing privatized idylls and 
publicized spectacles: “broad norms and conspicuous exceptions” (12), “love 
and trouble” (12), “pursuit[s] of home peace” and “flights from disaster” (16). 
Demonstrating that “the norm needed and cultivated the disturbance” (12), the 
“home peace” version of domesticity centers their arguments. Yet, while this 
idyll—and its grim antithesis—was indisputably central to nineteenth-century 
cultural representation, another version of marriage and homelife also preoccu-
pied Victorians, one that became crucial to negotiating marital breakdown and 
domestic violence in the courts and in the press.
 This second model, codified in marriage and family law, rather explicitly 
denied the home its claims to authenticity and privacy and exposed these appar-
ent privileges as mere romantic fictions that belied the fundamentally pragmatic 
and public functions of marriage. Marriage law mandated the systematic inter-
ference in intimate life, and, thus, virtuous and pleasant self-regulation suc-
cumbed to the coercive yokes and obstructive forces of public interests and legal 
contracts. As this disciplinary model prioritized state interests but privileged 
husbandly authority, coercion displaced cooperation and complementarity. 
Viewed through the lens of law, then, marriage—neither private nor authen-
tic—was quite simply a repeat and command performance at the behest of the 
state.
 The contest between sentimental reverence and state paternalism became 
most strikingly apparent during the mid-century renegotiation of marriage 
laws. In 1857 England’s revised matrimonial and divorce laws reiterated this per-
formative and disciplinary model of family life in several important ways. With 
the establishment of England’s first divorce court, these laws ensured the dis-
semination of that model in public trials and newspaper reports when the court 
refused time and again to grant separations or divorces to petitioning spouses. 
The revised laws also enforced what we might call an adversarial model of spou-
sal relations, which gained ideological force as the structures of both criminal 
law and family law, undergoing significant revisions in the second half of the 
nineteenth century, increasingly intersected uncomfortably (and publicly) in 
the home. Such interventions further challenged the collective fantasy of domes-
tic autonomy by underscoring the fragility of domestic peace, emphasizing the 
persistence of bad behavior, and regulating formerly private transgressions. 
While the “home-joys” idyll normalized, and made appealing, a paternalistic 
and cooperative model of private life, the adversarial model insinuated a more 
inhospitable and combative model of domestic relations—one that was always 
subordinate to the power and the interests of the state.
 The debates leading up to and the passage of the Divorce and Matrimonial 
Causes Act of 1857 highlighted the difficulties of revering marriage, facilitat-
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ing divorce, and upholding state interests through the classed and gendered 
mechanisms of marriage law. To liberalize and economize divorce procedures 
was to invite uncertain social consequences. Well before the passage of the act, 
these legal and ideological quandaries informed the first report generated by 
the Royal Commissioners on Divorce, who in 1850 were appointed by Queen 
Victoria to study divorce, specifically divorce à vinculo matrimonii (from the 
bonds of marriage). In 1853 the commissioners articulated the conflicting issues 
at stake in the process of divorce reform. Marriage, they explain, was “strictly 
speaking” indissoluble by law, and, therefore, divorce required an expensive and 
laborious act of parliament “to provide one specially by passing a particular law 
in favour of those who can make out a case which will warrant its interference” 
(First Report 3). Quoting from William Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws 
of England, the authors acknowledge unsettling tensions between reverence and 
regulation, contractual obligation and lawful renunciation:
[T]he common law of England, which follows in this case the canon law of the 
Church, ‘deems so highly, and with such mysterious reverence, of the nuptial 
tie,’ that the causes of Divorce are purposely limited to a few extreme and 
specific provocations; and the preservation of that union, so long as it can be 
secured, is so manifestly essential to the best interests of society, that before it 
can be dissolved it must clearly be established by the strictest proof that the 
offence has been committed; that there is no contrivance by which the parties 
are endeavouring to escape from their solemn obligations to themselves and 
their children; that they cannot discharge their mutual duties by continuing 
any longer to cohabit with each other, and that the party complaining is free 
from guilt. (First Report 1)
In proper service to the “nuptial tie,” the report goes on to explain, England’s 
ecclesiastical courts aptly established stringent divorce requirements: “Divorce 
will only be granted for the extreme provocations adverted to above; secondly, 
that the law will not suffer it to be obtained on the sole confession of the parties 
themselves; and thirdly, that it will be refused, even though an offense has been 
committed which would otherwise justify it, if collusion, connivance, condo-
nation, or recrimination can be pleaded and proved” (1). While by the mid-
nineteenth century these rules based on “soundest wisdom” require “some little 
modification,” the commissioners assert, “we conceive that in substance they 
ought to be maintained” (1). As the details of the report’s historical review and 
subsequent recommendations make clear, in order to maintain the substance of 
“mysterious reverence” and disciplinary authority, the law must skillfully and 
prudently adjudicate guilt and innocence, contrivance and evidence, provoca-
tion and protection, duty and default.
 The commissioners also established a more secular foundation for uphold-
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ing deference to the nuptial yoke so that the conservative approach outlined in 
the report is further justified by citations from one of England’s highly regarded 
ecclesiastical court judges, Lord Stowell, who in a 1790 ruling summarized the 
collective interests of marriage, the disciplinary power of indissolubility, and the 
unlikely roots of marital happiness:
For though, in particular cases, the repugnance of the law to dissolve the 
obligations of matrimonial cohabitation may operate with great severity upon 
individuals; yet, it must be carefully remembered, that the general happiness 
of married life is secured by its indissolubility. When people understand that 
they must live together, except for a very few reasons known to law, they learn 
to soften by mutual accommodation that yoke which they know they cannot 
shake off; they become good husbands and good wives, from the necessity of 
remaining husbands and wives; for necessity is a powerful master in teaching 
the duties which it imposes. If it were once understood, that upon mutual 
disgust married persons might legally be separated, many couples, who now 
pass through the world with mutual comfort, with attention to their common 
offspring, and to the moral order of civil society, might at this moment have 
been living in a state of mutual unkindness, in a state of estrangement from 
their common offspring, and in a state of most licentious and unreserved 
immorality. In this case, as in many others, the happiness of some individuals 
must be sacrificed to the greater and more general good. (13)
Yet, while Stowell and the commissioners express confidence in the softening 
effects of “mutual accommodation” and dismiss the inevitable “severity upon 
individuals” as sacrifices for the “greater and more general good,” the case for 
legal indissolubility necessarily falters in cases of adultery, which constitutes jus-
tifiable grounds “so consonant to reason and religion” (3) for divorce. As Barbara 
Leckie has argued, in such a context, adultery emerges as a “uniquely domestic 
crime” (62). The primary affront to the sanctity of marriage, an “extreme and 
specific” provocation, adultery forms the central issue in the reconsideration 
of divorce law, in the establishment of the divorce court, and in the increased 
availability of divorces à vinculo matrimonii. The various features of the report’s 
arguments—the investment in disciplinary yokes, the punishment of adulterous 
transgressors, the suspicion of colluding partners—contribute to an adversarial 
model of domestic unhappiness, which, foregrounding matters of sexual disci-
pline, informs the divorce court’s proceedings and its scandalous publicity.
 As Parliament sought to enact appropriate legislation, its members weighed 
the advantages and disadvantages of modernizing divorce law, and they con-
tinued to address the problems alluded to in the commissioners’ report. They 
considered ways to ensure that divorcing couples would not be rewarded by 
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the state and that a freshly liberalized divorce law would not threaten the social 
order. As both legal and ideological controls were considered, conventional 
models of spousal relations, including sexual double standards and separate 
spheres ideologies, set the priorities of legislators and organized the details of 
marital breakdown. After significant debate over the problem of equal grounds 
and equal access for husbands and wives, parliamentarians crafted a restrictive 
divorce act that privileged husbands’ interests and that created only a single, 
centralized civil divorce court in London. By restricting access, they sought to 
maintain male and class privilege, and they hoped to deter petitioners, reduce 
divorces, and enforce marriages. As Gail Savage explains, these restrictive mea-
sures “served both to limit and disguise the real demand for divorce” in Victorian 
England (“Intended” 36).
 In the end, the 1857 Divorce and Matrimonial Causes Act, the “cautious out-
come of a long public brooding” (Chase and Levenson 191), established separate 
and unequal grounds for male and female divorce petitioners. Demonstration of 
a wife’s adultery constituted sufficient legal ground for husbands to seek the dis-
solution of a marriage, but because only aggravated adultery legitimated a wife’s 
claim, the burden of proof increased for petitioning wives, who were required 
to demonstrate adultery and additional offenses, such as cruelty, desertion, sod-
omy, incest, or bigamy.4 This discrepancy, of course, upheld conventional male 
sexual freedoms and enforced female sexual constraints, and it privileged male 
prerogatives in sexual, property, and custodial matters. Petitioners who could 
not demonstrate adultery or aggravated adultery to the court’s satisfaction were 
condemned to remain married or restricted to judicial separations—divorce à 
mensa et thoro (from bed and board)—which failed to nullify the legal bond of 
marriage and disallowed remarriage.
 The gender inequalities written into the act further underscored, and indeed 
emerged from, an allegiance to an adversarial model of spousal relations. Docu-
menting a discussion in the House of Lords in 1857, in which members consid-
ered the social risks of equalizing the grounds for divorce, Savage explains that 
their language “evoke[d] a vision of sexual relations fraught with conflict, each 
side giving as good as the other”:
Men asserted a natural superiority but not a moral one. The weakness of 
husbands, who might commit ‘occasional and fugitive’ acts of adultery with 
domestic servants or even collude to commit adultery so that wives could 
sue for divorce if the law made that possible, did not invalidate masculine 
authority over the family. The argument mounted by the defenders of unequal 
grounds portrayed women as active and dangerous combatants, ready and 
willing to commit adultery themselves or to revenge themselves upon adulter-
ous husbands. (“Intended” 15)
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With two opposing views of femininity—one which sees women as patient, long-
suffering marriage preservers and one which sees them as potentially uncon-
trollable, vengeful, divorce-seeking producers of “spurious offspring” (Savage 
18)—parliamentarians ultimately placed their faith in the socially stabilizing 
features of gender inequality. “In so doing,” Savage observes, “they framed leg-
islation which in turn provided an institutional apparatus that constrained and 
directed the ways in which private conflicts between husbands and wives could 
be publicly recognized, acted out, and resolved” (18). In this model of domes-
ticity, the state penetrates the private sphere by establishing a husbandly proxy, 
and, through the mechanisms of sexual inequality, the state leverages the privi-
leges of one spouse against the subjugation of the other. “Household law,” then, 
founded upon readings of sexual transgression, affirms the preferences of the 
state and privileges the status of the husband while demanding a melodramatic 
legal script with a perpetrator and a victim. As such anxieties about private 
conflicts and public interests conspire to necessitate an adversarial model, that 
combative trope, in turn, provides a convenient basis for rationalizing sexual 
inequality and legal restrictions.
 As this combative notion of marriage circulated within the discourse of 
divorce reform, domesticity accumulated criminal associations. Not surpris-
ingly, given the recurrent themes of marital yokes and spousal conflicts, the 
newly established divorce court, requiring a practical schema for deciphering 
broken marriages, adopted an adversarial model similar to that operating in the 
criminal courts. Divorce cases, staged in the court and in the press like crimi-
nal cases in which an innocent party confronted a guilty party, demanded the 
conventional roles of perpetrator and victim. Tried by oral evidence, divorce 
cases required and recorded the testimony of opposing parties, and, thus, Vic-
torians witnessed the voices of husbands and wives publicly cataloging intimate 
conflicts and abuses as well as the trivialities and minutiae of domestic life. As 
the testimony of witnesses, including that of household servants and observant 
neighbors, was introduced into evidence, the domestic imperatives of privacy, 
loyalty, and discretion eroded, and the dissolution of privacy aided the disciplin-
ary functions envisioned by the state.
 As Martin Wiener argues in Reconstructing the Criminal, when husbands 
and wives brought each other to court and charged one another with adulterous 
transgressions, divorce proceedings mimicked their criminal counterparts both 
in terms of format and procedure and in terms of punishment and deterrence: 
“[t]hough a civil institution, the divorce court was (like bankruptcy court) in 
tone not unlike a criminal court, punishing the guilty party not through impris-
onment but through public denunciation” (73). Moreover, divorce courts, like 
criminal courts, had “the secondary aim of deterring, through its stigma, others 
from falling into guilt” and of “educating the public, through its proceedings 
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and decisions published in the newspapers, in the rules of respectable conjugal 
behavior” (73). Courts of law and courts of public opinion focused on culpabil-
ity, and, “if a marriage failed, someone was responsible and that person must be 
called to the bar of justice” (73). This paradigm secured a doctrine of marital 
discipline and a deference to—if not a reverence for—nuptial yokes. Within 
the adversarial framework, at least, marital failures appear to emanate from the 
actions of particular, identifiable, and legally accountable transgressing indi-
viduals, not from more systematic or diffuse institutional pressures, constraints, 
and inequalities.
 As the divorce court and an observant public scrutinized married and fam-
ily life in ways that paralleled and sometimes initiated criminal trials and legal 
procedures, an authentic and private idea of homelife was clearly imperiled, and, 
while the unhappiness of one spouse was legally sanctioned, the unhappiness 
of both spouses was explicitly denounced. Acknowledging that marital unhap-
piness was a tricky affair, the commissioners explained in their report that acts 
of “recrimination, connivance, and condonation” (the divorce court term for 
forgiving—or appearing to forgive—an adulterous offense) must be “deemed 
and treated as bars to the suit” (22), for they significantly undermined, even 
mocked, the social foundations and disciplinary functions of marriage. Flouting 
the binary logic of the adversarial model, mutual unhappiness, mutual disgust, 
mutual adultery, mutual guilt, or mutual victimization threatened the semiotics 
of guilt and innocence and, in the process, hinted at the possibility of broader 
institutional failures or social dysfunction. Therefore, the law forbade collusion, 
in which, for example, a husband “would ‘accept’ a charge of adultery in order 
to escape a marriage” or in which spouses “would suppress evidence of mutual 
guilt” (Horstman 101). Similarly, even specious evidence of condonation could 
erase the legal significance of otherwise culpable behaviors.
 The potential judicial and social menace of colluding spouses also inspired a 
range of deterrent procedural measures. In the parliamentary debates preceding 
the 1857 Divorce Act, a fear that rampant collusion would lead to high divorce 
rates and social chaos was cited as a reason for restricting access to a central 
court in London (Savage, “Intended” 13). At the beginning of the reform pro-
cess, the commissioners suggested that the court be given “large discretion” in 
“adjusting the rights” (First Report 22) of husbands and wives with respect to 
property and children. In procedural matters, their report recommended that a 
judge be charged with “examining the parties” and “ordering any witnesses” (22) 
and that oral testimonies, rather than the written testimonies used by the eccle-
siastical courts, be used in order to prevent collusion. It also proposed the use 
of written depositions and signed narrative records to secure the accuracy and 
authenticity of divorce proceedings. A structural resistance to collusion might 
also be improved, the commissioners suggested, by endowing the judge with the 
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right to call witnesses and by submitting controvertible facts to the collective 
common sense of a jury (22). By 1860, spousal collusion was thought to be so 
common that an amendment to the Divorce Act granted discretionary powers to 
the Attorney General, who, acting through an agent, the Queen’s Proctor, could 
charge suspected petitioning spouses with collusion. Charged, like criminals, 
with collusion, petitioners’ cases were suspended until they could adequately 
disprove the charges; likewise, if guilty, petitioning couples were subject to puni-
tive fines.5
 In addition to tainting the domestic idyll with such disciplinary interven-
tions, Chase and Levenson contend, divorce reform also signified, for some 
opponents of reform, the “long-dreaded fall into degraded modernity” (188). 
Acknowledging this blighted descent, Lord Redesdale penned an urgent critique 
of the commissioners’ initial proposal of “common legal remedy” in marriage 
matters. Embedded in his lament is a disdain for democratization and decen-
tralization:
These divorces will thus be opened to another and numerous class, but a 
still more numerous class will be equally excluded as at present. Once create 
an appetite for such license by the proposed change, and the demand to be 
permitted to satisfy it will become irresistible. The cry for cheap law has of 
late been universally attended to, and the result will too probably be that these 
delicate and important questions will be brought before inferior tribunals, 
where the number of the judges (each acting separately) will render anything 
like uniformity of decision upon the circumstances which are to rule in refus-
ing applications, impossible, and must ultimately lead to extreme facility in 
obtaining such Divorces. (“Lord Redesdale’s Opinion” 26)
Subjected to “cheap law” and “inferior tribunals,” the marital yoke loses its force, 
and divorce becomes “irresistible.” Such anxieties about compromised authority 
and legal remedy, of course, reveal the many classed and gendered investments 
in the marital yoke.
 While Redesdale and his counterparts wrestled with the implications of this 
“license” to divorce, another significant mid-century intervention in domes-
tic relationships, the 1853 Act for the Better Prevention and Punishment of 
Aggravated Assaults upon Women and Children, forced Victorians to grapple 
with what Mill and Taylor labeled the “license to kill.” Simultaneously chal-
lenging domestic pieties and increasing state intervention in the home, this 
act, the first decisive criminalization of domestic abuse, allowed magistrates to 
inflict six-month sentences for aggravated assaults. The discussion and passage 
of the bill inspired public reflections on the appropriate punitive measures for 
these new-found offenders, and an amendment to the bill, which was eventually 
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defeated, even introduced the possibility of corporal punishment for offending 
husbands (127).6 This act also contributed to adversarial and criminal inflec-
tions of domesticity. Although the language and intent of the act challenged 
conventional notions of patriarchal authority and household law, wives’ con-
tinued reluctance to testify against husbands and their economic dependence 
on husbands diminished its application and enforcement. Twenty-five years 
later, the Matrimonial Causes Act of 1878 provided maintenance and separation 
allowances for abused wives and thereby acknowledged the necessity of legal and 
financial protection for victims of assault. Notably, in both instances, the state 
preferred to grant legal protections rather than legal personhood to wives. The 
application of the criminal code to sort out domestic tyranny and economic 
inequality only deepened the associations between criminality and domesticity. 
Extending “the criminalization of harmful behavior” into the hitherto private 
domestic sphere (Wiener, Reconstructing 82), they reconfigured ideas about the 
commission of crime within Victorian homes.
 As these various examples of procedural and legal changes indicate, over and 
over again, the politics of domesticity required that the public sphere subject the 
private sphere to the rigors of adversarial law. While Victorian citizens negoti-
ated a concept of marriage that contradictorily celebrated and sanctified mar-
riage, enforced resigned capitulation to the nuptial yoke, and privileged a model 
of domestic combat (whether in cases of abuse or divorce—or both), the law 
always preferred acquiescence to the marital yoke. In Cruelty and Companion-
ship (1992), A. James Hammerton documents the law’s continued privileging of 
institutional integrity over individual safety or autonomy, and he documents the 
paternalistic (and pragmatic) investments in marital preservation following the 
1878 Matrimonial Causes Act:
[L]ocal magistrates’ courts increasingly took on a more paternalistic role, 
eager to intervene in an attempt to make the wife forgive, the husband reform 
and the family reunite, and thus avoid the fragile division of slender economic 
resources. Magistrates, together with a growing army of police court mis-
sionaries, probation officers and clerks of the court came to see themselves as 
marriage menders. (39)
In a more direct disciplinary mode, Judge Cresswell Cresswell, the Judge-Ordi-
nary of the divorce court, repeatedly explained to petitioners, witnesses, and 
juries that a willingness to separate simply did not constitute an entitlement 
to separate because, as he summed up in one case, “the adjudication of quar-
rels between man and wife was of great social importance, and involved conse-
quences much more enduring than were involved in the pecuniary questions 
generally submitted to juries” (Times, 18 February 1859, 9). Furthermore, the 
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law required that only one party could be deserving of a divorce—the clearly 
wronged, victimized party. Similar advisories appeared in more informal and 
unofficial newspaper commentaries. The Times, reporting on the first jury trial 
in the newly established civil court and dutifully covering the entire “mass of 
circumstances” involved in the case, editorialized on the implications of granting 
a separation and adjudicating squabbles:
They had made a bad bargain and they must abide by it. If man and wife knew 
that by getting into squabbles and making themselves unhappy they might 
obtain a judicial separation, that knowledge might be an encouragement to 
them not to attempt to curb their tempers; whereas, if they knew that if they 
did not curb their tempers they must continue to be miserable, they might set 
about it and become a decent couple. (1 December 1858, 11)
Located far below the elevated heights of the domestic romance, this pragmatic 
corollary necessitates abiding by a “bad bargain” and espouses a strikingly mod-
est proposal. Recommending a double-edged course of civility and mediocrity, 
the inflexible law advises its unhappy subjects to “become a decent couple.”
 Advocating a reformist, feminist agenda, Francis Power Cobbe in “A Lesson 
in Matrimony,” which appeared in The Echo in 1869, documents divorce cases 
not to “lament divorce itself,” as Susan Hamilton argues, but to argue that “our 
marriages turn out so badly because they are not well made” (234); surveying 
the public record of marriages and divorces, Cobbe concludes, “there is some-
thing radically wrong with our present matrimonial system” (qtd. in Hamil-
ton 232). Of course, feminist critique was not the dominant Victorian mode of 
analysis, but the juxtaposition of these differing critical responses reminds us 
that as domestic ideology and marriage law situated themselves awkwardly with 
respect to one another, the prerogatives of state control became more glaringly 
apparent. As a result, the domestic idyll was not always the predominant cul-
tural shorthand for articulating family relations in Victorian England. While the 
separate spheres model and the companionate model imagined spouses enjoy-
ing and sharing their respective gender-appropriate domestic comforts, which 
sanctify their union and fortify the social order, the law—and it various propo-
nents—insisted upon a bleaker picture of control, capitulation, and coercion. 
The default model of marital relations, it would seem, imagined disciplinary 
and adversarial scenes of domesticity with occupants perpetually tensed by the 
pressures of rectitude and restraint.
 And with this bleaker picture, the newspaper press—from the Times to the 
Divorce News and Police Reporter—found a thoroughly marketable commodity. 
As divorce proceedings were transferred from the legislature to the newly estab-
lished Divorce and Matrimonial Causes Court in London, the press capitalized 
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on the publicization of the private sphere. Transformed by a more sensational 
agenda, Stowell’s softening yoke became a “galling yoke” (Times, 12 March 1859, 
9) under which unhappy spouses might be heard “groaning” (15 July 1859, 5). 
Newspapers documented the divorce court’s practices, proceedings, and case-
loads, thereby contributing to and profiting from what Chase and Levenson 
have called the “political theater of private life” (14). “Scandal was a perpetual 
resource,” they argue, because “the Victorian investment in family life unfolds 
in the awareness that at any moment it can turn into the antifamily of popular 
sensation” (7). In the popular imagination, they explain, “the naming of private 
histories became one of the avocations of the age,” and generates “the spectacle 
of intimacy” (12).
 As a glance through the thorough divorce court reportage in the Times 
reveals, this spectacular intimacy included catalogues of pecuniary embarrass-
ments, drinking habits, sexual infidelities, ill-treatment, verbal taunts, physical 
assaults, and obscene language (often indicated with blank spaces and dashes).7 
In trial transcripts, however, readers also glimpsed (legally irrelevant) testimony 
on the minute tensions, myriad belittlements, and daily squabbles of married 
life. Petitioners quarreled about such things as a Newfoundland dog endanger-
ing the furniture (Times, 1 December 1858, 11) or the inequalities of butter 
distribution: “he complained that she eat fresh butter herself, and only allowed 
to him salt butter” (25 November 1858, 8). Documenting the cumulative slights 
of her domestic life, Mrs. Emily Cherry, a widow who married a man with eleven 
children, complained of “having no room made for her in the family circle near 
the lamp of an evening” and of having didactic portions of the thirteenth chap-
ter of the first of Corinthians “pointedly read at her” (16 December 1858, 8). Yet, 
even more striking than the courtroom litanies of the immense cruelties and 
intense banalities of domestic life, is the court’s repeated insistence, time and 
time again, that long-term exposure to chronic bad behavior fails to merit legal 
separation or divorce.8
 In examining the opportunistic and innovative methods for representing the 
tumult of mid-century family law and family life, recent textual scholarship has 
favored journalistic scandal, political melodrama, and sensational fiction.9 With 
notable exceptions, these genres upheld clear boundaries between innocence 
and guilt, boundaries which accommodated polemicist tactics, such as those 
used by Caroline Norton, and facilitated novel plots such as those popularized 
by Elizabeth Braddon and Wilkie Collins.10 Yet, such binaries, as we have seen, 
were also mandated by predominant legal fictions, and the law’s sensationalizing 
bent, as Anne Humpherys explains, contributed significantly to textual repre-
sentations of marital breakdown:
[B]ecause the only ground for divorce was adultery, and for women adultery 
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aggravated by cruelty or worse, the details in the press reports were by neces-
sity sensational and scandalous. Indeed, while novels that dealt with sexual 
infidelity and marital brutality were denounced as shocking and indecent 
and circulating libraries refused to handle them, the reports of divorce court 
proceedings were uncensored and available to every person who could read. 
(“Coming Apart” 224–25)
While divorce court coverage inspired “the first governmental restriction of 
newspaper reporting of judicial proceedings” (220), the allure of such uncen-
sored representations, as Savage contends, created the “aura of scandal attaching 
to divorce, which made the subject endlessly fascinating to newspaper read-
ers” but “in fact misrepresented the mundane reality of marital breakdown in 
Victorian society” (“Intended” 19). The primacy of adultery in divorce cases, 
Leckie explains, inspired a journalistic “epistemology of adultery” that “wr[ote] 
adultery as a domestic detective story” in which “the goal for the judge, jury, and 
reader alike is to read the signs by which adultery betrays itself, to determine the 
truth of this uniquely domestic crime” (62).11 Divorce reports, “part record, part 
entertainment” (Humpherys, “Coming Apart” 221), and their “distortions and 
misrepresentation of the social realities of marital conflict,” ultimately deterred 
petitioners and thereby “functioned to mitigate the potential threat that divorce 
posed to the gender and social orders” (Savage, “Intended”  37). Domestic scan-
dal, as Hammerton argues, privileged “the darker side of conjugal life,” and it 
inspired condemnations of “behaviour, from both sexes and in all social classes, 
which was inconsistent with the middle-class domestic idyll and with heightened 
emotional expectations of marriage” (2). Falling short of the domestic romance 
central to Hammerton’s study of marital conflict, however, the “darker side” 
and the scandal-seeking public gaze increased scrutiny of domestic violence. 
In doing so, they also corroborated the ominous adversarial notions inscribed 
in the legal model, and, thus, as “a locus of conflict” (14) or a site of crime, the 
home even threatened to reclaim some authenticity—albeit in a profoundly 
sinister way.
 In charting divorce’s contributions to “the spectacle of intimacy,” Chase and 
Levenson argue that, although the divorce act was “far from radical in its legal 
and material consequences” (185), the “specter of divorce” (185) haunted Victo-
rians because it placed divorce “intractably within the repertoire of possibilities” 
(186). Furthermore, they note, “because the difficult political struggle had made 
family breakdown so conspicuous in the cultural reverie—in Parliament, in the 
press, in prose fiction—no legal act could relieve the turbulent fantasy” (186). 
In tracing the representational influences of the divorce court, studies in the 
novel have been particularly interested in the ways in which historical cases of 
and debates about marital violence are filtered through the generic formats and 
influenced by the aesthetic affiliations of narrative fiction. In The Private Rod, 
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Marlene Tromp explores how the marginal status of the sensation novel allowed 
it to generate radical challenges to both high literary forms and conservative 
legal traditions. In Bleak Houses, Lisa Surridge, juxtaposing newspaper stories 
and novel plots and highlighting “moments in which generic, legal, and social 
discourses were particularly and visibly unstable” (7), examines how realist fic-
tion developed the theme of domestic violence and explored the cultural func-
tions of the “public scrutiny of private conduct” (10) not to reject marriage but 
to challenge male violence and regulate marital conduct.
 Reading poetry, with a similar attention to the dialectal relationships 
between genre and discourse as well as their counterdiscursive frictions, this 
chapter proposes a different reading of the moral panics and textual mediations 
surrounding the publicity of marriage and divorce. This reading highlights the 
ways in which the inaccessibility and unavailability of divorce was equally unset-
tling, and, along these lines, the poems under discussion here—also purveyors 
of “cultural reverie”—can be said to invert the “turbulent fantasy.” Rather than 
defending an institution and critiquing conduct, these texts indict marriage. 
Playing with the contentious politics of martial yokes and domestic discipline, 
they conjure a combative and criminalized vision of spousal relations and pres-
ent the home as a source of murderous motive and a site of violent opportunity. 
Extending the theme of misbehavior to the theme of murder, Browning, Lytton, 
and Levy interrogate the adversarial model of spousal relations and implicate 
its destructive absurdities. Accordingly, with the domestication of murder, they 
challenge the horrors of divorce by imagining more brutal and lethal alterna-
tives.
 In the context of marriage, murder has specific political meanings. Riveting 
instances of murder, unlike lesser forms of domestic violence or more salacious 
forms of transgression, check what Francis Power Cobbe, writing on “wife-tor-
ture” in 1878, criticized as “a certain halo of jocosity which inclines people to 
smile whenever they hear of a case of [an assault on a wife by her husband] (ter-
minating anywhere short of actual murder)” (133). Murder also exaggerates—
often to the point of absurdity—the contractual demands of the law when, for 
example, it very succinctly confronts the problem of contractual extrication and 
marital dissolution and challenges the fictions of marital unity and female cov-
erture. Examining divorce novels, Humpherys has argued that divorce reform 
broke the stranglehold of the marriage plot in the Victorian novel and developed 
narrative analyses of the difficulties of extrication. The most commonly used 
“Caroline Norton plot,” she argues, focuses on the long-suffering wife in which 
“a brutal and/or egregiously adulterous husband is repeatedly excused, forgiven, 
and often nursed by the heroic wife until finally he or she dies”; less often, the 
oppressed flees, and even less often, the husband reforms (“Breaking Apart” 44). 
Meanwhile, in the “Jane Eyre plot,” a husband is “tricked into a bad marriage 
or his wife turns bad quickly, and then he falls in love with a good woman who 
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should be his wife” (44). Both tropes present problems of how “to extricate the 
heroine or hero from the mistaken marriage” and “whether to allow her or him 
to make a second more fulfilling one” (44), and these novels often demonstrate 
an “intent to expose legal injustice” and the “denial of any remedy” (46). In the 
poems under discussion here, murder, with great ironic and traumatic force, 
offers the longed-for “remedy.”
 In writing marriage plots as murder plots, Browning, Lytton, and Levy, 
despite significant textual and historical differences, demonstrate striking 
consistency in their characterization of the home’s murderous orientation as 
overdetermined. Husbands and wives, thwarted by the intrinsic features of the 
marriage contract or the disciplinary functions of patriarchal authority, resort 
to murder because the strictures of domestic arrangements preclude less drastic 
solutions to marital conflict. Accordingly, readers witness the civilizing edifice 
of a disciplined domestic economy collapse under the weight of murderous 
violence. This collapse exposes the folly of domestic pieties, the structure of 
gender oppression, and the absence of adequate legal remedy, and because these 
murderers offer rationally, legally, and politically informed reasons for their 
actions, their crimes serve a variety of specific critical purposes. The synthesis 
of murderous action, domestic locale, and dramatic voice allows these poets 
to present a somewhat unusual vision of homicidal criminality: decisive, mur-
derous action arises from the paradoxical convergence of frustrated agency, 
overdetermined subjectivity, and domestic confinement. The remainder of this 
chapter explores the specific textual and contextual details of such criminal 
representations.
Divorce Rights and Wife-Murder 
in Robert Browning’s The Ring and the Book
In the often-quoted final line of The Ring and the Book, Browning proclaims 
the poetic value of “Linking our England to his [Lyric Love’s] Italy!” (XII.870) 
and thus concludes the Roman murder case with a firm nod to Victorian times. 
Notably, this announcement occurs just after the poet-narrator claims, “Art may 
tell a truth / Obliquely” (XII.855–56), and Browning’s not-so-oblique linking 
of a Roman murder trial and “our” Victorian England accesses the disarray of 
Victorian domestic politics. As Browning places “this old woe . . . on the stage 
again” to “[a]ct itself o’er anew for men to judge” (I.824–25), he explicitly and 
emphatically commands his audience, “Examine it yourselves!” (I.38). Addressed 
to “the British Public,” who, by 1868, over ten years after the establishment of 
the divorce court, constituted an audience learned in the political rhetoric of 
public scandal and marital breakdown, the poem’s first book apprises readers 
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of the legal questions defining this case of marriage and murder. Though often 
described as a murder poem, as Simon Petch has noted, “[m]arriage, as the locus 
of the competing demands of nature, trust, and contract, is the most charged 
legal site in Browning’s poem” (“Equity and Natural Law” 110), and for this 
reason, marriage also focalizes the poem’s questions about institutional force 
and violent agency.12
 An interpretation of the doomed marriage quite simply determines the mur-
ders’ status as criminal or non-criminal while their domestic locale, as Arcan-
geli reminds us, aggravates—or perhaps mitigates—their meaning. The “Roman 
murder-case” (I.121), as the notebook records, focused on the determination of 
criminal responsibility through a central question: “‘Wherein it is disputed if, 
and, when, / Husbands may kill adulterous wives, yet ’scape / The customary for-
feit’” (I.130–31). Starkly emphasizing the criteria of license and right, Browning 
asks readers to consider whether adultery or murder more forcefully affronts the 
marriage bond. Two interpretations of the killings—affront or necessity—yield 
two possible verdicts: “murder, or else / Legitimate punishment of the other 
crime [adultery], / Accounted murder by mistake” (I.133–35).
 In analyzing Browning’s epic crime poem, literary scholars have often focused 
on the noisy polyphony that follows this introduction. As the poem’s eleven 
speakers, “voices we call evidence” (I.833), select and highlight divergent details 
of the marriage in order to interpret and reinterpret the murders, they secure the 
deconstruction of truth itself. The poem’s stake in domestic politics, however, is 
most strikingly revealed in unexpected but recognizable symmetries between the 
monologues of Guido and Pompilia. As the monologues of husband and wife—
killer and victim—rebut and corroborate one another, Browning problematizes 
the conventions of adversarial discourse so integral to marriage reforms, divorce 
petitions, and scandalous spectacles.
 In doing so, Browning selects an outrageously unsympathetic figure, Guido, 
who easily courts characterization as a monstrous aberration, obsessed with 
power, pathetic in his aristocratic ravings, and representative of old Roman cor-
ruption. He then uses him to embed a much more topically resonant, and per-
haps unexpected, critique of marriage. In their respective testimony and debate, 
statements and accusations, rebuttals and refutations, Guido and Pompilia 
reconstruct the traumatic dynamic of their marriage and homelife. As Melissa 
Valiska Gregory has argued, Browning “persistently portrays the dynamics of 
the home as deeply painful for both men and women, and focuses especially 
on the various forms of masculine violence occurring in the struggle for sexual 
dominance between husbands and wives” (494). In The Ring and the Book, when 
both Guido’s and Pompilia’s accounts of marriage and murder coalesce on cru-
cial points of causality and consequence, they reveal the roots of such struggle 
in the violent permissions of household law and the oppressive strictures of 
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domestic ideology. The yoke of marriage, rather than inspiring “mutual accom-
modation,” cruelly forces violent resistance. Regardless of how skewed, unreli-
able, or ambiguous the facts of this murder case, the only two speakers with 
firsthand knowledge of the marriage and the murders cite the domestic roots 
of their destruction and trace their actions, transgressions, and victimization to 
marriage’s “galling yoke.”
 Attentive to the advantages of explaining, not denying, Guido’s first mono-
logue elaborates a patriarchal structure of marriage. Fortifying his claims with 
an impenetrably circular logic, Guido’s case relies heavily upon the reiteration of 
legal tautologies: “the law’s the law: / With a wife I look to find all wifeliness, / As 
when I buy, timber and twig, a tree— / I buy the song ’o the nightingale inside” 
(V.603–6). And the law, he maintains, obliges his mastery: “The obligation I 
incurred was just / To practice mastery, prove my mastership:— / Pompilia’s 
duty was—submit herself” (V.716–18). Jettisoning the embellishments of the 
“dusty crumblings of romance” (V.696), he discourses unapologetically on the 
economy of marriage. “We talk of just a marriage,” he argues, “The every-day 
conditions and no more; / Where do these bind me to bestow one drop / Of 
blood shall dye my wife’s true-love-knot pink?” (V.697–700). When Guido poses 
the rhetorical question, “Purchase and sale being thus so plain a point, / . . . . 
From the bride’s soul what is it you expect?” (V.574–77), he responds by express-
ing marriage as a contract in which a husband’s will subsumes all: “Why, loyalty 
and obedience” (V.578).
 To temper, yet support, these claims, Guido disingenuously qualifies his dog-
matic approach to husbanding by noting that symbolic dictates forced him to 
choose his particular domestic “path.” He recalls that as “eldest son and heir and 
prop o’ the house” (V.212), he was commanded to marry and forced to domes-
ticate himself. Occupying a somewhat feminized state, he is told, “Here’s your 
post, / By the hearth and altar” (V.213–14). When he returns from Rome to be 
“content at home” (V.366), Guido is led by Paulo, his priest-brother, to marry 
Pompilia. His marriage, therefore, complies with a triply mandated familial, 
class, and religious decree. Even after his condemnation, he presents himself 
as a hapless victim of an erring domestic ideology, noting, “I am one huge and 
sheer mistake,—whose fault? / Not mine at least, who did not make myself” 
(XI.938–39). In this sense, then, he identifies himself as an initially reluctant but 
nonetheless zealous enforcer of patriarchal codes. In making these arguments, 
Guido paradoxically invokes a powerlessness to avoid husbandly power in order 
to write a narrative of his domestic oppression. His murderous violence thus 
becomes a righteous attempt to maintain the dignity of a flagging institution.
 Despite logical inconsistencies, or perhaps because of them, Guido man-
ages to implicate a dishonored and fickle Roman society as the accomplice to 
his violent tyranny while noting its responsibility for his initial presence at “the 
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hearth and altar.” In this way, he traces his crimes to a restoration of an honor 
lost to state authority as much as to an adulteress wife. He shifts his crime, then, 
from a premeditated murderous frenzy to a loyal enforcement of matrimonial 
law. While clearly drawing upon a defensive legal rhetoric, which, as Arcan-
geli insists, must explain not deny, Guido exposes the ideological structures of 
marital tyranny. Set as they are amongst other corroborating and misogynist 
voices in the poem, which implicate sexual double standards and advocate legal 
latitude, his claims that society formed him—his brutal self—retain some cred-
ibility. Furthermore, when he articulates his violence as a physical embodiment 
of domestic ideology, he is able to question the condemnation of his judges:
Father and mother shall the woman leave,
Cleave to the husband, be it for weal or woe:
There is the law: what sets this law aside
In my particular case? (V.581–84)
Lacking more attractive ideological veneers, Guido’s “purchase and sale” ver-
sion of marriage and his proclamation of guilt seem starkly uncivilized. Yet his 
testimony about previous legal and church support for such uncivilized tactics, 
later confirmed in Pompilia’s testimony, and his bewilderment at its present 
withdrawal, tie his brutality to a history of legal permissions. For this reason, 
Guido, as wife-murderer, claims his superior integrity. Citing his ideologically 
consistent brutality, he can claim to have always been “[m]arching in mere mari-
tal rectitude!” (V.859) while the law has lapsed. Guido can defend “the irregular 
deed” (V.99) because the very irregularities of the law’s application and enforce-
ment, the law’s transgressions, have framed and, in fact, demanded violence.
 For Guido, the failures of legal discipline in marriage matters create domes-
tic breakdowns that can be overcome only through more unambiguous forms 
of control. The court’s refusal to share Guido’s strict interpretations of the law 
lead him to practice murder. His “desecrated hearth” (V.1034) results from 
Pompilia’s alleged affair with Caponsacchi and marks murder as “the natural 
vengeance” (V.1070) against a “thief, poisoner and adulteress” (V.1975). His 
singular folly, Guido argues, was his restraint—his initial failure to give mate-
rial force to the violence of the law—and he frankly surmises that if he had 
severed Pompilia’s finger to instruct her in wifely submission, he would have 
received “reproaches,—but reflections too!” (V.966). Guido’s particular model 
of a Blackstonian application of “moderate correction” appears excessive and 
thus grimly parodies the familiar legal precedent lurking behind the notion.13 
Yet, Guido explains, applications of verbal abuse failed because they simply 
continued to abstract his power in language. That he “[c]alled her a terrible 
nickname, and the like” (V.984), stands as the “gentle course” (V.986) which he 
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now deems “the fool’s” (V.980). Similarly, when, upon their apprehension in 
Castelnuovo, he forgoes the legally justifiable murders of Pompilia and Capon-
sacchi and instead turns the “criminals” over to legal authorities, Guido’s ends 
are frustrated by their nonviolent approach to punishment. To Guido’s dismay, 
for flight and apparent adultery, Pompilia is sent to a convent and Caponsacchi 
to Civita Vecchia.
 Guido’s repeated insistence on the hypocritical restraint of legal authorities 
allows him to indict the judges—and the state— as institutions that establish 
the motives and the conditions for murder. Because they tacitly acknowledge 
“the crime” (V.1228) of adultery but only punish it lightly, he argues, “the cure 
grew worse disease” (V.1947). As Guido’s murderous motive and multifaceted 
defense becomes entangled in the politics of divorce, Browning introduces the 
idea of divorce as a pressure-valve required to prevent more violent ends. The 
ecclesiastical court refuses the divorce that could end the domestic struggle that 
began in a secret marriage and continued through the revelation of Pompilia’s 
illegitimate birth, her overt resistance, her flight with Caponsacchi, her assault 
upon Guido with his sword, and her exile to the convent for adultery. Only at 
this point of refusal does Guido admit defeat: “I am irremediably beaten here” 
(V.1393).
 However repulsive Guido’s actions and explanations, the fact that the mur-
ders occur after the Church rejects his divorce petition underscores Guido’s vio-
lent dissolution of the marriage as a decision that he understands as “the will 
/ To do right” (V.1622–23). The Church’s response to his petition, “‘Annul a 
marriage? ’Tis impossible!’” (V.1813), forms Guido’s defense: “Well, let me have 
the benefit, just so far, / Of the fact announced,—my wife then is my wife, / I 
have allowance for a husband’s right” (V.1816–18). Amidst this muddle of state 
rights and husband rights, it is by the claim to “husband’s right” that Guido 
finally forces legal abstraction to confront its sanctioning of corporeal violence. 
Without divorce rights, in other words, he claims murder rights.
 Guido, of course, asserts Pompilia’s adultery in order to legalize, under sev-
enteenth-century Roman law, his murders as a restoration of his honor. But 
Guido’s accusations also resonate in nineteenth-century England, where adul-
tery informed divorce law and criminal law and thus offered another example 
of their gendered interdependencies. While a wife’s adultery did not legalize 
her murder outright, it permitted a reduction in the charge from murder to 
manslaughter. Providing leniency not available to women who killed adulterous 
husbands, this permission—if not for intentional lethal force at least for extreme 
violent rage—tacitly approved the husband rights so vehemently articulated by 
Guido two hundred years earlier (Doggett 50). As Wiener has documented in 
his recent study of masculinity and criminality, “In the course of the Victorian 
era wife killing appeared to be particularly resistant to the ‘civilizing offensive’” 
affecting masculine identity and male behavior:
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In an increasingly “civilized” society, the home seemed to have become the 
“last retreat” of men’s violence. In recorded homicide a new, more “modern” 
social pattern developed of fewer total cases overall, but with a substantially 
higher proportion of them taking place within the family, or within intimate 
relations, and thus with women rather than men as typical victims. Yet the rise 
in the domestic proportion of homicide prosecutions was not only the result 
of diminution elsewhere; it also reflected the increasing readiness of the law 
to “invade” the home. . . . (Men 146)
These historical details suggestively contextualize Guido’s predicament, for he 
finds himself caught precisely between a long history of consent and a recent 
willingness to monitor, convict, and condemn wife-killing. Such changes inspire 
Guido’s challenge to the ruling of Innocent XII in which Guido sees a newfan-
gled intolerance for wife-murder. He asks, “Why do things change? Wherefore 
is Rome un-Romed?” (XI.265), and replies, “Ah, but times change, there’s quite 
another Pope” (XI.276). As cultural models of respectable masculinity increas-
ingly hinged on exhibitions of personal restraint, Guido exemplifies the limita-
tions of that project.
 With such historical links, Browning confirms that Guido is ideologically 
adrift, and, perhaps for this reason, Guido constructs working-class men as char-
acter witnesses. In fact, he credits the influence of his “own serving-people” 
(V.1551) with his final violent resolve. “Not one of us,” they explain to Guido, 
“[b]ut would have brained the man debauched our wife, / And staked the wife 
whose lust allured the man, / And paunched the Duke, had it been possible, / 
Who ruled the land, yet barred us such revenge!” (V.1557–60). This account 
of the murders conjures stereotypical Victorian attitudes about working-class 
masculinity and criminality, but because Guido’s speech is unreliable and his 
character is unethical, his invocation of working-class support only amplifies his 
aristocratic arrogance while exposing his attempt to further implicate the moti-
vations of his paid accomplices. A less desperate aristocrat might purport to lead 
the people, not admit to eagerly following the murderous advice of “[r]esolute 
youngsters” (V.1562). When Guido scapegoats his servants, he attempts to dis-
place the origins of male violence onto an othered class. At the same time, by 
virtue of his eager participation, he implies the widespread appeal of husbands’ 
violent prerogatives. The male collusion addressed in Guido’s claims—and 
actions—recognizes the presumed marriage rights of husbands and the violent 
desire to preserve honor and control as a masculine, rather than an aristocratic, 
birthright.
 As the monologue progresses, Browning broadens the historical horizon of 
such violent entitlements. While traveling to Rome to commit the crimes, Guido 
attempts to call to mind the ideological origins of the violence he is about to 
inflict—an intertextual approach Arcangeli enacts in his rehearsal of a defense. 
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He searches his mind for “some snatch / Of a legend, relic of religion, stray / 
Fragment of record very strong and old / Of the first conscience, the anterior 
right, / The God’s-gift to mankind, . . . the one law, right is right” (V.1571–78). 
His pastiche of textual documentation and legal precedent lays the foundation 
for his later self-assurance: “I did / God’s bidding and man’s duty, so, breathe 
free” (V.1702–3). As “law’s mere executant” (V.2003) and “defender” (V.2004), 
Guido tells the court that he has “Blackened again, made legible once more / 
Your own decree, not permanently writ, / Rightly conceived but all too faintly 
traced” (V.1997–99). Insofar as his role in the poem is to embody the logic of 
patriarchy in extremis and to trace its violent legal history, he speaks accurately: 
he writes the law of marital and domestic authority clearly, permanently, and 
darkly in the blood of his victims. As Guido alternately abstracts this process in 
the legal language of his defense and renders it concrete through his metaphors 
and his murders, his maneuvering helps to position the critical value of the 
case, for it is the scrutiny of this very process that seems to particularly interest 
Browning.
 Speaking well after his crimes and after his trial, the condemned Guido, “the 
same man, another voice” (I.1285), continues to insist on the inevitable inter-
sections of marriage and murder. He imagines Rome as a community of prop-
ertied and “manly” men who understand, condone, and claim their murderous 
rights:
 . . . All honest Rome approved my part;
Whoever owned wife, sister, daughter,—nay,
Mistress,—had any shadow of any right
That looks like right, and, all the more resolved,
Held it with tooth and nail,—these manly men
Approved! (XI.39–44)
Despite his condemnation and imminent execution, Guido contends that, 
although the Pope condemns spousal murder, everyday men and honorable 
institutions continue to excuse it: “there be nods and winks / Instruct a wise 
man to assist himself / In certain matters nor seek aid at all” (XI.1530–32). Con-
templating his death sentence, he confidently explains, “Frown law its fiercest, 
there’s a wink somewhere” (XI.2001). In fact, Pompilia also describes her futile 
appeal to the Governor in exactly these terms; she arrives at his palace just in 
time to witness Guido and the Governor “[e]xchanging nod and wink for shrug 
and smile” (VII.1279). This lexicon of nods and shrugs—the nod of complicity 
and the shrug of consent—is fundamental to Browning’s depiction of patriar-
chal domesticity, and with reference to it, these two monologues document the 
ominous everyday structure of legal permissions. Demonstrating a link between 
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smiles and shrugs, winks and nods, and marriage and murder, Browning sketches 
an unsettling social portrait, and moments such as this in which murderer and 
victim corroborate one another’s claims, suggest the institutional, rather than 
purely individual, origins of domestic violence.
 Compromising his claims to “[m]arital rectitude,” Guido’s second mono-
logue delivers disorganized affronts and blasphemies. Yet, it nonetheless comple-
ments the arguments for domestic discipline applied in his first monologue. 
Guido has been defeated by the Pope’s belief in Pompilia’s sexual innocence 
and his denial of Guido’s murderous right. Pompilia’s restoration to an ideally 
chaste, victimized, pacified, silenced wife and woman frustrates Guido’s stance as 
a lawful hero who “judged, sentenced, and punished” a disobedient and adulter-
ous wife, whom he has earlier sought to dismiss as a “hysteric querulous rebel” 
(V.1828). The long project of devaluing and discrediting Pompilia included his 
sexual assaults, which, as Pompilia recalls, Guido described as an opportunity to 
damn her: “‘Give me the fleshly vesture I can reach / And rend and leave just fit 
for hell to burn!’” (VII.783–84). Accordingly, as he approaches his own death, 
calling attention to the abject decomposition of the dead Pompilia, he seeks a 
similar defilement: “What you call my wife / I call a nullity in female shape, / 
Vapid disgust, soon to be pungent plague . . .” (XI.1110–12). And, in a vengeful 
apostrophe to his dead wife, he warns, “Beware me in what other world may 
be!— / Pompilia, who have brought me to this pass!” (XI.2101). Presented as 
ravings, these claims also reveal a defensive logic. In refuting the justice of his 
condemnation, Guido must subvert Pompilia’s authority, which relies upon a 
notion of her innocence and her victimization and, amongst these “voices we 
call evidence,” becomes the interpretive crux of the case.
 Before the Pope’s ruling, most of the other voices in the poem presume the 
greater authority of the husband. Pompilia’s newfound authority, Guido argues, 
results from the fact that “The mob’s in love, I’ll wager, to a man, / With my 
poor young good beauteous murdered wife” (XI.1823–24). Guido, anxious as 
ever about class hierarchies, blames the representational powers of song sheets 
in which Pompilia’s violated, dying self outweighs his emboldened masculine 
authority:
And eyes, on warrant of the story, wax
Wanton at portraiture in white and black
Of dead Pompilia gracing ballad-sheet,
Which, had she died unmurdered and unsung,
Would never turn though she paced street as bare
As the mad penitent ladies do in France. (XI.1826–31)
Here again is the iconic imagery of victimized wife and brutalizing husband, 
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and in this passage, Browning suggests both the representational power of the 
crime ballad and the imperatives of melodramatic binaries in order to chart 
Guido’s fall. When Guido credits the ballad with gaining a public sympathy for 
her plight, a political pressure to which he believes the Pope is susceptible, he 
cites the inversion of class and honor that continually plague him. In the public 
forum of working-class literature, the nobleman loses his credibility to the ille-
gitimate daughter of a prostitute. At the same time, Browning’s ballad references 
highlight the fact that only Pompilia’s violent death authorizes her voice. The 
crime and her wounds speak for her in ways that she could not and compel an 
audience of listeners that, while living, she could not.
 Because Guido’s condemnation renders his campaign against her public 
honor and her otherworldly salvation futile, he redirects his ravings towards 
dismantling the abstract value of purity and sullying the revered sacrament of 
marriage. After deconstructing Pompilia’s popular authority, Guido attacks the 
wifely ideal itself, which has been instrumental in his ruin:
Why, when a man has gone and hanged himself
Because of what he calls a wicked wife,—
See, if the turpitude, he makes his moan,
Be not mere excellence the fool ignores! (XI.2205–8)
His proposed union with Lucrezia Borgia, a reference which inspires his priest-
interlocutors to hold up their crucifixes, extols the evils of a sinning woman, 
whose evil he can and will surpass:
Oh thou Lucrezia, is it long to wait
Yonder where all the gloom is in a glow
With thy suspected presence?—virgin yet,
Virtuous again in face of what’s to teach—
Sin unimagined, unimaginable,—
I come to claim my bride,—thy Borgia’s self
Not half the burning bridegroom I shall be! (XI.2212–18)
He thus deconstructs “[m]arital rectitude” and mocks the companionate ideal 
that so annoys him. In proposing a marriage in hell with a mythic poisoner 
and sexual predator, Guido attempts to undo all of the gendered codes that he 
ruthlessly enforced in his marriage and then opportunistically invoked in his 
defense.
 His relentless attempts to apply patriarchal law with rhetorical and material 
force culminate in this shocking scene where husband and wife vie for trans-
gressive dominance. Espousing this model of adversarial excess before a col-
lection of upheld crucifixes, Guido even claims “impenitence” (XI.2229) as an 
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act of resistance and a legal loophole. Just as he manages to attain this level of 
performative power, however, Guido’s final words mark his surrender, and they 
underscore the desperate dialogue with Pompilia that his monologues have 
consistently implied: “Abate,—Cardinal,—Christ,—Maria,—God, . . . / Pom-
pilia, will you let them murder me?” (XI.2424–25). With Guido’s wild rhetorical 
energy reduced to pathetic verbal exhaustion, this apostrophe to his murder 
victim encapsulates the poem’s commentary on the state’s interests, invest-
ments, and interference in domestic matters. But, in a perversion of the eter-
nal bond of marriage (the much touted yoke), Guido’s desperate inquiry also 
neatly condenses the intricate and unending dialogue between husband and 
wife—murderer and murder victim—upon which the poem builds its scrutiny 
of adversarial domesticity.
 Toward the same end, Pompilia’s monologue both contrasts and corrobo-
rates Guido’s assertions. Pompilia is a murder victim whose voice is only heard 
and recorded because she dies over the course of days. As she hovers between 
a tragic life and a certain death, her remarkable status grants her an uncus-
tomary wifely authority, which, as Guido laments, allows this “pale frail wife” 
(XI.1675) to “shimmer through the gloom o’ the grave, / Come and confront 
me” (XI.1680–81) and “turn / My plausibility to nothingness!” (XI.1686–87). 
Pompilia herself bitterly critiques the horrific origins of her death-bed author-
ity, noting that it lies only in the “twenty-two dagger wounds, / Five deadly” 
(VII.38–39) with which Guido has violently asserted his husband rights. She is 
“to die tonight” (VII.40), she explains, and “[f]our days ago, when I was sound 
and well / And like to live, no one would understand” (VII.908–9).
 Fittingly, then, Pompilia tells the story of silenced womanhood. Violante, 
Guido, the Archbishop, the Governor, the Friar, and the Court, which exiled 
her to the convent, prohibit her speech at various crucial points in her life. She 
describes her childhood wedding as an induction into silence. Violante, act-
ing without Pietro’s knowledge, instructs her that she “must hold [her] tongue, 
/ Such being the correct way with girl-brides” (VII.382–83). And Pompilia 
reminds her audience: “Remember I was barely twelve years old— / A child at 
marriage” (VII.734–35). Significantly, like Guido, Pompilia regards her acquies-
cence to the marriage as an economic exchange. She, however, barters herself: 
“hardly knowing what a husband meant, / I supposed this or any man would 
serve” (VII.410–11) to “purchase” the “praise of those I loved” (VII.408). She 
recalls a secret ceremony of uncertain vow-making in which Paolo required her 
to “[r]ead here and there, made me say that and this” (VII.446) and:
. . . told me I was now a wife,
Honoured indeed, since Christ thus weds the Church,
And therefore turned he water into wine,
To show I should obey my spouse like Christ. (VII.446–50)
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Pompilia, again equating wifehood with silence, “was quiet, being a bride” 
(VII.471). Only as a murdered wife can Pompilia speak with frankness and anger 
about the violent correlations between marriage and murder: “I was the chattel 
that had caused a crime” (VII.520).
 Throughout her monologue, Pompilia disclaims any desire to catalogue 
Guido’s actions: “. . . no, I leave my husband out! / It is not to do him more hurt 
I speak” (VII.1134–35). Commenting on the intentions and omissions of her 
speech, Pompilia signals (and perhaps feminizes) the difficulties of expression, 
but she also highlights the purpose of her monologue—to defend her sexual self 
and thereby indict her murderous husband. As Gregory has argued, “Browning 
fills her monologue with metaphors and ellipses, blank spaces, and oblique ref-
erences where the reader must imagine violence rather than (as in so much of 
Browning’s early work) experience its painfully intimate details” (503). Marriage 
is a “blank” (VII.574) and rape a silence marked by ellipses:
Remember I was barely twelve years old—
A child at marriage: I was let alone
For weeks, I told you, lived my child-life still
Even at Arezzo, when I woke and found
First . . . but I need not think of that again—
Over and ended! (VII.734–39)
Gregory considers these elliptical omissions as part of Browning’s “investigation 
into modes of achieving lyric self-expression without forcing violence upon his 
audience” (504), but while Pompilia sidesteps “the traditional role of courtroom 
plaintiff” (504) by refusing to completely narrate the crimes against her, she also 
asks the reader to acknowledge the violent possibilities and permissions of mar-
riage. In this way, her monologue indicts marriage itself as a violent and false 
covenant rather than detailing or isolating Guido’s individual perversions and 
transgressions. Both Guido and Pompilia sketch narratives that forge an uneasy 
agreement about cause and effect by pointing to the institutional powers and 
ideological pressures that determine their violent ends.
 While Guido idealizes household law, Pompilia idealizes romantic love. Pom-
pilia, like Guido, erects an ideal vision of marriage against which to measure the 
disorder of her own experience: “Marriage on earth seems such a counterfeit” 
(VII.1824). Aware that her authentic ideal cannot be realized on earth, Pompilia 
seeks to expose the “home-joys” version of domesticity, based upon husbandly 
love, religious devotion, and paternal protection, as a façade masking deeper 
structures of patriarchal violence and state control:
Everyone says that husbands love their wives,
Guard them and guide them, give them happiness;
“hou s eho ld lAw” And t h e  do m est I c At I o n of  murder 
’Tis duty, law, pleasure, religion: well,
You see how much of this comes true in mine! (VII.152–55)
Marital rape, which Pompilia only reluctantly documents in her monologue, 
leads her to connect her own experience to that of her biological mother, the 
prostitute from whom Violante purchased her:
My own real mother, whom I never knew,
Who did wrong (if she needs must have done wrong)
Through being all her life, not my four years,
At the mercy of the hateful,—every beast
O’ the field was wont to break that fountain-fence,
Trample the silver into mud so murk
Heaven could not find itself reflected there,—(VII.864–70)
Her angry comparison between abused wife and dehumanized prostitute, of 
course, echoes the arguments of nineteenth-century feminists who read the sex-
ual economies of marriage and the legal liabilities of wifehood through meta-
phors of prostitution. Comparing her mother’s trampled and profaned life “[a]t 
the mercy of the hateful” with the sexual, physical, and psychological debase-
ment of her marriage, Pompilia cynically undercuts angelic and sacred formula-
tions of wifehood and domesticity.14
 As Ann Brady has argued, when Pompilia rejects wifely submission, publi-
cizes her oppression, and flees with Caponsacchi, she violates parental, secular, 
and ecclesiastical authorities. Demonstrating “self-possession,” “self-direction,” 
and a “sense of sole responsibility for the preservation of self,” she resists patri-
archy in ways that constitute “radical behavior” and “radical judgment” (14). 
Yet, Pompilia’s attempt to murder Guido, it is worth noting, signifies a much 
more significant challenge to patriarchal control. Not only does Pompilia assault 
Guido with his own sword at Castelnuovo, but, overcoming her habitual and 
enforced silence, she shouts, “Die, . . . devil, in God’s name!” (VI.1546). Oddly, 
critics often neglect this passage, but it is here that the notion of marriage’s 
violent core—its adversarial mandate—is most solidly confirmed. Though Pom-
pilia later qualifies the intentions informing her actions, she nonetheless enacts 
and articulates an open revolt against marriage law, Guido, and the cast of col-
laborators that ensure her domestic imprisonment. In terms of scale, of course, 
her momentary act of resistance hardly compares to the systematic violence of 
Guido, but its symbolic functions are crucial to the poem’s vision of domestic 
combat and its commentary on bad bargains.
 In narrating her rebellion, Pompilia charts her resistance with details that 
reveal her intent and that powerfully implicate the ways in which the marriage 
engenders violence. Pressed by Guido’s presence as “master” and by the guards 
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who are taking custody of “her angel” (Caponsacchi), Pompilia recalls, “I did 
for once see right, do right, give tongue / The adequate protest” (VII.1591–92). 
Referring to her attempt to kill Guido as her single “adequate protest” and her 
“first / And last resistance” (VII.1622–23), she effectively argues that violence 
offered the only possible end to the marriage. The assertion that violence offers 
the only available recourse, of course, is precisely Guido’s argument, and, signifi-
cantly, both husband and wife describe their murderous violence as an effort to 
“do right.” At such points where their monologues converge, Browning forges 
an unsettling connection between the yoke of marriage and the outbreak of 
violence. The Ring and the Book, then, becomes more than a demonstration and 
critique of male violence, for it offers collective testimony about the inescap-
able and escalating tensions of bad marriage. The flight and apprehension—
and Pompilia’s and Guido’s accounts of the impossibility of divorce—create 
an unhappy vision of marriage as a prison closely guarded by legal, social, and 
religious codes.
 Although in the aforementioned lines Pompilia boldly claims her own mur-
der rights, in subsequent passages she exhibits a desire to situate the details of 
her rebellion in more acceptable terms. She authorizes her actions in a religious 
language of duty rather than secular language of protest, and with such dis-
cursive maneuvering, Browning exposes the contradictory ideological demands 
inflecting her character and her speech. All at once, this murdered child-wife 
must negotiate proper testimony, proper womanhood, and proper victimhood. 
When Pompilia confesses her actions, she also casts her violence as a service to 
God and positions it as the rescue of God’s angel, Caponsacchi:
I did spring up, attempt to thrust aside
That ice-block ’twixt the sun and me, lay low
The neutralizer of all good and truth.
If I sinned so,—never obey voice more
O’ the Just and Terrible, who bids us—“Bear!”
Not—“Stand by, bear to see my angels bear!”
I am clear it was on impulse to serve God
Not save myself,—no—nor my child unborn! (VII.1594–1601)
The strands of this explanation are complex. Pompilia displaces responsibility 
for her violence and denies her interests in defending herself. She differentiates 
between acceptance of the violence against her, which she had been instructed 
to “bear,” and a rejection of the violence against Caponsacchi, which, she argues, 
marital codes do not require her to bear. She forces this distinction even fur-
ther when she notes that she did not attack Guido for the sake of her unborn 
child, who would presumably also fall under Guido’s tyrannical authority. Her 
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violence against her husband, she attempts to argue, functions as a response to 
a higher authority (“serve god”), which necessarily overrides corrupt earthly 
systems of marital authority. The reference to an unborn child at this point also 
supports her claims to Guido’s paternity and, thus, implicitly denies the charge 
of adultery with Caponsacchi. While admitting to the attack, then, Pompilia 
refuses to acknowledge any shirking of womanly forbearance, and, at the same 
time, she undermines Guido’s claim to honoris causa. Her use of discursive pas-
tiche and rhetorical confusion once again reflects the labyrinth of gendered and 
classed codes that she must negotiate—even as she dies.
 As Pompilia continues, these strategies resurface when the explanations for 
her violence shift slightly:
But when at last, all by myself I stood
Obeying the clear voice which bade me rise,
Not for my own sake but my babe unborn,
And take the angel’s hand was sent to help—
And found the old adversary athwart the path—
Not my hand simply struck from the angel’s, but
The very angel’s self made foul i’ the face
By the fiend who struck there,—that I would not bear,
That only I resisted! (VII.1614–22)
Differing only slightly, both explanations serve to replace self-interest with self-
effacement. In this instance, she acts, “[n]ot for [her] own sake,” but for the sake 
of the “babe unborn.” This minor adjustment allows Browning to suggest the 
care with which Pompilia attempts to master and adhere to the codes of wife-
hood and womanhood while she simultaneously indicts and rejects them as fac-
tors in her demise. Even as a murdered woman, she remains wary of the perils 
of submitting the private circumstances of her marriage to the public record. 
Because criminalizing and condemning Guido, her “old adversary,” requires the 
maintenance of her wifely purity, she confronts these impossible contradictions 
with a doublespeak, one that mirrors and inverts Guido’s own self-interested 
language. Accordingly, Pompilia masks her intent and denies her own interests, 
in order to tame the transgression that she enacted against her “master.” Her 
reference to an angel’s support helps to secure the role of innocence and right, 
which can absolve her and condemn Guido.
 In spite of her rhetorical maneuvers, however, her attack on Guido reinforces 
the often unacknowledged agreement between these two adversaries about how 
the institution of marriage overdetermines their violent ends. Though it is 
tempting to scan their monologues in an effort to ascertain the veracity of one 
testimony or the other, as criminal and divorce courts mandated, the striking 
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resemblances between Guido’s and Pompilia’s narratives work against this 
interpretive approach. Browning, explicitly interested in the difficulties and 
contingencies of interpretation, constructs correlations that underscore causal 
relations between the marriage bond and its violent dissolution. As the narra-
tives of crime mutate into tales of marriage—and back again—Browning sug-
gests that marriage and murder form essential parts, beginning and end, of the 
same coercive contract.
 This argument about the nature of a “bad bargain” is echoed in other mono-
logues as well and establishes a kind of critical refrain. The voice of Half-Rome, 
for example, asserts that marriage is the “knot / Which nothing cuts except this 
kind of knife” (II.66–67). A similar connection between marriage and murder 
appears when Pompilia recollects Pietro’s words upon discovering her secret 
marriage to Guido. When Guido comes to claim his bride, an astonished Pietro 
cries to Violante, “You have murdered us, / Me and yourself and this our child 
beside!” (VII.492–93). Pietro’s certain application of the word “murder” sug-
gestively encapsulates the troubling slippage between marriage and murder that 
Browning sustains throughout the poem. Of course, Browning does not suggest 
that all marriages end in murder, but the poem uses this slippage to elaborate the 
lingering disillusionment with marriage law and marriage reform in Victorian 
England. He uses extreme violence to reinscribe patriarchal permissions, and to 
exaggerate the adversarial model, and thereby critique the notion that marital 
yokes and husbandly discipline produce decent couples.
 Accordingly, the problem of marital yokes, spousal antagonism, and inad-
equate remedy appears when Pompilia traces murder to the legal difficulties 
of divorce, citing Rome’s rejection of Guido’s divorce petition: “People indeed 
would fain have somehow proved / He was no husband: but he did not hear, 
/ Or would not wait, and so has killed us all” (VII.156–58). And though here 
she critiques Guido’s impatience and expresses confidence in an eventual legal 
divorce, she explicitly depicts the murder as a divorce. After asking, “I—pardon 
him?” (VII.1709), she explains:
Let him make God amends,—none, none to me
Who thank him rather that, whereas strange fate
Mockingly styled him husband and me wife,
Himself this way at least pronounced divorce,
Blotted the marriage-bond: this blood of mine
Flies forth exultingly at any door,
Washes the parchment white, and thanks the blow. (VII.1712–18)
Pompilia’s thanks for “the blow,” her acceptance of Guido’s irrevocable “divorce,” 
her appreciation of the now publicly visible blot on the “marriage-bond” 
(which had hitherto been privatized and concealed), and her exultation in the 
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purification of her violent death combine to register a deeply bitter and ironic 
anger. At the same time, they focus the poem’s grim conclusions about mar-
riage and divorce. The narrative and rhetorical logic of both accounts affirms 
that the radical annulment, the murders with which Guido finally “pronounced 
divorce,” constitutes the only solution possible within the confines of Roman 
society. Emphasizing this cultural oppression, Pompilia’s monologue ends with 
a full rejection of earthly marriage law and a vision of companionate marriage 
undertaken by angels—removed from a social context valuing “birth, power, 
repute so much, / Or beauty, youth so much, in lack of these!” (VII.1831–32).
 If we consider the symmetries of these two monologues, we can see how 
the poem challenges the codes of legal melodrama and public scandal circulat-
ing in Browning’s murder poem and in Victorian England. With the voices of 
Half-Rome, The Other Half-Rome, and Tertium Quid—and with the Pope’s 
contemplation of the historical significance of his ruling—Browning represents 
the “public anxiety” (I.1141), “the vibrations in the general mind” (I.844), pro-
duced by marital violence. Placed between the “world’s outcry” (I.839) and the 
“world’s guess” (I.842), the murder case, initially introduced as a problem of 
“if, and, when, / Husbands may kill adulterous wives,” raises more questions 
about institutional force and individual frailty than a narrative condemning the 
monstrous outrage of a violent devil, fated for execution, and lamenting the pas-
sive victimization of a virtuous saint, fated for martyrdom, can address. While 
responding to the noisy debates that accompany shocking crimes and failing 
marriages, the stories of Pompilia and Guido function as political critiques of 
the melodramatic mandates and legal discourses that threaten to misrepresent 
and misinterpret their marriage and her murder. While the voices of the public 
and of the law wish to uphold the binaries of martyrdom and monstrosity, or 
adultery and honor, Guido and Pompilia, although drawing heavily upon these 
polarities (because they are consistently subjected to them), develop a critique 
of marriage law and its entire apparatus of customs and permissions. Because 
Guido’s murder of Pompilia and the state’s execution of Guido both interrogate 
the power dynamics of marital yokes and bad bargains, the poem ultimately 
exceeds the limits of the central question posed by the “the old yellow book.” 
The question of “if, and when” requires an analysis of the violence supporting 
the mechanisms of marriage, which, Pompilia argues, “has killed us all.”
 As the converging monologues of Pompilia and Guido serve to expose the 
inadequacies of popular exegesis, Browning uses the verse novel’s polyphony 
and the epic’s massive scale to interrogate the reductive processes and ideologi-
cal blindspots determining its generic and discursive methodologies. As Felluga 
has argued, the development of the verse novel correlates to the marginalization 
of poetry in the Victorian literary marketplace. In developing verse analogues 
to the novel, he argues, “poetry could attempt to play to that market as best 
it could by exploring the characteristics that made the novel such a popular 
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success (narrative sequentiality, realistic description, historical referentiality, 
believable characters, dramatic situations, fully realized dialogism and, above 
all, the domestic marriage plot)” (“Verse Novel” 171). Suggesting an interest in 
the literary marketplace, Browning’s poetic maneuvering also suggests a stake 
in the cultural and political marketplace surrounding marriage and divorce, 
one that includes the sensation novel but also the newspaper press. Responding 
to the poem’s unusual approach to content and context, a review in The Brit-
ish Quarterly Review, lamenting Browning’s interest in “mere vulgar murders” 
rather than “really noble” actions, characterized the text as both a “story which 
would suit a contemporary sensation novelist” (“Browning’s Poetry” 456) and 
“the newspaper in blank verse” (457). Such observations return us to the perfor-
mative and intertextual experiments of poetry—and the dialectical interplay of 
genre and discourse—in the marketplace of Victorian verse.
 Considering the development of genre with respect to historical and cultural 
instability, Felluga considers that genres may be “perceived as belonging to a 
particular regimen but also as regimented against other genres” (“Novel Poetry” 
495). As The Ring and the Book exemplifies a poetic response to the represen-
tational practices of the novel, the newspaper, and the court in cases of marital 
violence and domestic cruelty, its most striking argument “against other genres” 
emanates from its performance of and differentiation from their codes. While 
demonstrating an interest in scandal, the disgressive witnesses to and partici-
pants in this domestic murder plot undermine their own interpretive authority 
with their idiosyncratic and self-interested asides and their allegiances to pre-
fabricated and outmoded narrative frameworks. To understand the laws of mar-
riage and the laws of murder in representational terms, the poem suggests, the 
laws of genre must be revised and reimagined. The Ring and the Book has a great 
deal to say about textual production and legal fictions, but it is worth noting 
that in alluding to but not reproducing the framework of novels and newspa-
pers, Browning generates the most startling feature of the text: the likenesses of 
Guido’s and Pompilia’s dramatic monologues. With their words, set amidst the 
crumbling integrity of matrimonial laws and the unstable resources of public 
gossip, readers glean some semblance of authenticity. With this unlikely sym-
metry—establishing the twinned testimonies of mutual disgust—Browning 
centers his critique.
“High Justice” and Husband-Murder in 
Edward Robert Bulwer Lytton’s Clytemnestra
Of course, when it comes to interrogating marriage law and domestic ideol-
ogy, murderous wives and mothers signify much differently than murderous 
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husbands and fathers. Guido’s crimes, as well as his rhetoric of impunity, for 
instance, crystallize the immense cultural machinery upholding wifely subju-
gation. As Guido explains in his defense, he merely embodies the abstracted 
ideologies and legal permissions of patriarchal hegemony. At the same time, 
his household crimes resonate with the developing Victorian discourses con-
demning abusive fathers and husbands, criminalizing domestic assault, and 
mandating protections for legally compromised wives. Murderous wives and 
mothers, in marked contrast, subvert this gendered system of permissions and 
protections. Neither respecting masculine authority nor requiring male rescue, 
domestic murderesses explode ideologies of feminine passivity, wifely patience, 
male protection, and husbandly dominance. And, while murderous wives and 
mothers countered representations of domesticated femininity, companionate 
marriage, and romantic love, they also threatened disciplinary models of mar-
riage that aligned state and husbandly power.
 Until 1828, English law had formally recognized the dense cultural symbol-
ism of such wifely transgressions. Wives who killed their husbands, like servants 
who killed their masters or mistresses and ecclesiastics who killed their supe-
riors, were guilty of “petit treason.” Quoting Blackstone’s legal interpretation 
of such acts, Maeve Doggett explains that these social relationships “embodied 
‘obligations of duty, subjection and allegiance’ similar to those characterizing the 
relation between citizen and sovereign” (50).15 Lytton’s Clytemnestra and Levy’s 
Medea play upon this relationship between domestic and political ordering by 
refashioning scenarios of domestic violence in Greek drama and positing causal 
links between marriage and murder. These texts allowed both authors to ignore 
the popular Christian rhetoric underlying justifications for the naturalness of 
domestic patriarchy and the compensatory enjoyments of angels in the house. 
Expressing themselves as sexual and psychological subjects, Lytton’s and Levy’s 
wives and mothers forego the domestic comforts of everyday “trifles” (2), the 
daily refinement of “minor morals” (7), and the measured exercise of “moral 
power” (49) advocated by Sarah Stickney Ellis in The Women of England (1838). 
As both poets secularize the dynamics of household law, they reconfigure these 
tragic murderesses as particularly modern women who express the dissatisfac-
tions and injustices of gender inequality in terms immediately connected to 
marriage and divorce laws of the Victorian period.
 Modern readers are not particularly familiar with Lytton’s poetry, but among 
Victorian readers his poems, published under the pseudonym Owen Meredith, 
alternately inspired admiration and elicited contempt. A protégé of the Brown-
ings, Lytton influenced a coterie of Oxford students with his debut poetry collec-
tion, Clytemnestra, the Earl’s Return, the Artist, and Other Poems, which Chapman 
and Hall published in 1855, and, as Florence Boos has documented, his early 
work likely influenced William Morris’s approach to medievalism.16 At the same 
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time, many critics challenged his work as derivative amateurism or outright 
plagiarism. Swinburne labeled him a “pseudonymous poeticule” and parodied 
his work in “Last Words of a Seventh-Rate Poet” (1880) (qtd. in Mitchell 83). 
Despite his poetic pursuits, however modest or contested, Lytton ultimately ful-
filled the demands of his novelist-father, Edward Bulwer-Lytton, and established 
his national reputation, not as a writer, but as a career diplomat.17 In 1876, he 
became Viceroy to India, just as Queen Victoria was preparing to assume the title 
of Empress of India. While his biographers have acclaimed his literary work and 
attempted to revitalize his poetic reputation, his diplomatic stature invariably 
outshines his artistic achievements. Yet, although Lytton’s work remains signifi-
cantly marginalized in our contemporary studies of Victorian poetics, Clytem-
nestra merits attention here because it deploys an ancient and familiar spousal 
murder in order to represent Victorian England’s anxious domestic politics and 
because it does so with attention to the imbrications of genre and discourse.
 Signifying its own importance, Clytemnestra headlined Lytton’s first poetry 
collection and thereby assumed particular responsibility in launching his poetic 
career. Lytton composed and published the verse drama during the especially 
tense arena of marriage debates between the establishment of the Royal Com-
mission on Divorce in 1850 and the passage of the Divorce and Matrimonial 
Causes Act in 1857, and he appropriated details from the national conversation 
on marriage reform in order to establish the homicidal motives and critical 
perspectives of Clytemnestra. Working in tandem, the dramatic voices and the 
narrative logic of Lytton’s Clytemnestra suggest that murder offers a form of 
recourse for legally, politically, and socially compromised wives. Poised in this 
symbolic position, murder affords, in Clytemnestra’s terms, a “high justice” that, 
with the sharp reprisals of the knife, condemns the sexual double standard that 
privileges and ensures husbandly dominance and patriarchal power. In mur-
dering Agamemnon—husband and king—Clytemnestra gains both the house-
hold and the state. In adapting Clytemnestra’s story to Victorian times, Lytton 
retrieves and reorganizes portions of the Orestian saga of family breakdown in 
order to consider the legal and psychological dilemmas of marital unhappiness. 
Because Clytemnestra balances extensive commentary on the dejected experi-
ence of wifely oppression with the terrific outcome of a murderous rebellion, 
Lytton forces the abstraction of unhappiness to be read through its tangible 
results.
 Though writing the verse drama in his early twenties, the young, unmar-
ried Lytton undoubtedly possessed insights into such matters, for he existed in 
especial proximity to the political, legal, and scandalous implications of marital 
disintegration and discord. His parents, the novelist and MP, Edward Bulwer-
Lytton and his wife, Rosina (née Wheeler), were the notorious adversaries of 
one of the most publicly vitriolic and endlessly scandalous society marriages 
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of mid-nineteenth-century England.18 Though his parents obtained a judicial 
separation in 1836, after nine years of marriage, they were ineligible for divorce, 
both before and after the Divorce Act, because they both had committed adul-
tery. Yet, as Marilyn J. Kurata has argued, “[a]lthough English law made divorce 
impossible in this case because both partners possessed grounds for divorce, 
other laws offered means of controlling a recalcitrant wife” (45). Accordingly, on 
various occasions, Bulwer-Lytton used the arsenal of marital weapons available 
to the mid-Victorian husband: financial control, child custody, secret surveil-
lance, forced asyluming, and physical assault.19 Skillfully wielding publicity as 
her instrument of redress, Rosina retaliated with newspaper letters, allegorical 
novels, and public appearances in which she vilified her husband’s character and 
disrupted his dignified political image.20 According to most biographers, Lytton 
almost unwaveringly aligned himself with his father in his parents’ matrimonial 
feuds—and even ushered his outraged mother off the stage of British scandal 
and onto the continent in order to salvage his father’s reputation.21 Clytemnestra, 
however, complicates this standard biographical view of his domestic allegiances 
and gendered sympathies. Fixing its gaze on Clytemnestra, the poem registers an 
attempt to depict, to understand, and to analyze the feminine subject position in 
the context of marital breakdown.
 In a few striking ways, the Bulwer-Lytton family saga resembled the Orestian 
nightmare portrayed in Clytemnestra. It includes an outraged wife and mother, 
who explicitly lamented the strictures of womanhood and sought compensa-
tion with increasingly radical methods, and a pompous, controlling patriarch, 
whose official state duties and political self-fashioning took precedence over 
his private, family duties. Their family story also includes the tragically early 
death of the daughter and sister, Emily, whom Lytton once referred to as a “mur-
dered girl” and whose early death inspired mutual accusations of neglect in 
the parents’ ongoing battles (qtd. in Raymond 75).22 In the ongoing recrimina-
tions, Emily appeared an innocent martyr to the neglect, incompetence, and 
selfishness of her warring parents. Furthermore, as Marie Mulvey-Roberts con-
tends, the “Bulwers feared the murderous inclinations of one against the other” 
(124), and many of the family’s struggles were broadcast to and witnessed by 
an observant and fascinated public. While Clytemnestra is certainly not a fully 
autobiographical domestic allegory, the struggles of the Bulwer-Lytton family 
signal the poem’s historical context and Lytton’s interest in the destructive forces 
lurking within the disharmonies and injustices of married life. Equally impor-
tant are his poem’s commentaries on publicity. With his representations of the 
chorus—alternately accusatory and placated—Lytton encompasses the broader 
cultural theater of marriage and divorce on the implied stage of the closet drama 
and thereby addresses the generic patterning of domestic romances and marital 
scandals.
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 With a text that is both safely literary and suggestively political, Lytton 
authorizes his work—and launches his career—with a classical crime. The liter-
ary alchemy of the ancient and the modern, especially in the context of crime, 
also attends to questions of authorial legitimacy and textual vulgarity that sur-
rounded crime writing in the Victorian period. In fact, just before Lytton began 
to exploit the violent and criminal resources of Greek tragedy for his début vol-
ume, his father had attempted to defend his crime novels—Paul Clifford (1830), 
Eugene Aram (1832), and Lucretia; Or, The Children of the Night (1846)—against 
charges of glorifying criminals and wallowing in vulgarities. In his defensive 
essay, “A Word to the Public” (1847), Bulwer-Lytton defends his work by plotting 
the literary relationship between the ancient and the modern. The “delineation 
of crime,” he explains, “in every age” has been the “the more especial and chosen 
thesis of the greatest masters of art quoted to us as authorities and held up to us 
as models” (14), and his catalogue of evidence includes the infamous murderers 
of several canonical favorites: Clytemnestra, Medea, Orestes, Oedipus, Phaedra, 
Richard, Hamlet, Othello, and Macbeth.
 These dramatic texts and characters do not celebrate crime, he argues, but 
rather exhibit and embody tragic necessity: “Crime, in fact, is the essential mate-
rial of the Tragic Drama. Take crime from tragedy, and you annihilate tragedy 
itself ” (16). Literary crimes generate “moral terror” because they induce specu-
lation about and confrontations with “some destroying or dangerous agency” 
(20). “Look a little deeper,” Bulwer-Lytton confides, “and you will find that there 
are only two kinds of this agency—the first, supernatural, such as Fate” and 
“the second agency is human crime” (20). Arguing that modern novelists must 
be permitted to depict modern crimes rather than crimes “clad in the pomp of 
history” (24), he asserts, “the past cannot monopolise the sorrows and crimes 
of ages” (25). For, with the Greeks, fate “was the main instrument of woe and 
crime. . . . [b]ut, with us, guilt or woe has its source in ourselves. Our conscience 
is our oracle, our deeds shape our fate” (54). In Bulwer-Lytton’s argument about 
the necessity of a modern crime literature, one might glean a corollary argument 
about the merits of revising ancient crimes. While Bulwer-Lytton defends the 
literary merits of modernity’s “vulgar” crimes, his son’s Clytemnestra, “clad in 
the pomp of history” and dwelling in the realms of poetry, exploits the aesthetic 
and moral comforts of classical crime in order to confront the modern dis-
courses of domestic scandal and household law. Combining the ancient crime 
with the modern motive, Lytton invokes the “moral terror” of wifely rebel-
lion. Moreover, the ancient Greek context also affords Lytton an opportunity 
to jettison Christian dogma from his analysis of spousal relations. Effectively 
secularizing the text, it allows Lytton to interrogate the symbolic laws of the 
home without having to honor—or address—Christian-based domestic pieties. 
A poetic comparison reveals the latitude gained by this secular bent. Penning 
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their verses of mid-Victorian homelife at precisely the same time, Coventry 
Patmore enshrines an “Angel in the House” (1854) while Lytton domesticates a 
high tragic murderess.
 In critiquing the poem, Victorian commentators—both private and pub-
lic—frequently relied on the dramatic template of Aeschylus and the genre codes 
of Greek tragedy as their evaluative tools. Elizabeth Barrett Browning described 
Clytemnestra as “too ambitious because after Aeschylus, but full of promise 
indeed” (Harlan and Harlan, Letters 27). Accusations of plagiarism also surfaced 
as several reviewers scrutinized his Greek and Shakespearean imitations and 
documented his contemporary literary borrowings.23 More interesting than the 
problems of generic authenticity and authorial originality, which Lytton himself 
addressed, is the poem’s discursive collage of literary precedents and contempo-
rary gender debates surrounding the subject of domestic conflict.24
 While Victorian critics eagerly scrutinized the text’s derivative style, its pos-
sible plagiarisms, and the impossibly lofty agenda of transposing Greek tragedy 
into Victorian culture (and imitating the notoriously obscure Aeschylus), their 
critical language also frequently revealed their preoccupation with the poem’s 
representation of marriage. As the reviewer for Tait’s Edinburgh Magazine noted, 
Lytton’s Clytemnestra had a “curious involution of the modern and the antique 
about it” (“Owen Meredith’s Poems” 682). In slipping between ancient and mod-
ern paradigms, Lytton demonstrates his conceptual showmanship by enlarging 
the scope of Clytemnestra’s character and by redefining the causalities of trag-
edy. These alterations combine to interrogate the semiotics of fate and crime. 
The involutions of past and present allow readers to consider psychological and 
ideological explanations for crime. A curse on the house of Atreus, therefore, 
resembles a bad nineteenth-century marriage while crime and fate emerge para-
doxically as socially determined and individually motivated entities.
 Clytemnestra consists of twenty separate scenes that range from the lone 
soliloquies of Clytemnestra to discussions between the chorus and other main 
characters. In revising the story, Lytton makes significant structural changes; 
most important, of course, is the centering of Clytemnestra. The drama pivots 
around Clytemnestra’s thoughts and deeds—and the always vexed relationship 
between these two components of crime. Accordingly, Lytton’s Clytemnestra, 
unlike Aeschylus’s Agamemnon, opens onto Clytemnestra’s soliloquy rather than 
a watchman’s exposition. Inducted into the drama via Clytemnestra’s senti-
ments and thoughts, readers immediately encounter the murderously unhappy 
wife, after a night of troubled and troubling sleep, explicating the psychological 
perils of domesticity, articulating her adulterous desire for Aegisthus, and con-
templating the immanent return of Agamemnon from war. As Clytemnestra 
lays out her adulterous anxieties, her murderous motive and intent present 
themselves for inspection when she suggests, as she apostrophizes the morning 
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sun, that she suffers the punishment of sleepless guilt without having commit-
ted the crime:
Wherefore to me—to me, of all mankind,
This retribution for a deed undone?
For many men outlive their sum of crimes,
And eat, and drink, and lift up thankful hands,
And take their rest securely in the dark.
Am I not innocent—or more than these?
There is no blot of murder on my brow,
Nor any taint of blood upon my robe. (I.4)25
Clytemnestra proclaims, however, that the darker crime exists in her thoughts: 
“It is the thought! It is the thought! . . . and men / Judge us by acts!”(I.4). While 
commenting on the origins of her adulterous transgression, “one wild hour of 
unacquainted joy” (I.4), Clytemnestra reveals that she has just awakened from 
a dream in which Helen ruefully reminds Clytemnestra that her similar incon-
stancy started a war. “Allured by love,” Helen explains, she “[fe]ll off from duty”; 
and a “baleful” procession of slaughtered Trojan warriors passes through Cly-
temnestra’s mind, affirming the extensive social consequences of one woman’s 
sexual impropriety (I.4). Here, then, Lytton introduces the troubling equations 
of thought and action, motive and deed, which are then interrupted by “the 
tread of nimble feet” (I.5) as the town awakes and gathers for Agamemnon’s 
return.
 As the first scene suggests, imagining modern social foundations for tradi-
tionally fated criminality required a fully developed psychological portrait of 
Clytemnestra. Writing to his father in 1853, Lytton explicitly claimed an interest 
in ascribing psychological complexity to this long-generalized icon. He high-
lights the poetic innovations and thematic limitations that underlie his interest 
in generating modernized circumstantial contingencies for this icon of “strong-
natured passionate” womanhood, and he characterizes the text as an “experi-
ment” and a “failure” (qtd. in Harlan 71):
The character of Clytemnestra always seemed to me one of the great creations 
of fiction, and yet it is one of wh. we really know very little—for in Aesch: 
she is more a goddess than a human being, and stalks out & in, like the old 
executioners with a mask, does her deed and disappears, while in Euripides 
she is a mere virago—a common sort of Madam Lafarge. About a year or two 
ago, I began a sketch of the character in blank verse; in wh. I endeavoured 
to suppose wht. might be the feelings of a strong-natured passionate woman 
under the circumstances wh. form the plot of the drama of Aesch: But not 
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liking wt. I had done, threw it by & forgot all about it. Some time back, in 
looking over old papers I found the sketch, & set to work upon it again. It 
almost unconsciously, however, grew into dramatic form, and I then changed 
the plan, & added choruses after the manner of a Greek drama. (qtd. in Harlan 
71–72)
Dwelling on the verse drama’s nature as a “poetical exercise” (71), Lytton con-
fesses something “impertinent” (71) in the work since it “brings one flat against 
the great Greek masters & Shakespeare too, both of whom crush one, of course” 
(71), and he argues that “poetry shd now be in front, & not behind, the age; the 
times are so quick” (71). Yet, because Lytton rewrites Clytemnestra during a 
national conversation about family law, amidst the renewed idealization of the 
separate spheres, and against the sentimentalization of the family, he imbues 
this verse drama with a modernizing stance. In refining Clytemnestra’s voice 
and complicating her motivations, he dismisses the conventional portrait of 
this disgruntled adulteress and high-tragic murderess. As Harlan has argued, 
Lytton “sought to penetrate the austere silences of the Greek drama by analyz-
ing and psychologizing” and “mak[ing] explicit and rational what in Aeschylus 
is symbolical and passionate” (72). In spite of his disclaimers, then, Clytemnestra 
attempts to develop a modern content.
 The replacement of symbol and passion with analysis and psychology also 
informs the important semiotic triangle connecting Clytemnestra, the Chorus, 
and Agamemnon, which Lytton establishes early in the second scene and contin-
ues throughout the entirety of the poem. The chorus, exhibiting deference and 
bearing offerings, inquires after Clytemnestra: “But tell us wherefore, O godlike 
woman, / Having a lofty trouble in your eye, / You walk alone with loosened 
tresses?” (II.6). The observant chorus then engages Clytemnestra in conversa-
tion on the well-being of Agamemnon. The Chorus states, “But more than all I 
reckon that man blest, / Who, having sought Death nobly, finds it not” (II.9), and 
Clytemnestra replies: “Except he find it where he does not seek” (II.9). When the 
Chorus counters, “You speak in riddles” (II.9), Clytemnestra merely redirects, 
“with garlands wreathe the altars, / While I, within, the House Prepare” (I.9). 
In this oblique yet ominous exchange, Clytemnestra both publicizes her dissent 
and invokes her duty. Yet, what in public appears the overseeing of domestic 
preparations is, in fact, the crafting of a murderous snare.
 Because Lytton yokes the exercise of household duty with the plot of mur-
derous retribution, he forces a point about the private traumas and the public 
mandates of separate spheres ideology. While anticipating a reunion of brothers 
and a restoration of a noble household, the chorus also articulates the possibil-
ity that Agamemnon’s public deeds, primarily the sacrifice of Iphigenia for the 
benefits of war, may have private repercussions: “My heart is fill’d with vague 
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forebodings, / And opprest by unknown terrors / Lest, in the light of so much 
gladness, / Rise the shadow of ancient wrong” (II.11). Breaking down the con-
venient dichotomy of private and public, this vague apprehension then takes 
more specific form: “For the unhappy sacrifice of a daughter; working evil / 
In the dark heart of a woman; / Or some household treachery, / And a curse 
from kindred hands!” (II.12). The chorus, the vocal proponents of fate’s powers 
and the record-keepers of family wrongs, effectively comes to represent the ever 
curious and scandalized public, which enforces social propriety as it attempts 
to cast its gaze into the home and bear witness to its intimate transgressions. As 
we shall see, Lytton complicates the role of the chorus throughout the drama, 
configuring it as an unreliable and unstable force of public opinion creating and 
consuming the “spectacle of intimacy.”
 The public’s instability and appetite for spectacle, Clytemnestra explains to 
Aegisthus, allows her to manipulate “the arts / That guide the doubtful purpose 
of discourse / ’Thro many windings to the appointed goal” (VIII.49) in order to 
“draw [the citizenry] on to such a frame of mind / As best befits our purpose” 
(VIII.49). While Clytemnestra uses Iphigenia’s sacrifice to position herself ethi-
cally, Lytton uses it to particularize Clytemnestra’s crime as the revenge of an 
unloved housewife whose false consciousness slips away when her daughter’s 
sacrifice materializes the absolute powers of the family patriarch and when her 
“heart” responds to the affection of Aegisthus. Priming the chorus to accept 
her murderous project, she questions their belief in “terrible necessity” (IX.54). 
Asking, “Was it a murder or a sacrifice?” (IX.55), she interrogates the “foul 
infanticidal lie” (IX.55). Similarly, as the chorus proffers an ethical equation that 
accepts “this single, individual loss” for the “universal good” (IX.55), Clytemnes-
tra counters with a criminal accusation: “Can all men’s good be helped by one 
man’s crime?” (IX.55). As the chorus begins to acquiesce, calling the sacrifice “an 
evil thing” (IX.56), Clytemnestra exploits maternal politics. Agamemnon, she 
explains, simply “did not bring [Iphegenia] forth” (IX.57), and while he enjoyed 
war, “his blythe pastime on the windy plain” (IX.57), Clytemnestra “sat apart, 
/ Silent, within the solitary house: / Rocking the little child upon [her] breast” 
(IX.57). Having been swayed by the arts of discourse, the chorus begins to expect 
retributive justice, and Clytemnestra notes with satisfaction that her “mischief 
works apace!” (IX.60).
 The entirety of the next scene, the mid-point of the play, is given over to the 
chorus’s narration, in great lyrical detail, of Iphigenia’s sacrifice, which leads the 
chorus to doubt Agamemnon: “Oh, what falling off is this, / When some grand 
soul, that else had been sublime, / Falls unawares amiss, / And stoops its crested 
strength to sudden crime!” (X.63). A clear indication of Clytemnestra’s political 
savvy and the public’s impressionability, this scene also implicates Agamem-
non’s own bloody choices and thereby deepens—and genders—the psychologi-
cal complexity of Clytemnestra’s murderous rage. As Boos has argued, “Lytton’s 
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‘Clytemnestra’ is not exactly a feminist rewriting of Aeschylus, but it recalibrates 
the scales of judgment to balance the guilt of an arrogant child-murderer against 
that of his vengeful wife” (37). In the end, Boos notes, Clytemnestra’s actions are 
“understandable but not attractive” (40), an apt expression that also describes 
Victorian England’s simultaneously queasy and riveted response to the public 
politics of marital breakdown.
 Although we witness Clytemnestra confidently manipulating public opinion, 
we also see her struggling with her own internal judgments. While she maintains 
her performative sensibilities and strategically masks her internal revolution 
with outward subordination “as best befits a wife / And woman” (IV.21), she 
privately strengthens her resolve with countless and contradictory reflections 
on necessity, justice, and fate. With a nod to destiny, for example, she refuses to 
“shrink” from the “forecast event” which “hurls” her into the “abyss of crime” 
(IV.21–22):
  . . . What need
Of argument to justify an act
Necessity compels, and must absolve?
I have been at play with scruples—like a girl.
Now they are all flung by. I have talk’d with Crime
Too long to play the prude. . . . 
Crime’s easier than we dream. (IV.22)
Yet, significantly, this event has been “forecast” by none other than Clytemnestra 
in her opening soliloquy. In such passages, then, Lytton highlights the struggle 
between her self-motivated intentions and what she considers girlish scruples. 
Throughout the play, Clytemnestra undergoes a clear psychological struggle 
between the imperatives of feminine identity and her unwomanly willfulness. 
This gender dilemma appears as Clytemnestra laments her womanhood as inad-
equate to her character.
O fate! to be a woman! You great Gods
Why did you fashion me in this soft mould?
Give me these lengths of silky hair? these hands
Too delicately dimpled! and these arms
Too white! too weak! Yet leave the man’s heart in me,
To mar your master-piece—that I should perish,
Who else had won renown among my peers,
A man, with men—perchance a god with you,
Had you but better sex’d me, you blind Gods! (IX.51)
In fact, fate, as in this passage, is often construed as a gendering of, rather than 
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a preordination of, her crimes, which are necessitated by the mismatching, or 
misgendering, of body and will.
 Though her references to gods clearly suit Lytton’s Greek context, her ref-
erences to fate more frequently designate a patriarchal hegemony rather than 
an interventionist cosmology. For example, Clytemnestra, reflecting on men as 
warriors and women as war slaves—“long hair’d virgin wailing at the shrines” 
(IX.51)—again denounces fate’s gendering properties:
O fate, to be a woman! To be led
Dumb, like a poor mule, at a master’s will,
And be a slave, tho’ bred in palaces,
And be a fool, tho’ seated with the wise—
A poor and pitiful fool, as I am now,
Loving and hating my vain life away! (IX.51)
Done in by limited options, Clytemnestra curses both her hatred for her hus-
band and her love for Aegisthus because both signify subordination and futil-
ity—a “vain life.”
 Furthermore, her tragic oversight, which she bemoans, has been her failure 
to perceive marital injustices, a kind of gendered hamartia that led her to believe 
that her own homelife would rise above that of other women. Speaking to Aegis-
thus, she confesses that she was “foolish” not to read other wives’—indeed, all 
women’s—unhappiness as a warning:
   . . . And tho’ I saw
All women sad—not only those I knew,
As Helen . . . 
Not only her—but all whose lives I learn’d,
Medea, Deianeira, Ariadne,
And many others—all weak, wrong’d, opprest,
Or sick and sorrowful, as I am now—
Yet in their fate I would not see my own
Nor grant allegiance to that general law
From which a few, I knew a very few,
With whom it seem’d I also might be number’d,
Had yet escaped securely:—so exempting
From this world’s desolation everywhere
One fate—my own! (VII.36–37)
In describing “all women” as “weak, wrong’d, opprest” and “sick and sorrow-
ful” and proclaiming the “world’s desolation everywhere,” Clytemnestra reveals 
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her sense of the scale of women’s oppression and the magnitude of her own 
folly. Her poignant regret highlights the collective oppression of women, for the 
home, she claims, is inevitably—fatefully—the space of solitude and alienation: 
“I moved about, a shadow in the house, / And felt unwedded though I was a 
wife” (VII.47). But she has also expressed a sense of compromise, though not 
“so exacting” at present, she explains to Aegisthus, she still hopes for a reformed 
domestic future with him.
 With her explanatory and analytical soliloquies in place, Lytton uses 
Agamemnon’s return from war to confirm the details of Clytemnestra’s critique. 
Agamemnon appears as the incarnation of heroic masculinity, and the cho-
rus proclaims this stature as he marches amongst the urns being carried home 
from war. References to his “sublime head” (XI.70) and “eminent authority” 
(XI.70) join admiring shouts, such as, “what an arm,” “what shoulders,” “what 
a throat,” and “Look at that sword” (XI.71), to underscore his royal masculinity 
and “stateliness” (XI.71). Clytemnestra’s majesty appears to match his: “With 
what grand eyes she looks up, full in his!” (XI.72). As the chorus revels in the 
palpable return of paternalism, patriarchy, and royalty, the public face of a noble 
marriage appears to them just, secure, and right.
 To underscore the falseness of this collective delusion, Lytton embellishes 
Aeschylus’s version of Agamemnon’s response to Clytemnestra’s welcome and 
thereby renders it an aggressive dismissal of her speech and an explicit deg-
radation of the feminine. As Clytemnestra expresses the required honorifics, 
Agamemnon exclaims, “Enough! Enough!” (XII.74), and he then discourses 
on the virtues of women’s silence in fully nineteenth-century formulations of 
domestic propriety:
But women ever err by over-talk.
Silence to women, as the beard to men,
Brings honour; and plain truth is hurt, not help’d
By many words. To each his separate sphere
The Gods allot. To me the sounding camp,
Steed, and the oaken spear; to you the hearth,
Children, and household duties of the loom.
’Tis man’s to win an honourable name;
Woman’s to keep it honourable still. (XII.74–75)
Clytemnestra’s “over-talk,” of course, is not an error but a posture, and as 
Agamemnon confines Clytemnestra to the custodial role of keeping his honor, 
his strict adherence to the doctrine of separate spheres, which casts the home 
as a place of silence and peace and the public sphere as a place of violence and 
war, profoundly undermines his strength and status. Given Clytemnestra’s fully 
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expressed murderous intent, Agamemnon’s reference to “plain truth” charges the 
scene with a dramatic irony, for readers know that Clytemnestra’s formal rheto-
ric of welcome, her “over-talk,” belies an intimate contempt and a malicious 
plan, which she has plainly spoken in “many words” throughout the drama. 
Agamemnon’s words thus appear both blindly complacent and arrogantly pro-
vocative.
 Although Clytemnestra summons the perfunctory apology, she prefaces it 
with an aside that mocks the domestic entitlements of presumed impunity of 
husbands:
(O beast! O weakness of this womanhood!
To let these pompous male things strut in our eyes,
And in their lordship lap themselves secure,
Because the lots in life are fallen to them.
Am I less heart and head, less blood and brain,
Less force and feeling, pulse and passion—I—
Than this self-worshipper—a lie all thro’?) (XII.75)
Now relegated to parenthetical aside, in contrast to the bold declaiming that 
opens the play, Clytemnestra’s speech nonetheless reclaims for woman the organs 
of agency and force. As Agamemnon takes leave of the reception in order to 
bathe, he inquires, “Is our house order’d?” (XII.76), and thus, Lytton furthers the 
dramatic irony of domestic breakdown. Clytemnestra responds that the palace is 
“order’d fair / Befitting state” (XII.77), including the “purple-paven, silver-sided 
bath, / Deep, flashing, pure” (XII.77). While the ideologies of domesticity, pre-
sumptions of womanly submission, and the privileges of husband rights define 
Agamemnon’s perspective, the audience observes in this scene a seething con-
frontation between a rebel and a tyrant in which the tyrannical “self-worshipper” 
remains completely oblivious to his imminent and complete overthrow. Basking 
in his heroic return from war, he adheres to a gendered code of dominance that 
has shifted unbeknownst to him during his long absence.
 Satisfied that his house is ordered, Agamemnon instructs Clytemnestra to 
attend to Cassandra, thus confirming Clytemnestra’s earlier judgments about 
women, slaves, and war. Notably, Lytton preserves Cassandra’s life so that Cly-
temnestra may express sympathy for their common experience as women: “Our 
fortunes are not so dissimilar, / Slaves both—and of one master” (XV.88). Cas-
sandra, therefore, stands as a fellow subjugated woman rather than a competitor 
in a patriarchal sexual economy, and this distinction enables Lytton to clarify 
for his audience that Clytemnestra’s crime constitutes a wholesale rejection of 
patriarchal authority and not a momentary (but momentous) flare-up of sexual 
jealousy.
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 In Agamemnon’s attempt to assert his authority via the reiteration of sep-
arate spheres, Lytton also establishes the interpretive schema for the murder. 
Occurring behind the closed, locked doors of the home, the murder is overheard 
in the streets by the agitated public. Choric voices avow that “[s]ome hideous 
deed is being done within” and call to “[b]urst in the doors” (XVI.96). This scene 
overthrows the binary comforts espoused so forcefully by the returning war 
hero, and the inversion is striking. As “[t]he house is fill’d with shrieks” (XVI.95), 
the noises of dishonorable violence astonish the public, which, assembled to 
celebrate a homecoming, listens helplessly to the demise of the patriarch, the 
household, and the state. The sounds of outrageous crime that emerge from the 
palace include Agamemnon’s cries, which serve to detail the crime. He identifies, 
in gendered terms, the killer, “Murderess! oh, oh!” (XVI.95), and the method, 
“Stabb’d, oh!” (XVI.97), while maintaining his characteristic boldness, “I will 
not die” (XVI.95). The conspirators are also overheard: Aegisthus instructs Cly-
temenstra, “Thrust there again!” and Clytemnestra affirms, “One blow has done 
it all” (XVI.98). As the astonished public grapples with the meaning of these 
verbal fragments, a choric voice exclaims and questions, “My heart stands still 
with awe! / Where will this murder end?” (XVI.98). The relationship between the 
chorus outside and the crime within is emphasized by the locale of the murder 
scene—a spatial representation of domesticity and publicity. The scandal of 
adultery, therefore, gives way to the monumental horror of murder, constituting 
the final, ironic reply to Agamemnon’s arrogantly naïve question about whether 
or not the house is “order’d.”
 In the next scene, Electra, the crime’s sole eyewitness, rushes from the house 
with Orestes in order to secure his escape and thus ensure his capacity to enact 
a future “high vengeance” (XVII.99). Responding to the citizenry’s inquiries, she 
presents an account of the crime. She calls attention to Aegisthus’s passivity as 
he “halted, half irresolute” (XVII.99), and she highlights Clytemnestra’s vigorous 
agency:
But Clytemnestra on him flung herself,
And caught the steel, and smit him through the ribs.
He slipp’d, and reel’d. She drove the weapon thro,’
Piercing the heart!” (XVII.99)
Contemplating the meanings of this crime, the chorus further articulates the 
ironic reversal of the private/public opposition: “But Death, that fear’d to front 
him in full field, / Lurk’d by the hearth and smote him from behind” (XVII.100). 
Electra then exhorts the crowd to assist in protecting Orestes and assuring a 
future restoration of proper order, and she represents the chaos of the pres-
ent, curiously, in terms of the virtual nonparticipant, Aegisthus, rather than the 
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“devilish woman, lying long in lurk” (XVII.99) who orchestrated and executed 
the crime: “The house runs blood. Aegisthus, like a fiend, / Is raging loose, his 
weapon dripping gore” (XVII.101). As Electra and the chorus lament the fall of 
the state and the death of a patriarch, the transformed Aegisthus, now thirst-
ing for power, demands Orestes and threatens Electra, who, boldly dismissing 
him, calls him “half a man” (XVIII.110) and, with rather comical alliteration, 
a “[b]lundering bloodshedder” (XVIII.111). She then threatens him with the 
future avenging powers of Orestes.
 The shocking spectacle of the crime scene, however, disrupts Aegisthus’s and 
Electra’s mutual posturing when, the palace doors are “thrown open” (XIX.112) 
and reveal Clytemnestra standing over the body of her victim and shouting: 
“Argives! behold the man who was your King!” (XIX.112). This positioning of 
murderer and victim visually underscores Clytemnestra’s murderous agency 
even as she verbally ascribes the deathblow to “Fate” (XIX.112). In marked con-
trast, her subsequent explanation uncovers a deeply personal agency:
He who set light by woman, with blind scorn,
And held her with the beasts we sacrifice,
Lies, by a woman sacrificed himself.
This is high justice which appeals to you. (XIX.113)
Clytemnestra thus expresses some satisfaction in this tit-for-tat gender equity, 
acquired by leveraging the effects of paternalist misogyny and domestic violence 
for the destruction of patriarchal ideology and its embodied authority. As the 
plotted crime and the expressed rage of the opening soliloquy are enacted, Cly-
temnestra asserts the purpose of her spectacular revolution. Implicating long-
standing analogies between state power and husbandly power, she combines 
high treason and petit treason.
 At this point, Clytemnestra’s insistence on “high justice” also confronts 
Victorian anxieties about women’s anger, the frightening antithesis of a feminine 
ideal of long-suffering patience, passivity, and, of course, silence. In her murder-
ous euphoria, she unequivocally represents the possibility that the resources of 
patience, whether naturally formed or culturally constructed, are, in fact, finite 
and, in this instance, completely depleted. The representation of Clytemnestra’s 
crime, and her public interpretation of it, appropriates the discursive trick of pitch-
ing arguments in extremis in order to generate an ideological and institutional 
critique. Nowhere is this more apparent than when, contemplating Agamemnon’s 
military strength, Clytemnestra proclaims the superior power of her private 
disdain:
  O triple brass,
Iron, and oak! the blows of blundering men
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Clang idly on you: what fool’s strength is yours!
For, surely, not the adamantine tunic
Of Ares, nor whole shells of blazing plates,
Nor ashen spear, nor all the cumbrous coil
Of seven bull’s hides guard the strongest king
From one defenceless woman’s quiet hate. (III.16–17)
The armor and weaponry of war, long-celebrated emblems of male strength and 
public purpose, thus prove useless when set against the quiet and long-growing 
hate of the domesticated woman.
 Because Clytemnestra consistently interprets her actions in terms of the 
separate spheres dichotomy, she signals Lytton’s ongoing attention to Victorian 
domestic ideology. Sacrificed to war, Iphigenia embodies the subordination of 
the private to the public and the feminine to the masculine. Aligning herself with 
her daughter, then, Clytemnestra again proclaims an affiliation of womanhood, 
and her use of the term “sacrificed” to characterize her murder of Agamemnon 
reconnects his husbandly oppression to his strategic killing of Iphigenia. This 
completion of the sacrificial cycle, Clytemnestra explains, ushers in a new politi-
cal order because it answers and overthrows the laws of patriarchal dominance. 
Manipulating the public’s desires for justice, she highlights the immediate prob-
lem of masculine authority and thereby sidelines the language of fated retribu-
tion and ancient wrongs that have defined choric speculation throughout the 
play.
 Accordingly, christened in the blood of a fallen monarch, she imbues her 
ascension to power with modern and secular revolutionary sentiments. Pro-
claiming, in the aftermath of a murder, “Now it is time to laugh!” (XIX.115), 
Clytemnestra attempts to replace gravity with levity, and she seeks to dispel both 
the public’s skepticism and its bloody memories by promising a moderate and 
peaceful rule:
A milder sway, if mildly you submit
To our free service and supremacy.
Nor tax, nor toll, to carry dim results
Of distant war beyond the perilous seas
But gateless justice in our halls of state,
And peace in all the borders of our land! (XIX.115–16)
As Clytemnestra articulates this bargain, a utopian state without wars or prisons 
in exchange for their immediate and collective submission, her efforts to insert 
emotional levity and political optimism into these murderous events, which 
the chorus has been reading as a tragic plot, is abruptly interrupted by Electra’s 
flinging herself onto the blood-soaked body of her dead father and asserting the 
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tragic necessity of retribution. Yet, in spite of Electra’s performative invocations 
of tragic imperatives, Clytemnestra’s rhetorical powers continue to persuade as 
she offers her traumatized daughter a “mother’s heart” and “[s]afe silence. And 
permission to forget” (XIX.116)—and Electra appears to relent.
 This scene reveals Lytton’s interest in exposing the scaffolding of the two fun-
damental discourses of Clytemnestra: ancient Greek tragedy and contemporary 
marriage debates. With Clytemnestra advocating a gendered political revolution 
and Electra insisting on tragic determinism, Lytton stages the two discourses in a 
competition for interpretive power. As Clytemnestra verbally subdues her angry 
daughter, Lytton privileges the modern content. Electra desires the familiar 
comforts of patriarchy, including its obsession with adultery, which she upholds 
early in the play when she expresses confidence that her returning father will 
“destroy the base adulterer, / And efface the shameful past” (VI.26). Explaining 
the contrasting figures to his father, Lytton stated that Clytemnestra represents 
the “active” principle and Electra represents the “suffering” principle (Harlan 
72). With their oppositional rhetoric, Lytton suggests that the tragic, ancient 
mode insistently perpetuates and obsessively redresses past suffering while the 
revolutionary, modern view seeks to invest in futurity—and femininity. 
 Questioning the causalities of individual agency and divine fate, the final 
scene of Clytemnestra continues to entertain modern and ancient explana-
tions for the crime and its relationship to the past and the future. The chorus 
concludes the play with a chant that repeats the phrase, “Destiny is over all” 
(XX.122). But, even though Lytton includes this discourse of fate, his changes 
to the drama challenge its explanatory power. In the end, despite her earlier 
references to the dejected state of all married women, Lytton’s Clytemnestra 
imagines a reformed union with Aegisthus. Because their partnership is quite 
literally built upon the violent dissolution of a combative model of marriage, 
the play hints at the possibility of and a desire for a companionate and equitable 
alternative to the more conventional model of the husband-centered family and 
the male-dominated state. Clytemnestra’s final words express the promise of a 
reformed domestic contract: “Thou lovest me! O love, we have not fail’d. / Give 
me thy hand. So . . . Lead me to the House. / Let me lean on thee. I am very 
weak” (XX.121). Exhausted by crime, Clytemnestra and Aegisthus enter their 
“House” to continue a partnership sealed in crime. Momentarily displaced are 
the portended revenge of Orestes and the sulky judgments of Electra.
 Yet, crucial textual details thwart this happy ending. The emphatically differ-
ent perspectives and behaviors of the two transgressing lovers trouble Clytem-
nestra’s companionate model of domesticity and monarchy.26 Most significantly, 
the contingencies of the illicit romance, which have inflected Clytemnestra’s 
crimes and motivations throughout the play, continue to resonate here. For 
example, Clytemnestra must prompt Aegisthus to declare his love. Just before the 
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ending, we see Clytemnestra fretting, “But, if he cease to love me, what is gain’d?” 
(XX.120), and, after she queries, “Aegisthus, dost thou love me?” (XX.121), Aegis-
thus claims, “As my life!” (XX.121). His response inspires her final confidence in 
their relationship and her feminized physical weakness, which requires her to 
“lean” on him as they enter the palace. Clytemnestra, however, has clearly not 
parsed Aegisthus’s line, for his language encodes a telling subtext. He has wit-
nessed the life-taking powers of this particular wife, as she drove a knife through 
the ribs and into the heart of her husband, and his future safety, citizenship, and 
life are now hers to control. Given this context, “As my life!” signifies the nature 
of his compromised condition, and it also quite pointedly alludes to her earlier 
threat that without committing to her and her crime, Aegisthus, a “poor baffled 
crownless schemer,” would be ruined—if not dead. Her romantic prompting 
and prodding at the end of the play, then, reminds readers of the private anxiet-
ies underlying her public pronouncement, which Clytemnestra, in fact, laments 
throughout the play. At the end of the play, with just a few words and gestures, 
we see the culmination of Lytton’s skepticism. Doomed and overdetermined, 
men and women cannot overcome the pressures and limitations of an adver-
sarial and hierarchical domesticity.
 Several particular impediments become most relevant to Lytton’s analy-
sis. For instance, Lytton fully demonstrates that Clytemnestra exceeds her two 
male counterparts in willful purpose and psychological grit. As we have seen, 
Agamemnon’s self-satisfied dismissal of Clytemnestra and his presumption of 
uncontested power leave him vulnerable in the bathtub, and Aegisthus’s terri-
fied hesitation mobilizes her murderous resources and places her in the role of 
supreme and singular agent. In terms of narrative logic, then, both Agamem-
non and Aegisthus contribute to the making of Clytemnestra the murderer. 
Agamemnon’s public interests establish Clytemnestra’s private hurts and pro-
voke her murderous outrage. Similarly, she frightens Aegisthus with her tena-
cious criminal plotting, which he had long entertained in theory but dislikes 
in practice. As Electra contemptuously explains, he blunders his conspiratorial 
duties and renders Clytemnestra solely responsible for Agamemnon’s death.
 Demonstrating how entrenched gender inequalities might yield disastrous 
results, such details also undermine crucial ideologies of masculinity. Clytemnes-
tra out-strategizes and overpowers Agamemnon. As they live out the adversarial 
model of spousal relations, he relies on traditional forms of control while she 
opts for new methods. Likewise, Aegisthus’s failed collusion undercuts notions 
of male agency and male rescue. Earlier in the play, examining Agamemnon’s 
shield, Clytemnestra reads its nicks and scratches as signs of his physical prow-
ess. Then noting, “Aegisthus’ hands are smaller” (III.16), she acknowledges his 
conspiratorial impotence and signals her ferocious power. Even more impor-
tantly, however, both Agamemnon’s and Aegisthus’s actions and inactions 
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suggest that Clytemnestra has no adequate match in marriage, love, or gover-
nance. Far from modeling a partnership of equals or investing in a companion-
ate ideal, Lytton’s verse drama marks the absence—and perhaps implies the 
impossibility—of spousal cooperation or domestic comfort. This conspicuous 
absence establishes the play’s relentlessly pessimistic critique of marriage.
 Details throughout the play set readers up to appreciate the spectacle of the 
doomed lovers at the end of the play and to read it as an exacting critique. The 
companionate marriage, the longed-for alternative to authoritarian models, is 
introduced early in the play when Clytemnestra uses it to justify her adulter-
ous transgressing and her criminal plotting. She deploys the language of love to 
contest the definition of adultery as treason: “If I had loved him once—if for one 
hour— / Then were there treason in this falling off. / But never did I feel this 
wretched heart / Until it leap’d beneath Aegisthus’ eyes” (III.14). For Clytem-
nestra, romance continues to function as both an interpretive framework and 
an intended goal, but she observes that Aegisthus is “wavering in nature” and 
“trembling ever on extremes” (XV.85) and is passive even in love: “his was never 
yet the loving soul / But rather that which lets itself be loved” (XV.86). She won-
ders if he will misinterpret her actions and intentions and “[r]emembering the 
crime, remember not / It was for him that [she is] criminal” (XV.87). Similarly, 
she adjusts her rhetoric and seeks to feminize her agency: “’Tis not for him, but 
for myself in him, / For that which is my softer self in him—I have done this, 
and this—and shall do more” (XV.86). Her anxieties about exercising her will 
and feminizing her self, stemming directly from the romantic idyll, complicate 
her project of self-liberation.
 Meanwhile, Aegisthus, concerned about public opinion, portends, “all the 
Greeks will hate us” (VII.33), and warns, “we shall be dishonour’d” (VII.34). 
Failing to comprehend that Clytemnestra is motivated by her revolutionary con-
tempt for female subjugation and her ambitious desire to reconstruct the state, 
he recommends that they “part now” and offers “[f]light” (VII.38) as a more 
prudent solution to their adulterous dilemma. Clytemnestra, however, seeks to 
confront and overthrow, and operating in a Macbethian mode, she mocks his 
lack of strength and cites her fatal error in entrusting her future to him: “This 
was the Atlas of the world I built!” (VII.39). Even suggesting that his lack of sup-
port constitutes “retribution” for her adultery, she proclaims, “a universe [her 
love] lies ruin’d here” (VII.39). Ever invested in his participation, however, she 
both rallies and bullies him, admonishing him to “be a man for once” (VII.39) as 
she explains to him that assuming power of the house is the only viable option. 
The public, she explains, valuing strength and hating weakness, will embrace 
their cause. She questions his integrity, asking, “lives there nothing of the ambi-
tious will?” (VII.40). She recalls the “proud plots” and “dextrous policy” that 
characterized years of pillowtalk (VII.40), and explains that to abandon their 
“hou s eho ld lAw” And t h e  do m est I c At I o n of  murder 
murderous plot would be shameful: “For to conceive ill deeds yet dare not do 
them / This is not virtue, but a two-fold shame” (VII.41–42). As Clytemnestra’s 
rhetoric escalates, as she seeks to recover “[her] King! [her] chosen! [her] glad 
careless helpmate” (VII.43), the idea of companionship and partnership begins 
to recede.
 Increasingly exasperated as Aegisthus wavers and shrinks, she finally 
announces that she will commit the crime herself: “What! Shrinking still? / I’ll 
do the deed. Do not stand off from me” (VII.44). Yet, Aegisthus’s “stand[ing] 
off” then forms a central anxiety. When in response to Clytemnestra’s asser-
tion that he fears her, Aegisthus claims to “worship” (VII.44) her, he betrays 
the absence of love, romance, or equality. As a rhetorical last resort, when the 
language of romance has failed, she warns this “poor baffled crownless schemer” 
that his fate rests in her power:
Without my love 
What rests for you but universal hate,
And Agamemnon’s sword? Ah, no—you love me,
Must love me, better than you ever loved—
Love me, I think, as you love life itself! (VII.45–46)
Here, then, is the antecedent to the final scene in which he claims, as instructed, 
to love Clytemnestra “[a]s my life!”; and therein lies the adversarial core of their 
domestic partnership.
 At the end of the play, if not throughout, readers see Clytemnestra’s anxieties 
legitimized. Boos notes that Clytemnestra intimates a “rhetoric of female self-
defense” (37) and revises Aeschylus’s more masculine Clytemnestra by ascribing 
to her “acceptable ‘womanly’ desires for love” (38). Given that Lytton sought to 
imagine a markedly feminine psychology, we might assume that he resorted to 
or relied upon conventional tropes of feminine subjectivity. However, it is also 
worth noting that companionate aspirations and romantic discourse in Clytem-
nestra always succumb to or are thwarted by uncooperative gender identities 
and inhospitable domestic ideologies. Conventional femininity, for example, 
rendered Clytemnestra a “weak, passionate, unhappy woman” (VII.44), but that 
weakened self attracted Aegisthus, who envisions her now as a “Terrible Spirit.” 
In seeking a masculine political power, therefore, Clytemnestra unwittingly sac-
rifices opportunities for love and companionship, which require a feminized 
identity. Clytemnestra’s particular tragedy, then, stems from an ideological 
miscalculation about the unwanted presence of female agency in any romance 
plot.
 Noting their frustrations with the text, Victorian reviewers somewhat 
obliquely acknowledged Lytton’s critique of domestic romance. Describing 
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Clytemnestra, a critic for the Dublin University Magazine explains: “She is, in 
[Owen Meredith’s] hands, neither the bold virago, indifferent to consequences, 
of Aeschylus, nor the depraved woman, by turns violent, sophistical and weak, 
that Sophocles represents her. She is a woman, haughty, proud, self-willed, yet 
possessed by one sentiment, her love for Aegisthus, which exhibits her a woman 
in her heart, and is the mainspring of all her errors and sins” (“Clytemnestra” 
487). The reviewer goes on to complain that her love “but little elevates her” and 
that Aegisthus is a “poltroon, who loves her a little, and fears her more” (488). 
But the fact “that the woman who has this deep love in her heart should repine 
at the fate that made her woman—should despise her sex, and long after man-
hood—is revolting, because it is utterly outside the bounds of nature—”(488). 
Such observations might be reinterpreted in terms of the gender tragedy that 
Lytton develops in the play.
 Clytemnestra’s gender bending is less a “revolting” perversion of nature than 
a daring attack on a particular set of gender norms. Another reviewer, diag-
nosing the “general unhealthiness of the poems relating to love” (“Meredith’s 
Clytemnestra” 302) and presenting them as characteristic of “the Byronic or 
Bulwerian kind” (302), maintains: “They never sparkle with health, or kindle 
with hope. . . . To us, these pieces wear the look of one who knows more than he 
ought to know; it may be a wrong impression, but it is none the less painful. Or 
else there is some fatality in the author’s choice of subjects relating to woman” 
(302). It is difficult to believe that this reviewer did not know the true identity 
of “Owen Meredith.” Regardless, the identification of Byronic and Bulwerian 
romantic pathologies and feminine fatalities—and certainly the claim that “he 
knows more than he ought to know”—correctly assert Lytton’s interest in dis-
turbing the domestic, gender, and sexual politics of Victorian England. His is 
indeed a “painful” view, and the profound failures of the romantic idyll that 
mark Lytton’s version of this ancient tragedy establish the principal dramatic 
and political ironies of the text.
 The dramatic irony that underpins this domestic failure thus fully engages 
the mixture of Greek paradigms and modern politics that characterizes the 
entire drama. As Clytemnestra insists upon performing a scene of domestic 
happiness, the psychological tensions of the domesticated subject, as “conflic-
tual complexes,” emerge even as the chorus sings the powers of fate: “Who shall 
say ‘I stand!’ not fall? / Destiny is over all! (XX.122). The chorus has relied on 
fate throughout the play as a device for explaining outrageous violence. Yet, 
Clytemnestra has consistently demystified fate, applying the term variously—to 
persuade the public, to delineate her will, and to denote gender hegemony. At the 
end of the play, the audience, privy to Clytemnestra’s public suasions and inner 
reflections, senses the ironic inadequacy of the chorus’s continued fate-based 
sensibilities. Just as the notion of fate cannot impinge upon the explanatory 
power of the intimate rage that Clytemnestra expresses and enacts, it also cannot 
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resolve the unsatisfying implications of Clytemnestra’s domestic bargain with 
Aegisthus.
 In Lytton’s Clytemnestra, then, the epistemology of gender trumps the epis-
temology of fate, and, because Lytton effectively accesses the Victorian contest 
of gendered prerogatives, individual rights, and domestic duties, the ending por-
trays neither triumphant love nor tragic destiny—but just another “bad bargain.” 
Clytemnestra and Aegisthus might just become a “decent couple,” but under the 
heavy yoke of domesticity—articulated throughout this verse drama as a psy-
chological yoke of entrenched and internalized sexual inequalities—their part-
nership will never match the high drama of its origins in adulterous romance 
and revolutionary crime. In positing such tragic mediocrity, Lytton exploits the 
formal freedoms of closet drama. Dispersing high tragedy into twenty clipped 
scenes, Lytton elaborates the psychological traumas of marriage, the system-
atic processes of marital breakdown, and the risky investments of unexacting 
lovers. Bending gender and genre in this way, he domesticates Clytemnestra’s 
ancient crimes for his particularly modern commentary on the ominous nature 
of household law.
Domestic “Compact[s]” and 
Child-Murder in Amy Levy’s Medea
Composed in 1882 and published in A Minor Poet and Other Verse in 1884, Amy 
Levy’s Medea. A Fragment in Drama Form, After Euripides, similarly scrutinizes 
the psychological perils of domestic bargains.27 Compressed into two scenes, 
Levy’s modernized Medea accommodates the adversarial model of domesticity 
by eliminating many of the voices of Euripides’ original drama and leaving only 
Medea and Jason, and Aegeus and Nikias (as “Citizens of Corinth”), to con-
vey a tragic plot of spousal bitterness. Levy presents Jason and Medea as hos-
tile adversaries whose household arrangements, initially negotiated under the 
influence of sexual desire, romantic love, and heroic adventure, succumb to the 
divisive public mandates and patriarchal agendas of domestic arrangements. 
Highlighting the self-interested benefits of husbandly authority and the solitary 
suffering of wifely subordination, Levy obscures Jason’s obligations to gods, 
fates, and Kreon and omits Medea’s sympathetic audiences with nurse, tutor, 
and chorus. Stripping away these influences, Levy enumerates the emotional, 
psychological, and sexual intimacies of spousal antagonism. With pointed rep-
resentations of Jason’s politicized marriage-making and Medea’s psychologized 
home-making, Levy, like Lytton and Browning, imagines the home’s emotional 
charge, which the disciplinary mechanisms of domesticity—from placating 
domestic ideologies to authoritative patriarchal decrees—can never fully neu-
tralize or contain.
chAp ter 3
 In particular, beginning with Medea’s dehumanizing, domestic alienation 
and culminating in Medea’s shameful, criminal isolation, the narrative logic of 
Levy’s verse drama provocatively aligns the psychological consequences of mar-
riage and murder—for women. Deemed a fragment, Levy’s Medea concludes 
with a fully incriminating portrait of marriage and domesticity, and, offering 
neither consolation nor remedy, she abandons a fugitive Medea, exhausted by 
“fruitless striving” and propped against a rock, “outside the city” (55).28 “This 
is the end,” she proclaims, “Thus go I forth / Into the deep, dense heart of the 
night—alone” (56). Imbued with a sense of domestic fatalism, Levy’s Medea 
also dramatizes the relationship between private discord and public voyeur-
ism as the gossipy commentators, Aegeus and Nikias, who are seen engaging in 
“idle talk” (38) and “conferring in whispers” (47) throughout the drama, per-
ceive and interpret events according to facile notions of femininity, domesticity, 
and criminality. With their inaccurate commentaries, Levy acknowledges the 
troubled communications between the private actors and the public spectators 
of domestic upheaval while probing the gendered logic of such private-public 
distinctions.
 When she invokes Euripides in the title of her poem, Levy signals a politi-
cal and poetic interest in outrageous femininity, and she situates her text 
within a broader context of Victorian Medeas. As Edith Hall points out, Eurip-
ides’ Medea enacts the only premeditated maternal child-killing, unmitigated 
by madness, in Greek tragedy. The infanticidal radicalism of the Euripidean 
Medea so affronted Britain’s maternal codes that “[o]n the British stage it was 
not until 1907 that Euripides’ Medea was performed, without alternation, in 
English translation” (Hall “Legislation” 42). Exacerbating her violent offenses, 
Euripides’ Medea renounces feminine duty, invests in masculine-coded honor, 
and enjoys the impunity of a charioted escape. With her multivalent transgres-
sions—from public speaking to murderous revenge—she fully unsettles distinc-
tions between “private and public, friend and foe, and especially between man 
and woman” (Hall, “Introduction” xvii). In mid-century London, the disruptive 
domestic politics of the Medea plot enjoyed particularly topical resonance. As 
Hall explains, during the divorce controversy of 1856 and 1857, the national 
obsession with marital matters created a “British epidemic of Medea plays,” and 
Medea was “one of the most ubiquitous heroines on the London stage” (56).
 In particular, Medea frequented Victorian burlesque theatre, where, as 
Fiona Macintosh has recently reminded us, she was “transposed” into a traves-
tied comic figure but nonetheless encoded “relatively radical” gender critiques 
(“Medea Transposed” 77). In Medea; Or, The Best of Mothers, with a Brute of a 
Husband (1856), for example, Robert Brough characterizes Medea as “a conjugal 
lesson, surpassing in intensity anything of similar description attempted even at 
this establishment, an awful warning to every single individual” while describing 
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Jason as “a hero of antiquity, of fabulous courage, about to marry the second 
time without the slightest hesitation.” In the productive disjunction between 
satirical levity and tragic weight—with Jason embodying the remarrying kind 
and Medea portending marital doom—Brough invites a timely and comical les-
soning on the serious politics of divorce and matrimonial law.
 Writing almost thirty years after Brough, Levy complicates the “conjugal 
lesson” of male lassitude and female fury in order to assess the conflict of spou-
sal interests and the precariousness of domestic bargains. Born in 1861, Levy 
missed the mid-century marriage debates that inspired Brough’s (and Lytton’s) 
Greek revival, but her Medea’s murderous exasperation suggestively alludes to 
the persistence of women’s inequality. Although women’s legal status contin-
ued to improve over the latter half of the nineteenth century, as Atkins and 
Hoggett have argued, the legal gains of the Married Women’s Property Acts of 
1870 and 1882 coincided with the “entrenchment of housewife marriage” (106). 
The colliding interests of marriage contracts and domestic pressures, emerging 
from what Mary Poovey terms the “uneven developments” of law and ideology, 
inform Levy’s historicized understanding of late-Victorian gender politics.29 As 
Linda Hunt Beckman notes in her recent biography, at thirteen, Levy reviewed 
Aurora Leigh for Kind Words and published “The Ballad of Ida Grey” in the 
feminist journal, the Pelican, thereby demonstrating a “precocious attraction to 
women’s rights” and, I would add, her historical awareness of women’s struggles 
and feminist discourse (Beckman 18).
 A poet with an equally historicized sense of literary genre, Levy enfolds this 
tension into her Medea plot, but, instead of developing a fully structured femi-
nist political allegory, she sketches the psychological momentum, rather than the 
political motivation, of Medea’s violence. In this way, the bleakness of Medea’s 
domestic experiences and the extremity of her psychological suffering inform 
the outrageousness of her crimes. For example, Levy excises Euripides’ “Women 
of Corinth” speech, in which Medea catalogues the systematic social wrongs of 
woman—from arranged marriage and shameful divorce to painful birth and 
domestic boredom. But she extracts from that famous speech a pithy summary 
argument and installs it as an epigraph: “Of all ensouled and minded things, 
women are the natural beings who struggle most.”30 With these lines, Levy prior-
itizes female subjectivity as the primary site of gender oppression and the most 
pressing issue of marriage politics. Accordingly, she traces Medea’s murderous 
violence to the affective extremes of domestic oppression, thus avoiding more 
conventional formulations of Medea’s crimes as vengeful defiance or political 
argument.
 Reconstructing the domesticated subject-position of the notorious, filici-
dal Medea, Levy gathers the resources of dramatic poetics to indict decades of 
piecemeal legislation and ideological lethargy, and, in this way, Levy’s psycho-
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logical poetics constitutes a particularly feminist stance, one that recalls Philippa 
Levine’s comments on “anachronistically” applying “feminism” to explicate Vic-
torian women’s discourse. Levine argues that feminism “signif[ies] a perspec-
tive far more concrete and thoughtful (if still contested and admirably plural) 
than an attachment to any vague notion of ‘rights’ or ‘equality’ might suggest. 
Its commitment to a thorough and holistic understanding of the pervasiveness 
and connectedness of a host of gendered subordination lends it consistency and 
vision” (1). Moreover, in the context of family politics, Levine explains:
The family in Victorian England was the site of confined domestication whose 
grip on women was firm and frequently total. It constituted one element of 
the polarized ordering of the social fabric which critically defined role and 
standing for both women and men. The binary opposition of home and work, 
of private and public translated into and percolated through to a bewildering 
range of thought, action and material circumstance. Feminists seized upon 
the cruelties, the injustices and the dangers that attached to that polarization, 
appropriating and subverting it to their design. (10)
While sidestepping focused “rights” arguments, Levy fashions her Medea to 
highlight the polarizing effects of family politics. For example, she forcefully 
highlights Jason’s self-interested exchange of a passionate illegitimacy for a con-
ventional respectability, which begins in his domestication of Medea and cul-
minates in his marital bargain with Kreon. Jason, of course, trades on Medea’s 
expendability, and insofar as Levy articulates the kind of feminist critique that 
Levine traces in Victorian discourse, Medea’s destruction of Jason’s proposed 
family underscores a “holistic understanding” of women’s domestic oppression 
in Victorian England. Striking at scions and royals, Medea bluntly exposes the 
methods of procuring, protecting, and publicizing family assets. With the legal 
and ideological features of domesticity—maternity, paternity, patrilineality, 
respectability, legitimacy—under scrutiny, Levy constructs a dramatic “assess-
ment of gendered wrongs” (Levine 1) and offers a wholesale rejection of domes-
ticity as an unregenerate form of social contracting.
 Demonstrating the political ingenuity of poetic design, Levy initiates her 
verse drama with a soliloquy. Speaking to herself in front of her home, Medea 
proclaims herself “lone and weary and sad” (33). Acknowledging her status as a 
foreigner, but emphasizing her alienation as a wife, she catalogues the sources of 
her dejection. A Colchian among Corinthians, she identifies herself as “[a]lien” 
(34) and describes herself as “[h]ungry” (35) for love. Detailing the features of 
Corinth, where “marble-cold” (34) and “fair” people (34) greet her with “hatred” 
(35) and “hostile eyes” (35), she laments, “I, an alien here, / That well can speak 
the language of their lips, / The language of their souls may never learn” (34). 
Lacking opportunities for companionship and communication, she is misread: 
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“I am very meek. / They think me proud, but I am very meek, / Ready to do 
their bidding” (35). Occupying this emotional slum, suffering from hunger, cold, 
and loneliness—the very antitheses of domestic comforts—Medea observes a 
contrast between her present self and her former self. Now “a creature reft of 
life and soul” (35), she was formerly “a creature in whose veins ran blood / Red-
der, more rapid, than flows round most hearts” (34). Levy intertwines notions 
of ensoulment and embodiment by offering bodily metaphors—the hunger for 
love or the flow of blood—to describe Medea’s domesticated state. In this way, 
Levy alludes to the predicaments of wifely personhood. Housebound and hated, 
Medea endures a kind of physical and psychological coverture, and suffers her 
own negation.
 Throughout the poem, the critical observations of Aegeus and Nikias, who 
pronounce judgments upon Medea as wife, mother, and woman, confirm her 
marginalization. While Aegeus judges Medea “fair enough” (36) but “strange” 
(37), Nikias detests such “swart skins and purple hair” and “black, fierce eyes 
where the brows meet across” (37). Meanwhile, Nikias admires Jason’s “gracious 
presence” (37), his “strange and subtle strength,” his “gold-curled head,” and his 
“smooth tones” (44). Racializing gender in this way, the stinging prejudices of 
Nikias and Aegeus, which pit Jason, civilized and “fair,” against Medea, “strange” 
and “swart,” affirm the social layers of Medea’s subordination.31 Their smug, 
objectifying voyeurism also contextualizes Medea’s definition of herself as mon-
strous: “. . . I have poured the sap / Of all my being, my life’s very life, / Before a 
thankless godhead; and am grown / No woman, but a monster” (41). Alluding 
to her bad bargain with Jason, a “thankless godhead,” Medea again defines her 
bartered self with bodily metaphors. The deadening, almost vampiric, effects of 
Jason’s household law, render her a bloodless or sapless thing. Playing with the 
civilizing pretenses of domesticity and the political meanings of Medea’s ethnic 
otherness, Levy pits a vital barbarity against a banal civility and twists the con-
ventions of domestic rhetoric.
 Although Medea precisely detects the circumstantial origins of her alterity, 
she nonetheless remains subdued by persistent memories and nostalgic desires. 
Overhearing Jason’s name spoken by Aegeus and Nikias, Medea acknowledges, 
“I wax white and do tremble; sudden seized / With shadowy apprehension” (36), 
but yields to passionate loyalties, for “woman’s chiefest curse” (36), she explains, 
is:
That still her constant heart clings to its love
Through all time and all chances; while the man
Is caught with newness; coldly calculates,
And measures pain and pleasure, loss and gain;
And ever grows to look with the world’s eye
Upon a woman, tho’ his, body and soul. (36)
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Similarly, when Medea overhears the citizens’ “idle talk” describing Jason’s “wise” 
(36) marriage alliance with Kreon (for Glaukê), she exclaims, “’Tis false, ’tis false. 
O Jason, they speak false!” (38). Surveying Levy’s poetic oeuvre and personal life, 
Beckman has asserted that Levy was “obsessed by” the “theme of woman’s con-
stancy” but not necessarily “convinced of the truth of this tenet of nineteenth-
century gender ideology” (95). Here, with Medea’s expression of women’s cursed 
fidelities and her disbelief at “strange rumours” (39) of Jason’s betrayal, Levy 
establishes the sexual and material interests of heterosexual romance. When 
Jason, having “coldly calculate[d]” his political “loss and gain” with “the world’s 
eye,” later defines the “shadowy apprehension” with a specific decree, his callous 
bargains obviate romantic fidelities and domestic sentiments. In establishing her 
compromised status, Levy uses Medea’s cloying regret to underscore the radical-
ism of her murderous transformation.
 While Medea dramatizes the pathetic qualities of a domesticated femininity, 
Jason signifies the unsavory ethos of a domesticating masculinity. Neither con-
tractually legitimate nor politically advantageous, Jason and Medea’s conjugal 
cohabitation—a sexually but not legally consummated “marriage”—nonethe-
less inspires Jason to perform conventional household rituals. Jason’s first words 
to Medea introduce his disciplinary strategies: “Your looks are wild Medea; you 
bring shame / Upon this house, that stand with hair unbound / Beyond the 
threshold. Get you in the house” (38). Preoccupied with rumors of his marriage 
negotiations, however, Medea remains on the threshold and struggles to activate 
Jason’s loyalties. In addition to citing “[t]he long years passed in this Corinthian 
home” (39) and “[t]he great love I have borne you through the years” (39), she 
reminds Jason of his profound indebtedness to her:
O strong you were; but not of such a strength
To have escaped the doom of horrid death,
Had not I, counting neither loss not gain,
Shown you the way to triumph and renown. (39)
Medea’s recollections incite Jason to regret and repress his former dependency. 
Dismissing any obligatory gratitude, he responds:
And better had I then, a thousand times,
Have fought with my good sword and fall’n or stood
As the high Fates directed; than been caught
In the close meshes of the magic web
Wrought by your hand, dark-thoughted sorceress. (39–40)
The clash between Medea’s historical memory and Jason’s dismissal of her “magic 
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web” revisits the problem of Medea’s compromised subjectivity. Marking her 
disempowerment, Levy conspicuously downplays her magical powers in order 
to underscore the debilitating effects of domestication, which saps Medea of 
magical, psychological, and sexual force and, therefore, fortifies Jason’s control.
 Medea declaims her weakened state, “Lo, I who strove for strength have grown 
more weak / Than is the weakest” (41), and she laments the fact that her magical 
powers prove ineffectual—and irrelevant—in the loveless economy of the patri-
archal household: “What avail / Charms, spells and potions, all my hard-won 
arts, / My mystic workings, seeing they cannot win / One little common spark 
of human love?” (41). Linking the concurrent loss of her “mystic workings” 
and “human love” (41), Medea registers sexual and emotional deprivation and 
conjures the circumstances of her careless domestic bargain (“counting neither 
loss nor gain”) with Jason. Her now obsolete “hard-won arts” indicate an unre-
warded and unacknowledged sacrifice of self, and her domestication consists of 
social and sexual annihilation:
Behold me now, your work, a thing of fear—
From natural human fellowship cut off,
And yet a woman—sick and sore with pain;
Hungry for love and music of men’s praise,
But walled about as with a mighty wall,
Far from men’s reach and sight, alone, alone. (41)
“[W]alled about” and “cut off” (41) from “human fellowship,” “men’s praise,” 
and “love,” Medea, “thing” and “woman,” attributes her degraded homelife to 
Jason’s “work.” His “work,” her alienation, then, does not arise as the byproduct 
of domestic duties but functions—quite intentionally—as the central mecha-
nism of Jason’s domestic rule. For this reason, Medea’s continued speech on the 
home’s threshold irritates Jason because it threatens the privatizing effects of his 
home rule. Monitored by Jason and transgressed by Medea, the threshold forms 
the boundary between the private and public spheres upon which Jason expects 
to stage his respectability and authority. Seeking to prevent an inexpedient spec-
tacle of troubled intimacy, Jason ushers her into the home, and offsetting his 
self-possessed masculine poise with a reference to her compromised feminine 
dishevelment, he condemns her “wide-eyed, unveiled, unfilleted” (42) appear-
ance. In this verbal skirmish, Medea’s unrestrained (and notably sexualized) 
feminine pathos offsets Jason’s disciplinary male reserve. Yet, as Nikias observes, 
Jason “speaks low and smooth,” but “there is that within his level tones, / And in 
the icy drooping of his lids / (More than his words, tho’ they are harsh enough) 
/ Tells me he hates her” (40). Summing up, Nikias reads “wrath and hate and 
scorn” in Jason’s “white cheeks” and “knitted brows” (42).
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 His hatred on display, Jason nonetheless attempts to defend his actions and 
defuse Medea’s affective arguments by blurring distinctions between romantic 
loyalties and political advantages. He questions the sincerity of her professed love 
and cites her failure to embrace his public interests: “Can I deem it so, / When 
what does most advantage me and mine / You shrink to hear of?” (42). Seeking 
to temper Medea’s skepticism with appeals to maternal and familial interests, he 
contends that his proprietary union with Glaukê constitutes an investment in 
Medea’s and their sons’ political future. Because his seemingly “hard” proposal 
signifies “a blessing, wrapped and cloaked about / In harsh disguisements” (43), 
he advises, her present submission may yield her future rule:
And in those days Medea’s sons and mine
Shall stand at my right hand, grown great in power.
Medea, too, if she do but control
Her fiery spirit, may yet reign a queen
Above this land of Corinth. I have said. (43)
Concluding his previous comments with a despotic “I have said,” he likewise 
punctuates the announcement of his new marriage contract and the banishment 
of Medea and their sons:
That I have sworn to take as wedded wife
Glaukê, the daughter of our mighty king,
In this, in nowise hurting you and yours.
For you all fair provision I have made,
So but you get beyond the city walls
Before the night comes on. Our little ones—
They too shall journey with you. I have said. (43)
Ironically upholding household laws at the very moment he intends to abandon 
them, Jason expects Medea to adhere to the private ethos of wifely sacrifice and 
obedience while he brokers a political marriage to secure his public influence 
and power. At the same time, he expects his political promises to his illegitimate 
and neglected family to silence opposition because framed in “I have said.”
 After Jason maliciously pronounces this divorce, an admiring Nikias com-
ments, “Well said” (43), and Aegeus contends, “But none the better that ’twas 
false” (4). When Nikias in turn replies, “I’d sooner speak, for my part, fair than 
true” (44), Levy prompts readers to recognize that Jason builds his domestic 
autocracy upon style rather than substance. Though Nikias and Aegeus are clearly 
prejudicial commentators, their observations alert readers to important charac-
ter details. Having emptied his words of intent, Jason appears to believe that 
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domesticity is a fundamentally dictatorial and rhetorical endeavor. Signaling his 
exit and his orders with an “I have said,” he simultaneously nullifies and exercises 
his husbandly authority. His redistribution of affections and allegiances under-
scores the extent to which Jason opportunistically invests in domestic authority 
but neglectfully shirks domestic obligations. With his insistence on disciplinary 
authority, his symbolically freighted decree of divorce, and his banishment of 
Medea and their “little ones,” he unconditionally negates their conjugal union 
and waives away the custodial prerogatives of paternal guardianship. Divest-
ing himself from these particular familial roles, he renders domestic sentiments 
and parental affections irrelevant—committing household violations most often 
attributed exclusively to Medea. In marked and stunning contrast, having gone 
from homebound to homeless, from femme coverte to femme sole, in a single 
decree, Medea signals her own exit not with rhetorical flourishes but with mur-
derous actions. In a clever set of discursive inversions, Levy demonstrates that 
while Jason claims license to divorce, Medea claims license to kill, and, while 
Jason exchanges one domestic scenario for another more advantageous one, 
Medea rejects domesticity entirely.
 In the monologue that follows Jason’s bold decree, Medea metamorphoses 
from the downtrodden and degraded Medea to the troubling and tragic Medea 
of theatrical infamy. Responding to Jason’s authoritative “I have said,” Medea 
states, “As you have said, O Jason, let it be” (45) and claims not to protest a 
“compact never in fair justice framed” (45). But she only momentarily assumes 
this posture of compliance, and she immediately launches into an analysis of 
their sexual domestic “compact” and his political marriage plot and reveals the 
mocking intent of her initial “[a]s you have said”:
For you, you thought: This maid has served me well
And yet may serve me. When I touch her palm
The blood is set a-tingle in my veins;
For these things I will make her body mine. (45)
While he rakishly devised a system of sexual service, Medea tells Jason, “I stood 
before you, clean and straight, / And looked into your eyes with eyes that spake: 
/ Lo, utterly, for ever, I am yours” (45). Reflecting on her trampled status, Medea 
must retrieve her “gift”—her self—by “gather[ing] it up”:
And since that you, this gift I lavish laid
Low at your feet, have lightly held and spurned—
I in my two arms, thus, shall gather it up
So that your feet may not encounter it
Which is not worthy of your feet to tread! (45)
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Liberated by Jason’s rejection, a self-possessed Medea claims a moral integrity 
that dwarfs Jason’s. While she elevates her love to a magnanimous gesture, a lav-
ishly bestowed “gift,” she reduces Jason to its mere unworthy recipient. Medea’s 
earlier moments of pronounced self-abasement increase the rhetorical weight 
of this speech, which, beginning with a well-mannered and humble assent, con-
cludes in exclamatory and insulting defiance.
 As her monologue progresses, Medea’s analytical rebuttals evolve into omi-
nous threats, which stage the psychological transition from demoralized subor-
dinate to murderous agent. Taking on a patronizing tone, Medea reviews Jason’s 
domestic logic and instructs, “Yet pause a moment, Jason” and then, with even 
more condescension, repeats, “Ah, Jason, pause” (46). That he considered her 
“meek enough” and “[c]ontent with what [he] gave” (46), she explains, consti-
tutes a gross miscalculation:
You never knew Medea. You forget,
because so long she bends the knee to you,
She was not born to serfdom.
  I have knelt
Too long before you. I have stood too long
Suppliant before this people. You forget
A redder stream flows in my Colchian veins. (46)
With the retrieval of her past self—signified here, as in the opening soliloquy, 
by the “redder stream” in her “veins”—she finds the resources for overthrowing 
Jason’s authority: “Now behold me free, / Ungyved by any chains of this man 
wrought / Nothing desiring at your hands nor his” (46). Having “[u]ngyved” 
herself, she transcends romantic conceits and sexual desires and enters “an awful 
realm / Where is nor love, nor pity, nor remorse, / Not dread, but only pur-
pose” (47). Undistracted by domestic obligations or ethical attachments, Medea 
embodies only destructive “purpose.” She has exchanged her sentimental haze 
for an angry lucidity, and she replaces a cultural fantasy of feminine compliance 
with a feminist fantasy of female rebellion. In contrast to Lytton’s Clytemnestra, 
Levy’s Medea threatens Jason—and the entire local system of patriarchal opera-
tions—plainly, directly, and publicly:
  There shall be
A horror and a horror in this land;
Woe upon woe, red blood and biting flame;
Most horrid death and anguish worse than death;
Deeds that shall make the shores of Hades sound
With murmured terror; with an awful dread
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Shall move generations yet unborn:
A horror and a horror in the land. (47)
While Medea foretells the violent consequences of Jason’s familial negligence, 
the metrics of her warning forcefully underscore the psychological momentum 
of her crimes. In the syncopations of “Woe upon woe, red blood and biting 
flame,” Levy measures Medea’s terrible intent. The metaphorical bloodletting of 
her domestication will be retributively turned back onto the wholly complicit 
“land.”
 This upsurge of verbal energy, in turn, highlights the extremes of Jason’s 
emphasis on rhetoric over action in matters of spousal antagonism, for he cat-
egorizes her speech as a mere public raving, and, practicing his usual disci-
plinary methods, simply ushers Medea, once again, into the house with angry 
epithets and a vague warning: “Shrew, triple-linked with Hell, get you within. / 
Shame not my house! ’Tis your own harm you work” (47). Concluding the first 
scene, Jason’s lines generate a pronounced incongruity. Blinded by his bargain-
based understanding of domestic life and his rhetoric-based practice of spousal 
antagonism, Jason fails to acknowledge the emotional charge of domestic life 
and the psychological authenticity of Medea’s “purpose.” In response to her 
promise of “[a] horror and a horror in the land”—resonating in hell and across 
generations—Jason merely issues his habitual directive, “get you within,” and 
a wholly inadequate retort, “Shame not my house!” In the contrast between 
Medea’s exclamation of social destruction (“the land”) and Jason’s obsession 
with domestic propriety (“my house”), Levy creates a dramatic irony that 
attests to Jason’s patriarchal folly. Attempting to enforce his husbandly author-
ity, which, of course, he has just negated, Jason ignores the birth of murderous 
“purpose.”
 Such ironies inform the signifying power of Medea’s subsequent crimes. 
Throughout the poem, Levy locates Medea’s speeches and crimes on the thresh-
old of the home, and, merging dramatic space and speech, she comments on 
the disciplinary function of separate spheres ideology. When Medea transforms 
the threshold of the home into a bloody scene of filicide, she literalizes both the 
logic and the failure of Jason’s household laws. As the first scene culminates in 
Jason’s attempts to redomesticate Medea, the second scene opens with a frenzied 
spectacle of their public exposure. With a “crowd of people running to and fro” 
(48), Nikias and Aegeus unravel a “bloody rumour” of “awful purport” (48) and 
mediate the details of the crime spree that bisects the text. The social aftereffects 
of the murder help to configure Levy’s radicalized Medea plot.
 In filtering the crimes through the astonished witnesses, Levy depicts the 
interpretive preferences and unreliable perspectives of public opinion. Nikias, 
who presides over the telling, ascertains that Medea has deployed her sons to 
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murder Glaukê and Kreon and then, having used these “tender boys” as “her 
crime’s instruments” (49), murdered them when, bewildered by events, they 
returned to her for solace and protection. Her crimes completed, Nikias explains, 
Medea deposited the bodies of these “[i]nnocent doers of most deadly deed” 
(50) to be discovered by Jason on “his own home’s threshold” (55). Nikias, less 
inspired by regicide, virtually ignores the demise of Kreon and Glaukê and devel-
ops his crime narrative around the sensational scene of child-murder. Proclaim-
ing, “I saw the deed, I, Nikias, with these eyes!” (51), he foregrounds Medea’s 
particularly maternal violations:
Half apprehending what thing had befallen,
Fled forth unmarked, and all affrighted reached
The house of Jason, where Medea stood
Erect upon the threshold. (51)
As her sons stand “[h]iding their faces” (51) in her robe, Medea responds, “I 
will not have ye, for I love ye not!” (52). Nikias’s credibility notwithstanding, 
his account—the only account—of the infanticide sharpens the edge of Levy’s 
critique. Notably absent are the Euripidean antecedents: Medea’s expressions 
of motherly hesitation and the fretful death cries of her protesting children. 
With these absences—and Medea’s “I love ye not!”—Levy enforces the notion of 
dreadful “purpose.” With her subsequent actions, also narrated by Nikias, Medea 
actualizes her stark rejection of maternal affection with a double murder:
Forth from her gathered garment swiftly drew
A thing that gleamed and glinted; in the air
she held it poised an instant; then—O gods!
How shall I speak it?—on the marble floor
Was blood that streamed and spurted; blood that flow’d
From two slain, innocent babes! (52)
As the scandal-mongering Nikias revels in the narrative and verbal tropes of 
crime reporting and as his interlocutor, Aegeus, seeks to absorb and assess the 
spectacular details of a knife “that gleamed and glinted” and of “blood that 
streamed and spurted,” Levy addresses the semiotic processes of publicity. Nikias 
can fully—and enthusiastically—articulate the status of Medea’s bloody victims 
but not the details of the murder (“How shall I speak it?”). Significantly, how-
ever, Nikias subsequently records the strange sounds of Medea’s murderous fury. 
Above the crowd’s “wail / Of lamentation” (53), he recalls, “[a] fierce long shriek, 
that froze the blood i’ the veins, / Rang out and rose, cleaving the topmost cloud” 
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(53). As the transcendent shriek of the killer obscures the mournful wail of the 
crowd, Levy once again implicates Medea’s murderous “purpose.” Emanating 
from the adversarial endgame of domestic strife, her “purpose” disentangles 
her from social sympathies and domestic pieties. Paradoxically, the inarticulate 
shriek manages to articulate the profound alienation of the wife-turned-crimi-
nal in a way that conventional crime narratives, such as that put forth by Nikias, 
cannot.
 In fact, throughout the public’s crime reporting, Levy insists that amongst the 
characters of the play, the symbolic power of Medea’s crimes remain obscured. 
Aegeus, expressing “woe” for “the state,” “Kreon slain,” “hapless Glaukê,” and 
“our Jason,” assigns “three times woe for her that did the deed— / Her woman-
hood sham’d; her children basely wrong’d” (48). Scripting her motives according 
to the conventions of romantic tragedies, he situates the murders within the 
context of spurned love: “’[t]was her love / That wrought the deed—evil, yet 
wrought for love” (49). Favoring melodrama, a dismissive Nikias replies, “Spare 
me such love” (49), and proceeds to document Medea’s maternal villainy. He 
recalls a “summer’s morn” on which she “looked into [her son’s] eyes, / Not 
gladly, as a mother with her child, / But stirred by some strange passion; then 
the boy / Cried out with terror, and Medea wept” (50). As a result, Nikias “never 
yet could deem, / Ev’n ere the horror, that Medea held / The love of human 
mothers in her breast” (49). In the end, Nikias’s persuasive reading prevails, and 
Aegeus concedes, “You judged this thing aright; / This woman was dark and evil 
in her soul; / Black to her fiend-heart’s root; a festering plague / In our fair city’s 
midst” (54). Espousing a “fiend-heart” theory of her crimes, Nikias and Aegeus 
categorize her criminality as innate rather than circumstantial, and their shared 
misjudgments force readers to consider and question the epistemological barri-
ers of gender politics.
 The public’s errant logics and mistaken conclusions, in fact, cast into relief 
the symbolic power of Medea’s crimes. The threshold theatrics of the poem’s 
domestic cruelties and crimes resonate fully with Victorian conceptions of the 
architecture of the home. While the home’s interior gathered “nook and nest” 
associations, the home’s threshold possessed signifying powers of its own. In 
Family Fortunes (1987), Davidoff and Hall reflect on the threshold indicators 
of private and public space in Victorian England: “Clean steps, doors, and win-
dow ledges, gleaming brass knockers, and starched white curtains dramatically 
demonstrated the break between private rectitude and public squalor” (382). 
Reversing this semiotic equation, Levy offers a picture of private squalor and 
public rectitude—stunningly embodied in the corpses of Jason’s banished boys 
sprawled on “his own home’s threshold.” Their corpses embody the negating 
powers of his banishment. Thus counterposing the inauthenticity of Jason’s 
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public rectitude and the sincerity of Medea’s domestic dejection, Levy indicts 
the material consequences of Jason’s household law more than she denounces 
or sensationalizes Medea’s crimes. In pairing Medea’s violent extremism with 
Jason’s domestic despotism, Levy complicates the equations of provocation and 
culpability and introduces mitigations such as those entertained by Mill, who 
argued, “The despotism of Louis XVI was not the despotism of Philippe le Bel, 
or of Nadir Shah, or of Caligula; but it was bad enough to justify the French 
Revolution, and to palliate even its horrors” (286). Because the children’s bloody 
bodies saturate the home’s threshold, the staging ground for Jason’s despotic 
husbanding throughout the drama, Medea’s infanticides symbolize a brutal and 
revolutionary comeuppance.
 As Armstrong has suggested, Levy’s Medea appears “to rationalise and jus-
tify feminine violence,” to represent the “destructive impulse of the rejected,” 
and to dramatize “the fury and anguish of the woman who is dispossessed and 
denied” (Victorian Poetry 375). One of her most interesting accomplishments 
in this regard is Levy’s savvy ability to objectify and thus critique the maternal 
politics that invariably come to bear on representations of child-murder and of 
Medea. With her intricate alignments of domesticity and spectacle, she manages 
to foreground paternal politics and patriarchal policies. She accomplishes this in 
part because she courts readerly sympathies and skepticism when she mediates 
Medea’s crimes through the perspective of the always crude and presumptuous 
Nikias. But she also insists that while Medea’s crimes grotesquely renounce all 
ordering principles of familial sentiment and domestic rectitude, Jason’s auto-
cratic neglect and his arrogant decrees precede Medea’s violent crimes in ren-
dering such ideals illusory and defunct. Presenting domestic ideals as expedient 
methods for organizing and hierarchizing gendered relations, Levy links the 
politics of infanticide to the politics of marriage in order to launch her thor-
oughly feminist critique of domesticity.32
 As Thaïs Morgan has commented, “As with divorce, so infanticide raises the 
question of the distribution of the power between the sexes. The child holds 
a special position at the intersection of the capitalist economy and the gender 
economy that structured Victorian society. Who produces, owns, and manages 
a child, and through the child, the future of society: the man or the woman?” 
(294). Levy emphasizes these predicaments of household management with a 
simple plot: Jason banishes his children, and Medea murders them. Only when 
Medea thus forcefully redistributes domestic power does Jason relinquish his 
claims to discipline and punish Medea. Nikias narrates Jason’s public decree at 
the crime scene when it becomes apparent that Medea has escaped:
“Let no man seek this woman; blood enough
Has stained our city. Let the furies rend
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Her guilty soul; nor we pollute our hands
With her accursèd body . . .” (54)
With his matrimonial and political aspirations wholly thwarted, a humbled and 
humiliated Jason transfers authority to the furies, and, attempts, once again, to 
leverage some public power via rhetorical force. Contrasting their pure citizen-
ship with Medea’s defiled criminality, he invokes stock formulae of public out-
rage and personal insult.
 At the end of the second scene, Levy shifts locales, and we see Medea speak-
ing from “outside the city.” No well-connected sorceress escaping in a god-sanc-
tioned chariot, this Medea lurks alone in the dark “beyond men’s eyes, beyond 
/ The city’s hissing hate” (55). Defamiliarizing the classical Medea in this way, 
Levy substitutes somber defeat for tragic vengeance. Medea speaks of her time 
in Corinth as the dream of a woman who “strove and wept and yearned for love 
/ In a fair city” and who “was blind indeed” (55). “I have fought with the Fates / 
And I am vanquished utterly” (55), she proclaims, and, as in Clytemnestra, this 
fated universe bespeaks the hegemony of domestic imperatives, which nurture 
despots and expel dissidents:
  This is the end:
I have dash’d my heart against a rock; the blood
Is drain’d and flows no more; and all my breast
Is emptied of its tears.
  Thus go I forth
Into the deep, dense heart of the night—alone. (56)
Medea is, once again, engaged in lonely soliloquy, and the social and psychologi-
cal status of Levy’s fugitive Medea, drained of blood and tears, precisely parallels 
that of the housebound Medea, who, “lone and weary and sad” (33), lamented 
her dejection at the opening of the play. In rendering the domesticated wife 
and the escaped murderer in like terms, Levy provocatively parallels the social 
annihilation of wives and murderers. In her evolution from housewife to killer 
to fugitive, Medea’s status does not change.
 This grim conclusion forcefully reveals the extent of Levy’s feminist critique. 
For Levy, a renegotiation of domestic arrangements, such as that attempted by 
Lytton’s Clytemnestra, offers no solution to the injustices of household law, 
which casts women as the loveless and unloved objects in a series of unequal 
exchanges. With the outlaw Medea lurking on the margins of the city in painful 
solitude, Levy continues to engage the poetics and politics of affect that inform 
her rereading of Euripides’ Medea. While Medea’s murderous rage allows Levy 
to render the psychological devastation of her domestication and banishment 
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in the terrible images of terrible crimes, Medea’s quiet fugitive despair repre-
sents the complete negation of the feminine. Casting Medea in such stark terms, 
Levy’s Medea enacts a wholesale dismissal of Victorian domesticity and rigor-
ously disavows any possibility for reformed alternatives.33
The Politics of Genre: 
The Murderous Scandal and the “Cool Queer Tale”
In scrutinizing marriage and murder, Browning, Lytton, and Levy each orga-
nize their poetic resources differently. While The Ring and the Book, versifying 
the found curiosity of a bookstall, deploys narrative polyphony and symmetry, 
Clytemnestra and Medea condense and compress the grand stage tragedies of 
ancient Greece. Yet, collectively their texts exhibit striking consistencies. They 
share a common thematic interest in dramatizing the bad bargains of married 
couples, the psychological effects of marital yokes, and the immense pressures 
of household law. Such commonalities alert us to central anxieties of marriage 
law and domestic ideology in Victorian England. Aligning these three different 
representations of domestic murder from three different decades allows us to 
see particularly poetic approaches to exploring the problem of marriage reform 
and divorce law, to plot some ideological consistencies across time and texts, 
and to observe how the same legal and cultural problems lingered unresolved 
for several decades.
 On the most fundamental level, murder offers a way of interrogating the 
disciplinary functions of marriage law and domestic ideology—of imagining 
homes, to use Stallybrass and White’s phrasing, as “discursive sites where social 
classification and psychological processes are generated as conflictual com-
plexes” (25). In murderous scenarios, the fictions of homelife—from the legal 
notions of coverture and marital unity to the sentimental notions of separate 
spheres and paternal protection—lose their force. In their murder plots, Brown-
ing, Lytton, and Levy imagine spousal combat in the context of public pressures 
and personal frustrations. As they insist on the emotional extremes and psycho-
logical problems of the home, they contest the two most popular social models 
of domesticity; for, in these poems, the soothing effects of “home-sanctitudes” 
and the “softening effects” of disciplinary yokes are entirely absent. Instead, 
domesticity functions as a kind of house arrest, and, similarly, marriage, with its 
“galling” yokes and hierarchical imperatives, always appears, on some level, to be 
the primary culprit and the determining force in cases of outrageous violence: 
it is the “knot / Which nothing cuts except this kind of knife.”
 The breeding of violent offenders in the home, of course, clearly challenges 
stock formulations of criminality, which frequently expressed crime as a con-
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dition of modern decay and imagined criminals emerging from urban squa-
lor. And, as each of these poems depicts the home as a symbolically resonant 
locale that operates as both a cause and a site of murder, their bloodied interiors 
and thresholds overturn the binaries of domestic purity and public corrup-
tion. While the domestic sites and scenes of crime clearly jettison ideological 
constructions of a domestic idyll, they even more pointedly exploit and critique 
the discourse of adversarial marriage and the reverence for “mutual accommo-
dation.” As murderers forcefully and authoritatively explicate their motivations 
and expectations, they claim their crimes as the distinct features of domestic 
arrangements. At the same time, however, operating within a prisonhouse of 
legal barriers and ideological controls, these killers depict their crimes as sym-
bolically appropriate modes of redress or singularly available acts of resistance 
to an uncompromising law.
 In depicting ominous links between marital unhappiness and murderous 
agency, these poets draw upon the performative features of poetic voice and 
the discursive significance of poetic genre. With respect to murder, their poems, 
unlike the poems discussed in previous chapters, have little interest in obscuring 
the origins of murderous subjectivity, in introducing the possibilities of criminal 
lunacy, or in diminishing the processes of premeditation. Instead, the home pro-
vides a contextualized understanding of intimate struggles between individuals 
and institutions, which, in turn, inflect intimate struggles between murderers 
and their victims. Murderers’ soliloquies and murder-victim dialogues analyze 
murderous motive and opportunity as the particular effects of domestic ideol-
ogy, matrimonial law, and gender inequality.
 The focused and frank expressions of murderers and their crimes are then 
set against the wayward and contrived commentaries of the public. Interro-
gating the modes and manners of public opinion, Browning, Lytton, and Levy 
carefully enfold the voices of witnesses and voyeurs, who, representing the ill-
informed and widely disseminated speculations of their Victorian counterparts, 
articulate muddled social investments in marital yokes and domestic rectitude. 
These poets therefore scrutinize rather than affirm the codes of legal melodrama 
and sensational scandal. Recalling Browning’s emphatic directive, “Examine it 
yourselves!” (I.38), the integration of formal techniques and political content 
forces readers to consider the play of gender and genre in representations and 
misrepresentations of marriages and murders.
 The particular generic characteristics, instructive agendas, and critical pos-
tures of these texts become even clearer when placed within a wider historical 
network of domestic murder poems. Just as these poets looked back to glimpse 
literary and legal precedents, we might look forward to speculate about the inter-
connections of literary development and cultural change. Offering a coda to this 
study of nineteenth-century representations of domestic crime, a speculative but 
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suggestive discussion of Thomas Hardy’s short lyric poem, “Her Second Hus-
band Hears Her Story” (1928), casts into relief the distinct generic and political 
priorities of its fully public and extremely bloody Victorian counterparts. Pub-
lished in the 1920s, when cultural reconsiderations of marriage, divorce, and 
remarriage had shifted away from the noisy outcries and anxious tones of the 
nineteenth century, “Her Second Husband Hears Her Story” images marriage 
and murder in private and lyrical tones. Hardy’s claim that the poem represents 
“a true story” situates his text, perhaps disingenuously, as a social record rather 
than a social argument.34
 The poem presents a bedtime conversation between a wife and her second 
husband in which the wife explains how she killed her first husband by stitching 
him too tightly to their bed, the very one upon which the newlyweds now sit 
in conversation. The second husband, incredulous and puzzled, exclaims, “I do 
not see how / How you could do it, seeing what might betide” (4–5). The wife 
replies that her crime originated in her fear of his habitual drunken abuse after 
“he came home one midnight, liquored deep— / Worse than I’d known— / And 
lay down heavily, and soundly slept” (6–8). Fearful that he might “wake up, and 
attempt embracing” (24), she practically employs her domestic skills to protect 
herself:
Then, desperate driven, I thought of it, to keep
Him from me when he woke. Being an adept
With needle and thimble, as he snored, click-click
  An hour I’d sewn,
Till, had he roused, he couldn’t have moved from bed,
So tightly laced in sheet and quilt and tick
He lay. And in the morning he was dead. (9–15)
She covers up her crime by simply removing the stitches “[e]re people came” 
(16), and his death “thus ’twas shown to be a stroke” (18). 
 The crime brings about no public upheaval, only the husband’s comment 
that “it sounds strange—told here and now to me” (20). Her second husband 
does, however, attempt to interpret her actions through legal definitions of 
homicidal intent. He asks, “Did you intend his death by your tight lacing?” (21). 
The wife replies with an ambiguous “O, that I cannot own” (22). The husband’s 
conclusion, and the last line of the poem, is simply: “Well, it’s a cool queer tale!” 
(25). While criminal intent remains unstated, in linking domestic labor and 
crafty resistance, the poem wryly reimagines the exercise of household duty as a 
form of murderous agency. As the housewife constitutes a potential threat in an 
intimate disguise, the subdued conversation and lyrical inflections of the poem 
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leave open the question of whether the wife seeks to confess a bad memory 
or issue a subtle warning. With this ambiguity, Hardy’s “Her Second Husband 
Hears Her Story” illustrates an alternate take on wife-abuse and husband-mur-
der; in this case, murder, like marriage, is very practical and very private.35
 The quiet and private act of murder committed by an abused wife, now 
enjoying her second marriage, also suggests the evolution of marriage discourse 
and the shifting importance of publicity. Hardy’s decision to write an often 
sensationalized crime as an unplanned sewing project highlights by contrast 
the aggressively public voices and political interventions of Victorian poems—
in which speakers voiced extended monologues about murderous motive and 
denounced the domestic bargains necessitating their crimes. Attentive to such 
cultural changes, Hardy, no stranger to Victorian representations of violent 
marriages and sexual outrages, enacts an ironic inversion of domestic ideology: 
no longer requiring the fully legible expressions of the knife, murder becomes 
the silent work of “needle and thimble.” And no longer demanding a public 
reckoning or confronting an astonished community, the murderer refuses to 
unequivocally “own” or refute any malicious intentions behind the “click click” 
that brings her snoring husband to his end. In its privatization of domestic 
tragedy, “Her Second Husband Hears Her Story” allows us to trace the generic 
contours of domestic discord from the old traditions of honoris causa to the 
revolutionary aspirations of “high justice” to the pragmatic remedy of the “cool 
queer tale.” With this comparison in mind, we might speculate about how the 
dialectical relations between genre and discourse in turn signal the historical 
relationships between poetic form and cultural content, and how the heights of 
domestic romance and the depths of domestic conflict allowed poets to examine 
the epistemological and legal contingencies of murder and the subjectivities and 
identities of murderers.
E p i lO g u E
a siTE of ExPrEssiVE difficulTiEs and epistemological 
struggles, a sublime transgression and a capital offense, a modern 
content and a poetic enterprise, murder supplies ample evidence 
of Victorian poetry’s “aestheticised politics” and “politicised aes-
thetics.” With measured representions of stabbings, stranglings, 
smotherings, poisonings, bludgeonings, and drownings, poets 
used the characteristic particularity and performativity of poetic 
form to highlight the politics of interpretation and explore 
the play of genre. In commending modes of cultural and textual analysis that 
exchange the abstract for the particular, Gallagher and Greenblatt celebrate the 
allure of the “encounter with the singular, the specific, and the individual” (6). 
These terms, and their analytical implications, aptly describe the disruptive 
presence of murder poems amongst the ideologies, institutions, and disciplines 
informing and regulating criminal discourse.
 Exchanging the abstract for the particular, murders in verse, variously medi-
ated through the elaboration of bloody details, lyrical confessions, metrical 
ironies, suggestive rhymes, structural ambiguities, dramatic soliloquies, legal 
testimonies, discursive hybrids, and generic combinations, reveal the extent to 
which the formal features and generic conventions of poetry generated oppor-
tunities for cultural critique and poetic experimentation. Set within a self- 
consciously modern culture, which was continually and publicly reevaluating 
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The criminal classes are so close to us that even the policeman can see them. 
They are so far away from us that only the poet can understand them.
—oscar Wilde, “a few Maxims for the instruction of the over-Educated”
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its methods of disciplining criminals and controlling crime, murder poems—as 
double forms, verbal technologies, and performative speech—rather mischie-
vously administered overwhelming doses of psychological details and intimate 
circumstances. In doing so, they exposed and interrogated the fictions and 
abstractions of criminal theories, policies, and laws.
 Attentive to the historicity of poetry and murder, we can look beyond inti-
mations of “transhistorical truth”—and rethink the stability of transhistorical 
themes—and instead highlight “historically embedded social and psychological 
formations” (Gallagher and Greenblatt 7). In Stallybrass and White’s formula-
tion, this allows us to see the poetics and politics of murder as an encounter with 
the cultural embeddedness of “conflictual complexes.” In the poetry under dis-
cussion here, “historically embedded social and psychological formations” and 
“conflictual complexes” are directly and explicitly considered. Going well beyond 
transmitting ideology in “subtle or covert” fashion, they position themselves 
skeptically and polemically with respect to other legal, political, and aesthetic 
representations of murder. According to Gallagher and Greenblatt, the “commit-
ment to particularity” and the recovery of “dense networks of particulars” (19) 
in New Historicist methodology protects against the loss of intricate meanings 
and local details. A similar kind of historicism is encouraged by all of the poems 
examined here. Most explicitly rendered in the advertised “full particulars” of 
astonishing disclosures, a resistance to abstraction and authority extends to the 
intimate psychological struggles of the criminal poet, the expressive idiosyn-
crasies of dramatic speakers, the hybrid innovations of the verse novel, and the 
modern renovations of ancient tragedies.
 Finding poetic materials in the unsettled and unsettling epistemologies of 
murder, these poems also establish the cultural engagements and cultural poli-
tics of Victorian verse. As Antony Harrison argues, “encounters with poetic texts 
were an unusually complex psychological and emotional event for nineteenth-
century readers. This was true not only because of the anticipated formal dif-
ficulties of such texts but also because of the widespread expectations that poetic 
words on a page meant a good deal more than other writing: they embodied 
the voice of a being possessed of extraordinary epistemological capacities” (10). 
While Harrison is primarily concerned with the middle-class experience of read-
ing poetry, his comments have particular resonance for all of the poems exam-
ined in this book, as they establish a “productive friction” (Hadley 10) between 
low content and high form—and often thwart the very expectations that Har-
rison illustrates. In linking the domains of high literature and the politics of sen-
sational curiosity, we find, then, another manifestation of poetry’s double form. 
Through the suggestive interplay of discourse and genre, through the semiotic 
operations of content and form, these texts extended the “cultural work” of 
poetic representation and established its modern content.
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 With an epigrammatic shorthand, Wilde, offering (much-needed) instruc-
tion to the “over-educated” and differentiating the scrutiny of the poet from 
the surveillance of the police, challenges the myopic failings of a disciplinary 
state and grants the poet the capacity for understanding and interpreting crime. 
In more subtle and less comical ways, the poems of this study both claim and 
challenge expressive sensibilities and interpretive power. Leveraging generic dif-
ference—for the purposes of political appropriation and contestation, generic 
variety and hybridity, and verbal particularity and incommensurability—poets 
adapt a variety of aesthetic modes (the sublime, the grotesque, the melodramatic, 
the tragic) and assume a variety of counterdiscursive stances as they reconsider 
the congruities and incongruities of crime and culture.
 Historicizing murder and poetry, by examining dialectical relations between 
genre and discourse, we can begin to recover neglected texts, and, recognizing 
and acknowledging associations among major and minor, canonical and non-
canonical, anonymous and notorious poets, we can reconsider lines of literary 
influence and retrace paths of intertextuality in ways that expand the terrain of 
Victorian poetry studies. While Crime in Verse has relied upon a relatively small 
set of close and contextualized readings to make its arguments, its methods and 
its conclusions support a broader reexamination of poetic representations of 
murder. Answering Armstrong’s call for studies in poetic networking, we might 
assemble or imagine networks of murder poems. However speculative or contin-
gent, such assemblages might highlight the occasions on which the sound effects 
and the staged authority of verse were publicized and rhetorically posed. We 
might, for example, revisit the verse editorials of daily newspapers or the sing-
song communiqués of “Jack the Ripper.” Or, preferring more established poets, 
we might return to Wordsworth’s Sonnets upon the Punishment of Death (1841), 
in which the intellectual precision, iambic cadences, and rhyming couplets of the 
sonneteer are used to insult the sloppy sentimentality and reform-minded aspi-
rations of abolitionist parliamentarians and pamphleteers. Or, enjoying poetic 
scandal and humiliation, we might reconsider Sydney Dobell’s Balder (1854), in 
which, suffering emotional traumas and generating textual confusion, the frus-
trated and “felonious” (281) speaker finds murderous motive in poetic ambition. 
As these brief references, and the preceding chapters, suggest there is much work 
to be done on the topic of crime in verse.
n O t E s
Introduction
 1. For studies of the interdisciplinary and ideological features of criminal discourse 
in nineteenth-century England, see Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of 
the Prison; Marie-Christine Leps, Apprehending the Criminal: The Production of Deviance 
in Nineteenth-Century Discourse; Martin J. Wiener, Reconstructing the Criminal: Culture, 
Law and Policy in England, 1830–1914 and Men of Blood: Violence, Manliness and Criminal 
Justice in Victorian England; and Judith Rowbotham and Kim Stevenson, Criminal Con-
versations: Victorian Crimes, Social Panic, and Moral Outrage.
 2. This list cites only a few notable examples of the kinds of scholarly work that 
shape our notions of literary crime—the chapters of this book offer a more complete 
picture. While many of these studies focus exclusively on the novel, important interdis-
ciplinary projects, such as Jan-Melissa Schramm’s Testimony and Advocacy in Victorian 
Law, Literature, and Theology and Simon Joyce’s Capital Offenses: Geographies of Class and 
Crime in Victorian London, also contribute substantially to our understandings of narra-
tive representation and criminal discourse.
 3. Subsequent chapters acknowledge the particularities and develop the insights of 
these studies of crime poetry, but I include a brief list here. Increasingly refined and fo-
cused studies of the narrative, dramatic, and lyrical dimensions of Robert Browning’s 
murder poems extend from Robert Langbaum’s The Poetry of Experience: The Dramatic 
Monologue in Modern Literary Tradition to the section entitled “Browning’s Ring Around 
a Murder” in Alexander Welsh’s Strong Representations to Melissa Valiksa Gregory’s 
“Robert Browning and the Lure of the Violent Lyric Voice: Domestic Violence and the 
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Dramatic Monologue.” Studies of Barrett Browning’s treatment of gendered crimes in-
clude Margaret Reynolds’s annotated edition of Aurora Leigh; Amanda Anderson’s chap-
ter, “Reproduced in Finer Motions: Encountering the Fallen in Barrett Browning’s Aurora 
Leigh” in Tainted Souls and Painted Faces; Marjorie Stone’s “Between Ethics and Anguish: 
Feminist Ethics, Feminist Aesthetics, and Representations of Infanticide in ‘The Runaway 
Slave at Pilgrim’s Point’ and Beloved” and “Genre Subversion and Gender Inversion: The 
Princess and Aurora Leigh”; E. Warwick Slinn’s chapter, “The Mark as Matrix: Subject(ion) 
and Agency in Barrett Browning’s ‘The Runaway Slave at Pilgrim’s Point’” in Victorian 
Poetry as Cultural Critique; Elizabeth H. Battles’s “Slavery Through the Eyes of a Mother: 
‘The Runaway Slave at Pilgrim’s Point’”; Sarah Brophy’s “Elizabeth Barrett Browning’s 
‘The Runway Slave at Pilgrim’s Point’ and the Politics of Interpretation”; and Ann Par-
ry’s “Sexual Exploitation and Freedom: Religion, Race, and Gender in Elizabeth Barrett 
Browning’s ‘The Runaway Slave at Pilgrim’s Point.’” Analyses of Oscar Wilde’s ballad in-
clude Seamus Heaney’s “Speranza in Reading: On ‘The Ballad of Reading Gaol’”; Leonard 
Nathan’s “The Ballads of Reading Gaol: At the Limits of the Lyric”; Karen Alkalay-Gut’s 
“The Thing He Loves: Murder as Aesthetic Experience in ‘The Ballad of Reading Gaol’”; 
and Regenia Gagnier’s chapter, “Art for Love’s Sake: ‘Salome’ and ‘Reading Gaol’” in Idylls 
of the Marketplace.
Chapter 1
 1. Crime ballads were part of a much larger broadside trade, which comprised many 
genres and covered numerous topics. Execution ballads in particular contributed signifi-
cantly to the cultural experience of capital punishment and flourished until just after 
public executions ended in 1868. Rather than repeating basic information about broad-
sides and ballads, this chapter builds upon existing histories in order to focus on devising 
and applying new critical strategies. For histories of the broadside trade, see Hindley’s 
History of the Catnach Press and Life and Times of James Catnach; Shepard’s History of 
Street Literature, John Pitts, Ballad Printer, and The Broadside Ballad; and Hepburn’s re-
cent study, A Book of Scattered Leaves. For a discussion Irish street ballads, see Georges 
Denis Zimmerman’s Songs of Irish Rebellion.
 2. Woodcuts were not fabricated to depict specific crimes or executions, but, rath-
er, were used repeatedly and often incongruously. Prose reports contained information 
gleaned from trial coverage and public discussion. The separate authorship of the ballad, 
its visibility on the page, its audibility in the streets, and its inconsistencies in the use of 
woodcut images and journalistic prose make the case for individual ballads as indepen-
dent texts, and, accordingly, this chapter focuses on the verse forms of the broadside trade. 
The specific publication year of a ballad is not always indicated. Whenever possible, I have 
dated ballads from newspaper coverage of crimes, trials, and executions.
 3. While ballad historians typically describe them as working-class “hacks” mak-
ing little more than a shilling per song, in 1861 the National Review extolled their gothic 
everyman qualities: “That self-denying mind, indifferent to worldly fame, which charac-
terised the architects of our cathedrals and abbeys, would seem to have descended on our 
ballad-writers” (“Street Ballads” 409). In response to the statement, “Oh, anybody writes 
them,” the author notes, “we walk about the streets with a new sense of wonder, peering 
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into the faces of those of our fellow-lieges who do not carry about with them the external 
evidence of overflowing exchequers, and saying to ourselves, ‘That man may be a writer 
of ballads’” (410).
  Many publishers, with the exceptions of the notorious James Catnach and John 
Pitts, have fallen into obscurity as well. Hindley, Shepard, and Hepburn discuss ballad 
publishers and writers in their histories. See also Hughes’s “Foreword” in Curiosities of 
Street Literature; Mayhew’s London Labour and the London Poor; Vincent’s Literacy and 
Popular Culture in England; Gretton’s Murders and Moralities; James’s Print and the People; 
and Vicinus’s Broadsides of the Industrial North. For details about John Morgan, a known 
Victorian ballad writer, and for a full discussion of class, audience, and authorship, see 
Hepburn’s A Book of Scattered Leaves.
 4. As cheap ephemera, broadsheets were discarded by consumers and were rarely 
collected by libraries. For years, contemporary scholars have had to labor to read a full 
selection, but that problem is now being remedied as libraries make their broadside col-
lections available online. While anthologies, such as Hindley’s, have made these texts 
available, they have also fostered a habit of generalizing about thousands of texts by read-
ing a very small proportion of the originals. Because printers produced hundreds and 
hundreds of crime ballads, including multiple songs for each crime and each execution, 
conjectures that they are uniform and undifferentiated are inaccurate. My analysis selects 
a relative few of the many hundreds that I have examined in order to focus on instances in 
which the ballads play with genre codes in the most aesthetically striking and politically 
resonant ways. These examples of generic play and political critique, however, are by no 
means rare, and they demonstrate that the generic codes of the street ballad produced 
and inspired poetic tinkering and innovation, political innuendo and analysis, and ethical 
interrogation and dissent.
 5. Several contemporary studies have reviewed the methodologies of Mayhew. In 
addition to Joyce’s commentary in Capital Offenses, see Anne Humpherys’s Travels in the 
Poor Man’s Country: The Work of Henry Mayhew; Gertrude Himmelfarb’s The Idea of Pov-
erty; and Deborah Epstein Nord’s “The Social Explorer as Anthropologist.” For a concise 
discussion of “criminal conversations” and the “rhetoric of reassurance” across a range of 
texts, including Mayhew’s, see David Taylor’s “Beyond the Bounds of Respectable Society” 
in Rowbotham and Stevenson’s Criminal Conversations.
 6. David Philips identifies this writer as Archibald Alison, “Sheriff of Lanarkshire, 
High Tory and arch-opponent of trade-unions” (82).
 7. Charles Smith’s account of the ballad trade explains the devalued labor of the 
ballad writer: “The established honorarium for a new song is a shilling, though eigh-
teen pence is sometimes given for something ‘particular spicy.’ This miserable payment 
is defended by the publisher on the ground that, whatever he pays for a song, he cannot 
make it his own. ‘If I print a new song,’ says he, ‘on Wednesday, my neighbor is selling it 
on Thursday. How can I afford to pay for property which is at another man’s use as it is at 
mine?’” (254). The National Review reports that ballad writers could not support them-
selves in the trade (unless they sang and sold copies of their texts after printing) because 
“the price of an original ballad, in these buying-cheap days, has been screwed down by 
publishers to somewhere about a shilling sterling” (“Street Ballads” 409). The author of 
“The Poetry of Seven Dials” reports: “If one of the patterers writes a Ballad on a taking 
subject, he hastens at once to Seven Dials, where, if accepted, his reward is ‘a glass of rum, 
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a slice of cake, and five dozen copies,’—which, if the accident or murder be a very awful 
one, are struck off for him while he waits” (404). Vincent explains that ballad writers 
were “remunerated at a level well below that of the average factory worker. It was a trade 
founded in pennies” (200).
 8. Because of their “come all ye” introductions (“attend all you feeling parents dear,” 
“you kindest fathers, tender mothers,” “you feeling Christians,” “good people”) and pat 
conclusions (“hanging is too good for such a villain,” “she her desserts will get,” or “the 
blood of the murdered will not cry in vain”), Gatrell describes crime ballads as “objective 
correlatives” of “acquiescence, approval, identification with the law” (156). Reflections 
on generic regularity highlight a lack of political currency in textual codes that have 
not changed in “some two hundred years” (169). For similar reasons, Neuburg critiques 
their “muted” politics (“Literature of the Streets” 197), Cooper sees their “thread[s] 
of didactic quality” as collectively “confirm[ing] the lesson of the gallows” (26), and 
Kalikoff reads them as “moral fable[s]” that reassure audiences that “criminals are always 
subdued by society” (14–15). Casting crime ballads as working-class failures and novels 
as middle-class achievements, Grossman dismisses them as a “ritualized and unindi-
vidualized” whole, “indoctrinating docility” and “inculcat[ing] only one ‘right’ response 
to the punishment of vastly different people and crimes” (29). Kalikoff grants a historical 
dynamism to street balladry, but, relying on Hindley’s anthologized selection and under-
standing ballads as simple melodramas, her study, like the others mentioned here, does 
not account for the sheer variety of street ballads or the case-specific details of particular 
crimes and trials.
 9. For another example of self-referential and self-parodying ballad humor, see “Tri-
al and Execution of Betty the Cook, Who was Tried by the Servants in the Kitchen, and 
Executed in the Scullery, for Lying Too Long in Bed in the Morning.”
 10. Hindley notes that spells of good behavior sometimes required the publication of 
fictional “cocks” in order to sustain business: “the patterer must live; and lest the increase 
of public virtue should condemn him to starvation, the ‘Seven Dials Press’ stepped for-
ward to his aid, and considerately supplied him with—‘cocks’” (Hindley, Life 361). For a 
discussion of “cocks,” see Hepburn’s Book of Scattered Leaves.
 11. This line features Hamlet’s reference to the power of the play to uncover the truth 
about his uncle’s crime and his father’s murder. Its suggestion that truth can be found 
through the representation of crime resonates with the analytical aesthetic of these “aston-
ishing disclosures.”
 12. An excerpt from this Times report is also cited in Wiener’s Men of Blood (140–
41).
 13. See also Margaret Arnot’s “The Murder of Thomas Sandles: Meanings of a Mid-
Nineteenth-Century Infanticide” and Cath Quinn’s “Images and Impulses: Representa-
tions of Puerperal Insanity and Infanticide in late Victorian England.” For discussions of 
legal and medicolegal developments, see Roger Smith’s Trial by Medicine, Nigel Walker’s 
Crime and Insanity in England, and J. P. Eigen’s Witnessing Insanity: Madness and Mad-
Doctors in the English Court.
 14. As Jill L. Matus has argued, wet-nursing inspired particular moral judgments 
about sexual fallenness, innate criminality, and social contagion. Paraphrasing C. H. F. 
Routh’s alarmist discussion of wet-nursing in The Lancet in 1859, Matus summarizes the 
biological questions underlying his theories: “If blood was the medium through which the 
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inheritance of criminality or insanity was passed, was not milk a vital and essential fluid 
like blood?” (161).
 15. At Brough’s trial, Dr. Forbes Winslow testified that she exhibited the signs of a 
“structurally disorganized” brain and experienced a case of “transient insanity” during 
which she killed her children (“Recent Trials” 616). Her prior good mothering and her 
medical history were cited as evidence of a temporary insanity. Two other psychologists 
concurred at trial. After the case sparked controversy, Winslow explained:
In discussing the merits of this case, much stress has been laid upon the alleged 
immoral character of Mrs. Brough. It has been asserted that she was a depraved 
woman; that she was detected in an act of gross infidelity; and fearing the con-
sequences of her vice, she, from a feeling of revenge, deliberately and premedi-
tatively sacrificed the lives of her children, and then attempted her own! We do 
not deny that she was an adulteress; but if we are to form our judgment of her 
moral character from the evidence adduced at the trial, she is certainly not the 
horribly depraved woman represented by those who have severely animadverted 
upon her escape from the extreme penalty of the law. (622)
He went on to dismiss claims that moral lassitude made her responsible for her own 
mental breakdown: “we dismiss altogether the argument of Mrs. Brough’s legal account-
ability, based upon the presumption that her insanity was self-created, and the result of 
an habitual indulgence of a criminal passion” (625). After her death in Bethlem in 1862, 
an autopsy “revealed blood clots in her brain, which Dr. Hood correlated with a partial 
paralysis evident before the crime” (Smith, Trial 57).
 16. By the mid-1850s, psychological readings of women’s violence were not out of 
keeping with general sentiment. Smith explains, “Femaleness was a major element in 
medico-legal decisions. Female criminal lunatics came nearest to enabling medical dis-
course to describe legally exculpatory conditions. This reflected a shared assumption that 
woman was closer to nature than man; medical discourse was therefore more appropri-
ate to women’s lives” (Trial 160). However, this ballad significantly rejects melodramatic 
polarities and strict notions of individual responsibility in a case where these definitions 
were hotly debated. It avoids, for example, the sensationalizing of the adulterous affair, 
unlike the Times, which highlighted the “circumstances” that surrounded the crime as 
having “no parallel in the history of crime” (Times, 10 August 1854, 11).
 17. Emma Pitt’s case also raised questions about adequate charges and appropriate 
punishments. As Marland explains, “the severity of the penalty for infanticide, death by 
hanging, compared with the mildness of the punishment for concealment was picked 
out as a particular failing of the law” (170). For a discussion of concealment and murder, 
long-contested in English law, see Mark Jackson, New-Born Child Murder: Women, Ille-
gitimacy and the Courts in Eighteenth-Century England, and Peter C. Hoffer and N. E. H. 
Hull’s Murdering Mothers: Infanticide in England and New England 1558–1803.
 18. Newspaper reports of the case used multiple spellings, including Duggan, Dug-
gin, and Duggen.
 19. In the nine years between 1826 and 1835, England saw 514 executions, with mul-
tiple executions fairly common (Gatrell 617). In marked contrast, in the thirty-one years 
between 1837 and 1868, 347 murderers were hanged in public (594).
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 20. For examples of broadside ballads accommodating multiple hangings, see “A 
Copy of Verses on those Under Sentence of Death” printed on the broadside “Sentences 
of the Prisoners at the Old Bailey Sessions, September 12” (1824), and “The Sorrowful 
Lamentation and Last Farewell to the World of Eight Unhappy People, Who Are to Die at 
the Old Bailey, on Tuesday the First.”
 21. This was the case until the Criminal Evidence Act passed in 1898 and granted 
defendants the right to testify under oath on their behalf even while retaining counsel. For 
a summary of debates surrounding the passage of the Prisoner’s Counsel Act, see Cairns’s 
Advocacy and the Making of the Criminal Trial, 1800–1865. See also Emsley’s Crime and 
Society in England, 1750–1900.
 22. Because ballad authors are unknown and because the illusion of criminal author-
ship is crucial for the meaning of these texts, I refer to the fictive authors, the featured 
criminal poets, as the speakers throughout the chapter.
 23. The effect of anonymous authorship has particular significance in the first-person 
ballads since it upholds the marketing illusion that these expressive verse autobiographies 
emanated from the desperate minds of condemned criminals. These reality effects have 
not been treated explicitly in ballad criticism, and, in fact, authorial anonymity contrib-
uted to their obscurity in contemporary scholarship. In the absence of specific authorship, 
ballad scholars have sometimes drawn on publisher’s politics and histories, particularly 
those of James Catnach and John Pitts, for interpretation. Other critics stress rhetorical 
forms and generic conventions to determine meaning. Both approaches offer interpretive 
control over a voluminous, authorless body of work and help to sort out the discursive 
layers of state condemnation and execution, criminal autobiography and confession, bal-
lad conventions and literary tragedy, as well as individual cases and public opinion. These 
approaches tend to ignore, however, the details of individual ballads that reveal the politi-
cal features of ballad poetics.
 24. A legal loophole created by the 1840 Insane Prisoner’s Act enabled Townley’s be-
lated reprieve, and Parliament later amended the act in response to public controversy 
over the questions of judicial discrimination raised by Wright’s execution and Townley’s 
institutionalization. For histories of the Townley case as an application of the insanity 
plea, see Smith’s Trial by Medicine and Walker’s Crime and Insanity in England. For Vic-
torian medical commentaries on the case, see Maudsley and Robertson’s Insanity and 
Crime: A Medico-Legal Commentary on the Case of George Victor Townley; “The Sequel of 
the Townley Case” in the Journal of Mental Science; and “Insanity and Crime” in the Social 
Science Review. For a brief discussion of Townley in the context of dramatic poets, see 
Faas’s Retreat into the Mind.
 25. This cause-and-effect scenario is explicitly rendered in “A Copy of Verses on F. B. 
Courvoisier, who was Executed for the Murder of Lord William Russell,” printed in Bris-
tol. The ballad states that Lord Russell “caught him in the act of plunder / . . . which made 
him plan the horrid deed.” Yet, this particular ballad positions the problem with respect 
to more conservative moral advice: “Let Honesty then guide your actions / And in your 
stations be content.”
 26. For a discussion of the combined effects of the criminal’s speech, the ethics of 
counsel, and the rise of adversarialism in the Courvoisier case, see Cairns’s Advocacy and 
the Making of the Adversarial Criminal Trial, 1800–1865. 
 27. Armstrong’s list of poetic networks and pairings is inspired by existing studies, 
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some of which are published in the same two-volume special issue of Victorian Poetry in 
which her comments appear. This issue, entitled “Whither Poetry?” and edited by Linda 
Hughes, stages a dialogue between two “generations” of Victorian poetry scholars and 
offers selections of innovative new work in the field and commentaries on the evolving 
methodologies and priorities of Victorian poetry studies.
 28. Browning’s vision of the condemned prisoner in his cell, the tortured psychology 
of condemnation, and the legal appeals in Guido’s final monologue are coincident with 
the popular vision of the condemned criminal presented over and over again in execu-
tion ballads. Guido pastes together various legal and religious defenses to challenge his 
death sentence—rather than to deny his crimes. Among these is a claim of madness and 
a request for asylum: “Sirs, my first true word, all truth and no lie, / Is—save me notwith-
standing! Life is all! / I was just stark mad,—let the madman live / Pressed by as many 
chains as you please pile!” (XI.2418–21).
 29. More concerned with establishing the poem’s affinities with Speranza’s Irish na-
tionalist ballad, “Trial of the Brothers Sheares,” Heaney does not elaborate these parallels. 
He argues that Speranza’s (Lady Wilde’s) political ballad, “The Trial of the Brothers Sheares 
in ’98,” which appeared in a volume dedicated to Oscar Wilde and his brother, established 
an important antecedent for Wilde’s own political ballad. Heaney seeks to “draw attention 
to these parallels and foreshadowings and coincidences of style and behaviour between 
mother and son” and notes, “by recalling it, the provenance of the ballad is illuminated 
even if its stylistic faults are not extenuated” (101). Because the ballad represents the kind 
of work “not usually discussed within the academy” (101) and a text in which “Wilde the 
aesthete was stripped of his dandy’s clothes to become Wilde the convict” (102), Heaney 
argues, “the poem does give credence to the idea of poetry as a mode of redress” (102).
Chapter 2
 1. In January 1843, Daniel M’Naghten, a Scottish laborer, whose name is spelled 
variously in historical documents and press coverage, shot Edward Drummond, Prime 
Minister Robert Peel’s private secretary, whom he mistook for the Tory Prime Minister 
himself. Drummond died several days later.
 2. At trial, M’Naghten’s attorney, Alexander Cockburn, launched an insanity de-
fense. Applying recent medical theories not yet formally recognized in jurisprudence, 
including notions of partial insanity, he included the testimony of Dr. Forbes Winslow, 
who had just published The Plea of Insanity in Criminal Cases and who, controversially, 
provided diagnostic testimony about M’Naghten without ever having interviewed him. 
The jurors, instructed by the presiding judge to determine whether, at the time of his 
crime, M’Naghten had been “capable of distinguishing between right and wrong” and 
had been “sensible that [his act] was a violation of the law of God or of man,” shocked the 
public with an acquittal on the ground of insanity (Walker 95). M’Naghten was commit-
ted to Bethlem Hospital and later Broadmoor, where he died in 1865. M’Naghten’s trial 
is recorded in William C. Townsend’s Modern State Trials. For analysis of the trial and its 
judicial significance, see Nigel Walker’s Crime and Insanity in England; Roger Smith’s Trial 
by Medicine; Jane Campbell Moriarty’s The Role of Mental Illness in Criminal Trials; and 
Donald West and Alexander Walk’s Daniel McNaughton: His Trial and the Aftermath.
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 3. Upon being apprehended, M’Naghten stated, “The Tories in my native city 
[Glasgow] have compelled me to do this,” and he explained that these Tories had been 
following him, that they had accused him of crimes of which he was innocent, and that 
they “wish[ed] to murder [him]” (Walker 91).
 4. After the M’Naghten verdict, the House of Lords responded to the apparent lapse 
in the application of criminal law with an extensive investigation into the legal test of in-
sanity. The Lords devised a series of questions pertaining to the language of insanity and 
responsibility, the role of medical evidence at trial, and the proper instruction of juries. 
They called upon the English judges to address each question, and their responses became 
the “M’Naghten Rules,” a set of guidelines for English courts to consider and adjudicate 
insanity. “In effect,” Smith argues, the rules “restated the ‘right-wrong test’: a man was not 
responsible for his criminal deed if, at the time of committing it, he was unable to know 
that the deed was wrong” (Trial 15). In discussing mental science and juridical authority, 
Walker cites the influence of Isaac Ray’s Treatise on the Medical Jurisprudence of Insanity 
(1838). An American doctor, Ray could “make all his points by attacking English judges 
and counsel without the tact that was needed where his own courts were concerned” 
(Walker 89). The text criticizes legal notions of criminal responsibility, and because Alex-
ander Cockburn used this text in his defense of Daniel M’Naghten, it influenced criminal 
cases and statutes.
 5. Walker documents the increased recognition of insanity in murder trials, a trend 
that reflects the increased application of mental science theories and the increased use of 
defense counsel resulting from the 1836 Prisoner’s Counsel Act. Walker’s glimpse at the 
gradual but steady increase in insanity acquittals also underscores the exaggerated nature 
of public anxiety on the subject. Of persons indicted for murder between 1834 and 1843, 
2 percent were found unfit to plead, and 7.5 percent were acquitted as insane. Between 
1844 and 1853, 4.7 percent were found unfit, and 7.5 percent were acquitted as insane. 
Between 1854 and 1863, 5.7 percent were found unfit, and 10.1 percent were acquitted as 
insane. Between 1864 and 1873, 5.8 percent were found unfit, and 9.6 were acquitted as 
insane (Walker 86).
 6. Rodensky offers a useful examination of the Victorian discourse of criminal re-
sponsibility. Problematizing the “straightforwardness” that characterized J. F. Stephen’s 
assertion that “[t]he general rule is, that people are responsible for their actions,” she 
explores “the necessary fractures in Victorian ideas and ideals about criminal responsibil-
ity” across a multigeneric expanse of legal discourse comprising “legal opinions, statutes, 
treatises, histories, [and] articles” (3).
 7. The Criminal Lunatics Act (1800) established the idea of criminal lunacy by in-
troducing the special verdict of “not guilty on the ground of insanity.” The Criminal Lu-
natics Amendment Act (1816) provided for the transfer and custody of insane persons 
charged with crimes, and the Insane Prisoner’s Act (1840) further addressed the logistics 
of asylum transfers and certification procedures. This act was amended by The Insane 
Prisoners Amendment Act (1864) after George Victor Townley avoided a capital sentence 
because the 1840 act allowed prisoners to be certified between the trial and the sentenc-
ing. The Lunatics Care and Treatment Act (1845) and the Lunatic Asylums Act (1845) es-
tablished the Commissioners of Lunacy and mandated county asylums. The Criminal Lu-
natics Asylum Act (1860), responding to demands that the criminally insane be separated 
from other lunatics, resulted in the construction of Broadmoor. The Trial of Lunatics Act 
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(1883), responding to pressure from the queen, revised the exculpatory language of the 
special verdict to a more deterrent-minded “guilty but insane.” The Criminal Lunatics Act 
(1884) addressed issues of mercy and the Home Secretary’s powers to appoint doctors 
and certify insanity.
 8. Smith points out that because the “[t]reatment of the insane . . . became a potent 
symbol for society’s ability to regulate its affairs” (Trial 5), asylum reform resonated with 
a Victorian faith in institutionally driven social progress and corresponded to England’s 
national sensibility. W. F. Bynum explains that “[b]y the 1850s, when the asylum move-
ment was in full swing . . . , British psychiatrists could look upon the combination of 
moral therapy and non-restraint as genuinely indigenous, humane, and therapeutically 
sound. They also saw it was peculiarly adapted to Britain, with its well developed tradition 
of individual liberty and toleration. . . . Thus, although moral therapy was generally linked 
to medical therapy in the total therapeutic programme, and although the non-restraint 
system was not rigidly observed in many asylums, these two themes were the most visible 
ones around which the nascent psychiatric profession emerged in early Victorian Britain” 
(229).
  In his 1833 entry in Cyclopaedia of Practical Medicine, Prichard cites Esquirol’s 
assessment of madness and civilization: “In barbarous nations, among whom the mind 
is uncultivated. . . . [m]adness is comparatively rare (850). In contrast, Esquirol observes, 
the “changes . . . which have taken place during the last thirty years in our moral senti-
ments and habits, have produced more instances of madness in France than all our po-
litical calamities. We have exchanged our ancient customs and fixed habits, our old and 
established sentiments and opinions, for speculative theories and dangerous innovations” 
(850). In 1843, John Barlow proclaimed, “The cases of insanity, we are told, have nearly 
tripled within the last twenty years!—a fearful increase even after allowing to the utmost 
for a larger population!” (49).
  In the second half of the century, anxieties about civilization evolved into more 
explicit narratives of regression and degeneration. By the late Victorian period, Veida 
Skultans argues, insanity “is no longer seen as a problem to be grappled with by indi-
vidual will-power, but it has become a major social problem which threatens the health 
of the nation rather than mere individual autonomy. The insane are thought to constitute 
a reservoir of bad heredity” (English Madness 133). Writing in 1870, Dr. Henry Maudsley 
explained, “I should take up a long time if I were to enumerate the various brute-like 
characteristics that are at times witnessed among the insane; enough to say that some very 
strong facts and arguments in support of Mr. Darwin’s views might be drawn from the 
field of morbid psychology. We may, without much difficulty, trace savagery in civiliza-
tion, as we can trace animalism in savagery; and in the degeneration of insanity, in the 
unkinding, so to say, of human kind, there are exhibited marks denoting the elementary 
instincts of its composition” (Body and Mind 51).
 9. The role of history, of course, has been central to definitions of the genre—from 
Robert Langbaum’s contest between sympathy and judgment, to Herbert Tucker’s histo-
ricized individual via the “art of disclosure,” to Isobel Armstrong’s statement that “psy-
chological states are rooted in history” (Victorian Poetry 146). Placing “the genius of the 
dramatic monologue” in “the effect created by the tension between sympathy and moral 
judgment” (85), Langbaum highlights its ability to create a psychologized, historicized, 
and relativist judgment: “We adopt a man’s point of view and the point of view of his 
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age in order to judge him—which makes the judgment relative, limited in applicability 
to the particular conditions of the case” (107). Tucker links history to character forma-
tion: “[s]ubjectivity [is] ironically demystified by the historical contextualization that is 
the generic privilege of the dramatic monologue and . . . one of its indispensable props in 
the construction of character” (“Dramatic Monologue” 22). With a focused application 
of Armstrong’s insights into the epistemological mischief of a “double form” exploring 
“utterance both as subject and as object,” this chapter adds another facet to discussions 
of history and dramatic poetics. In these murder poems, the mystification of subjectivity 
caused by medicolegal debates further complicates the interpretive irony, relativism, or 
authority of history.
 10. Explorations of psychology were frequently associated with modernity. Arm-
strong notes that “[n]early all the commonest evaluative words in criticism at this time 
carry a psychological, human/social or moral reference,” and the repeated use of terms 
such as “human,” “sympathy,” “the sympathies,” “the affections,” and “feelings” reinforced 
this psychological poetics (Scrutinies 6).
 11. Skultan’s Madness and Morals: Ideas on Insanity in the Nineteenth Century and 
English Madness: Ideas on Insanity, 1580–1890 provide an overview of nineteenth-cen-
tury mental science. Rylance’s Victorian Psychology and British Culture 1850–1880 offers 
a “taxonomy” of nineteenth-century mental science theories. Scull’s Museums of Madness 
and The Most Solitary of Afflictions cover asylum practices. Hunter and MacAlpine’s Three 
Hundred Years of Psychiatry, 1535–1860 and Bourne Taylor and Shuttleworth’s Embodied 
Selves: An Anthology of Psychological Texts, 1830–1890 anthologize excerpted mental sci-
ence documents. Smith’s Trial by Medicine and Walker’s Crime and Insanity in England 
provide succinct histories of the medicolegal context.
 12. Prichard did not originate the theories reported in his treatise, nor was he a men-
tal scientist by training or profession. He collected continental research from the first 
decades of the nineteenth century and presented and popularized its conclusions in Vic-
torian England.
 13. In an effort to establish linguistic parallelism with monomania, Prichard sug-
gests the words “Parapathia” or “Pathomania” to describe moral insanity (Treatise 10). 
Esquirol’s discussion of folie raisonnante sparked debates about ideas of madness marked 
by delusion and frenzy and madness marked by reason and irresistible impulse. Though 
“moral insanity” had been used early in the century, Prichard publicized these new defini-
tions of madness in his Treatise on Insanity, which by all accounts became the standard 
text on madness until John Charles Bucknill and Daniel H. Tuke published their Manual 
of Psychological Medicine (1858).
 14. Writers consistently warned about the misapplications and inconsistencies of in-
sanity pleas in criminal and civil courts. In the Juryman’s Guide, Sir George Stephen cited 
the misjudgments inherent in criminal lunacy: “Men of science declare that monomania 
is consistent with sanity in all other points, and a jury acquits; we may be in error, but in 
our view such monomania amounts only to this, that a long-cherished feeling of maligni-
ty, or of criminal desire, has at length burst the bounds of common sense—as all criminal-
ity of desire, if not resisted in its incipient stages, invariably does,—and having obtained 
liberty to range, plunges its self-immolated victim into an abyss, as the herd of swine were 
precipitated into the sea by the legion of devils, when these same devils were once let 
loose to take their course” (141). He explains that, although monomania manifests itself 
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in many crimes and transgressions, “it is in murder only, because it is now almost the only 
capital crime, that juries give credence to it” (141). He continues: “Nor is monomania, if 
such it may be called, peculiar to crime. There are very few men of active minds who are 
totally exempt from the habitual indulgence of some whim or fancy, which strengthens as 
life advances, and the gratification of which, at last, becomes essential to comfort, if not to 
happiness. Some select benevolent pursuits, as schools, visiting societies, or repositories. 
Some late distinguished men carried anti-slavery enthusiasm to monomaniacal pitch; we 
ourselves confess to a failing that way. . . . The essential difference between such cases and 
the monomania of criminal courts, is, that legitimate passion may in the one be indulged 
to the extent of folly, but takes a direction in which it cannot fall into crime; in the other it 
becomes criminal, because its direction is originally wrong: in both cases it is still passion, 
and not often abstractedly wrong” (142). Dr. Forbes Winslow critiqued the wholesale dis-
missal of responsibility in cases of partial insanity:
I am not prepared to give an unqualified assent to the dogma, that in every 
case of mental derangement,—without any reference to its degree or charac-
ter,—ought the person to be screened from the penalty awarded by the laws for 
criminal offences. I am ready to admit, that if insanity be clearly established to 
exist, a primâ facie case is made out in favour of the prisoner; but that because 
a person may be proved to be strange and wayward in his character; to fancy 
himself a beggar when he may have the wealth of Croesus, or to be ill when he is 
in the buoyancy of health—to believe that such a person ought, of necessity, to be 
exonerated from all responsibility, is a doctrine as unphilosophical and untenable 
as it is opposed to the safety and well being of society. (“Criminal Insanity” 42)
 15. By the 1870s, “Maudsley argues for the existence of insanity even where it ‘has 
so much the look of vice or crime that many persons regard it as an unfounded medical 
intervention’” (qtd. in Skultans, Madness 7).
 16. See Faas and Mason for detailed discussions of “Porphyria’s Lover,” its antecedent 
texts, and theories of moral insanity. An excerpt in Blackwood’s entitled “Extracts from 
Gosschen’s Diary” (1818) was written by John Wilson, but Blackwood’s marketed the piece 
as an excerpt from the memoir of a German priest who records a condemned murderer’s 
confession of his murder of his mistress therein. Directly inspired by “Gosschen’s Di-
ary,” Brian Procter’s “Marcian Colonna” (1820) is a poem about a man who murders his 
mistress. Procter exploits the aesthetic of the murdered woman’s body and the topic of 
the murderer’s calm but mad resolve, but he also retains more conventional elements of 
frenzy and mania. As Mason explains, “In both these sources not only is the murderer 
a lunatic, but his madness is described and discussed at some length” (257). Faas notes 
that though neither text “directly mentions or discusses ‘moral insanity,’” they each, like 
“Porphryia’s Lover,” portray a murderer who “glories in his crime and justifies it with 
great show of pseudo-logic and persuasiveness” (56). Mason concludes that “Browning 
could not have failed to entertain the idea that Porphyria’s murderer is a lunatic, as this is 
the essential character of his model in the two sources” (257). The “suggestive similarities 
between certain prominent innovations in the psychiatric theory of the day and the no-
tion of mind suggested by ‘Porphyria’” (258) and Browning’s association with Procter and 
Procter’s position as a Metropolitan Commissioner in Lunacy in the 1830s also underpin 
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his case for Browning’s interest in insanity. In The Life of Robert Browning (1910), Griffin 
and Minchin locate the composition of “Porphyria” in St. Petersburg in 1834. Though this 
composition date precludes the direct influence of Prichard’s Treatise, it affords a possible 
historical connection to Prichard’s article on “Insanity” in the Cyclopaedia of Practical 
Medicine (1833) as well as earlier, continental discussions of moral insanity in the first 
decades of the century.
 17. “Porphyria” was first published with “Johannes Agricola” in the Monthly Reposi-
tory in January 1836. In Dramatic Lyrics, published in 1842, the two poems appeared 
under the heading “Madhouse Cells.” In 1849, still featured with its companion poem 
in “Madhouse Cells,” it was retitled “Porphyria’s Lover.” In 1863, “Porphyria’s Lover” ap-
peared independent of a companion poem or a madhouse cell in Dramatic Romances. Al-
though the committal of his homicidal lover to a madhouse in 1842 would have situated 
the text rather explicitly within the context of diagnostic controversy and asylum reform, 
the heading seems an incongruous afterthought. Placing the figure in a “madhouse cell” 
renders the dramatic setting impossible and the representation of madness conventional. 
As Mason argues, “[O]nly if Porphyria’s lover is grossly hallucinated can his utterance be 
consistent with such an environment. Moreover, if I am right about his particular species 
of lunacy, then hallucination is exactly the wrong sort of symptom for him to exhibit; it 
would shatter the delicate and startling portrayal of rational lunacy. . .” (265).
 18. In Browning’s Hatreds, Karlin discusses the poem as a study in “aristocratic hau-
teur” and “sexual hatred.” Exploring the poetics of domestic violence and the theme of 
“violent heterosexuality” (507), Melissa Valiska Gregory discusses the politics of identifi-
cation and judgment that allow Browning to “engage the disquieting and outlandish (for 
the period) subject of domestic conflict in the first place” (494).
 19. Ralph Rader has argued that the couplets, reflecting the Duke’s “deliberate calcula-
tion” (136) in acknowledging the murder, operate “to give a sense of submerged pattern 
running, like the Duke’s hidden purpose, through the whole” (139). Loy D. Martin has 
suggested that whether they signify an author’s presence or a character’s motive, “we are 
observing a doubleness or bifurcation of the text” (112), which ultimately suggests “an on-
tological division between what language is as an artificial and malleable aesthetic medium 
and what it says as a constant medium of human communication” (112–13). Extrapolating 
from this, Martin writes that Browning thereby establishes the “alienation between poetry 
and discourse” (113) and differentiates poetic skill in language from that of “unspecialized 
language consumers” (113), such as Renaissance dukes or Victorian poetry readers.
 20. In his infamous attack on Rossetti, Robert Buchanan discusses “A Last Confession,” 
noting that it is “in the minutest trick and form of thought, suggestive of Mr. Browning” 
(“Fleshly School” 342). In differentiating himself from Browning, Rossetti claimed the 
figure of the Italian patriot as the seed of inspiration. In a letter to Franz Hüffer in 1873, 
Rossetti responds to Hüffer’s comparison of the two poets: “May I ask you to cut out the 
last paragraph in this page about Browning? The first nucleus of the Confession was the 
very earliest thing in the whole book, and was the simple and genuine result of my having 
passed my whole boyhood among people just like the speaker in the poem” (Doughty and 
Wahl, Vol. 3, 1233). He goes on to express his literary rights to the subject:
Browning by travel and cultivation, imported much the same sort of thing into 
English poetry on a much larger scale; but this subject, if any, was my absolute 
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birth-right, and the poem was conceived and in a manner begun long before 
1848 (the date afterwards put to it, as characteristic of patriotic struggles,) and 
at a time when Byron and Shelley were about the limits of my modern English 
poetic studies. (1233)
In a letter to Swinburne, he claims that “A Last Confession” is “maybe the best of all my 
doings” and the “outcome of the Italian part of me” (Doughty and Wahl, Vol. 2, 762–63). 
Though his letter clearly represents an argument for his own literary authority both as 
an Italian and as a reader of transgressive poetry, it also reflects Rossetti’s poetic use of 
Italianness, which allows him to merge an aesthetic ideology of passionate excess with a 
desperate and violent political situation.
 21. Jerome McGann has described the poem as a “politically disillusioned commen-
tary on the situation in Europe, and especially Italy, after 1848” (Collected Poetry 383), 
but the poem’s psychological interests in murderous subjectivity also help to explain the 
unheroic figure of the Italian patriot. If we emphasize Italian politics, the speaker’s crime 
becomes a more generic crime of passion, a literary convenience for depicting more press-
ing political ideals. The stabbing, then, as disabling secret and narrative climax, signifies a 
tragic violence with which “A Last Confession” performs “operatic” gestures (Bullen 112). 
To be sure, Rossetti reinforces this convention when he claims the poem as a study of 
the “deadliest of all passion-woven complexities,” the explication of “terrible Love turned 
to Hate,” and a representation of “the savage penalty exacted for a lost ideal” (“Stealthy 
School” 793). Moreover, the speaker’s violent political, sexual, and religious transgressions 
clearly synthesize the sensual and affective interests of Pre-Raphaelitism and Rossetti’s 
own Art Catholic aesthetic. Victorian psychology, however, armed with moral theories 
of madness, undermined the mythologizing power of criminal passion. Its ideological 
force shrank under scientific scrutiny, giving it a flatness unsuitable for the sophisticated 
character development afforded by dramatic monologues.
 22. Despite the fact that the poem exemplifies what he sees as the annoying traits of 
the collection, the “protracted hankering after a person of the other sex; it seems meat, 
drink, thought, sinew, religion for the fleshly school” (343), Buchanan grants an excep-
tion to “A Last Confession,” finding it less offensive than others because in it “[fleshli-
ness] is fiercely held in check by the exigencies of a powerful situation and the strength 
of a dramatic speaker” (339). More generally, poetry of the transgressive limit alarmed 
critics like Matthew Arnold, George Henry Lewes, and Walter Bagehot because they saw 
in it the taste of the “scattered, headless” (66) middle class in modern art. Buchanan’s 
indictments somewhat echo Bagehot’s claim that “grotesque” art “takes the [character] 
type, so to say, in difficulties. It gives a representation of it in its minimum development, 
amid the circumstances least favorable to it, just while it is struggling with obstacles, 
just where it is encumbered with incongruities. It deals, to use the language of science, 
not with normal types but with abnormal specimens” (Bagehot 56). Bagehot’s invoking 
of the scientific language of “normal types” and “abnormal specimens” is also marked 
by the discourse of insanity. When Bagehot deploys the term “grotesque” to disapprove 
of a poetics of “ugly reality” (63), an art of “abnormal specimens,” or a portrayal of a 
“distorted and imperfect image” that might appeal to “the half educated” (66) quality 
of readers, the popular fascination with high-profile criminal insanity trials is, perhaps, 
implicated in the condemnation.
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 23. In acknowledging Browning’s influence, critics have typically cited “Porphyria’s 
Lover” and “My Last Duchess” as the poem’s literary antecedents, but in its fascination 
with manic excess, “A Last Confession” is more closely aligned with “The Laboratory.” 
Though often neglected in contemporary scholarship, “The Laboratory” inspired Rosset-
ti’s first watercolor, which he completed in 1849. Its composition thus overlaps with the 
years given by William Michael Rossetti for the original drafting of “A Last Confession.”
 24. Maudsley was notorious for such elisions. His concern with improper leavening 
intertwines history, will, and responsibility, but Maudsley also decentered the will: “When 
we reflect how much time and what a multitude of divers experiences have gone to the 
formation of character, what a complex product it is, and what an inconceivably intricate 
inter-working of intimate energies, active and inhibitive, any display of it in feeling and 
will means, it must appear a gross absurdity for any one to aspire to estimate and appraise 
all the component motives of a particular act of will” (Body and Will 29). He explains: 
“What the metaphysician has done is plain enough: he has converted into an entity the 
general term which embraces the multitude of particular volitions, themselves varying 
infinitely in power and quality, and has then referred them all to it as cause. So he talks ha-
bitually as if will had always the same nature, whereas these is no such thing. . . . A general 
will is not an entity, it is no more than a notion. No wonder that there is neither common 
end nor end to philosophical disquisitions concerning a notion of which each person is 
free to have his own notion” (17).
 25. Maudsley writes: “Moreover, the particular will-faculty of the particular purpo-
sive act must be built up gradually by culture and practice; it may be a late acquisition 
which is unstable and easily lost, or it may be so grounded in the nature that it is merged 
and disappears in automatism. Therefore . . . the particular wills of particular acts may be 
impaired or abolished while the several wills of other acts are unimpaired, or . . . the single 
wills of single acts may survive amidst the general wreckage, like columns, broken or en-
tire, of a ruined temple which still stand upright in its ruins; so giving rise to the manifold 
and diverse disintegrations of will which, despite the postulate of its metaphysical unity, 
are met with in the concrete” (Pathology of Mind 142). The idea of a character in ruins 
offers an apt metaphor for the speaker depicted in “A Last Confession.”
 26. Applying Langbaum’s template of sympathy and judgment, Ronnalie Howard 
argues, “Internally the movement of the poem is determined by the narrator’s strategy, 
his desire in the face of death to lessen the magnitude of his crime, to secure relief from 
the torments of his conscience, to obtain pardon, or at least sympathy, from the priest” 
(“Rossetti’s ‘A Last Confession’” 23). In a later publication she argues that sympathy for 
the murderer ultimately overtakes judgment because “the real villain is the Austrian oc-
cupation,” which creates an “unstable world in which passionate natures become accus-
tomed to living with violence, in which love and hate become intertwined” (Dark Glass 
100). He is ultimately, then, a “victim of his times” (100). Though the speaker clearly de-
velops a narrative strategy, as Howard argues, Rossetti neither resolves the matter through 
circumstance, lunacy, or religious principles nor asks readers to operate primarily within 
the context of sympathy and judgment. In fact, the text often thwarts both operations by 
forcefully contrasting his expressive mode and his rhetorical manner.
 27. In 1848, an article reprinted in the Journal of Psychological Medicine and Mental 
Pathology advised priests that knowledge of physiology might “aid them at the confes-
sional”: “To administer advice and consolation, he should be aware of the failings of his 
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patient, and how much is due to temperament and constitution. In fact, the good priest 
should have a tolerable acquaintance with physiology, in order to be most useful in his 
vocation” (“Moral Theology” 559).
 28. Continuing his narrative, the speaker recalls the day when, at fourteen, she “asked 
[him] / If she was not a woman” (223) and when he observed her “breasts half-globed 
/ Like folded lilies deepset in the stream” (225–26). Rossetti must have carefully con-
sidered the implications of her liminal status and the boundary of womanhood. In the 
draft stages of the poem, this passage occurs when the girl is thirteen years old; Rossetti 
changed it to fourteen for its publication in Poems. The speaker’s account of his victim’s 
sexual attributes is jarring because she occupies the margin between girl and woman, 
and at times his sexual responses take place when she is unambiguously still a child. His 
sexual desire thus fully transgresses Catholic and Victorian codes of sexual morality and 
thereby establishes him as man of habitual moral laxity—with all of its implications for 
guilt and responsibility. While Rossetti provides ample material for a critique of gendered 
violence (the entire mad-criminal scenario centers upon this fleshy core), an analysis of 
feminine othering and victimization within the poem remains unfinished, supplanted by 
an interest in his masculine subject’s inscrutable complexities. Rossetti’s fleshly aesthetic 
functions in the context of criminal insanity, as the conspicuous sexual dynamics of the 
crime feed theories of criminal motive and monomaniacal obsession. While Rossetti uses 
the speaker’s misogynist arguments to develop the poetics of obscurity, the eroticization 
of the girl-woman takes on a life of its own and, therefore, becomes one example of his 
larger poetic and artistic project of aestheticizing the feminine and radicalizing Victorian 
sensual and erotic representation. For an analysis of the dynamics of violence and desire, 
see Bullen’s The Pre-Raphaelite Body, which includes a discussion of the poem’s psycho-
sexual dynamics and its place in Rossetti’s Pre-Raphaelite aesthetics.
 29. A modified version of this recollection forms the speaker’s wish to reunite with 
his victim again in hell: “Ah! be it even in flame, / We may have sweetness yet, if you but 
say / As once in childish sorrow: ‘Not my pain, / My pain was nothing: oh your poor poor 
love, / Your broken love!’” (485–89).
 30. See “‘A Last Confession’ (fair copy manuscript with corrections, Fitzwilliam Mu-
seum),” Rossetti Archive.
 31. Rossetti removed the words “if God / Can Pardon me” from these lines, leaving 
only “what hope / Can reach me still” to allude to the question of divine judgment that 
informs the language of the confession. This revision further undercuts confessional re-
ligiosity and divine justice. The fragmented nature of the proceeding functions similarly. 
No priestly words pronounce judgment, and no dialogic reconciliation occurs because, at 
the end of his confession—and, most likely, his life—the speaker is lost in a hallucination 
of his victim’s revenge. His final words, then, conjure secular understandings of criminal-
ity, madness, and passion.
 32. See Smith’s Trial by Medicine for discussion of some of these controversial trials. 
Faas argues that the poem can be most readily connected to the case of George Victor 
Townley. Considering the physicians consulted in the Townley case, Faas wonders “how 
Dr. Hitchman and Dr. Winslow would have adjudicated the mental state of Rossetti’s pro-
tagonist in ‘A Last Confession’” and asks, “Was the speaker’s obsessive behavior sufficient 
for certifying him as morally insane or as incapable of distinguishing right from wrong at 
the time of the deed?” (167). Responding to his own query, he writes, “As in the Townley 
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case, the learned doctors probably would have disagreed. . . .” (167). Rossetti’s drafting of 
the poem predates the Townley case and is clearly not directly inspired by it. However, 
Rossetti courts the kinds of diagnostic obscurities inherent in most theories and cases 
of criminal lunacy, and for Victorians reading Poems in 1870, the poem’s indeterminacy 
would no doubt be recognized in these terms.
Chapter 3
 1. Welsh situates his discussion of Arcangeli within his larger study of the “erosion” 
of “strong representations” by “stor[ies] of experience” (200). The representation of Ar-
cangeli as a “mercenary defender of a moral monster,” who works for “bread and butter” 
and “thank[s] God for it” (208), helps Browning to “demol[ish] the pretense of lawyers to 
give a true account of what has happened” by revealing that the “professional managers of 
evidence” are “strictly rhetoricians” (208).
 2. In addition to the 1857 Divorce Act, several other important pieces of legislation 
publicized and altered the practices of domesticity. These include: the Act for the Bet-
ter Prevention of Aggravated Assaults Upon Women and Children of 1853; the Married 
Women’s Property Acts of 1870 and 1882; the Infant Custody Acts of 1873 and 1886; and 
the Matrimonial Causes Act of 1878. For histories of marriage law, see A. James Ham-
merton’s Cruelty and Companionship; Joan Perkin’s Women and Marriage in Nineteenth-
Century England; Mary Lyndon Shanley’s Feminism, Marriage and the Law in Victorian 
England; Allen Horstman’s Victorian Divorce; Maeve Doggett’s Marriage, Wife-Beating 
and the Law in Victorian England; and John Gillis’s For Better or For Worse. Lawrence 
Stone’s Broken Lives: Separation and Divorce in England, 1660–1857 and Family, Sex, and 
Marriage in England, 1500–1800 cover pre-Victorian developments in matrimonial law. 
For a useful discussion of the complex intersections of common law, statute law, and case 
law and the mid-century political context of marriage debates, see Mary Poovey’s Uneven 
Developments.
 3. In particular, I have in mind Poovey’s Uneven Developments, Chase and Leven-
son’s The Spectacle of Intimacy, Marlene Tromp’s The Private Rod, Barbara Leckie’s Culture 
and Adultery, John Tosh’s A Man’s Place, Kristine Otteson Garrigan’s Victorian Scandals, 
and Lisa Surridge’s Bleak Houses.
 4. Insanity did not constitute grounds for divorce.
 5. The male disadvantages and vulnerabilities introduced by such stringent require-
ments did not go unacknowledged in parliamentary debate. Anxieties about the extent 
to which the state should outrank the husband surfaced amidst the conversation. One 
member hypothesized “a case in which, under the influence of intoxication, or any other 
equally palliating circumstances, a man might once in his life be seduced into a house of 
ill-fame. Twenty years after, his wife, totally ignorant of the fact, might commit adultery; 
and on his seeking redress would, by the aid of spies and informers, who were always 
called into requisition in such proceedings, rake up the hitherto forgotten fact, and defeat 
his petition” (qtd. in Chase and Levenson 187–88).
 6. Harriet Taylor and John Stuart Mill, among others, favored a proposed amend-
ment to the 1853 bill which mandated the punishment of flogging for offending hus-
bands. See Doggett’s Marriage, Wife-Beating, and the Law in Victorian England.
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 7. The Times, Anne Humpherys explains, “reported the largest number of divorce 
cases and gave the fullest transcripts with the least comment,” and the “whole trial was 
reported over a series of weeks or months from the first hearing to the judge’s summing 
up and judgment, whereas the weeklies and later the tabloids felt under no obligation to 
report the trial in its entirety” (“Coming Apart” 221).
 8. The repeat appearances of petitioning couples over months and years underscored 
both the desperation of miserable couples and the unyielding power of the divorce court. 
See, for example, the Times reporting on Curtis v. Curtis and Marchmont v. Marchmont in 
1858.
 9. Narrative fiction and print journalism have garnered the most critical attention in 
recent years. Critics have thoroughly teased out the political complexities of these genres 
and sometimes charted the links between the two. For analysis of melodramatic methods 
and Caroline Norton’s work, see Poovey’s Uneven Developments and Hadley’s Melodra-
matic Tactics. Juxtaposing press reports with fictional works, Leckie’s Culture and Adultery, 
Chase and Levenson’s Spectacle of Intimacy, and Lisa Surridge’s Bleak Houses chart interest-
ing discursive connections between publicity and textuality.
 10. For discussion of narrative fiction and marriage reform, see Trodd’s Domestic 
Crime in the Victorian Novel, Tromp’s The Private Rod, and Surridge’s Bleak Houses.
 11. Discussing the representational relationships between divorce court reportage and 
developments in the Victorian novel, Leckie highlights the “[d]evices of surveillance and 
suspicion” (91) in divorce trials and press coverage: “When the crime is a domestic crime 
buttressed by a legally endorsed gender discrepancy and a powerful ideology relating to 
marriage and women’s sexuality, relating ‘exactly what happened’ is complicated by what 
arises like a leitmotif in the transcription of these cases: suspicion” (91).
 12. The term “criminal” is applied to each character in the poem, and the poem enu-
merates many crimes inextricably linked to the laws of marriage rights, birthrights, and 
property rights. While I focus on murder, detailed accounts of the civil and criminal in-
tricacies of divorce, annulment, reproduction, prostitution, adultery, rape, assault, inheri-
tance, property, dowry, and so on, offer numerous variations on domestic transgression 
and terror. The stability of marriage and the security of domesticity are completely dis-
mantled in this poem, and as Mary Ellis Gibson argues, even “the fate of Pompilia’s child 
remains obscure” (89) and, thus, “The Ring and the Book proposes no reknitting of domes-
ticity, no ending that relieves its readers of the burden of its story” (89).
 13. In Commentaries on the Law of England, Blackstone articulated an argument for 
husbands’ disciplinary authority: “For, as [the husband] is to answer for [his wife’s] mis-
behaviour, the law thought it reasonable to intrust him with this power of restraining her, 
by domestic chastisement, in the same moderation that a man is allowed to correct his ap-
prentices or children; for whom the master or parent is also liable in some cases to answer” 
(qtd. in Doggett 34). As Doggett explains, this “doctrine of reasonable chastisement” (34) 
was “seized upon and endlessly reproduced” (38) throughout the nineteenth century.
 14. In a discussion of the Caroline Norton case, the history of feminist criticism on the 
poem, and debates over the woman question, Susan Brown examines Pompilia as “speak-
ing subject” and “cultural object” (30). Arguing that her presumed innocence ignores 
some of her “rhetorical agency,” Brown also encourages a skeptical reading of Pompilia’s 
monologue. Ann Brady situates Pompilia’s agency within the poem’s critique of “sexual 
cynicism” (125).
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 15. Blackstone explained: “A wife killing her husband is petit treason; but a husband 
killing his wife is only murder; because of the obedience which in relation of law is due 
from the wife to the husband” (qtd. in Doggett 50). As Doggett explains, punishments 
differed as well: “Until the end of the eighteenth century, the punishment for women 
guilty of petit treason differed from that imposed upon murderers; it also differed from 
that imposed upon male petit traitors. Whilst wife-murderers and male petit traitors 
were hung, female petit traitors were sentenced to burning alive. In practice, many wom-
en were garroted or strangled before the flames reached them, but this was not invariably 
the case” (50).
 16. While in Italy, Lytton became acquainted with the Brownings via a letter of intro-
duction from the well-known literary critic and advisor John Forster, who functioned as a 
surrogate father and a literary agent. See Harlan and Harlan’s Letters from Owen Meredith 
(Robert, First Earl of Lytton) to Robert and Elizabeth Barrett Browning. For a description of 
Lytton’s popularity with young poets, see Harlan’s Owen Meredith. Raymond’s Victorian 
Viceroy briefly addresses Lytton’s popularity in the United States.
 17. In referencing the two writers as Lytton (the younger) and Bulwer-Lytton (the 
elder), I follow biographers’ usage in naming father, Edward George Earle Lytton Bulwer- 
Lytton, and son, Edward Robert Bulwer Lytton. Lytton’s father pressed him into diplo-
macy and frequently discouraged his poetic endeavors, using a variety of reasons, in-
cluding, at one point, the problem of their names. Writing to his son in 1854, Bulwer-
Lytton explained, “I don’t think, whatever your merit, the world would allow two of the 
same name to have both a permanent reputation in literature” (qtd. in Harlan 62). When 
Chapman and Hall agreed to publish the Clytemnestra collection in 1855, Lytton’s father 
only conditionally consented to the venture, requiring that Lytton adopt a pseudonym 
and that he cease to write verse “for two years following the date of this publication” (qtd. 
in Harlan 67).
 18. When Lytton himself wrote a biography of his father, The Life, Letters, and Literary 
Remains of Edward Bulwer, Lord Lytton, he stopped in 1831 (the year of his birth)—thus 
avoiding the problems of representing his life, his parents’ feud, his mother’s institution-
alization, and his sister’s death.
 19. For discussions of Bulwer-Lytton’s husbanding tactics, see Marie Mulvey-Rob-
erts’s “Fame, Notoriety and Madness: Edward Bulwer-Lytton Paying the Price of Great-
ness”; Marilyn J. Kurata’s “Wrongful Confinement: The Betrayal of Women by Men, Med-
icine, and Law”; and Mitchell’s Bulwer Lytton.
 20. According to Mitchell, Rosina Wheeler and Edward Bulwer met at a bluestocking 
gathering, and Harlan explains that Rosina always “bore the stamp of the Regency” (3). 
Rosina’s “mother was apparently well-versed in Wollstonecraft and assertive in declaim-
ing the wrongs against women, and her father refused to support his family either fi-
nancially or emotionally” (Mitchell 25). An uncompromising Regency bohemian, Rosina 
failed to embrace the mid-century feminine ideal and publicly deplored the “passivity” of 
English women (Mitchell 57). In the ongoing marital combat between the warring spous-
es, Rosina, deprived of legal opportunities, sought redress in the manipulation of public 
opinion: “Exposure is the only thing that complex monster dreads,” she explained, “and 
consequently the only check I have on him” (qtd. in Mitchell 44). Rosina published Chev-
eley; or, The Man of Honor, which caricatured her husband’s wrongs, and she sent angry 
and obscene letters to his personal friends and political colleagues. In 1858, shortly after 
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Bulwer-Lytton had taken up the position of Secretary of State for the Colonies, Rosina 
again asserted her powers of publicity: at an “uncontested election at Hertford, while Bul-
wer was addressing his constituents, Rosina appeared on the platform and, addressing the 
assembled crowd, began a violent denunciation of him” (Harlan 87). Responding to this 
public incident, Bulwer-Lytton committed her to an asylum. After three weeks of public 
outcry and press coverage, Rosina was released, and Bulwer-Lytton was forced to resign 
his position (Harlan 87–88).
 21. In 1858, Lytton chaperoned his mother abroad after the asylum scandal. Con-
stantly beset by the lobbying tactics of both mother and father, Lytton departed his moth-
er after five months and never saw her again (Harlan 88). She died in 1882.
 22. The circumstances and causes of Emily’s death remain obscure—in part because 
of the strikingly different accounts of her feuding parents. The “murdered girl” comment 
appears in Raymond’s Victorian Viceroy: “The memory of that murdered girl makes it 
sometimes all but impossible for me to forgive the man who systematically hastened and 
finally extinguished her existence” (76). See also Mitchell’s Bulwer Lytton.
 23. In reviewing the volume, the National Review contended that “the more you read 
the less you admire him” (“The Poetry of Owen Meredith” 175) and that he demonstrated 
a “spurious poetic art, which invents decorative artifices to hide the emptiness of its form” 
(202). Dublin University Magazine noted the ever-present “danger of degenerating into 
mere imitation” (“Clytemnestra” 486) and explained that he “plagiarises” from Aeschylus 
and at times becomes “Tennysonian” (486). The Eclectic Review accused the poet of “free 
paraphrase of Shakespeare and Browning, variegated by touches, tones, and tints of Keats 
and Tennyson” (“Meredith’s Clytemnestra” 300), labeled him a “mocking-bird” (301), and 
listed correspondences between lines from Owen Meredith’s poems and those of other 
poets.
 24. Writing to his father in 1853, Lytton confessed, “Since I sent off the MS I have 
discovered in one or two of the poems some quite unconscious plagiarisms wh. I will alter, 
but I know that most of them are altogether in the colour of other writers. The imitation, 
however, is more in form than in thought, I hope you will think. I believe language to be 
the last thing—the forging of an armoury of oneself” (qtd. in Harlan 60).
 25. Textual citations refer to scene number and page number.
 26. Commenting on the divorce press and subsequent developments in Victorian 
marriage, Humpherys argues that while such press coverage progressively “naturalized” 
divorce (“Coming Apart” 228), it contributed to the social devaluation of marriage as an 
arrangement for reproduction and legitimate offspring and aided the consolidation of 
a companionate vision of marital relationships. As Shanley has argued, marriage trans-
mutes into a “locus for companionship and mutual support” and thus “could not be prop-
erly understood solely as an institution for sexual or reproductive bonding” (“One Must 
Ride Behind” 369). Significantly, in each of these poems, characters allude to an ideal 
companionate model to situate their murderous resolve and to frame their desperate ac-
tions. But even the companionate model fails to salvage the relationships in question. The 
conditions for companionate unions, it seems, are simply not yet in place. In the case of 
Clytemnestra, the portended failure of Clytemnestra and Aegisthus might also suggest 
negative Victorian attitudes toward remarriage.
 27. For textual history and composition dates, see Lynda Hunt Beckman’s Amy Levy: 
Her Life and Letters.
notes  to  chAp ter 3

 28. Citations refer to page numbers in A Minor Poet and Other Verse (1884).
 29. Although she focuses on “unevenness within the construction and deployment 
of mid-Victorian representations of gender, and representations of women in particular” 
(4), Poovey’s sense of the “two guises” of ideology—“apparent coherence and authentic-
ity” and “internal instability and artificiality” (3)—aptly characterizes the quandary and 
the opportunity that Levy confronts in her Medea. For it is the unevenness, Poovey argues, 
that finally “allowed for the emergence . . . of a genuinely—although incompletely articu-
lated—oppositional voice” (4).
 30. I am indebted to Stuart Warner for this translation.
 31. For discussions of Levy’s interest in ethnic and racial identities, see Linda Hunt 
Beckman’s Amy Levy; Cynthia Scheinberg’s “Canonizing the Jew: Amy Levy’s Challenge to 
Victorian Poetic Identity” and “Recasting ‘sympathy and judgment’: Amy Levy, Women 
Poets, and the Victorian Dramatic Monologue”; and Josephine McDonagh’s Child Murder 
and British Culture.
 32. For discussions of common cultural scripts of infanticide, see Josephine Mc-
Donagh’s Child Murder and British Culture; Margaret Arnot’s “The Murder of Thomas 
Sandles: Meanings of a Mid-Nineteenth-Century Infanticide”; Hilary Marland’s “Getting 
Away with Murder?: Puerperal Insanity, Infanticide, and the Defence Plea”; Cath Quinn’s 
“Images and Impulses: Representations of Puerperal Insanity and Infanticide in late Vic-
torian England”; Christine Krueger’s “Literary Defenses and Medical Prosecutions: Rep-
resenting Infanticide in Nineteenth-Century Britain”; and Ann R. Higgenbotham’s “‘Sin 
of the Age’: Infanticide and Illegitimacy in Victorian London.”
 33. In Child Murder and British Culture, Josephine McDonagh categorizes Levy’s 
Medea with other late-Victorian “new Medeas” dating from the late 1860s, which “rep-
resented [her] unambiguously as the killer of her children” (164). She reveals “the new 
ways in which child murder had figured in evolutionary discourse, as the heroic act of the 
queen bee, or the primal mechanism for social adaptation, that allowed Medea to be rein-
terpreted” as both “a champion of women’s emancipation” and “a force of social progress” 
(165). McDonagh contends that Levy “saw child murder as the product of a barbarous 
and atavistic society” and thus it is “an act forced upon [Medea] by a degenerate and back-
ward-looking society” (170). While these evolutionary metaphors and this evolutionary 
determinism usefully define the radicalism of Levy’s Medea and the pessimism of Levy’s 
critique, they tend to obscure the verse drama’s interest in the questions of agency sur-
rounding marriage contracting and child-killing.
 34. In his handbook of Hardy’s poetry, J. O. Bailey cites Edmund Blunden’s Thomas 
Hardy, which records Hardy’s claim that “it was a true story” (588). Bailey then offers his 
own vague corroboration: “I was assured by elderly people in Dorset that the event might 
well have occurred in some remote village” (588).
 35. Perhaps, this ambiguity reflects Hardy’s deliberate vagueness about his views on 
marital and domestic politics that received so much attention after Tess and Jude the Ob-
scure. Speaking in 1895 of Jude the Obscure, Hardy wrote, “I feel that a bad marriage is one 
of the direst things on earth, & one of the cruellest things, but beyond that my opinions 
on the subject are vague enough” (Letters ii.98).
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